A Relational Encounter with Race

Race remains one of the most highly charged subjects of discourse in our society. At a cultural level, white racial identity has become dissociatively split off from the rest of identity formation. A racialized subjectivity is usually carried by those with darker skin colors, whereas whiteness is experienced as an unmarked and invisible state. The author argues that whites have dissociated the historical position of the oppressor from collective consciousness, due to our inability to tolerate an identification with the aggressor. Our disavowal of race as constitutive of subjectivity ensures that race becomes a site for enactments.

This paper follows the transference-countertransference dynamics between an African American patient mandated to treatment and the author, a white analyst born in South Africa. The haunting presence of racial trauma infused the analysis. Focus is placed on the rich, often unmetabolizable experiences of race, including the ways in which the structure of the treatment recreated the racial dynamics of slavery.     

Crossing Boundaries: Commentary on Paper by Sarah Hill

This commentary focuses on two aspects of Hill's presentation. First, it addresses the critical role of repetition compulsion in carrying into analytic enactments the patient's early, unsymbolized traumas. This discussion addresses, furthermore, Hill's reference to her early, preverbal, experience with an African nanny, as this resonated with some of the author's personal experiences. It is suggested that, particularly in American culture, the identities of white children who experience extended care by black nannies must be regarded as multiply determined, race being a critical determinant. How this aspect of white identity is negotiated in a culture bounded by established racial dichotomies is regarded as critical to analytic inquiry, regardless of the racial makeup of the analytic dyad.     

What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by ??biological racial realism??. Some philosophers mean that ??race is a natural kind in biology??, while others mean that ??race is a real biological kind??. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of ??biological racial realism?? is one that interprets ??biological racial realism?? as ??race is a genuine kind in biology??, where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of ??biological racial realism?? in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article.     

Interactive constructionism: A more preferable anti-realist approach to the metaphysics of race

There is a school of thought that holds the view that the concept of race has a biological referent. In other words, they are of the view that race is biologically real. However, there is a general consensus among the academic and scientific community that race being biologically real is false. The main aim of this article is to argue that interactive constructionism is a more preferable anti-realist position than racial eliminativism. In other words, I will present interactive constructionism as a panacea for what ails racial eliminativism. Firstly, I will begin by giving an analysis and then a critique of racial eliminativism, which is a theory that advocates for the entire elimination of all references to race. Particular attention will be paid to Anthony Appiah’s version of racial eliminativism. I will argue that Appiah’s version lacks cogency and is ultimately controversial because he endorses racial identities, the building block for the formation of race that he wants eliminated. Secondly, I will argue that interactive constructionism – a theory that posits that the groups that we call “races” are really racialised groups – is preferable because it not only allows us to talk about and write policies about the groups that we have been calling “races”, but also does not make the mistake of legitimising or laying the foundation for the concept of race.     

Reckoning With Kant on Race*

This essay develops Kant’s theory of reform to theorize racial justice reform. I assess the function of Kant’s philosophy of race as part of his nonideal theory of justice, which offers a racist pragmatic anthropology that uses the concept of race to determine the practical effectiveness of legislative reason. His philosophy of race defends a teleological account of the natural history of the human species to fulfill the requirements of justice and assumes that certain racial groups have failed to develop their innate capacity for legislative reason. I show that we need an alternative Kantian nonideal theory of justice that demonstrates how legislative reason actualizes practical freedom. Rather than appeal to anthropology, I expand Kant’s model of public reason to advance racial justice reform under the conditions of partial compliance to the requirements of justice in a profoundly nonideal republic such as the U.S. I then showcase the promise—and limits—of the a priori ideals of citizenship and publicity for racial justice reform and introduce the new ideal of interracial civic fellowship to guide the public use of reason in nonideal circumstances.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

The Minimal Cue Hypothesis: How Black Candidates Cue Race to Increase White Voting Participation

Racial group interests can compete in politics. One way competition may occur is when Black candidates cue racial thinking among Whites, leading to rivalry at the ballot box. I address this hypothesis with theories of identity, affect, and racial cognition. I argue that Black Congressional candidates cue these factors among Whites, leading the factors of White racial prejudice and White race liberalism to impact Whites' voting participation. I employ logistic regression analysis of data from the American National Election Study in 1988, 1992, and 2000. The effects of racial prejudice on the predicted probability of voting occur among all Whites, as well as White Republicans, White Democrats, and White conservatives. The effects of White race liberalism occur among all Whites, as well as White Democrats and White liberals. The effects are strongest when Whites are in elections with Black candidates that are either challengers or in open seats.     

