On Love and Fortitude: A Relational Discussion of “Poison Cookies”

The author offers a relational perspective on Oram's “Poison Cookies.” The discussion focuses on two central questions. Why does analytic empathy feel like torment to this patient? How does the analysis transmute this experience into healing? In the course of this investigation, the author will also consider the role of envy, the role of the sibling, the analyst's predicament around termination, and our tendency to conflate isolation and solitude.     

Dysregulated Rhythms and the “Grip” of the Context: A Discussion of the Paper “Poison Cookies” by Katherine Oram

Two moments from the clinical narrative under discussion are used to highlight the critical impact of attention to timing not in terms of when and what to say, but rather as a an ongoing source of emotional meaning emerging on implicit dimensions of rhythm and affective tone occurring in the clinical interaction. Meanings having to do with different forms of power including fear of psychic annihilation, agency, and aggression expressed within sado-masochistic dynamics are demonstrated to be scaffolded and coming into formation on these implicit levels. Alternatively, Merleu-Ponty's concept of Urdoxa as a grip on context is introduced to highlight how the analyst's use of timing to violate an expectation for nonresponsiveness or impingement creates an experience of distance between enactment and reflection, allowing space for re-membering as a form of representation. Here the creation of space through timing serves not just a representational function, but also a way for affective self and interactive regulation to emerge in an interaction as scaffolding for experiences of predictability (i.e., continuity and coherence) and vitality in self and other.     

How Shall We Talk With Our Patients About Mortality? Response to Gerson and Shabad Discussions

In this response I discuss Shabad and Gerson’s viewpoints, not only in relation to my own but also to each other, in an effort to delineate variables at play within analytic subjectivity when we are confronted by issues concerning mortality in treatment. I suggest that our personal relationships with our own mortality, in conjunction with our analytic commitments and clinical sensibilities, determine how we will talk with patients about their having to die and/or if we will talk with them about it at all.     

Response to “Turning Words and Twisting Truths”

SUMMARY

Too often, in discussions of psychotherapy, the techniques are given undue emphasis. Research suggests that the same techniques are differentially effective when used by equally trained and supervised therapists. Not only are some therapists more effective, irrespective of the type of therapy they practice, but some, because of their personal qualities, may actually harm those with whom they work. This research reflects the vast importance of the ubiquitous element in therapy, that of the “person” of the therapist. The question, then, follows, how may personhood be developed? This question is explored as it relates to both breadth and depth of life experience.     

Response to Ted Peters’ “Models of God”

In “Models of God,” Ted Peters discusses a methodology for formulating and evaluating models of God, surveys nine models, and proposes one that he entitles “Eschatological Panentheism.” This paper provides critical comments on Peters’ methodological claims, taxonomy of models of God, and specific proposal. This paper has been delivered during APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.Both Peters’ “Models of God” and these comments were presented at the “Models of God” mini-conference at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in April of 2007.     

Response to Commentators of “A Critique of Positive Responsibility”

It has been claimed that (1) computer professionals should be held responsible for an undisclosed list of “undesirable events” associated with their work and (2) most if not all computer disasters can be avoided by truly understanding responsibility. Commentators of “A Critique of Positive Responsibility in Computing” argue that this is not Donald Gotterbarn’s view (Gotterbarn, JSEE 14(2):235–239, 2008) but that a critique of the view nevertheless raises significant moral issues within computing such as the ethical goals of a computing profession, the appropriate ethical stance toward bugs, and the public good with respect to computing (Miller, JSEE 14(2):245–249, 2008). Commentators also argue that “A Critique”’s “profitable misreading” demonstrates the “moral ecology” of organizations “dedicated narrowly to financial success” and that other “moral ecologies” that are customer or quality driven can be shown to be more important or preeminent (Huff, JSEE 14(2):241–244, 2008). It is argued here that (1) the hyper-inflated reading of Gotterbarn’s and Ladd’s views on positive responsibility persists despite Gotterbarn’s explicit rejection of it, and that (2) such a reading of positive responsibility cannot be placed within a single moral ecology, nor can a single moral ecology be shown to be any more important or preeminent than others. Stieb, J. A. (2008). A critique of positive responsibility in computing. Science and Engineering Ethics, 14(2), 219–233.     

Response to commentaries on “A neurobiological model for near-death experiences”

This work has received financial support from FONDECYT (Project 1111-88). The authors also acknowledge the helpful comments of Dr. Bruce Cassels.