Reliability in the context of the experiment: A commentary on two articles by Birkimer and Brown

Two sources of variability must each be considered when examining change in level between two sets of data obtained by human observers; namely, variance within data sets (phases) and variability attributed to each data point (reliability). Birkimer and Brown (1979a, 1979b) have suggested that both chance levels and disagreement bands be considered in examining observer reliability and have made both methods more accessible to researchers. By clarifying and extending Birkimer and Brown's papers, a system is developed using observer agreement to determine the data point variability and thus to check the adequacy of obtained data within the experimental context.     

Marihuana and the counselor: it's not so simple

This invited article takes a different position on the topic of marihuana from that discussed by William Camp in the previous article. The author of this article presents recent reports on marihuana research and points to the need for counselors not only to keep abreast of current developments in the area but also to “get it together” themselves before attempting to deal with clients who use marihuana and other drugs.     

Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): rethinking the recognition heuristic

The 'fast and frugal' approach to reasoning (Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press) claims that individuals use non-compensatory strategies in judgment--the idea that only one cue is taken into account in reasoning. The simplest and most important of these heuristics postulates that judgment sometimes relies solely on recognition. However, the studies that have investigated usage of the recognition heuristic have confounded recognition with other cues that could also lead to similar judgments. This paper tests whether mere recognition is actually driving the findings in support of the recognition heuristic. Two studies provide evidence that judgments do not conform to the recognition heuristic when these confounds are accounted for. Implications for the study of simple heuristics are discussed.     

On the relevance of folk intuitions: a commentary on Talbot

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.     

On genes,environments and human development: A commentary to Goossens

Using the example of adolescent loneliness, Goossens (this issue) presented an outline of integral research programmes in European developmental psychology. Integral research programmes should combine longitudinal analysis with state-of-the-art methods from the neurosciences and use the gene×environment approach to track differential susceptibility to the environment. In my commentary, I suggest using control variables in gene–environment studies to rule out spurious associations, to make the studies more developmentally sensitive, and to stress the need for replication of gene–environment findings. I offer two hypothetical models for developmentally sensitive gene–environment studies on adolescent loneliness, namely a social cognition model and a social rejection model.     

Attention and the processing of emotional words and names: not so special after all

Abstract— Previous research has suggested that a person's own name or emotionally charged stimuli automatically "grab" attention, potentially challenging limited-capacity theories of perceptual processing. In this study, subjects were shown two digits surrounding a word and asked to make a speeded judgment about whether the parity of the two digits matched. When the subject's own name was presented on a few scattered trials, responses were markedly slowed (replicating a previous study). However, in a subsequent block of trials in which half the words were the subject's name, the slowing did not occur. The same slowing occurred (but even more fleetingly) when an emotionally charged word was presented between the digits. When the name was embedded among multiple distractor words, it ceased to slow reaction times. The results suggest that perceptual analysis of high-priority stimuli is subject to the usual capacity limitations of other stimuli, but when enough capacity is available for a high-priority stimulus to be perceived, a transient surprise reaction may interrupt ongoing processing.