On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse

The traditional debate about whether race should be eliminated from public discourse is often conducted in significant part by examining whether race is real. Whether race is real, in turn, often comes down to whether racial discourse purports to refer to social or natural kinds, which means that analysis of racial concepts is crucial to the question of racial eliminativism. The dominate theory of conceptual analysis in the race debate is that racial concepts should be analyzed according to how those terms have been used by historical experts. It is argued here that this dominant theory is misguided, and that we should therefore analyze racial concepts according to how they are used in contemporary, folk discourse. In addition, and in contrast to the main rival to the dominant theory, I argue that we should analyze folk racial discourse not from the armchair, but instead through empirical research.     

"Outsider Within" the Firehouse: African American and White Women Firefighters

Prior findings regarding (a) the subordination of African American women firefighters through imposed exclusion, (b) expanded definitions of tokenism and workgroup composition, and (c) the omnirelevance of race/ethnicity in Black women's perceptions of work experiences are extended to White women firefighters. A nationwide sample of 24 White women firefighters completed a 20-page survey and 1 hr interview developed from these previous findings. Both groups experienced insufficient instruction, hostility, silence, hyper-supervision, lack of support, and stereotyping and supportive as well as strained relationships with coworkers. Specific enactments of these global commonalties often varied along racial/ethnic lines. The present data, which start with the experiences of Black women then examine the experiences of White women, model an important methodological approach for understanding difference.     

Thoughts from a Safe Harbor: Commentary on The Problem of Thinking by Yvette Esprey

Yvette Esprey’s claim that race has the capacity to disrupt thinking in the analytic situation accords with my own experience. In this discussion I take up the question as to why ruptures that occur around race may have a special capacity to disrupt and disable analytic thinking. I look in detail at Esprey’s instructive clinical experience as it gives us a template, something to fall back on, in those moments when anxiety overwhelms us around a racial disruption. Such a template can settle us until we can restore a sense of self that is both raced and analytically focused on the rupture at hand with all its personal and social/historical resonances.     

Enactment as Unconscious Communication

ABSTRACT

I explore the way in which unconscious primitive and nonsymbolic experience is communicated to the analyst’s unconscious through enactment. As the analyst receives the projections unconsciously, she is encouraged to enact aspects of the patient’s internal world. The analytic work then is through the understanding of these subtle and ubiquitous enactments. I value the work of understanding enactments as a rich and subtle pathway into the deepest levels of the patient’s unconscious. I explore the nature of this work and illustrate my point with clinical examples.     

The Strangeness of Passing: Commentary on Paper by Christopher Bonovitz

Christopher Bonovitz gives us a rich landscape of the theoretical, historical, and relational aspects of his work with his mixed-race patient. In my response I explore what seems missing: a stronger sense of the patient as a person, more of her own history in her family, more of the clinical back and forth with her therapist, a sense of what is being played out in the transference, and particularly what “passing” is for her. I show how his choices about how to think about her story and how to tell it are oversaturated with awareness of identity and race at the expense of the basic human relationship. In the face of such racial anxiety, there is a pull to rely too strongly on countertransference as a way to gain privileged access to knowledge about the other. I attribute many of these problems to the inescapable power of race in our culture. Furthermore, I address the themes of hatred, silence, secrecy and transgression as they relate to the history of transgenerational trauma for this patient and invite our broadening our awareness about how they play out in the therapeutic process. We are faced with the difficult, yet the essential task of holding and living out the patient's anger and outrage at the racial hatred that has been endured.     

Black client,white therapist: Working with race in psychoanalytic psychotherapy in South Africa

In post‐apartheid South Africa we speak about race extensively. It permeates our workplace, weaves a thread through the fabric of our professional and personal lives, as well as our private conversations and public interactions with others. From within psychoanalytic theory, the thread weaves through the unknown content of our racialized unconscious. When there is a focus on race in the South African psychoanalytic context it largely takes the form of the struggle to articulate the complexities of working with difference, as Swartz notes, or the struggle to map out issues of race. Such struggles are not localized in South Africa, but strongly reflect a much broader struggle within the global psychoanalytic community, as mirrored in the expanding focus on race. Although the consulting rooms seem far removed from the ongoing political tensions that have recently emerged in South Africa, psychoanalytic psychotherapy remains a space of meaningful engagement with the other, and where the therapeutic dyad is one of racial difference it permits an encounter with our racialized unconscious. This article seeks to document the experience of my black client and my white response to her racial pain and struggle; in doing so, I describe the racial ‘contact’ between us and within us that triggers a racialized transference and countertransference dynamic, which contains the space for racial healing for both of us.     

