Comparing Field Theories

While in broad agreement with many of the observations made by Donnel B. Stern, this essay emphasizes certain differences in how BFT in general and the work of Nino Ferro in particular are seen. These begin with the very meaning of the term, field, and include a less authoritarian view of the analyst's “knowing” the degree to which the analyst's unconscious and subjectivity are implicated in the creation of the field, and the nature and degree of the analyst's unconscious contribution to the creation of the field.     

The patient's transference experience of the analyst's gender: Projection,factuality, interpretation,or construction

The constructivist/relational perspective has challenged the analyst's emotional superiority, her omniscience, and her relative removal from the psychoanalytic dialogue. It at first appears to be antithetical to treatment approaches that emphasize the analyst's holding functions. In this essay I examine the holding model and its resolution from a relational perspective. I propose that the current discomfort with the holding function is related to its apparent, but not necessarily real, implications. I discuss the analyst's and patient's subjectivity during periods of holding. I believe that the holding process is essential when the patient has intensely toxic reactions to “knowing”; the analyst and is therefore not yet able to stand a mutual analytic experience. During holding, the patient experiences an illusion of analytictic attunement. This requires that the analyst's dysjunctive subjectivity be contained within the analyst, but not that it be abandoned. Ultimately, it is the transition from the holding position toward collaborative interchange that will allow analyst and patient explicitly to address and ultimately to integrate dependence and mutuality within the psychoanalytic setting and thereby engage in an intersubjective dialogue. The movement toward mutuality will require that the analyst of the holding situation begin to fail in ways that increasingly expose her externality and thus her subjectivity to the patient.     

Countertransference: Our new royal road to the unconscious?

In this paper I am tracing the history of countertransference and how it has informed the current debate about self‐disclosure as a pivotal instrument of analytic work. Now that the analyst's “subjective factor”; has been understood as a central influence on the analysand and as a vital source of information about the analysand's intrapsychic life, I argue that certain currents in the relational school of psychoanalysis confuse the analyst's subjectivity with his personality. While becoming more “real”; with a patient may enliven a stale analytic dialogue, it ought not be confused with, or take the place of, an analysis of unconscious desires and phantasies. I claim that a two‐person psychology can exist only within a tripartite structure in which the analyst does not lose sight of his complex function of being the carrier, observer, and conveyor of the unconscious currents holding both participants in check.     

Identification with the aggressor and the ‘normal traumas’: clinical implications

Ferenczi's (1933) surprisingly unknown concept of identification with the aggressor – an abuse victim's ‘eliminating’ her own subjectivity and ‘becoming’ precisely what an attacker needs her to be – has radical implications for our understanding of analytic technique. Its very frequent occurrence also forces us to broaden our understanding of what constitutes trauma. Ferenczi saw the experience of ‘traumatic aloneness’ or ‘emotional abandonment’ as the key element of trauma, since this is what enforces the traumatic responses of dissociation and identification with the aggressor. Identification with the aggressor operates in the analytic relationship in both patient and analyst. This has various consequences, including the structuring of the relationship through unconscious collusions – mutually coordinated, defensive identifications designed to help both participants feel secure. This view of the analytic relationship has clinical implications in at least four areas: the understanding of the patient's free associations, which may reflect the patient's compliance with the analyst's wishes rather than the contents of the patient's own unconscious; the need for some kind of mutuality of analysis; the traumatizing potential of the analyst's authority; and the tendency of some patients to take blame and responsibility reflexively, as a way of protecting the analyst.     

Affective Experiences and Honesty in the Interaction: Discussion of Holly Levenkron's Paper

Anchoring her views in the work of Benjamin and other American relational authors, Levenkron asserts that intersubjective relatedness in which there is recognition of separate realities is essentially the only form of relatedness. Framing growth as coming about through the recognition of another's subjectivity provides a basis for “confrontation” and for a more direct injection of the analyst's subjectivity into the analytic encounter. More specifically, it fosters the expression of the analyst's subjectivity from what this author calls the “other-centered” and “self” perspectives.

