The Effect of Intuitive Advice Justification on Advice Taking

How do you respond when receiving advice from somebody with the argumentation “my gut tells me so” or “this is what my intuition says”? Most likely, you would find this justification insufficient and disregard the advice. Are there also situations where people do appreciate such intuitive advice and change their opinion accordingly? A growing number of authors write about the power of intuition in solving problems, showing that intuitively made decisions can be of higher quality than decisions based on analytical reasoning. We want to know if decision makers, when receiving advice based on an intuitive cognitive process, also recognize the value of such advice. Is advice justified by intuition necessarily followed to a lesser extent than an advice justified by analysis? Furthermore, what are the important factors influencing the effect of intuitive justification on advice taking? Participants across three studies show that utilization of intuitive advice varies depending on advisor seniority and type of task for which the advice is given. Summarizing, the results suggest that decision makers a priori doubt the value of intuitive advice and only assess it as accurate if other cues in the advice setting corroborate this. Intuitively justified advice is utilized more if it comes from a senior advisor. In decision tasks with experiential products, intuitively justified advice can even have more impact than analytically justified advice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing Individual Differences in Experiential (Intuitive) and Rational (Analytical) Cognitive Styles

Even though it is argued that intuition has ‘come of age’ in the behavioral sciences, there are still unresolved issues regarding self‐report assessment of intuitive and analytical styles of information processing (cognitive styles). The unitary view proposes that intuition and analysis are opposite ends of a single continuum. The dual view proposes that intuition and analysis are independent (orthogonal) constructs. Moreover, within the dual view, it has been proposed that intuition and analysis can be further subdivided into ability and engagement subcomponents. The aim of this article was to test both of these claims and thereby move discussions regarding the assessment of cognitive styles further forward. This research is important given that much intuition research in organizations is predicated on self‐report methods of assessment. Using data from a sample of police officers and police staff from a large police organization in the United Kingdom, we found that the adoption of a dual (rather than unitary) perspective when assessing experiential and rational cognitive styles is warranted, whereas adopting an ability and engagement refinement is not (hence a simpler formulation is to be preferred). We also observed a number of main effects and interactions with respect to job type, job level, gender, and experience. We offer guidelines for the self‐report assessment of intuition and analysis cognitive styles and discuss a typology of styles. The article concludes by outlining a number of practical implications for cognitive styles assessment in organizational settings.     

The Heart and the Head: On Choosing Experiences Intuitively and Possessions Deliberatively

An enduring question in the field of judgment and decision making is when people are likely to choose on the basis of intuition and when they are likely to pursue a more deliberative decision strategy. Here, we attempt to shed light on that question by examining whether people tend to weight intuition more heavily when making experiential purchases, and to weight deliberation more heavily when making material purchases. Results from seven studies indicate that they do. In Study 1 (and a replication), participants expressed an explicit preference for choosing experiential purchases intuitively and material purchases analytically. In Study 2 (and a replication), participants anticipated experiencing more regret after going against reason for material purchases and going against intuition for experiential purchases. Participants in Study 3 who were asked to think about an experiential purchase wanted to see the relevant information presented by alternative, which facilitates intuitive/holistic processing, more than did those who were asked to consider a material purchase. In two additional studies, participants who were induced to think intuitively chose experiential purchases more often (Study 4) and reported a higher willingness to pay for them (Study 5) compared with participants induced to think analytically. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Affect, Religion, and Unconscious Processes

After a brief review of the central and organizing role of affect in both personality and religion, the bridge between psychoanalytic and contemporary cognitive perspectives of the unconscious is investigated, with a special focus on an affectively based experiential component as outlined in Epstein's (1973, 1993, 1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) model. Four basic needs postulated by CEST are applied to religious experience: the need to manage pleasure and pain, the need for a coherent conceptual system, the need for self-esteem, and the need for relatedness. The last of these four needs is explored in detail from an object relations perspective that expands Freud's religion-as-illusion concept. It is maintained that an object relations approach contributes much to an understanding of a process-oriented spirituality, though it cannot appropriately speak to religious truth claims.     