Enactments of Race in the UK’s Blood Stem Cell Inventory

Recent sociological analyses of the intersections of race and science recognise race’s quality as an enacted object. Through this analytic lens, race is always materialising in the practices and processes that enrol it and therefore enjoys a kind of multiplicity. The context of blood stem cell transplantation, a scientific domain marked by a more and less explicitly racialised logic, offers an opportunity to see the conceptual assertion of race’s multiplicity play out. Indeed, an exploration of the UK’s stem cell inventory reveals—through analysis of interviews, policy and parliamentary meetings—how race materialises in the various practices that comprise this increasingly popular cancer treatment option. Looking at practices of recruitment, inventory management and tissue selection in particular provides an interesting window to look upon race and the many signifiers that implicate it. These cases reveal moments of race’s stablisation and silencing; its oscillation between the status of vital information to the life of a public stem cell inventory, and of secondary data that provides little useful information to clinicians selecting tissue. Adopting an analytic lens that attends to race’s multiple enactments allows us to begin asking why enactments take the shape they do, and why the particular practices that mobilise them come to be.     

The use of race in medicine as a proxy for genetic differences

Race is a prominent category in medicine. Epidemiologists describe how rates of morbidity and mortality vary with race, and doctors consider the race of their patients when deciding whether to test them for sickle-cell anemia or what drug to use to treat their hypertension. At the same time, critics of racial classification say that race is not real but only an illusion or that race is scientifically meaningless. In this paper, I explain how race is used in medicine as a proxy for genes that encode drug metabolizing enzymes and how a proper understanding of race calls into doubt the practice of treating race as a marker of any medically relevant genetic trait.     

Video Treatment Re-Examined: Enactments,Erotic Transference,and the Third: Reply to Lyons and Williams

This discussion will address clinical, procedural, and theoretical issues raised by Lyons and Williams in response to my paper. I will elaborate on potential enactments, the erotic transference, and the third as related to the case.     

From psychic holes to psychic representations

Abstract

In this essay, I will explore the term “psychic hole,” and compare it to similar terms from the world of astrophysics and terms used in the psychoanalytic literature. I will then present my own conception of the “psychic hole” in cases of Holocaust survivors' offspring. I will explain how this “hole” is created, and describe a particular aspect of the “psychic hole” that is unique to Holocaust survivors' offspring, namely the enactments (termed “concretization” by Bergman) generated by the negated traumatic themes that reside in it. I will illustrate these enactments using clinical material taken from case studies of Holocaust survivors' offspring that I have previously published. The clinical vignettes reveal the transgenerational impact of the memory hole resulting from negation of survivor parents on the lives of their offspring, up to the third generation. They also show the painful journey from enactments to psychic representations, a journey which exposes the traumatic events that have been denied or repressed, and facilitates the work of mourning and the eventual achievement of a better integrated self. Finally, I will offer technical suggestions for analysts to help patients transform psychic holes into psychic representations.     

Resolving the Tensions Between White People's Active Investment in Racial Inequality and White Ignorance: A Response to Marzia Milazzo

This article responds to Marzia Milazzo's article ‘On white ignorance, white shame, and other pitfalls in critical philosophy of race’ (2017), in which Milazzo argues that the concepts white shame, white guilt, white privilege, white habits, white invisibility and white ignorance are pitfalls in the process of decolonisation. Milazzo contends that the way these concepts are theorised in much critical philosophy of race minimises white people's active interest in reproducing the racial status quo. While I agree with Milazzo's critique of white shame and white guilt, I argue that these affective responses are fundamentally different to the remaining concepts. Drawing on critical whiteness studies and agnotology, I argue that white privilege, white invisibility and white ignorance are valuable conceptual tools for revealing (as opposed to minimising) white people's active investment in maintaining racial inequality. Whereas Milazzo sees a contradiction between white people's active interest in maintaining racial inequality and concepts like white invisibility and white ignorance, I argue that, correctly theorised, these concepts resolve this apparent contradiction. I contest Milazzo's call to reject white privilege, white invisibility and white ignorance, arguing that these concepts are useful tools in the project of decolonisation.     

Whiteness in Latina Immigrants: A Venezuelan Perspective

This article examines the construct of Whiteness in Venezuela, which requires a framework that differs from the fixed racial categories commonly used in the United States. In Venezuela, where most citizens are of mixed race and where the concept of race is fluid, race and racism take on more complex forms that include dimensions such as social class, eye color, family, education, and even manners. This means that Whiteness and privilege do not always go hand in hand. I discuss ways in which this culturally defined notion of race can be incorporated into psychotherapy with Latina immigrants to the United States.     

Construction and cross-validation of an MMPI Black-White scale

A robust set of MMPI items, sensitive to the effect of race (Blacks versus Whites), was constructed by compiling the results of six prior studies. Thirty-two items comprised the MMPI B-W scale. The scale was cross-validated on psychiatric patients and police cadets. Statistically significant mean differences were found between races in both groups, with 83% and 60% correct racial classification, respectively. These findings suggested that when used as a clinical instrument, the MMPI might pick up nonpathology-related racial variance contributing to scale devotion biased against the black respondent, but the degree of nonpathology-related racial scale score covariance has yet to be determined. For future research, the B-W scale was proposed as a set of standard queries in studies assessing connotative meaning for Black-White contrast groups, and to index "functional" as opposed to "objective" race membership.