“Generative Co-Constructions”: An Exploration of the Analyst’s Influence and Desire: Commentary on Paper by Richard Almond

In this commentary on Almond’s (this issue) paper, in which he asks us to consider ways in which his personality/history/psychodynamics played a significant role in his younger women patients becoming pregnant, the author questions Almond’s premise that we can know what “real-life effects” we have on our patients, when so much that occurs in psychoanalysis happens in mutually unconscious and procedural realms. In addition, the author critiques Almond’s archaic and reductive conceptions of gender and sexuality, which feel particularly problematic as they interpenetrate with his fantasies of his impact and pivotal role in their pregnancies.     

The Orsino complex: Men who love themselves as love objects

Abstract

The Duke Orsino, in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night, is cited as the archetypal embodiment of a psychological complex which, it is argued, may affect many men in modern patriarchal societies. This condition named the ‘Orsino complex’ is characterized by the subject's experience of being in love with himself as a love object. It is the consequence of the subject's very early experience of his mother's dual psychological reactions to him as a male child. The first of these, and the more significant, I have called maternal phallic projection, while the second I term maternal withdrawal. I also consider the influence of the father upon this complex.

While this paper remains speculative in its present form—that is, its central thesis is based on fictional and not on clinical material—it might, I hope, assist all of us working psychodynamically in understanding further some of the severe problems that male clients present in their relationships with women, as well as directing further research into the complexities of gender identity in contemporary society.     

Yu in the Xunzi: toward a precise understanding

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others.     

VICISSITUDES OF BISEXUALITY: CRUCIAL POINTS AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS3

The author begins by noting that the heuristic value of the concept of bisexuality can be explored in two directions, involving respectively its role in psychopathology and in the development of creativity and thought. The author concentrates on the first of these aspects, which entails a reconsideration of the ‘phallic question’. The status of femininity is investigated on the basis of Freud's and Winnicott's theories of bisexuality and the author here finds an explanation for the repudiation of femininity and for the ‘phallic question’ thereby implied, which represents the underlying bedrock resulting in interminable analyses. An important element in this rejection is stated to be the maternal aspect of femininity. Particular reference is made to the somatic roots of phallic defences and to their effects on thought and symbolisation. Some brief clinical examples are presented to suggest that the bedrock may be due to the distorted use of sensoriality and of the erotogenic zones. The author contends that the anal zone plays a crucial part in the manifestations of bisexuality and contrasts phallic logic with the logic of triangulation. Numerous literature references and clinical examples support and illustrate her arguments throughout. The author ends with a discussion of the implications of bisexuality for thought and knowledge.     

The singularity of the cinematic object

In order to avoid the reduction of desire to demand and to produce a theory in keeping with the insights of psychoanalysis, Lacan had to move beyond Hegel’s theorization based on recognition. To do so, Lacan had to come up with a new form of object, an object irreducible to the signifier but with the power to arouse the desire of the subject. The theorization of the objet a enables Lacan to make an important advance on Hegel’s theory of desire, an advance that effectively reverses the priority that Hegel establishes between the object and the Other. Despite the widespread association of Lacan with the signifier and its laws, his one great theoretical breakthrough concerns what remains absolutely irreducible to signification. My central contention in this essay is that Lacan’s theory of desire allows us to understand how singularity appears in the cinema, despite the medium’s inherent resistance to it. I examine this appearance of singularity through two filmic occasions—Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin and Michael Mann’s Heat. It is a medium in which recognition predominates, and yet the singularity of the objet a nonetheless emerges and animates the desire of the spectator.     

The Primary Maternal Oedipal Situation and Female Homoerotic Desire

In this paper, I closely examine classical psychoanalytic theory on the female oedipal complex in order to shed light on same-sex object choice. Given that the mother is the first love object for the girl as well as for the boy, the girl's object relational constellation centrally involves the experience of homoeroticism as well as heteroeroticism. Yet, it remains a question as to whether a mother can see her daughter as a sexual subject; can mother–daughter homoerotic desire be experienced and validated by the mother? That a girl desires her mother is generally not seen or registered by the mother; it remains an unrecognized desire.

I suggest that the obscuring of female desire has to do centrally with the fate of eroticism in the early mother–daughter relationship. I propose relabeling the “negative oedipal complex” in girls as “the primary maternal oedipal situation.” Issues involving invisibility or stigmatization of one's erotic desire likely pose a significant challenge to the self–esteem of many lesbians. It is important in clinical work with lesbian patients to be open to a complex interweaving of developmental experiences, varying with each individual, some of which may have been damaging to, and others strengthening of, female sexuality.     