An experiential thinking style: its facets and relations with objective and subjective criterion measures

In Study 1, an experiential factor divided into the following 3 factors when 3 or more factors were extracted: intuition, emotionality, and imagination; whereas a rational factor retained its coherence. In Study 2, an experiential but not a rational thinking style was positively associated with performance measures of creativity, humor, aesthetic judgment, and intuition and with self-report measures of empathy and social popularity. A rational thinking style was associated with several measures of adjustment. Both thinking styles were positively related to personal growth. Support was provided from several sources for the discriminant validity of the experiential facets. In a third study, the independence of the 2 thinking styles and of gender differences in self-reported data were verified by observations by others of participants' thinking styles. The importance of identifying facets of an experiential thinking style and of discovering previously unrecognized favorable attributes of this thinking style was discussed.     

Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective

A lay definition of intuition holds that it involves immediate apprehension in the absence of reasoning. From a more technical point of view, I argue also that intuition should be seen as the contrastive of reasoning, corresponding roughly to the distinction between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processes in contemporary dual process theories of thinking. From this perspective, we already know a great deal about intuition: It is quick, provides feelings of confidence, can reflect large amounts of information processing, and is most likely to provide accurate judgments when based on relevant experiential learning. Unlike reasoning, intuition is low effort and does not compete for central working memory resources. It provides default responses which may—or often may not—be intervened upon with high effort, reflective reasoning. Intuition has, however, been blamed for a range of cognitive biases in the psychological literatures on reasoning and decision making. The evidence indicates that with novel and abstract problems, not easily linked to previous experience, intervention with effortful reasoning is often required to avoid such biases. Hence, although it seems that intuition dominates reasoning most of the time—both in the laboratory and the real world—it can indeed be a false friend.     

Ockham’s weak externalism

There is debate over whether the content of an intuitive cognition is determined externally or internally in Ockham’s theory. According to the most common view, which I call the Strong Externalist Interpretation (SE), intuitive content is wholly determined externally. Opposed to SE is the Strong Internalist Interpretation (SI), according to which the content of an intuition is wholly determined by internal features of a cognizer. The aim of this paper is to argue against those interpretations, and to argue for a third kind of interpretation which preserves interpretative advantages of SE and SI without falling into the difficulties that each faces. On this view, intuitive content is complex, and its complexity is analyzed into a mix of internalist and externalist elements.     

Gender differences in the effect of visual sexual stimulation on the perceived covariation between freedom and responsibility

The authors replicated and extended a test of Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST; S. Epstein, 1973, 1980, 1985, 1994, 2003) regarding subjective estimates of the relationship between freedom and responsibility. CEST predicts that information in the form of sexually provocative images is likely to be processed by the experiential system. The authors' hypothesis was that such experiential processing would cause an increase in the likelihood of participants endorsing as true a statement that proposed a negative correlation between freedom and responsibility. University students (N = 97) in introductory psychology classes viewed 25 images of either men or women in provocative clothing, or a control consisting of academic journal covers, after which they responded to 24 statements proposing either a positive, negative, or noncontingent relationship between freedom and responsibility. Judgments were analyzed according to perceiver gender and target gender, as well as the framing of the proposition and its contingency category. The hypothesis was supported for the men and to a lesser extent for the women. Although priming the experiential system by exposing participants to sexually provocative images did not change endorsement rates of positive contingencies, it did lead to an increase in the likelihood of simultaneously endorsing negative contingencies.     

The effects of rational and experiential information processing of expert testimony in death penalty cases

Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

Thinking about smoking: A novel approach to describing cognitive style profiles

Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) emphasizes the dual roles of rational and experiential thinking, with individuals having varying preferences for each style. This study explored the relationship between these constructs, illustrating the value of the derived model in addictive behavior, as illustrated by smoking. Data were extracted from a study of the predictors of men’s health behavior. Participants comprised 212 Australian men (aged 25–65 years) who completed a self-report questionnaire which assessed thinking styles and recorded smoking status. Rational and experiential data were subjected to cluster analysis and median splits to identify logical subgroups based on participants’ dual responses. The four derived clusters were more representative of smoking status than groups defined by median splits. In general, both smokers and ex-smokers preferred experiential thinking and non-smokers preferred rational thinking. There was a strong tendency for smokers to report both low rational and high experiential thinking. The use of cluster analysis advanced the evaluation of the interactive nature of rational and experiential thinking by allowing an empirical test of their potential relationship. The thinking profiles reported represent an advance in the assessment of CEST which may provide a useful model for applications in fields both related to, and beyond, addiction.     

