Desire for a positive moral self-regard exacerbates escalation of commitment to initiatives with prosocial aims

Across three experiments, people escalated commitment more frequently to a failing prosocial initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of others in need) than they did to a failing egoistic initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of the decision-maker). A test of mediation (Study 1b) and a test of moderation (Study 2) each provided evidence that a desire for a positive moral self-regard underlies people’s tendency to escalate commitment more frequently to failing prosocial initiatives than to failing egoistic initiatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for the resource-allocation decisions that people and organizations face when undertaking initiatives with prosocial aims.     

Escalate shamefully,de‐escalate angrily or gratefully: The influence of discrete emotions on escalation of commitment

Decision makers often tend to escalate their commitment when faced with a dilemma of whether to continue a losing course of action. Researchers recently began to investigate the influence of discrete emotions on this decision tendency. However, this work has mainly focused on negative emotions and rarely considered positive emotions, to say nothing of comparing the effects of both of them simultaneously. The current study addresses this need by presenting the results of three experiments that examined the effects of four emotions of both positive and negative valences in escalation situations. Experiment 1 investigated the relationships of three trait emotions (hope, shame, and anger) and escalation of commitment. Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effects of three induced emotions (anger, shame, and gratitude) on escalation of commitment in a student sample and an employee sample, respectively. The results revealed that the effects of discrete emotions in escalation situations are mainly due to their associated differences on the appraisal dimension of responsibility that is related to escalation situations rather than their valence. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Preference-based escalation: A new interpretation for the responsibility effect in escalating commitment and entrapment

A prominent finding in escalating commitment and entrapment research is the “responsibility effect”: people invest more in a losing course of action or persist with it for longer if they themselves initiated this action (responsibility) as opposed to if it was assigned to them. We argue that this effect is driven by participants’ preferences. Responsible participants usually prefer the chosen alternative since they have chosen it themselves. Non-responsible participants, in contrast, represent a mix of persons who either favor or disfavor the chosen alternative. In two experiments, we demonstrate that responsible participants favor the chosen course of action more strongly than non-responsible participants do, that these preferences facilitate reinvestment in and persistence with the chosen course of action, and that responsibility has no effect over and above this effect of preferences. Non-responsible participants preferring the chosen course of action made similar reinvestments and exhibited similar persistence as responsible participants.     

The effect of decision risk and project stage on escalation of commitment

We investigate the joint effects of decision risk and the stage of project completion on escalation of commitment. In two experiments, we demonstrate that the effect of decision risk is moderated by project stage such that the decision risk has the strongest effect on escalation of commitment at the intermediate stage of project completion. This is due to the dynamic influences underlying escalation of commitment. Whereas the need for project information influences resource commitment at the initial stage of a project, the need for project completion affects resource allocation at the terminal stage. In contrast, motivation to commit resources is disproportionately low at the intermediate stage since both the need for project information and the need for project completion are relatively weak. As such, the decision to commit resources is most sensitive to the moderating effect of decision risk when the project is about half complete.     

The promise and peril of self-affirmation in de-escalation of commitment

Drawing on the motivated cognition literature, we examine how self-affirmation processes influence self-justification needs and escalation decisions. Study 1 found that individuals with a larger pool of affirmational resources (high self-esteem) reduced their escalation compared to those with fewer affirmational resources (low self-esteem). Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that individuals also de-escalated their commitments when they were provided an opportunity to affirm on an important value. Finally, Study 3 found that affirming on traits that were of low relevance (e.g., creativity) to an initial decision reduced escalation, but affirming on decision-relevant traits (e.g., decision-making ability) ironically increased escalation. Across three studies, using three instantiations of self-affirmations and two measures of escalation, the results highlight the potential benefits and costs of using self-affirmation as a vehicle to de-escalate commitment.     

The role of anticipated regret in escalation of commitment

This research tests the general proposition that people are motivated to reduce future regret under escalation situations. This is supported by the findings that (a) escalation of commitment is stronger when the possibility of future regret about withdrawal is high than when this possibility is low (Studies 1a and 1b) and (b) escalation of commitment increases as the net anticipated regret about withdrawal increases (Studies 2a and 2b). Furthermore, the regret effects in the 4 studies were above and beyond the personal responsibility effects on escalation. This research indicates that people in escalation situations are simultaneously influenced by the emotions they expect to experience in the future (e.g., anticipated regret) and by events that have happened in the past (e.g., responsibility for the initiating previous decision).     

