AdJusting Jonah

In this article, I engage the theme for the WCC Busan assembly – “God of Life, Lead Us to Justice and Peace” – through a reading of the story of Jonah that listens for the currents and vibes in and from Oceania. I circle around the story of Jonah with a double‐edging (AdJusting) reading: first, listening for justice (Just ing) in the story of Jonah and second, shifting (Adjusting) the way we hear (read, view) Jonah. I hear Jonah's Wrath as a call for justice, with calm and respect of someone who is angry but at peace. Jonah did not agree with G*d from the start, seeing that Nineveh was not as wicked as G*d claimed, and at the end of the story Jonah is silent because he did not want Nineveh's countless cattle (like pigs in my culture) to be destroyed.     

Jonah's Crisis: Commentary on Paper by Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg

In discussing Zornberg's paper, Jonah's Flight, the author uses Zornberg's multifaceted midrashic analysis as a portal to offer an alternative reading of the Jonah text. Using Relational and British Object Relations psychoanalytic theories, the author explores Jonah's state of mind, focusing on his profound despair. Most notably she finds that his despair is indicative of traumatic disappointment stemming from the sense of not being recognized by God, experiencing an acute disconnection. Jonah is then seen as being in crisis: incapable of self-reflection, caught in a dissociated self-state, and unable to inhabit and struggle with his own feelings. The result is alienation from himself, incapacity to feel concern for others and estrangement from God. Using the spiritual writings of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, who believes that God is in search of man, the author suggests that it is the need for an intersubjective relationship with God that is at the core of this Biblical story.     

Worship and Theology: Lancelot Andrewes in Durham,Easter 1617

Abstract

On Easter Day 1617, Lancelot Andrewes, one of the foremost preachers in England in the first quarter of the 17th century, preached before King James I in Durham Cathedral. This article sets the sermon in its historical and liturgical context, including the choice of an unusual text with nautical imagery – the allegory of the ‘sign of Jonah’ (Matthew 12.39–40). The preacher is shown to move subtly through the book of Jonah, his flight from God, the storm in the sea, the three days in the whale's belly, his escape to dry land, and the repentance of the people of Nineveh, applying each episode to growth in the Easter faith. The ‘three days’ in particular are seen as the ‘Sacred Three Days’ (‘Triduum Sacrum’) of patristic tradition, which point to a journey of faith that includes repentance and forgiveness, and participation not only in the sacrament of the Eucharist, but in the great sacrament of Easter as well. Andrewes emerges from this sermon as an imaginative thinker, with an original way of handling Scripture and tradition.     

Jonah and Applied Psychoanalytic Dialogue: Introduction

This introduction to a series of fascinating papers on the biblical book of Jonah provides a brief schematic outline of the narrative as well as an orientation to the place of the book in the Jewish liturgy. An explanation is given for why a secular psychoanalytic audience might well be interested in such an effort at applied psychoanalysis. This rationale has to do with the story's universal as well as particularistic significance. Jonah himself may be viewed as attempting to escape from dialogue, but this lively and engaged psychoanalytic dialogue examines and debates the meaning of his story.     

Freud, Dora, and the maid: a study of countertransference

Early advances in psychoanalytic knowledge, profound though they were, were incomplete structures to be built upon, modified, and partially discarded. In addition to errors due to insufficient knowledge, Freud's difficulties with Dora stemmed from countertransference. Dora's transference included an identification with a governess/maid. Important oedipal role played by a nursemaid in Freud's life made him vulnerable to being left by Dora. The maid, Monika, "the prime originator" of Freud's neurosis, seduced him, chastised him, and taught him of hell. In his self-analysis she was associated with Freud's mother who left him when she gave birth to his sister. When he was two and a half years old, Monika was discharged and jailed for stealing. I suggest that Freud's attraction to Dora revealed itself in his libidinal imagery of the treatment and his premature sexual interpretations, the effects of which he misjudged. Defending against his attraction, he pushed her away from him, did not act to keep her in analysis or allow her to reenter analysis later. In addition, since Dora had left him as he must have felt his childhood nursemaid had, he reacted as if she were that maid. Hurt, saddened, and angered, he used reversal and deserted her, thus damping his feelings.     

Against Propositionalism

‘Propositionalism’ is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations—all intentional attitudes—are relations to propositions or something proposition‐like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate ‘F’. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they are, and that propositionalism must be abandoned.     

Justification,Attachments and Regret

Abstract: In The View From Here, Jay Wallace emphasises that an agent's capacity to regret a past decision is conditioned by the attachments that she may have developed as a result. Those attachments shape the point of view from which she retrospectively deliberates. Wallace stresses, however, that not every normative aspect of her decision is affected by this change in perspective, because her decision will remain as unjustified as it was in the past. I will argue, however, that this approach to justification is inconsistent with the normative import that Wallace ascribes to the actual dynamics of our attachments in his defence of the rationale of regret. If I am right, Wallace's approach is caught in the following dilemma: Either he renounces a nonperspectival approach to justification or he revises his view about the normative import of the actual dynamics of our attachments.     