What Does it Mean to be Trauma-Informed? A Multi-System Perspective from Practitioners Serving the Community

The increased awareness of the detrimental consequences of trauma exposure has led researchers to focus their attention in identifying best practices on integrating trauma-informed approaches (TIAs) to child and family services. Yet, terms related to TIAs are often utilized without an adequate definition, and most importantly, without concrete and specific strategies to ensure that services are in fact trauma-informed. Using a multi-methods approach, this project examined important practice considerations that support successful implementation of TIA in school and community-based behavioral health settings. Key informant interviews and electronic surveys were conducted with child and family systems practitioners; interviews inquired about training, current practices, and barriers to service engagement. Data was analyzed, organized, and synthesized in accordance with core domains and specific components proposed by Hanson and Lang’s (2014) trauma-informed care framework. Findings suggest that practice of TIA differed by system and was largely driven by experiential and informal learning experiences. Practitioners also report challenges unique to each system hinder the utilization of screening and intervention best practices. Salient differences included those related to knowledge and accessibility to training, utilization of evidence-based practices, application of screening tools, and availability of resources within their systems. This brings to light the importance of considering both general and system-specific practice mechanism for the successful implementation and sustainability of TIA frameworks. We suggest system-specific strategies to help integrate trauma into services, including prioritizing capacity building efforts within each system by leveraging their natural supports and identifying systems-specific assets for both screening and intervention practices.

     

Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe

Abstract: This essay addresses three specific moments in the history of the role played by intuition in Kant's system. Part one develops Kant's attitude toward intuition in order to understand how ‘sensible intuition’ becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ for human cognition. Part two considers the role of Jacobi when it came to interpreting both Kant's epistemic achievement and what were taken to be the outstanding problems of freedom's relation to nature; problems interpreted to be resolvable only via an appeal to ‘intellectual intuition’. Part three begins with Kant's subsequent return to the question of freedom and nature in his Critique of Judgment. With Goethe's contemporaneous Metamorphoses of Plants as a contrast case, it becomes clear that whereas Goethe can embrace the role of an intuitive understanding in his account of nature and within the logic of polarity in particular, Kant could never allow an intuition of nature that in his system would spell the very impossibility of freedom itself.     

The Psychophysiology Of Intuition: A Quantum-Holographic Theory Of Nonlocal Communication

This work seeks to explain intuitive perception—those perceptions that are not based on reason or logic or on memories or extrapolations from the past, but are based, instead, on accurate foreknowledge of the future. Often such intuitive foreknowledge involves perception of implicit information about nonlocal objects and/or events by the body's psychophysiological systems. Recent experiments have shown that intuitive perception of a future event is related to the degree of emotional significance of that event, and a new study shows that both the brain and the heart are involved in processing a pre-stimulus emotional response to the future event. Drawing on this research and on the principles of quantum holography, I develop a theory of intuition that views the perception of things remote in space or ahead in time (nonlocal communication) as involving processes of energetic resonance connecting the body's psychophysiological systems to the quantum level. The theory explains how focused emotional attention directed to the nonlocal object of interest attunes the bio-emotional energy generated by the body's psychophysiological systems to a domain of quantum-holographical information, which contains implicit information about the object. The body's perception of such implicit information about things distant in space/time is experienced as an intuition.     

A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.     

Intuition: A Challenge for Psychological Research on Decision Making

Intuition represents an enormous challenge for research on decision making. What is intuition? How does it modify our appreciation of cognitive abilities? When should people trust intuition? These questions set the agenda for this article, which (a) defines intuition, (b) comments on how intuition has been viewed across time in the decision making literature, (c) stresses the need to specify different types of intuition, (d) discusses when intuition is likely to lead to good decisions, and (e) presents four challenges. These are, first, elucidating the evolution of preferences; second, illuminating culturally acquired values such as morals; third, the need to educate intuitive responses; and fourth, problems in using intuition for decision making in a changing world. However, the major challenge facing intuition research is the need for conceptual work to define the nature and scope of different intuitive phenomena. To be useful, the concept should not become too broad.     