In contrast, the recognition of selfobject and caretaking relatedness positions the analyst to express directly aspects of the analyst's subjectivity pertaining to mirroring, idealizing, and twinship selfobject needs. Kohut and classical self psychologists have delineated selfobject needs and the selfobject dimension of relatedness and transference and have emphasized the consistent use of the empathic listening/experiencing perspective. American relational theorists have delineated intersubjective relatedness and the usefulness of the other-centered listening/experiencing perspective. This author focuses on an integrative theory including three forms of relatedness and different listening/experiencing perspectives. Different listening/experiencing perspectives and forms of relatedness fundamentally influence analysts' affective experiences within the analytic encounter as exemplified in Levenkron's case.     

Discussion of Holly Levenkron's “Love (and Hate) With the Proper Stranger”

I agree with Holly Levenkron that the value of an intersubjective perspective is pragmatic: It directs the analyst toward more effective technique. Also, I agree with her view that a successful analytic process is a negotiation between analyst and patient. However, I question Levenkron's idea that the analyst must loosen her hold on her own subjectivity in order for the negotiation to proceed. An analyst cannot and need not diminish her subjectivity. Rather, what is required for clinical analytic work to unfold is that the analyst include the patient within the analyst's subjectivity—or, in other words, that the analyst come to love the patient.     

CHEMISTRY AND CONTAINING: THE ANALYST'S USE OF UNAVOIDABLE FAILURES

Certain patients overwhelm the analyst's capacity to contain both the patient and the analyst's own unbearable feelings. Though some such failures of containing may lead fairly quickly to self‐correction and others to clinical impasse, our focus is on an in‐between state in which the analyst's ability to tolerate his inevitable failures and gradually to (re)establish his containing capacities through difficult self‐analytic work can lead to significant change that might not otherwise be possible. The authors argue that this internal psychological work on the analyst's part, which may require considerable time, effort, and suffering, is an important aspect of “good enough” containing. The unique chemistry generated between patient and analyst plays an important role in both establishing and maintaining this kind of productive analytic process.     

Shades of Mark Twain: Commentary on Paper by Steven H. Cooper

The author considers Cooper's notion of the pluralistic third from several angles as Cooper's use of the term covers a range of applications from that of an internal supervisor to the use of ideas from psychoanalytic traditions other than one's own in evaluating one's clinical work. The impression created of the American situation is contrasted with the institutionalized pluralism of the British Psychoanalytical Society since the Second World War. The author believes that the theoretical question of the analyst's accountability to a professional authority is overdetermined in the paper because the clinical material is dominated by the patient's problems in facing up to parental authority. A crucial enactment is seen as starting at the analyst's first contact with the patient, which seems to subvert the analyst's capacity to be an authority figure. The analyst finds a working relationship with his own psychoanalytic authority in the second session of the analysis but seems to lose it through an overextension of the ideas of “play,” self-questioning, and the seeking of agreement between patient and analyst. The author considers the clinical material from the point of view that his peer supervision group would take.     

Self‐analysis and the development of an interpretation

In spite of the fact that Freud's self‐analysis was at the centre of so many of his discoveries, self‐analysis remains a complex, controversial and elusive exercise. While self‐analysis is often seen as emerging at the end of an analysis and then used as a criteria in assessing the suitability for termination, I try to attend to the patient's resistance to self‐analysis throughout an analysis. I take the view that the development of the patient's capacity for self‐analysis within the analytic session contributes to the patient's growth and their creative and independent thinking during the analysis, which prepares him or her for a fuller life after the formal analysis ends. The model I will present is based on an over lapping of the patient's and the analyst's self‐analysis, with recognition and use of the analyst's counter‐transference. My focus is on the analyst's self‐analysis that is in response to a particular crisis of not knowing, which results in feeling intellectually and emotionally stuck. This paper is not a case study, but a brief look at the process I went through to arrive at a particular interpretation with a particular patient during a particular session. I will concentrate on resistances in which both patient and analyst initially rely upon what is consciously known.     

