Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position.     

Character changes in epilepsy?]

There are no personality structures which are typical of epilepsies in the sense of a change in character that can be seen in cross and especially in longitudinal sections. Reported changes of character due to epilepsies cannot be exactly defined reproducibly for the forms of fits to be differentiated and cannot, therefore, be used operationally. There is no doubt, however, that several causal factors must be considered to be responsible for the manifestation of certain frequently observed peculiarities and characteristics, respectively. In addition to organic, psychodynamic, and socio-situational causes, long-time antiepileptic medication is an essential factor of changes in character due to diseases characterized by fits. A better understanding has now been obtained of the importance of this particular factor, and this allows to conclude that there can only be epileptic functioning and reacting.     

Grammatical and Phonological Influences on Word Order

ABSTRACT— During the grammatical encoding of spoken multiword utterances, various kinds of information must be used to determine the order of words. For example, whereas in adjective-noun utterances like "red car," word order can be determined on the basis of the word's grammatical class information, in noun-noun utterances like "… by car, bus, or …," word order cannot be determined on the basis of a word's grammatical class information. We investigated whether a word's phonological properties play a role in grammatical encoding. In four experiments, participants produced multiword utterances in which the words' onset phonology was manipulated. Phonological-onset relatedness yielded inhibitory effects in noun-noun utterances, no effects in noun-adjective utterances, and facilitatory effects in adjective-noun, noun-verb, and adjective-adjective-noun utterances. These results cannot be explained by differences in the stimulus displays used to elicit the utterances and suggest that grammatical encoding is sensitive to the phonological properties of words.     

CORNELIUS ERNST. SERMON PREACHED BY FERGUS KERR O.P.

"Ultimately, I cannot accept the framework of experience demanded and presupposed by the orthodox ecclesiastical tradition. I think I must face this, with consequences I can't foretell. I have another tradition to which I am almost equally respectful–in some ways more so–the tradition of the human heart: novels, art, music, tragedy. I cannot allow that God can only be adored in spirit and in truth by the individual introverted upon himself and detached from all that might disturb and solicit his heart. It must be possible to find and adore God in the complexity of human experience. (Patrick White). On my deathbed, what in memory will I be grateful for? Where will my life have been most fully lived? And memory is a sort of history. The eschatological moment must be a fulfilment and consummation of human history and not its negation merely. Let. me grasp this as true; then perhaps the pain may be more bearable. For of course there must be a negation and a separation at the heart of this affirmation and consent; and this remains the importance of the ecclesiastical tradition".     

GRAMMATICAL GENDER IS ON THE TIP OF ITALIAN TONGUES

Abstract— To correctly produce words, speakers must have access to three broad classes of information lexical semantics, syntax, and sound structure. The relevant information must be organized in ways that permit rapid and accurate retrieval of specific lexical targets. Current models of language production do this by a two-stage process. The first stage incorporates lexical meanings and syntax, and the second, sound structure. We used studies of the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon (i e, the condition in which a speaker cannot produce a well-known word) to evaluate this organization and in so doing, we provide the first clear experimental evidence for a lexical stage that includes syntax and is distinct from both sound structure and the conceptual correlates of syntactic features     

Can God Create Abstract Objects? A Reply to Peter van Inwagen

The Platonic theist Peter van Inwagen argues that God cannot create abstract objects. Thus, the quantifier ‘everything’ in traditional statements of the doctrine of creation should be appropriately restricted to things that can enter into causal relations and abstract objects cannot: ‘God is the creator of everything distinct from himself…that can enter into causal relations.’ I respond to van Inwagen arguing that he has provided no good reason for thinking abstract objects must be uncreated. And if this is the case, then there is no good reason to think that God cannot create abstract objects.     

