Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

NEW VOICES, NEW VISIONS

This article proposes an alternative model for psychological inquiry based in the experiences of lesbians and gay men. I propose that there are three elements that cross-situationally define a lesbian and gay reality: biculturalism, marginality, and normative creativity. Each of these elements is explored with examples of how these perspectives might alter the way that certain dominant notions about human relationships are understood. The article closes with questions regarding the application of this lesbian and gay paradigm to methodologies for inquiry. The relationship between a lesbian/gay paradigm for psychology and feminist questions regarding epistemology is also explored.     

Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model

The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model appears to violate Bayesian conditionalization, but I argue that this is not the case. By paying close attention to the details of conditionalization in contexts where indexical information is relevant, we discover that the hybrid model is in fact consistent with Bayesian kinematics. If the proposed model is correct, there are important lessons for the study of self-location, observation selection theory, and anthropic reasoning.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: The test of development

Dual-process theories have become increasingly influential in the psychology of reasoning. Though the distinction they introduced between intuitive and reflective thinking should have strong developmental implications, the developmental approach has rarely been used to refine or test these theories. In this article, I review several contemporary dual-process accounts of conditional reasoning that theorize the distinction between the two systems of reasoning as a contrast between heuristic and analytic processes, probabilistic and mental model reasoning, or emphasize the role of metacognitive processes in reflective reasoning. These theories are evaluated in the light of the main developmental findings. It is argued that a proper account of developmental phenomena requires the integration of the main strengths of these three approaches. I propose such an integrative theory of conditional understanding and argue that the modern dual-process framework could benefit from earlier contributions that made the same distinction between intuition and reflective thinking, such as Piaget’s theory.     

Rethinking the biopsychosocial model of health: Understanding health as a dynamic system

The biopsychosocial model has dominated research and theory in health psychology. This article expands the biopsychosocial model by applying systems theories proposed by developmental scholars, including Bronfenbrenner's ecological models and Sameroff's transactional model, as well as contemporary philosophical work on dynamic systems. The proposed dynamic biopsychosocial model construes human health as a product of the reciprocal influences of biological, psychological, interpersonal, and macrosystem contextual dynamics that unfold over personal and historical time. The importance, or centrality, of these influences varies within a person over time. The model is explicated using two hypothetical case studies derived from existing interdisciplinary health research. Implications for health, theory, research, and policy are discussed.     

Diversity in Individual↔Context Relations as the Basis for Positive Development Across the Life Span: A Developmental Systems Perspective for Theory,Research, and Application (The 2004 Society for the Study of Human Development Presidential Address)

Contemporary, cutting-edge scholarship in human developmental science is framed by developmental systems theories emphasizing that the basic process in development involves mutually influential relations between the individually distinct person and his or her diverse, multilevel context; stressing that relative plasticity in development derives from such individual?context relations; and providing optimism about the possibility that applications of developmental science may promote positive development. These ideas underscore the substantive importance of human diversity, seen both as the potential for systematic intraindividual change across life (plasticity) and as interindividual differences in intraindividual change, and stand in contrast to views about diversity as either unimportant, error, or reflecting deficits in development. I discuss these differing conceptions of human diversity and of their distinct implications for the methodological and ethical conduct of science and of applications to programs and policies aimed at promoting positive development.     

Sacred Circle: Symbol of Wholeness in Traditional Persian Art and Architecture

Jung wrote extensively about the archetypal mandala symbol as an expression in many cultures of the centrality and nature of the interplay between human consciousness and divine consciousness. This article investigates—how in Persia, for millennia—the archetypal symbol of the mandala has been widespread in many expressions of the sacred arts. My research outlines the importance of the archetypal mandala symbol in Persian religio-aesthetic history from the first unearthed stone carvings of Persia's ancient foundations until the more recent, breathtakingly marvellous ceilings of traditional Persian architecture today. From the artistic expressions of first religious beliefs of ancient Persia—Mithraism—and through the development of the Zoroastrian faith until the subsequent rise of Christianity and then Islam, Persian sacred art illustrates the Jungian idea that wholeness sought in the journey of individuation is often expressed through archetypal symbols of circles that articulate basic truths about the divine interplay with humanity.     