Understanding a Desireless Action as a Benevolent Action

Scholars have questioned the doctrine of desireless action in the Bhagavadgita and questioned whether Krishna’s advice is to be taken literally on the basis that the Humean account of motivation is more plausible (or not) than the anti-Humean account. In this paper, I will avoid the Humean principle debate by proposing a new way of examining the term ‘desireless action’. I aim to show that Krishna’s advice can be rendered coherent on the basis that we understand a desireless action as an action motivated by a benevolent desire. I will be referring to the notion of benevolence as constructed by Francis Hutcheson because there is a parallel between the Hutchesonian experience of benevolence and purusha, or pure consciousness. Benevolent desire results in a desireless action since to act benevolently is to act ‘disinterestedly’ and thereby accepting purusha as one’s true nature.     

Capitalism and the Banality of Desire

ABSTRACT

This paper elaborates on Todd McGowan’s perspicacious, psychoanalytic explanation of capitalism’s resilience, due to its formidable ideological insinuation into the banal micro-desires of consumers. I outline his contention that capitalism’s false promise of future satisfaction is subverted by the psychical change indicated by Freud’s re-evaluation of the desire/satisfaction relationship. This is elaborated on via Lacan’s claim, somewhat underplayed in McGowan’s reflections, that desire is essentially narcissistic. Lacan’s claim raises the stakes of capitalism’s psychic appeal, but also indicates how Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a point of intervention. I briefly point to the consistency between Lacan’s conception of the actualized subject and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s articulation of desire in terms of “the process” and the complex metaphor of “desiring machines”. I finally turn to ?i?ek’s conception of the developing world as “the place of rupture” and a major fault line internal to capitalism that threatens to disrupt its operation.     

Normative Impulsivity: Adorno on Ethics and the Body

Abstract

Adorno’s commitment to anti-foundationalism generates a concern over how his ethically normative appraisals of social phenomena can be founded. Drawing on both Kohlmann and Bernstein’s account, I produce a new reading which contends somatic impulses are capable of bearing intrinsically normative epistemic and moral content. This entails a new way of understanding Adorno’s contention that Auschwitz produced a new categorical imperative. Working with Bernstein’s account, I claim that Auschwitz makes manifest the hostility of the instrumentalization of reason to the somatic grounds of reason. One’s mimetic identification with the victims of Auschwitz arouses a self-preserving desire to intercede in and re-orient the progress of reason itself, for the sake of one’s own somatic integrity. In closing, I claim – contra Zuidervaart – that this reading allows us to place the ethical as primary in Adorno, without reducing the political to it.     

Tyrannized Souls: Plato's Depiction of the ‘Tyrannical Man’

In book 9 of Plato's Republic, Socrates describes the nature and origins of the ‘tyrannical man’, whose soul is said to be ‘like’ a tyrannical city. In this paper, I examine the nature of the ‘government’ that exists within the tyrannical man's soul. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of three potentially attractive views sometimes found in the literature on Plato: the view that the tyrannical man's soul is ruled by his ‘lawless’ unnecessary appetites, the view that it is ruled by sexual desire, and the view that it is ruled by a lust for power. I then present my own account. On the view I defend, the tyrannical man's soul is to be understood as ruled by a single, persistent, powerful desire for bodily pleasure: as much as he can get, and however he can get it. Finally, I show how understanding the tyrannical man's soul in the way I recommend helps resolve some commonly expressed concerns about this part of the Republic. I suggest, on this basis, that Plato's procedure in constructing his catalogue of corrupt cities and souls in Republic 8 and 9 was more carefully thought out and systematic than has sometimes been supposed.     

The Twofold Task of Union

Love is practical, having to do with how we live our lives, and a central aspect of its practical orientation is the wish for union. Union is often considered in two forms—as a union of affections and as union in relationship. This paper considers both sorts of union and argues for their connection. I first discuss the union of interests in terms of the idea of attentive awareness that is focused upon the beloved individual and his or her concerns, life, and history. I then discuss union in relationship and show how this emerges from the attentive awareness in a desire to specify a determinate way of responding to the concerns that attentive awareness opens us to. I use the example of Jane Austen’s Emma throughout; the conduct of Austen’s heroine, who fails badly at loving well, shows by means of anti-example what is at stake in pursuing union as well as illustrating the close connection between the two aspects of union.     

Wings of desire: Reflections on sexual desire,identity and freedom

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom.     

The Black Man and the Mermaid: Desire and Disruption in the Analytic Relationship

This paper considers the impact of desexualization of the maternal on the development of female sexuality. A “chance encounter” revealing a desire in the female analyst, previously unsuspected, disrupts a female patient's prior sense of homoerotic immersion with the analyst. I argue that a girl's would-be oedipal competition is encased within a patriarchal structuring of sexuality where the mother is rendered solely reproductive and preoedipal, not erotically sexual. I examine the meanings for a patient of internalizing a female figure, her analyst, who is viewed as both maternal and sexual. I suggest that a female sense of genital inadequacy and inferiority may have a component of not being able to link the mother's (and in the transference, the analyst's) use of her genitals with her use of her mind/maternal function. I unfold a thesis regarding maternal desexualization that I believe, given mother–infant symbiosis, has rather extensive applicability, and that can lead to viewing any third party as a “dark” interloper.     