Dream content: Individual and generic aspects

Dream reports were collected from normal subjects in an effort to determine the degree to which dream reports can be used to identify individual dreamers. Judges were asked to group the reports by their authors. The judges scored the reports correctly at chance levels. This finding indicated that dreams may be at least as much like each other as they are the signature of individual dreamers. Our results suggest that dream reports cannot be used to identify the individuals who produced them when identifiers like names and gender of friends and family members are removed from the dream report. In addition to using dreams to learn about an individual, we must look at dreams as telling us about important common or generic aspects of human consciousness.     

Sola Scriptura—A Hermeneutical Impossibility and a Doctrinal Necessity: Twenty‐One Theses

The following theses represent an attempt to delineate some of the contemporary basic conditions for maintaining the use of the sola Scriptura in the Lutheran churches. This must, I argue, be done without using it as a means for ignoring other types of information and experience than that which is contained in the Scriptures. I argue that sola Scriptura formulates what is necessary for salvation, but cannot be used to delineate or present all information that is necessary to live in the contemporary world and interpret all contemporary experience.     

器官移植伦理审查委员会实践难题的伦理思考

器官移植伦理审查委员会在器官移植技术的临床应用中意义重大,但其在实践中面临着缺乏明确的伦理原则和沟通技巧、对需要审查内容的理解不深刻等难题,这影响了其伦理使命的充分实现。为此,伦理审查委员会必须制定明确的伦理原则、深入理解需审查的内容、在伦理学知识、行动纲领和沟通技巧方面对其成员进行培训。     

GENERALIZING ABOUT MESSAGES: SUGGESTIONS FOR DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS

Current research practices in communication create problems for both internal and external validity. One serious design flaw, which involves use of a single message to represent a category of messages, occurs in nearly all of the experimental research on communication effects. The problem with such a design is that an observed difference between categories may reflect only differences between individual, idiosyncratic cases. A related error, the “language-as-fixed-effect fallacy,” involves use of several replications of each category, but analysis of the cases as fixed effects. The consequence is that findings cannot be generalized beyond the sample used. Future research should use multiple cases within each message category studied and treat cases as nested random effects. Since the cases cannot be true random samples from message populations, care must be taken to avoid known sources of bias or other barriers to generalization.     

In the world but not of it: managing the conflict between Christian and institution.

Christian physicians, nurses and other health care workers must manage a daily conflict of conscience between their Christian faith and predominantly secular health care institutions. This essay examines various efforts for managing these conflicts: a turn towards social justice or a seeking of holiness. Seeking social justice, however, is theologically empty. Traditionally, the Christian requirement that we be "in this world but not of it" requires a journey along a narrow path to holiness. Christian medical morality must, therefore, be understood within this light. However, just as there cannot be generic health care, but rather health care for a particular person's needs and problems there cannot be generic holiness, but only a holiness grounded in worshiping God rightly. In so worshiping the Christian will be assisted in negotiating the inescapable and perilous vocation of being in the world but not of it.     

On Ground as a Guide to Realism

According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a colour primitivist cannot accept that an object's being scarlet grounds its not being chartreuse. The Finean might try to defend these implications, but it generates further problems. Instead, the principle should be rejected. An important upshot is that the principle cannot be relied on to distinguish robust realism from anti‐realism about a propositional domain, for the principle obscures ways of taking features to be both real and fundamental.     

The Unknown Before Discovery

Starting from the most important conquests of contemporary post-positivistic epistemology and from its authors such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Edgar Morin and going through Gadamer's hermeneutics or Wittgenstein and de Mandeville's approaches to scientific and social paradigms, this article focuses on the limits of scientific dogmas and on the overbearing rationalism that claims to explain everything, marginalizing many aspects of human life which cannot be rationalized. The scientific approach cannot be just conceptual. It must be opened to images and unusual connections. The scientist must concentrate his or her attention on limit-matters that are often unpredictable and go beyond the logical-philosophical field toward the metaphysical one. “I did not know I did not know” realized von Foerster, and aware of that, the scientist should become the specialist of the unknown, moving along the border-figures of science and philosophy.     