Our Theories,Our Selves: Commentary on Paper by Ruth Gruenthal

Ruth Gruenthal invites us to explore the dynamics embedded in disengagement. She suggests that this very concept is an oxymoron; by virtue of the fact that the patient is in treatment she is, in fact, engaged. Gruenthal focuses on disengagement's self-sustaining function, noting that it represents an attempt to regulate emotional distance while still retaining a connection to the other. Recognizing how difficult work with withdrawn patients can be, Gruenthal suggests that theory can actually shift the analyst's negative countertransference response. Implicitly she challenges the relational assumption that active engagement around the analyst's subjectivity always lies at the center of therapeutic process. I offer my own take on the dynamics at the heart of Gruenthal's treatment of Helen, proposing that neither disengagement nor containment can be accounted for by the patient or analyst alone. I explore how theory helps us manage our subjectivity while also embodying it.     

Psychoanalysis and Humanism: A Review and Critical Examination of Integrationist Efforts With Some Proposed Resolutions

Psychoanalysis and psychological humanism are theories that provide ways of understanding the psychotherapeutic process. These orientations have somewhat incompatible assumptions, thereby making integration difficult. Efforts at theoretical integration of psychoanalysis and humanism are critically reviewed along the lines of F. Pine's (1990) 4 psychologies of psychoanalysis. The author concludes that psychoanalysis and humanism have certain compatible features, but that they generally represent opposing vantage points in the study of subjectivity. Each orientation is grounded in a particular epistemic value system that dictates the way knowledge about others should be acquired. Recommendations for integrating these orientations in the psychotherapeutic process are provided.     

Meditations on Aggression,Loss, Discovery,and Influence in Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis requires acts of creative destruction. At the same time that analysts create new ways of being for themselves and each other, old ways are consequently destroyed. Just as parents envision futures for their children, analysts envision futures for their patients, reflecting a desire or effort to change them. Awareness of the destruction inherent in facilitating growth can enrich an analyst's work, but anxiety about being destructive, and being destroyed, can stifle it. This paper presents an analyst's reflections on creative and destructive aspects of psychoanalysis. Autobiographical and clinical data are presented to illuminate this theme.     

SELF‐KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL STUPIDITY

Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self‐deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception‐distorting self‐absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self‐knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the presence or absence of particular desires and beliefs can an agent have authority over them or exercise responsibility for their absence. But what is the connection between self‐knowledge and moral development? I argue that accounts (such as Kant's and Richard Moran's) which construe instances of self‐knowledge as like the verdicts of a judge cannot explain its potential role in moral development, and claim that it must be conceived of in a way that makes possible a process of self‐refinement and self‐regulation. Making use of Buddhist moral psychology, I argue that when self‐knowledge plays a role in moral development, it includes a quality of attention to one's experience best modeled as the work of the craftsperson, not as judge.     

The Psychoanalytic Other: Commentary on Paper by Helen K. Gediman

Dr. Gediman locates the intersection of modern Freudian and relational theory in the arena of what she calls the “disclosures of everyday analysis” (p. 242). She suggests that because Freudian analysts, like their relational colleagues, work intersubjectively, relational theory does not itself embody a paradigm shift away from the Freudian model. I disagree. Relational theories assume that the analyst's work is inevitably informed by the relational context in a way that precludes clinical certainty. Gediman, however, believes that the analyst is capable of separating her countertransference response from her subjectivity and thus can interpret from a position of clinical certainty. Each set of theoretical assumptions is associated with a somewhat different analytic stance and analytic ideal. Freudian analysts aim for a position of “methodological neutrality” that relies on considerable certainty in the countertransference while giving the analyst plenty of room within which to use her subjectivity. The relational ideal concerns the analyst's capacity to enter into an asymmetrical treatment relationship and to tolerate the uncertainty generated therein.     

The soul of psychoanalysis in the modern world reflections on the work of Christopher Bollas

The paper begins with the claim that psychoanalysis faces a dilemma in locating itself in a contemporary world that devalues experiences of interiority, depth, and embeddedness in personal history. Psychoanalysis's coming to terms with this modern world—reflected in contemporary relational paradigms and emphases on interaction, authority, and epistemology—is essential yet tends to replace an outdated conformity with an updated one, in which what is offered to analysands may become limited and the soul of psychoanalysis lost.