The verdictive organization of desire

Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.     

Reclaiming Lost Loves: Transcending Unrequited Desires. Discussion of Davies’ “Oedipal Complexity”

In this discussion I address the multidimensionality embedded within the oedipal phase of development and contend that the elaboration and working through of unrequited oedipal longing within the transference–countertransference matrix is one of the most profound gifts of an analysis. The child’s confrontation with thwarted desire (generationally) for either parent is central to the development of the mind, the personality, and one’s erotic life. I also argue that the experience of oedipal exclusion becomes not solely a response to a generational boundary but to a gender boundary discouraging same-sex love. I speak for retaining a conceptualization of an oedipal complex without losing any of the complexity of individual experience. In describing our oedipal lineages for erotic life as resting upon an interwoven layering of maternal and paternal oedipal desires, my aim is to continue a project to rehabilitate the oedipal concept from heteronormative presumptions and from being (mis)understood in a reductive manner that alienates rather than engages.     

Response to Stuart Rennie's ‘Elegant variations’

Abstract

In Happiness, Tabensky equates the notion of happiness to Aristotelian eudaimonia. I shall claim that doing so amounts to equating two concepts that moderns cannot conceptually equate, namely, the good for a person and the good person or good life. In §2 I examine the way in which Tabensky deals with this issue and claim that his idea of happiness is as problematic for us moderns as is any translation of the notion of eudaimonia in terms of happiness. Naturally, if happiness understood as eudaimonia is ambiguous, so will be the notion of a desire for happiness, which we find at the core of Tabensky’s whole project. In §3 I shall be concerned with another aspect of the desire for happiness; namely, its alleged self-justifying nature. I will attempt to undermine the idea that this desire is self-justifying by undermining the criterion on which Tabensky takes self-justifiability to rest, i.e. its basicness, but also by shedding doubt on the idea that there is such a thing as an ultimate basic principle and, even if there were, that it is what Tabensky calls the eudaimon principle.     

How to Use Your Mind When You Can’t Think: Reply to Commentaries by Davies and Cooper

There is much area of agreement between the author and the discussants. The author addresses areas of concern and questions raised in the commentaries. These topics include the use of reverie, how I have defined maternal desire, concerns about the avoidance of negative transference, the analyst’s own dissociation, and compassion.     

Exposed: phallic protections,shame and damaged parental objects 1

Using ideas derived from Dana Birksted-Breen (‘Phallus, penis and mental space’, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 77: 649–57, 1996), this article explores the clinical experience with ‘Tommy’, a young boy who suffered multiple traumas and neglect. Birksted-Breen describes a phallic state of mind, which, amongst other things, serves to repudiate the potential for a creative link between internal parental objects and a capacity for thinking. In order to survive psychically, Tommy frequently turned to a phallic state of mind. The deficits in his internal and external objects meant that helpful parental qualities, linked with the development of psychic bisexuality, were not available for introjection and identification. The paper suggests a link between Tommy's employment of phallic (and at times perverse) ways of thinking, related to his intrusive attempts to expose and humiliate his psychotherapist, and to an experience of shame associated with inadequate internal objects. The serious compromise to the development of a creative psychic bisexuality in the patient is reflected in the countertransference strain on the psychotherapist's own internal couple.     

Irigaray on the Problem of Subjectivity1

In Speculum of the Other Woman (1974), Luce Irigaray argues that “any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the masculine.” This paper offers an analysis of Irigaray's critique of subjectivity and examines the psychological mechanism referred to as “the phallic economy of castration.” A different way of conceiving the relation between subject and object is explored by imagining a new subject of desire.     

Heidegger on Human Finitude: Beginning at the End

Interpreters generally understand Heidegger's notion of finitude in one of two ways: (1) as our mortality – that, in the end, we are certain to die; or (2) the susceptibility of our self‐ and world‐understanding to collapse – the fragility and vulnerability of human sense‐making. In this paper, I put forward an alternative account of what Heidegger means by ‘finitude’: human self‐ and world‐understanding is non‐transparently grounded in a ‘final end.’ Our self‐ and world‐understanding, that is, begins at the end, and authenticity requires us to interpretively appropriate the full range of this understanding. After laying out this view of finitude, via an analogical appeal to the Socratic account of action and desire in the Gorgias, I discuss its relationship to the two leading views of finitude mentioned above.