A Liberal Defence of (Some) Duties to Compatriots

This paper asks whether we can defend associative duties to our compatriots that are grounded solely in the relationship of liberal co‐citizenship. The sort of duties that are especially salient to this relationship are duties of justice, duties to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship, and a duty to favour the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. Critics have argued that the liberal conception of citizenship is too insubstantial to sustain these duties — indeed, that it gives us little reason to treat compatriots any differently from how we treat foreigners, with all the practical consequences that this would entail. I suggest that on a specific conception of liberal citizenship we can, in fact, defend associative duties, but that these extend only to the duty to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship. Duties of justice and favouritism, I maintain, cannot be particularised to one's compatriots.     

Priming family values: How being a parent affects moral evaluations of harmless but offensive acts

In modern liberal societies people are generally reluctant to morally condemn acts that they find personally distasteful so long as those acts are not harmful or unfair to others. However, in providing character education for their children, parents often have to censure harmless but offensive acts. Thus, we hypothesize that the parental role broadens the scope of morality beyond narrow considerations of harm and fairness. To test this idea we asked parents and nonparents to morally evaluate harmless/offensive acts and a control harmful act. We manipulated whether the parental role was primed before they evaluated these acts. Parents and nonparents did not differ in their moral objections to the control act regardless of parental role priming. However, when the parental role was primed parents were more morally opposed to harmless but offensive acts than were nonparents. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding the dynamics of moral judgment and the recruitment of parents into moral reform movements.     

Liberal–conservative dimension of moral concerns underlying political faction formation in Taiwan

Moral foundations theory provides a framework for understanding the traditional liberal–conservative dichotomy in political factions. Typically, factions on the liberal side are more concerned with individualizing foundations—including care/harm and fairness/cheating—for the protection of individual rights and welfare whereas factions on the conservative side are concerned with both individualizing and binding foundations—including loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation—for the maintenance of existing social ethics. Our research extended this framework to the analysis of Taiwanese political factions, which are not distributed conspicuously along the liberal–conservative line but instead on whether Taiwan should become a legally independent state or unify with the People's Republic of China (Mainland China). Our results indicate that despite the scarce use of the terms liberal or left and conservative or right in common communication, a liberal–conservative dimension underlies the Taiwanese political spectrum. Specifically, supporters of Taiwan independence exhibit liberal‐like moral concerns whereas supporters of China unification and the status quo demonstrate conservative‐like moral concerns. Moreover, indirect effects exist through moral foundations from political factions to stances on social issues; this is especially prevalent in the case of Taiwan independence camp's clear support for the legalization of same‐sex marriage, a stance resulting from anti‐authoritarian moral and political characteristics.     

Equal Opportunity and the Family: Levelling Up the Brighouse‐Swift Thesis

Although liberal political philosophers have long recognised the tension between equal opportunity and the family, most have assumed there is little society can do to mitigate it. Brighouse and Swift argue, by contrast, that an analysis of the value of the family reveals limits on the rights of parents to benefit their children and hence points to a way to reconcile the family with equal opportunity. Their solution for resolving the tension between equal opportunity and the family, however, leads to some untenable conclusions. A better solution for promoting equal opportunity in the family is to level up the opportunities that less advantaged parents have to promote the development and wellbeing of their children so that they are on par with the opportunities of the most advantaged parents. Five strategies are outlined for achieving this goal. Once society has provided all parents with real opportunities to fulfil their fiduciary duties, Brighouse and Swift's argument for limited parental partiality can be applied without contradiction. The result is an alternate solution for mitigating the conflict between equal opportunity and the family in liberal political philosophy.     