Jonah: His Story,Our Story; His Struggle,Our Struggle: Commentary on Paper by Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg

The Book of Jonah, one of the best known of the biblical tales, is much more than a children's fable about a man and a whale. This brief narrative about a prophet who refuses to be a prophet is our story—how we too often give in to our nature which pulls us toward resentment, parochialism, and narrowness, too often avoid what we need to face within ourselves and our responsibilities, too often are crippled by our inability to transcend our anger and forgive. After examining Aviva Zornberg's analysis of the Book of Jonah in which she argues that the message, like the latent dream à la Freud, is obscure, I argue that the meaning of the Book of Jonah is clear. Psychic unity requires that we face our objects—God and conscience, Nineveh and storm and mother, self and other—struggle with them, stare at them, allow them to breathe and live in the same room. As God, Jonah's “psychoanalyst,” argues, it is only then that we can find our way to where His analysand Jonah never quite arrives—forgiveness of the self and of the other.     

“And Also Much Cattle”—A New Reading of an Old Fish Story

The author presents a careful analysis of the Book of Jonah to demonstrate that from beginning to end, in form and content, in diction, phraseology and style Jonah [is] a masterpiece of rhetoric. The author shows that the aim of the rhetoric is first to warn religious leaders against Jonah-like behavior and, second, to caution the general reader against a smug certitude that leads inevitably to the condemnation of those who do not agree. Moreover, the author's painstaking exegesis of the Book of Jonah indicates not only how carefully and subtly crafted the book is but also how much care the reader must take if he or she wishes to understand it.     

The Forward Edge of Resistance: Toward the Dignity of Human Agency

Psychoanalysts have traditionally viewed the patient’s resistance as an obstacle to treatment progress. In this paper, I will view resistance in relation to the primary asymmetry built into the treatment relationship with regard to help seeking – patients are help seekers and analysts are designated helpers. More specifically, since there is an ethical privilege and power derived from the self-confidence in providing help to another person, there is a subtle hierarchical subject-object relationship that emerges from the relative dignity or indignity with regard to help-seeking. In this view, resistance is seen as the patient’s attempt to reclaim the dignity of his/her agency as a human subject. Since the patient often feels stymied by a fatalistic inertia in living his/her life, the patient’s resistance of “I Won’t,” instead of a fatalistic “I Can’t,” provides a pathway for the analyst to respect the patient’s resistance as a manifestation of the patient’s need for self-determination.     

Who is the Hero in the Life of the Traumatized Patient? Reflections on Bodansky’s Work with Mrs. E

The vexed question of how to explain analytic success with traumatized patients like Bodansky’s Mrs. E is considered from a perspective on psychoanalytic history and the specific theory-buttressed assumptions and practices of earlier generations of analysts that led them to conclude that traumatized patients couldn’t be helped via psychoanalytic work. I then consider Mrs. E’s life with an organizing question, Who is its hero?, applying perspectives from Charles Dickens and from Fraiberg and colleagues’ work, and use these perspectives to question the theory-based assumption that Mrs. E must have somewhere had a good object experience to have a life. These perspectives allow contemplation of a saving forceful agency at Mrs. E’s core (perhaps one experienced by her as “animal”) that seems essential to understanding her successes in living. The success of her treatment in assisting her with building a life suggests that her analyst’s helping her with mirroring and, even more important, with mentalizing, contribute importantly to her life improvement. Some potential limitations of his approach to her are also implied in his account; in particular, his limited work with her intimate desires and feelings, both libidinal and aggressive.     

Knowledge of Self,knowledge of others,error; and the place of consciousness

"Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, error and the place of consciousness" examines texts and problems from the phenomenological tradition to show that the other does not present her/himself as a consciousness enclosed in a merely material body. I discuss Merleau-Ponty's attempt to supplant this view with the view that the other is always seen as an "incarnate consciousness" - a unity of mind and body in activity. This view faces a difficulty in that it seems to collapse the distinction between one's own understanding of one's behavior and the understanding which another might have of this same behavior. In response to this objection, I study how the meaning of people's behaviors are settled in dialogue. I argue that the meanings that an actor gives to her or his behavior cannot rest entirely with that person, nor are they determined solely by the interpreter, but instead develop in the interaction between the actor and the interpreter.     

Fairy-tales in psychotherapy

Fairy-tales, like mythologies, can be found all over the world containing the same motif and chains of motifs. In this paper I have presented some theories on the occurrence of this archetypal phenomenon ranging from the old migration theory to Sheldrake's theory of morphogenetic fields. I have then tried to show how fairy-tale-motifs can appear in various ways in analytical therapy, often in hidden forms. We find them in patients' dreams as well as in their fantasies and associations. If the therapist is open to them they will also appear in his or her amplifications. He or she might then take note of the fairy-tale or point it out to the patient; in the latter case it might provide better access to the patient's problems and complexes as fairy-tales have an emotional completeness because of their pictorial character. Finally I have described the favourite fairy-tale of one of my patients and related it to his symptoms, his central complex and his personal ways of experiencing and behaving. This survey of how fairy-tales can be used in therapy with children and with adults far from exhaustive.     