Optimism as modifier of escalation of commitment

To study whether optimism-pessimism modifies escalation of commitment, 52 undergraduates were told that they had made an unsuccessful investment, then they chose to continue or discontinue this investment. Optimism about future returns was induced in one group by varying the probability of a successful outcome from an initial low to medium, pessimism was induced in another group by varying this probability from an initial high to medium. Supporting the assumption of the manipulation, the results showed that optimistic participants preferred to continue investments whereas pessimistic participants preferred not to. As predicted, when the sunk cost increased, optimism led to escalation of commitment, whereas pessimism led to de-escalation of commitment. These effects were strengthened when probability of a successful outcome was ambiguous.     

The development of the experience and anticipation of regret

Although recent studies have established that children experience regret from around 6 years, we do not yet know when the ability to anticipate this emotion emerges, despite the importance of the anticipation of regret in decision-making. We examined whether children will anticipate they will feel regret if they were to find out in a box-choosing game that, had they made a different choice, they would have obtained a better prize. Experiment 1 replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's study in which children were asked what they hoped was in a non-chosen box. Even 8- to 9-year olds find this question difficult. However, when asked what might make them feel sadder, 7- to 8-year olds (but not younger children) predicted that finding the larger prize in the unchosen box would make them feel this way. In Experiments 2 and 3, children predicted how they would feel if the unchosen box contained either a larger or smaller prize, in order to examine anticipation of both regret and of relief. Although 6- to 7-year olds do experience regret when they find out they could have won a better prize, they do not correctly anticipate feeling this way. By around 8 years, the majority of children are able to anticipate both regret and relief.     

The effects of mortality salience on escalation of commitment

Based on propositions derived from terror management theory (TMT), the current study proposes that people who are reminded of their mortality exhibit a higher degree of self-justification behavior to maintain their self-esteem. For this reason, they could be expected to stick with their previous decisions and invest an increasing amount of resources in those decisions, despite the fact that negative feedback has clearly indicated that they might be on a course toward failure (i.e., "escalation of commitment"). Our experiment showed that people who were reminded of their mortality were more likely to escalate their level of commitment by maintaining their current course of action. Two imaginary scenarios were tested. One of the scenarios involved deciding whether to send additional troops into the battlefield when previous attempts had failed; the other involved deciding whether to continue developing an anti-radar fighter plane when the enemy had already developed a device to detect it. The results supported our hypothesis that mortality salience increases the tendency to escalate one's level of commitment.     

Consequences of regret aversion in real life: The case of the Dutch postcode lottery

Although ample research has shown that decisions may cause regret and that the anticipation of regret may influence decision-making, this previous research was largely limited to hypothetical choices with student participants. The current research replicates and extends these findings for real life lottery participation decisions in non-student samples. Four studies are reported in which two lotteries in the Netherlands, the Postcode Lottery and the National State Lottery, were compared. The State Lottery is a traditional lottery in which one has to buy a ticket with a number printed on it. In the Postcode Lottery, one’s postcode is the ticket number, and hence even if not participating one may still find out that one would have won had one played. As our research shows, this particular feedback that is present in the Postcode Lottery but absent in the State Lottery influences the level of anticipated post-decisional regret, and moderates the influence that anticipated regret has on lottery participation. Study 1, 100 street interviews, confirmed our expectations that the Postcode Lottery may elicit regret. Study 2 found under controlled conditions, that people anticipate more regret over not playing when there is feedback about the neighbors winning a prize in the Postcode Lottery than in the State Lottery. However, when this feedback is absent they anticipate equal amounts of regret over not playing. Study 3 replicated these findings for regret, while showing that the two lotteries do not differ with respect to envy and jealousy, emotions that might also be invoked in this context. Study 4 validated that, as we predicted, anticipations of post-decisional regret influence decisions to play the Postcode lottery, but not the State Lottery. These findings demonstrate the external and discriminant validity of anticipated regret for decision-making, and indicate its pragmatic relevance. The implications or recent developments in regret research are discussed.     