The Friendship Model of Filial Obligations

ABSTRACT This paper [1] is a defence of a modified version of Jane English's model of filial obligations based on adult children's friendship with their parents. (I) Unlike the more traditional view that filial obligations are a repayment for parental sacrifices, the friendship model puts filial duties in the appealing context of voluntary, loving relationships. (II) Contrary to English's original statement of this view, which is open to the charge of tolerating filial ingratitude, the friendship model can generate obligations to help our parents even if we are no longer friendly with them. (III) Joseph Kupfer has pointed out several ways in which parent-child relationships differ from peer friendships; but his arguments do not preclude our enjoying a type of friendship with our parents. (IV) In response to Christina Hoff Sommers, who objects that feelings of friendship toward our parents are too flimsy a ground for filial duties, the friendship model can provide a plausible, robust account of filial obligations. (V) As for adult children who have never formed friendships with their loving, caring parents, and refuse to give them much-needed assistance, they can be criticised by moral considerations independent of but compatible with the friendship model .     

With infinite utility,more needn't be better

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivization duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers.     

On the Existence of Duties to the Self (and Their Significance for Moral Philosophy)

Contemporary philosophers generally ignore the topic of duties to the self. I contend that they are mistaken to do so. The question of whether there are such duties, I argue, is of genuine significance when constructing theories of practical reasoning and moral psychology. In this essay, I show that much of the potential importance of duties to the self stems from what has been called the “second‐personal” character of moral duties—the fact that the performance of a duty is “owed to” someone. But this is problematic, as there is reason to doubt whether a person can genuinely owe to herself the performance of an action. Responding to this worry, I show that temporal divisions within an agent's life enable her to relate to herself second‐personally, in the way required by morality. The upshots, I argue, are that we need an intra‐personal theory of justice that specifies the extent of a person's authority over herself, and that we need to rethink our theories of moral emotions in order to specify how an individual ought to respond to attacks on her interests and autonomy that she herself perpetrates.     

As the Twig Is Bent? The Myth of Child-Rearing Influences on Personality Development

Social scientists and laypersons alike believe that child-rearing styles and family environments are formative of personality traits such as shyness and activity level, intellectual traits such as IQ, and psychopathology. After 100 years of behavioral genetic research, however, including new studies of twins raised apart and together, little factual support for this “common sense” proposition can be found. Nonintellectual traits seem to be determined instead by genetic influences and by relatively specific environmental influences, most of which are not particularly tied to the family or parental treatments. Intellectual traits show modest family environmental influence, but that influence may diminish in importance after childhood. I conclude that parents should be given less credit for children who turn out well and should take less blame for children who turn out poorly. Counselors who blame parents less for children's behavioral outcomes—especially extreme traits and psychopathology—may find those parents to be more willing helpers in those intervention processes that have been shown to work.     

The Right to Meaningful Education: The role of values and beliefs

This article argues that children have a right to education that assists them to find a meaning in life. The right of children to meaningful education is interpreted as a right to be raised within a coherent concept of the good and to learn about a variety of alternative conceptions. Both parents and teachers have duties that correspond with the two aspects of meaningful education. I argue that parents have a freedom to raise their children within the conception of the good they themselves hold, but that this freedom is restricted in two ways. Firstly, they have to give their children the freedom to explore alternative conceptions. Secondly, the conception of the good that they offer to their children has to be moral.     

Same duties,different motives: ethical theory and the phenomenon of moral motive pluralism

Viewed in its entirety, moral philosophizing, and the moral behavior of people throughout history, presents a curious puzzle. On the one hand, interpersonal duties display a remarkably stable core content: morality the world over enjoins people to keep their word; refrain from violence, theft and cheating; and help those in need. On the other hand, the asserted motives that drive people’s moral actions evince a dazzling diversity: from empathy or sympathy, to practical or prudential reason, to custom and honor, cultural identity, excellence and independence, faith and spirituality, narrative and beauty, and more besides. I term this twin phenomenon—a core of fixed moral duties driven by diverse motives—“moral motive pluralism.” In this article, I marshal evidence to show the prevalence of the phenomenon. Contrary to widespread assumptions, across generations and cultures, diverse motives drive different people to perform their moral duties. But despite this diversity, each different motive impels conscientious compliance with the same core moral duties. I argue this phenomenon undermines key types of evidence commonly employed to justify popular moral philosophies, and provides us with reason to seriously consider certain sorts of ethical theories—especially “functionalist” accounts of morality.     