Responsibility and the shallow self

Contemporary philosophers of moral responsibility are in widespread agreement that we can only be blamed for actions that express, reflect, or disclose something about us or the quality of our wills. In this paper I reject that thesis and argue that self disclosure is not a necessary condition on moral responsibility and blameworthiness: reactive responses ranging from aretaic appraisals all the way to outbursts of anger and resentment can be morally justified even when the blamed agent’s action expresses or discloses nothing significant about his or her “deep self,” judgments and cares, or the quality of his or her will. I argue that the self-disclosure requirement on responsibility overestimates the extent to which our blaming practices and responsibility judgments are responsive to agents as opposed to actions, and that this mistake has the potential to distort both our reactive responses and our understanding of blamed agents’ characters.     

The Strangeness of Passing: Commentary on Paper by Christopher Bonovitz

Christopher Bonovitz gives us a rich landscape of the theoretical, historical, and relational aspects of his work with his mixed-race patient. In my response I explore what seems missing: a stronger sense of the patient as a person, more of her own history in her family, more of the clinical back and forth with her therapist, a sense of what is being played out in the transference, and particularly what “passing” is for her. I show how his choices about how to think about her story and how to tell it are oversaturated with awareness of identity and race at the expense of the basic human relationship. In the face of such racial anxiety, there is a pull to rely too strongly on countertransference as a way to gain privileged access to knowledge about the other. I attribute many of these problems to the inescapable power of race in our culture. Furthermore, I address the themes of hatred, silence, secrecy and transgression as they relate to the history of transgenerational trauma for this patient and invite our broadening our awareness about how they play out in the therapeutic process. We are faced with the difficult, yet the essential task of holding and living out the patient's anger and outrage at the racial hatred that has been endured.     

Therapeutic Action in the Work of a Playful Clinician: A Reflection on Dr. Silber’s Reimagining of Humpty Dumpty

ABSTRACT

In my discussion of Dr. Silber’s paper, Reimagining Humpty Dumpty: The Therapeutic Action of Play, I mirror Dr. Silber’s playful posture in her use of the Humpty Dumpty fable to talk about children and their care by society. My reflections on Dr. Silber’s therapeutic work with her two young patients focus on her co-creating meaning with each child’s parents as well as with the child. I discuss that by holding in her mind both the subjectivities of the child and his parents, Dr. Silber is able to practice a fundamentally relational therapy. I would have liked to have heard more about her emotional reactions in her work with both cases as another important dimension of her work. Finally, I emphasize through my play with Humpty Dumpty several ways that society can support children and families that are essential for their development: parental leave, developmentally approptiate expectations for children in school, and the facilitation and protection children’s open ended time and ability to play.     

Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?

In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe aweird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning endsup with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certainsentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that wereject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt onethat better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.     

Mary Astell’s critique of Pierre Bayle: atheism and intellectual integrity in the Pensées (1682)

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the English philosopher Mary Astell’s marginalia in Lady Mary Wortley Montagu’s personal copy of the 1704 edition of Pierre Bayle’s Pensées diverses sur le comète (first published in 1682). I argue that Astell’s annotations provide good reasons for thinking that Bayle is biased towards atheism in this work. Recent scholars maintain that Bayle can be interpreted as an Academic Sceptic: as someone who honestly and impartially follows a dialectical method of argument in order to obtain the goal of intellectual integrity. In her commentary, however, Astell suggests that: (i) if Bayle were honest and impartial in his inquiries, then he would not have pretended to attack popular superstition, only to undermine generally-held religious beliefs; and (ii) if Bayle valued intellectual integrity, then his argument for a society of virtuous atheists would not have relied upon a deceptive equivocation in terms. I conclude that the rediscovery of this marginalia is valuable for enhancing our appreciation of Astell as an astute reader of one of her most enigmatic contemporaries.     

The Role of the Third Chakra in the Psychology of Terrorism

Abstract

In a recent dream I am with my German childhood girl friend. We are in a German town. There is an ominous feeling in the air. I have just learned that a young Jewish man who has lost his reason is running through town, seeking murderous revenge for the crimes of the Nazi Holocaust, committed almost forty years ago. Then I see lying on the sidewalk the black, charred body of a young man, a violin near his head. I know at once that this is the first victim of the young Jew's revenge, a horrible reminder of the crimes of the Nazi regime.

My girl friend buries her head on my shoulder and cries: “Will the past ever stay in the past?” I stroke her hair as I answer, “It is this poor young Jew's way of reminding us of our collective guilt.”     

From canon to context

This article traces the development of my own scholarly work on Paul from the individualism of “justification by faith” as the theological canon during my student period, to studies of Paul within his historical context and his efforts to unite Jews and non-Jews. The changes in my own studies took place within the larger shift in New Testament studies from a German, Protestant hegemony to an American, non-confessional scene. The historical-critical method was supplemented with other methods, illustrated here by studies of honour and shame societies. In conclusion, I outline how these changes have influenced my own teaching of Paul, as a contextual theologian.