Education for Computers

The computer engineers who refer to the education of computers do not have a definite idea of education and do not bother to justify the fuzzy ones to which they allude. Hence, they logically cannot specify the features a computer must have in order to be educable. This paper puts forth a non-standard, but not arbitrary, concept of education that determines such traits. The proposed concept is derived from the idea of education embedded in modern standard-English discourse. Because the standard concept entails that an educable entity must be capable of consciousness and voluntary action, it cannot apply to computers. If, therefore, one is to have an idea of educable computers, one must drop the feature of consciousness and omit or modify that of voluntariness. The advanced concept leaves out consciousness, alters the ordinary notion of voluntariness, but keeps in tact the other criteria of the standard idea. Thereby, it provides continuity between those who talk about education in modern ordinary English and those who talk about it in the world of artificial intelligence.     

The EEG in subacute sclerosing panencephalitis (SSPE)]

This article gives an overview of electroencephalographic results obtained in the case of subacute sclerosing panencephalitis. Severe disturbances of background activity have been observed in all patients. Repetitive complexes usually occur transitorily, so that they cannot always be detected in individual cases. Repetitive complexes must be regarded as being typical of the disease, and consideration must be given in this connection to their particular characteristics (repetition frequency, constancy of form, relations to disorders characterized by myoclonus) and the clinical picture.     

Androgyny in Psychotherapy: But Will It Sell in Peoria?

Androgyny, as conceptualized in psychology, is based on traditional masculine and feminine stereotypes. Masculine characteristics (as measured by two commonly used sex role inventories) contribute more to measures of self-esteem than do feminine characteristics from the same inventories, indicating that masculine characteristics have more functional value in our culture. Traditionally feminine characteristics are not highly valued by either clients or therapists. However, therapists need to be aware of potential costs to women who make nontraditional choices, moving toward androgyny. It is questionable that androgynous women are perceived in the same favorable manner as androgynous males, particularly in a traditional social context. The consequences of internal and external conflicts created by moving toward androgyny or by devaluation of feminine characteristics cannot be dismissed lightly. Psychotherapists must be willing to assist clients with the external problems that psychological research has demonstrated exist for women who either must or choose to function in roles that are not traditional.     

Special Divine Action and How to Do Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situations, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action’s rightness. This indicates that what is right must be determined independently of the good.

In this paper, I argue that these purported counterexamples to teleology fail to establish that the right must be prior to the good. In fact, putting the right prior to the good can lead to sets of ought statements which potentially conflict with the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. I argue that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right independently of a notion of value or goodness. Every plausible ethical theory needs a mapping from goodness to rightness, which implies that right cannot be prior to the good.     

Discoveries and Dangers in Teaching Theology with PowerPoint

PowerPoint can be a genuine aid to theological education by providing a medium for employing visual art in the classroom. But PowerPoint does not and should not replace the ordinary stuff of teaching and learning theology: reading, lecturing, discussing texts, and writing papers. Like any other tool, its pedagogical benefit depends on discerning use. Particular care must be used to blunt PowerPoint's tendency to produce a disembodied, decontextualized learning environment. Using PowerPoint to incorporate art into theology classes is not merely a strategy for making verbal points more powerfully. Art can sometimes go where theological words cannot.     

Truthier Than Thou: Truth,Supertruth and Probability of Truth

Different formal tools are useful for different purposes. For example, when it comes to modelling degrees of belief, probability theory is a better tool than classical logic; when it comes to modelling the truth of mathematical claims, classical logic is a better tool than probability theory. In this paper I focus on a widely used formal tool and argue that it does not provide a good model of a phenomenon of which many think it does provide a good model: I shall argue that while supervaluationism may provide a model of probability of truth, or of assertability, it cannot provide a good model of truth—supertruth cannot be truth. The core of the argument is that an adequate model of truth must render certain connectives truth‐functional (at least in certain circumstances)—and supervaluationism does not do so (in those circumstances).