Receptivity,or Going on (Not) Being: Commentary on Paper by Robert Grossmark

“The treatment hinged on my being able to live with him in this ongoing non-existence and know it and tolerate it, and expect no more,” writes Dr. Robert Grossmark about himself and his patient, Kyle (pp. 637–638). This is a key sentence, outlining the core of the enlightening analytic work done. I comment on the linkage between living the ongoing nonexistence and going-on-(not)-being, then reflect about the distinction between what I call the “outward” technique, which is everything Grossmark describes about treating Kyle, and the “inward” technique, which is all that occurred within him, in an inner, hidden, powerful, unconscious dialogue with the patient, and which is only hinted at. In this context, with patients like Kyle, who bring to the analyst physical sensations and actions for dreaming, the analyst's corporeality, by which I mean his experience of his body and his capacity to connect it to emotion, thereby lending it meaning, has a critical importance. I bring, in a nutshell, references to several psychoanalytic writers about the subject of corporeality in analytic treatment and use a vignette from an analysis to demonstrate the point.     

Enigmatic Masculinities: A Reply to Swartz and Grossmark

In reply to Swartz and Grossmark’s commentaries on my paper about encounters with the masculine, I elaborate from a reflexive stance on the notions of context, positionality, and warrants to speak in my writing and the responses. My account is part of an unfolding exploration of how I stand as a gendered being within psychotherapeutic praxis, and in line with that, how what was intimated in my original paper points to Laplanche’s theorizing on the sexual and to his notion of enigmatic seduction in ongoing gendering processes. The reply finds itself haunted by the abject and its position within the postcolony, and with a desire for what is an illusory transcendence.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

Blowin' in the Wind—Considering the Impact of “Inadvertent Touch” Commentary on Paper by Graham Bass

In my discussion of Graham Bass's paper, my comments fall under three main categories: an aspect of Bass's theoretical/technical view that informs his conscious clinical choices, his incredible work with Robert as presented in the written case, and, finally, theory in practice as exemplified in his phrase, “inadvertent touch.” I mean for my perspective and the purely personal associations that are stimulated by this case to evoke further discussion and, in general, open some sort of useful dialogue. I believe that anybody who sits with severely dissociated patients would agree that, side-by-side with the necessary terror creeping around in the room, we often experience a confusing, sometimes even silly, “higgledy-piggledy” that seems pathognomonic to the work entailed. This weird experience seems, almost, to set our sense of continuity and logic on its edge. When reading Bass's paper, we must, to maintain our equilibrium, begin by taking for granted some of the contradictory, nonlinear aspects of his reporting, which is, after all, an accurate reflection of what happens in this work. At the level of theory in practice, I consider the implications for symbolic realization in the clinical process when touch need not be relegated to the category of the “inadvertent.”     

Shaping and Discovering: Thoughts About Marc Rehm's Meditations

Marc Rehm invites us to muse about the theme of undue influence as it affects our relationships with our patients and children. Marc suggests that alongside our good intentions and loving vision of their future lie feelings of hate and destructiveness that complicate our efforts on their behalf. I address Marc's thesis, its Winnicottian roots, and then turn his question back on itself by musing about how his paper—which was born and nurtured in my writing group—might have itself been shaped (as much as discovered) by the group. I raise the question of undue influence as it affects the process of mentoring.     

Creativity,Spontaneity, Impasse,and Leaps of Faith: Reply to Commentaries

In my reply to the commentaries, I address several points of convergence with and divergence from Drs. Danielle Knafo and Philip A. Ringstrom. I clarify my view that while shame can drive the creative process, the thrust of my paper is about ways in which shame can close down access to one's creative potential, as well as creating obstacles to vitality and intimacy in relationships. I expand on how it was indeed a visceral, embodied sense of my own shame which served as an “informant,” as Ringstrom suggests, of Julia's chronic experience of shame, opening a door to our exploration of the repetitive enactments between us. Grounding my understanding of therapeutic action and enactments in a relational perspective, I describe how I view enactments as inevitable and co-created, and reflecting on them collaboratively as a potentially useful opportunity in analytic work. I resonate with Ringstrom and Knafo's belief in the creativity inherent in the psychoanalytic process, and the importance of spontaneity and risk taking, particularly in negotiating impasses in treatment. Finally, I describe Julia's poetic reflections upon reading the paper.     