Bollas's work attempts to reinspire psychoanalysis. This paper explores his contributions and the tensions within them and develops several points about how psychoanalysis can maintain a worthwhile self—for itself and for its analysands—in the modern world. Among the issues discussed are the sense in which an endogenous motivational core associated with an emphasis on interiority may be compatible with a relational paradigm and how the notion of personal idiom is a rich and fruitful one, but that the cultural field deserves a more fundamental place than it is given by Bollas. The problem of authority and exploitation, within and outside the consulting room, is also taken up, and it is argued that psychoanalysis should be conceived as a moral discourse in which the analyst's self‐subverting (but not diminished) authority is essential.     

THE ANALYST'S WAY OF BEING: RECOGNIZING SEPARABLE SUBJECTIVITIES AND THE PENDULUM'S SWING

Whether the analyst finds the patient's emerging transference affectively tolerable or intolerable plays an important role in the analytic couple's negotiation of the configuration that the transference‐countertransference relationship ultimately assumes. If the analyst is deeply repelled by transference‐related roles to which he is assigned, patient‐ascribed attributions, or projection‐drenched interactions, he may react in violent protest, engaging in enactments that say more about his separable subjectivity than about the intersubjective situation. While there has been a recent trend to view enactments as a crucial aspect of psychoanalytic technique, this trend risks overlooking the way in which the analyst's way of being comes into play in the treatment.     

PATIENT‐ANALYST “WITHNESS”: ON ANALYTIC “PRESENCING,” PASSION,AND COMPASSION IN STATES OF BREAKDOWN,DESPAIR, AND DEADNESS

This paper focuses on the analyst's “presencing” (being there) within the patient's experiential world and within the grip of the psychoanalytic process, and the ensuing deep patient–analyst interconnectedness, as a fundamental dimension of analytic work. It engenders new possibilities for extending the reach of psychoanalytic treatment to more disturbed patients. Here patient and analyst forge an emergent new entity of interconnectedness or “withness” that goes beyond the confines of their separate subjectivities and the simple summation of the two. Using a detailed clinical illustration of a difficult analysis with a severely fetishistic‐masochistic patient, the author describes the kind of knowledge, experience, and powerful effects that come into being when the analyst interconnects psychically with the patient in living through the process, and that relate specifically to the analyst's compassion.     

Neutrality,tenderness and the analyst's subjectivity

Addressing the rôle of the analyst in the psychoanalytic relationship, the author takes issue with the emphasis on acknowledging the analyst's subjectivity and the critique of concepts like neutrality and abstinence as these issues are presented in the relational tradition. He advocates a better articulation and emphasis of these concepts in the service of understanding the impact of the analyst's subjectivity, and demonstrates how the mere loosening up of analytic neutrality and abstinence and an acceptance of the analyst's self-disclosure make transference analysis more difficult to handle. Such an attitude also increases the risk for ethically dubious conduct, since there is a close link between clinical methods and ethical standards in psychoanalysis. In conclusion, the author points to the importance of the analyst's continuous self-reflection and countertransference analysis.     

Falling into language life: a montage of pre‐faces in search of a text‐ual body

Clinical work, as all of consciousness, is steeped in and emerges out of language. Language is the medium of our knowing, and knowing the medium of our relating. Language has us; words dream us. For the mythical Navajo as for John of the New Testament, in the Beginning was the Word. Before any kind of distinction of thought, feeling, sensation or intuition comes language – language, not as ‘just words’, but as image. Words are images, and images as encompassing worlds present themselves as and through language. As a determinant of identity, language undermines all cues as to individual subjectivity, Yahweh's ‘I am here’ rendering time and place relative, and subjectivity co‐constituted. This paper is a meditation on language for clinicians in the form that language presents itself, as a meandering flow of consciousness with associations and signposts leading onward.