The Proof of Utility and Equity in Mill's Utilitarianism

Bolzano incorporated Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts into the doctrine of propositions by distinguishing between conceptual (Begriffssätze an sich) and intuitive propositions (Anschauungssätze an sich). An intuitive proposition contains at least one objective intuition, that is, a simple idea that represents exactly one object; a conceptual proposition contains no objective intuition. After Bolzano, philosophers dispensed with the distinction between conceptual and intuitive propositions. So why did Bolzano attach philosophical importance to it? I will argue that, ultimately, the value of the distinction lies in the fact that conceptual and intuitive truths have different objective grounds: if a conceptual truth is grounded at all, its ground is a conceptual truth. The difference in grounds between conceptual and intuitive truths motivates Bolzano's criticism of Kant's view that intuition plays the fundamental role in mathematics, a conceptual science by Bolzano's lights.     

‘If something doesn’t look right,go find out why’: how intuitive decision making is accomplished in police first-response

ABSTRACT

Intuition is an important mechanism by which organizational actors make significant decisions; however, precisely how intuitive decisions are taken is not well understood and hence is worthy of closer scrutiny. First-response decisions, because of the conditions under which they are executed, offer researchers an interesting and relevant context for the study of intuitive decision making in organizations. We used qualitative methods to explore how “peak performing” police officers used intuition in first-response decisions. Our findings show that intuition’s role in first-response occurs in two differing but complementary ways: “recognition-based intuition” and “intuition-based inquiry”. This finding builds on previous intuition research and informs current debates in behavioural sciences regarding “default-intervention” versus “parallel-competitive” variants of dual-process theory; it also reveals how a complex and situated mix of intuition and analysis can guide effective decision making and support peak performance in uncertain, dynamic and complex environments that typify many organizational decision processes. Our findings contribute to intuition research by extending the current theory of “intuition-as-expertise” in going beyond a simple “recognize-and-respond” model. We propose a “Perceiving-Knowing-Enacting-Closing” framework which captures the complex role that intuition in combination with analysis plays in police first-response decisions, and discuss implications for decision-making policies and practices in organizations.     

Feeling we’re biased: Autonomic arousal and reasoning conflict

Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive beliefs. A key question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with logical considerations or from a failure to discard these tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by focusing on conflict-related autonomic nervous system modulation during biased reasoning. Participants’ skin conductance responses (SCRs) were monitored while they solved classic syllogisms in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the logical correct response. Results indicated that all reasoners showed increased SCRs when solving the inconsistent conflict problems. Experiment 2 validated that this autonomic arousal boost was absent when people were not engaged in an active reasoning task. The presence of a clear autonomic conflict response during reasoning lends credence to the idea that reasoners have a “gut” feeling that signals that their intuitive response is not logically warranted. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Affect,Moral Intuition,and Risk

The natural way to deal with moral issues involving risk is to rely on our intuitive feelings. “How bad is it? Well, how bad does it feel?” We can also rely on reason to determine right and wrong but, as Jonathan Haidt has demonstrated, intuition comes first and dominates our responses unless we make an effort to critique and, if necessary, override it. We argue that our intuitive feelings are insensitive to large losses of life and thus mislead us in the face of natural disasters or human disasters associated with poverty, disease, and violence. Our intuitions seduce us into calmly turning away from these catastrophes, when we should be driven by outrage or sorrow to act. We propose ways to overcome this insensitivity through new forms of education and communication coupled with reliance on moral deliberation aimed at designing laws and institutions that compel attention to such problems.     

Personality and the use of intuition: individual differences in strategy and performance on an implicit learning task

There is a divergence of opinion regarding the existence of individual differences in the use of intuition, ranging from intuition being the preserve of a creative minority to intuition as a basic cognitive process that is equally accessible to all. The existence and nature of individual differences in the use of intuition were explored by studying relationships between the sensing–intuition scale of the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator and strategy and performance on an implicit learning task. Results indicated differences in strategy and performance in implicit learning between sensing and intuitive types. Intuitive types were more likely to report a strategy of using intuition; sensing types were more likely to use explicit knowledge. In addition, intuitive types were more accurate than sensing types in their intuition. Thus, the position that there are individual differences in the use of intuition has been supported. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.