Goal agreement and relationship quality among college students and their parents

Two hundred eight parent–college student dyads (total N = 416) participated in the current study, which examined the link between goal agreement and perceived conflict within their relationships. Undergraduate participants (91 male, 117 female) completed a demographic form, a 65 items goal measure, and a measure of parental conflict. Parents (98 fathers, 110 mothers) were asked to rate the importance of the same 65 goals for their emerging adult children. College students tended to place more importance on independence, affect control, health, social relationships, and financial concern goals than their parents did, whereas parents placed more importance on moral and religious goals than their emerging adult children did. However, relative goal agreement between parents and college students was found to be moderately high. Those parent–college student dyads who experienced less conflict tended to have higher goal agreement, whereas those dyads with a higher level of conflict had lower goal agreement. These findings provide further evidence for the link between interpersonal relationships and the personality construct of goals.     

What do we owe co-nationals and non-nationals? why the liberal nationalist account fails and how we can do better

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled.     

Hindu Women,Destiny and Stridharma

Ideas about destiny —about how and why things occur and what they promise for the future —have rarely been discussed in relation to gender. By discussing the sociological and anthropological literature on karma and other sources of misfortune, andstridharma, I provide a context for examining the views of Hindu women on destiny, particularly those living in Britain. In addition to examining their references to a variety of spiritual forces which influence events and to their duties as daughters, wives and mothers, I consider the issues of resistance, intervention, agency and autonomy. It is my contention that when contemporary Hindu women speak about fate, karma, divine agency and freewill what they say can only be understood with reference to their dharma as women.     

THE ILLIBERALITY OF ‘LIBERAL EUGENICS’

This essay evaluates the moral logic of ‘liberal eugenics’: the ideal of genetic control which leaves decisions about what sort of people to produce in the hands of individual parents, absent government intervention. I argue that liberal eugenics cannot be justified on the basis of the underlying liberal theory which inspires it. I introduce an alternative to Rawls's social primary goods that might be called natural primary goods: hereditable mental and physical capacities and dispositions that are valued across a range of projects and pursuits. I suggest that reproductive genetic biotechnologies like embryo selection, cellular surgery, and genetic engineering, which aim to enhance ‘general purpose’ traits in offspring are less like childrearing practices a liberal government leaves to the discretion of parents than like practices the state makes compulsory. I argue that if the liberal commitment to autonomy is important enough for the state to mandate childrearing practices such as health care and basic education, that very same interest is important enough for the state to mandate safe, effective, and functionally integrated genetic practices that act on analogous all‐purpose traits such as resistance to disease and general cognitive functioning. I conclude that the liberal case for compulsory eugenics is a reductio against liberal theory.     

Morality and behavioural regulation in groups: A social identity approach

In recent years social psychologists have displayed a growing interest in examining morality—what people consider right and wrong. The majority of work in this area has addressed this either in terms of individual-level processes (relating to moral decision making or interpersonal impression formation) or as a way to explain intergroup relations (perceived fairness of status differences, responses to group-level moral transgressions). We complement this work by examining how moral standards and moral judgements play a role in the regulation of individual behaviour within groups and social systems. In doing this we take into account processes of social identification and self-categorisation, as these help us to understand how adherence to moral standards may be functional as a way to improve group-level conceptions of self. We review a recent research programme in which we have investigated the importance of morality for group-based identities and intra-group behavioural regulation. This reveals convergent evidence of the centrality of moral judgements for people’s conceptions of the groups they belong to, and demonstrates the importance of group-specific moral norms in identifying behaviours that contribute to their identity as group members.     