A model of perceptual classification in children and adults

The developmental trend from overall-similarity to dimensional-identity classifications is explained by a quantitative model. I begin with the assumption that objects are represented in terms of constituent dimensions and that the representation of objects changes little with development. Given this assumption, the model has three major parts. First, the similarity between objects is a function of the combination of the constituent dimensional differences. I propose developmental change in the likelihood that dimensions are differentially weighted in the calculation of similarity. Second, the perceived similarities between objects are valued for the purpose of constructing classifications. I propose that similarities are valued more dichotomously with age, such that identity becomes increasingly special. Third, the valued similarities are used to choose the best classification of those possible. The model provides good qualitative fits to the extant data. Three experiments examining classifications in 2- to 8-year-olds and in adults support specific new claims of the model. The data and the model provide new insights about development, classification, and similarity.     

‘Core Knowledges’: a dissociation between spatiotemporal knowledge and contact‐mechanics in a non‐human primate?

Human toddlers demonstrate striking failures when searching for hidden objects that interact with other objects, yet successfully locate hidden objects that do not undergo mechanical interactions. This pattern hints at a developmental dissociation between contact-mechanical and spatiotemporal knowledge. Recent studies suggest that adult non-human primates may exhibit a similar dissociation. Here, I provide the first direct test of this dissociation using a search paradigm with adult rhesus monkeys. Subjects watched as a plum rolled behind one of two opaque barriers. In Experiment 1, subjects had to locate the plum based on the position of a wall that blocked the plum's trajectory. Subjects searched incorrectly, apparently neglecting information about the location of the wall. However, subjects searched correctly in Experiments 2-4 when they were given spatiotemporal information about the plum's movement. Results indicate that adult monkeys use spatiotemporal information, but not contact-mechanical information, to locate hidden objects. This dissociation between contact-mechanical and spatiotemporal knowledge is discussed in light of developmental theories of core knowledge and the literature on object-based attention in human adults.     

HAS PSYCHOLOGY A FUTURE?

I consider that psychologists have a duty to explore their own field, to create hypotheses about the behavior of animals, especially human, and to test these and look for possible causal relationships at the level of acting, thinking, perceiving humans m their environmental context Our agenda should be at this level, not one that depends on waiting for reductionist theories at some other level, be it neural, genetic, nuclear, or especially artificial To go about this work, a developmental approach, in a systems setting—the organism-environment system—holds great promise and has the dignity of successful precedents in other sciences
All of behavior—perceiving, acting, problem solving, communicating with others—should be our province The hallmarks of human behavior can and should be studied in all of these areas It IS their development that offers a road to understanding We should continue to look for theories of considerable generality, however elegant a model may be in a tiny realm If we tot find universal laws, we may still come up with unifying principles
Not so long ago, in another keynote address, George Miller told us that It was time to "give psychology away" (Miller, 1969) I am afraid that that is exactly what we are doing, though n the sense that Miller intended Let us keep psychology, recapture the old excitement, looking for the causes in behavior itself, and not giving up on the grand unified theory     

Animalism versus Lockeanism: No Contest

In 'Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy', The Philosophical Quarterly , 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo-Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo-Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo-Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan's new neo-Lockean proposal is inadequate.
email : david.mackie@oriel.oxford.ac.uk     

The Priest and the Rabbi Meet in a Bar: The Dialectic between Merger and Recoil in Psychoanalysis

The tension between union and separation is a leitmotif in all social relations and cuts a swath across psychoanalytic theories. I am proposing that the interplay, between merger and recoil is an oscillating and enduring rhythm throughout the life cycle and characterizes an ongoing pattern in relatedness. Awareness of this repetitive cadence in the transference/countertransference as a reflection of the human drama can alert the analyst to a pattern that prompts clinical interventions and expands the potential of deepening the dyadic relationship and its mutative effects.     

USING ANALOGIES TO TEACH CONCEPTUAL APPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES

Teachers traditionally have used analogies as explanatory tools in bridging the gap between new and preexisting knowledge. In two studies, I examine the impact of analogies in teaching undergraduates conceptual applications of developmental psychology theories. In Study 1, I generate analogies reflecting each theory; in Study 2, I use both teacher- and student-generated analogies. Students' attitudes toward analogy-enhanced instruction were predominantly favorable. Teacher-generated-analogy (TGA) and student-generated-analogy (SGA) learning conditions performed significantly better than a no-analogy control group in understanding and applying developmental theories. Because learning becomes more active and interactive when students create their own analogies and share them with classmates and the instructor as part of in-class discussion and critique, the SGA learning condition similarly outperformed the TGA learning condition. In line with a constructivist model of teaching and learning, psychological explanations, educational applications, and implications for future research are discussed.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications

In this paper, I discuss the current state of theorising about dual processes in adult performance on reasoning and decision making tasks, in which Type 1 intuitive processing is distinguished from Type 2 reflective thinking. I show that there are many types of theory some of which distinguish modes rather than types of thinking and that assumptions about underlying cognitive architecture vary. I show that some dual-system theories have been replaced recently by the idea that we have two or more distinct ‘minds’ with different evolutionary histories. I also present the most recent formulation of my own account of dual processing within hypothetical thinking theory, at a level more easily applied to performance on specific tasks. I then consider implications for cognitive development, pointing out that while Type 2 thinking is clearly linked to the development of cognitive ability, it combines and competes with multiple Type 1 processing systems which persist in adult cognition, each of which could have their own developmental time course. Hence, while dual-process theories can and should inspire much research and theory in cognitive development, the derivation of predictions for cognitive development is far from straightforward.     

Unconscious Representations 2: Towards an Integrated Cognitive Architecture

The representational nature of human cognition and thought in general has been a source of controversies. This is particularly so in the context of studies of unconscious cognition, in which representations tend to be ontologically and structurally segregated with regard to their conscious status. However, it appears evolutionarily and developmentally unwarranted to posit such segregations, as, otherwise, artifact structures and ontologies must be concocted to explain them from the viewpoint of the human cognitive architecture. Here, from a by-and-large Classical cognitivist viewpoint, I show why this segregation is wrong, and elaborate on the need to postulate an ontological and structural continuity between unconscious and conscious representations. Specifically, I hypothesize that this continuity is to be found in the symbolic-based interplay between the syntax and the semantics of thought, and I propose a model of human information processing characterized by the integration of syntactic and semantic representations.     

发展情境论——一种新的发展系统理论

发展情境论（Developmental Contextualism）是发展系统理论体系中的一种具有代表性的理论。该理论认为人的发展是通过发展中的个体与其所处情境间的持续交互作用实现的,个体的发展变化过程在本质上是或然渐成性的。该理论不仅更系统地概括了影响人发展的时间和空间因素,而且在交互作用观点的基础上提出了循环影响的研究取向。同时,发展情境论认为人的可塑性特点为干预个体的发展提供了可能,并进一步提出了干预的思路,即通过建立和调整个体与所处情境的拟合优度模型来实现个体和所处情境的积极发展。     

MYTHIC RELIGIOUS NATURALISM

In his book Religion Is Not About God, Loyal Rue presents an evolutionarily based explanation of religion as a means to further the personal and social fulfillment of human beings. Rue argues that religions in the form of myths, adaptive falsities, provide an account of the connection between what is (facts) and what matters (values). Myths are false because they attribute subjectively based values to valueless facts, but adaptive because they motivate personally and socially beneficial actions. He maintains that the current crises of humankind, evidenced by both social conflict and environmental degradation, indicate that the major religious traditions—all of which project values onto some transcendent reality—are failing to serve humanity. To overcome these crises, Rue maintains that we need a new, scientifically based naturalized religion, one that attributes subjectively based values to Nature instead of a transcendent reality. I accept Rue's naturalism about values but reject his subjectivist account of them. Contrary to Rue, I show that the naturalistic fallacy sets no barrier to the existence of objective moral values. Modeling my view on the selection theories used in biology and psychology, I offer a scientifically based explanation of the origin and existence of objective values and support it with empirical findings from developmental psychology. Whether this account can count as religious, I do not address.     

Autonomy in Action: Linking the Act of Looking to Memory Formation in Infancy via Dynamic Neural Fields

Looking is a fundamental exploratory behavior by which infants acquire knowledge about the world. In theories of infant habituation, however, looking as an exploratory behavior has been deemphasized relative to the reliable nature with which looking indexes active cognitive processing. We present a new theory that connects looking to the dynamics of memory formation and formally implement this theory in a Dynamic Neural Field model that learns autonomously as it actively looks and looks away from a stimulus. We situate this model in a habituation task and illustrate the mechanisms by which looking, encoding, working memory formation, and long‐term memory formation give rise to habituation across multiple stimulus and task contexts. We also illustrate how the act of looking and the temporal dynamics of learning affect each other. Finally, we test a new hypothesis about the sources of developmental differences in looking.