The development of children's regret and relief

Previous research found that children first experience regret at 5 years and relief at 7. In two experiments, we explored three possibilities for this lag: (1) relief genuinely develops later than regret; (2) tests of relief have previously been artefactually difficult; or (3) evidence for regret resulted from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N=162 4- to 7-year-olds) children chose one of two cards that led to winning or losing tokens. Children rated their happiness then saw a better (regret) or worse (relief) alternative. Children re-rated their happiness. Regret after winning was first experienced at 4, regret after losing and relief after winning were experienced at 5 years and relief after losing at 7 years. Experiment 2 (N=297 5- to 8-year-olds) used a similar task but manipulated children's responsibility for the outcome. Greater responsibility for the outcome resulted in a greater likelihood of an experience of regret and relief. Results support that previous tests of relief were artefactually difficult and regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously thought.     

Effective behaviors to de-escalate organizational conflicts in the process of escalation

The goal of the present study was to determine what behaviors negotiators can use to help to quell an escalating conflict. In doing so, we formed a sample of professionals who took on the role of negotiator when we provoked an organizational conflict between a superior and subordinate that escalates due to the intervention of research confederates. Trained judges analyzed the negotiators' behaviors that most effectively mitigated the intensity of the conflict in which they were involved. The results demonstrate that the behaviors most effective at de-escalating an escalating conflict are problem-solving and accommodation, especially when said conflict has escalated considerably. Similarly, jointly employing problem-solving and direct fighting behaviors also seems to help de-escalate conflict. The results do not, however, consistently support using a forceful behavioral strategy to de-escalate a conflict in the early stages of escalation.     

Myopic regret avoidance: Feedback avoidance and learning in repeated decision making

Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice.     

Cultural grounding of regret: Regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

When curiosity killed regret: Avoiding or seeking the unknown in decision-making under uncertainty

In two experimental studies we investigated how curiosity and regret aversion affect decision-making under uncertainty. Building on insights derived from information-gap theory [Loewenstein, G. (1994). The psychology of curiosity: a review and reinterpretation. Psychological Bulletin, 116, 75-98], we demonstrate that curiosity may overcome regret aversion. In Experiment 1, we concentrate on the reluctance to opt for alternatives with uncertain outcomes and demonstrate that curiosity about the uncertain outcomes may override regret aversion. In Experiment 2, we focus on reluctance to expose oneself to potential regret-inducing information and demonstrate that curiosity may overcome this reluctance.     

Looking back with regret: Visual perspective in memory images differentially affects regret for actions and inactions

People can regret things they've done and things they've failed to do. However, the experience of a regrettable action tends to be painful, while regrettable inactions tend to be painful only when one considers the inaction's impact in the broader context of one's life as a whole (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Three experiments manipulated the visual perspective (own first-person vs. observer's third-person) that participants used to picture regretted actions or inactions from their lives. Imagery perspective influences the degree to which people's understanding of events is determined by features of the event itself (first-person) or by the integration of the event with broader self-knowledge (third-person) (Libby & Eibach, in press-b). As predicted, relative to first-person imagery, third-person imagery reduced regret for actions but increased regret for inactions. Results provide new insight into the relationship between imagery perspective, meaning-making, and emotion, and suggest ways to strategically increase or decrease regret.     

Before escalation: behavioral and affective forecasting in escalation of commitment

This research examines preinvestment forecasting processes in escalation of commitment, considering two questions: whether individuals are able to accurately predict their behavior and affect in escalation situations and how forecasting processes may be linked to actual escalation. Three experiments demonstrated that individuals underpredicted their escalation and overpredicted their postescalation regret. Two of the experiments also indicated that the less individuals predicted being entrapped, the more they escalated. Counter to expectations, anticipated regret did not predict escalation. The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical importance of forecasting on escalation and on the importance of understanding both behavioral and affective forecasting effects simultaneously.     

Regret aversion and decision process quality: Effects of regret salience on decision process carefulness

A considerable amount of past research has examined the effects of regret aversion on which options decision makers choose. However, past research has largely neglected to address the effect of regret aversion on the decision process. We conducted five experiments to examine the effect of making regret salient on decision process quality. We predicted that increased regret aversion would lead to more careful decision processing. The results consistently supported this prediction across the different decision situations, incentive structures, regret salience manipulations, and dependent variables used. In all experiments making regret salient led decision makers to take significantly longer to reach a decision. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 4 it also led participants to collect significantly more information before making a choice. Implications and future directions are discussed.