Pathological Women Gamblers: Gender-Related Aspects of Control

This study examines the control exhibited by pathological women gamblers over their lives and their surroundings, and how this is governed by their perception of their gender role and socio-cultural expectations of them as women. Seventeen pathological women gamblers (13 of whom were mothers) were recruited from three addiction treatment centers in Israel, and participated in semi-structured interviews. Three central themes emerged during analysis: maintaining control over the gender roles—putting child raising and housekeeping duties first despite their gambling habits; control over the choice of gambling venue—gambling far from their home, or where they knew the owners; and moral control—steering clear of immoral behaviors in spite of their addiction to gambling. Further analysis reveals how pathological women gamblers who are also mothers make rational choices that help them juggle between their gender roles and gambling, to minimize the social costs that might be incurred by their gambling habit. Moreover, presenting the gambling behavior as more moral than theft or prostitution enabled them to normalize their behavior. The study’s findings show how the decisions and choices made by the women in this study are shaped by the socio-cultural context in which they are made.     

Feminist directions in medical ethics

I explore some new directions—suggested by feminism—for medical ethics and for philosophical ethics generally. Moral philosophers need to confront two issues. The first is deciding which moral issues merit attention. Questions which incorporate the perspectives of women need to be posed—e. g., about the unequal treatment of women in health care, about the roles of physician and nurse, and about relationship issues other than power struggles. “Crisis issues” currently dominate medical ethics, to the neglect of what I call “housekeeping issues.” The second issue is how philosophical moral debates are conducted, especially how ulterior motives influence our beliefs and arguments. Both what we select—and neglect—to study as well as the “games” we play may be sending a message as loud as the words we do speak on ethics.     

The effects of social comparison,emotion induction,and parent vaccination status on parental intentions for COVID-19 vaccine uptake in children

Parental vaccine hesitancy—delays in vaccine uptake for children—is a significant public health concern. Using an online adult sample of U.S. parents (N = 183), the current research experimentally examined how exposure to cautious or risky social comparison models on social media (in terms of their COVID-19 beliefs and behaviors) influenced parental intentions to vaccinate their children against COVID-19 in the early stages of the pandemic. Additionally, we examined whether the influence of social comparison models was moderated by emotional state (fear or contentment) and parental vaccination status. Overall, we found that parents exposed to cautious (vs. risky) comparison models and vaccinated (vs. unvaccinated) parents reported greater vaccine intentions for their children. We further found that vaccination intentions were highest among unvaccinated parents after exposure to cautious (vs. risky) comparison models, whereas intentions were highest among vaccinated parents after exposure to risky (vs. cautious) comparison models (but only when induced to feel content). Overall, our findings highlight the importance of understanding the additive and interactive impact of psychological and situational factors in shaping parental vaccine hesitancy.     

FOUR THEORIES OF FILIAL DUTY

Children have special duties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts of filial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude theory and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in structure and content from any that we are likely to share with anyone apart from a parent. A more promising account will concentrate on what is unique about the parent-child relationship. I articulate and defend the 'special goods theory', according to which filial duties arise from the distinctive kinds of goods that healthy parent-child relationships typically involve.     

Felt obligation and the family life cycle: A study on intergenerational relationships

Since the 1990s researchers have considered as the dominant view on family obligation a set of responsibilities, duties, and obligation of care and assistance, that adult children should assume when parents are old or infirm. This concept is limited, because it assumes that family obligation is salient only in one period of life: when parents reach old age and are infirm. In contrast, a relational approach to family obligation considers family relationships as central to understanding children's duties and responsibilities. Following Stein, family obligation can be defined as felt obligation: expectations for appropriate and negotiated behaviour, perceived within the context of specific personal relationships with kin across life course. Felt obligation is conceptualized in five dimensions: a duty to maintain contact, assistance, avoidance of conflict, personal sharing, and self‐sufficiency. The purpose of the present study was to analyze perceptions of felt obligation in intergenerational relationships (parent–child and family of origin) in different phases of the family life cycle in a specific cultural context (Italy). The sample was composed of 92 parents with children of different ages (infants, school‐aged children, and young adults). The measure addressed the five dimensions of felt obligation, all assessed in various phases of family life. Results indicated differences in dimensions of felt obligation between intergenerational relationships (both parent–child and with family of origin). Some of these differences, such as self‐sufficiency and personal sharing, assumed more importance and salience in some periods of the life cycle than in others.