You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

Suits,Autotelicity, Temporal Reallocations,Game Resources and Defining ‘play’

Bernard Suits bequeathed a rich legacy of philosophical insights contributing to our developing a deeper understanding of sport-related issues, and his work has attracted much attention and stimulated valuable controversy over many years. However, the interest it has stimulated appears uneven. In this context and with reference to the former claims above, I focus on a part of his work that has received relatively less commentary, in the hope that it too will yield work of value. Given the imaginative quality of Suits's writing, it is pessimistic to assume that attention to a relatively neglected part of his work will fail to bear fruit, if not as a result of my labours here, then perhaps of someone else's in further discussion. My concern is his account of ‘play’, by which he meant to toy, fiddle or trifle with something or other, written over 30 years ago, and it stems from reflection on one recent effort to examine this part of Suits's work, namely Morgan's discussion of ‘play’. My article attempts an analysis of the definition Suits gave and an evaluation of efforts he made to defend his understanding, alongside brief exploration of Morgan's work. Both of these tasks are undertaken against a background of Suits's broader concerns with the place of games in an ideal life. The conclusions I reach are that Suits's account embodies too many issues to be acceptable; that Morgan's attempt to rescue him from one of them is misdirected; but that even if my criticisms are damaging to the account of ‘play’ I examine, they leave Suits's main work on playing games seriously as sports unscathed.     

Commentary on ‘The arms of the chimeras’ by Béatrice Ithier

In this Commentary I will first of all summarise my understanding of the proposal set out by Béatrice Ithier concerning her concept of the ‘chimera’. The main part of my essay will focus on Ithier's claim that her concept of the chimera could be described as a ‘mental squiggle’ because it corresponds to Winnicott's work illustrated in his book ‘Therapeutic Consultations’ (1971). At the core of Ithier's chimera is the notion of a traumatic link between analyst and patient, which is the reason she enlists the work of Winnicott. I will argue, however, that Ithier's claim is based on a misperception of the theory that underpins Winnicott's therapeutic consultations because, different from Ithier's clinical examples of work with traumatised patients, Winnicott is careful to select cases who are from an ‘average expectable environment’ i.e. a good enough family. Moreover, Winnicott does not refer to any traumatic affinity with his patients, or to experiencing a quasi‐hallucinatory state of mind during the course of the consultations. These aspects are not incorporated into his theory. In contrast (to the concept Ithier attempts to advance), Winnicott's squiggle game constitutes an application of psychoanalysis intended as a diagnostic consultation. In that sense Winnicott's therapeutic consultations are comparable with the ordinary everyday work between analyst and analysand in a psychoanalytic treatment. My Commentary concludes with a question concerning the distinction between the ordinary countertransference in working with patients who are thinking symbolically in contrast to an extraordinary countertransference that I suggest is more likely to arise with patients who are traumatised and thus functioning at a borderline or psychotic level.     

Academic on a mission: Run and run and run

Challenges the distinctions we make between research/scholarship and practice. Recognizes and values the complimentarity of teaching, research, practice, and public policy. Tells how I have tried to approach creating opportunities to integrate those activities in my role as a community psychologist in an academic setting. Describes some of the lessons I have learned from my two decades of practice. This article is a very close approximation to my Distinguished Contribution to Practice in Community Psychology award address at APA in Toronto, August 1996. That talk included numerous overheads, which reason demands I omit. I thank Jim Sorenson and George Albee who, each in their own way, showed me that university professors can be passionate about their work and extend their reach beyond the perimeters of the campus. I thank Heather Barton, Krista Hopkins, Jennifer Heigel, and Anne Salassi for being such good ambassadors and for my most meaningful source of professional satisfaction: turning students on to careers as community psychologists and preventionists. I thank the Virginia prevention community for two decades of working together toward a common mission and the College of William and Mary for supporting my life’s work. Finally I thank John Morgan for his friendship and his affirming introduction, State Michaels for her help with the original talk, and Beverly Peterson for always being there. I am deeply honored.     

When Relatedness is Damaged or Undeveloped: A New Consideration of the Link between Relational Psychoanalysis and Object Relations Theory

The author discusses Lisa Director’s concept of being a catalyst, an enlivening presence, and Robert Grossmark’s concept of companioning, in their work with patients whom I think of as being in the autistic contiguous position. Director and Grossmark each provide a moving example of a long-term, successful treatment with patients who are often seen as unanalyzable and dismissed. These patients are very challenging, having great difficulty entering relationships; either floating through space in a dull, disconnected manner or violently crashing into others in order to make contact and maintain a minimal sense of cohesiveness and connection. I discuss these two exceptional clinical papers using object relations theory, which can provide a more generalizable approach to the treatment of such difficult patients.     

The Relational Use of Self and Space in Creation: Commentary on Paper by Frank Summers

In this discussion I address some of the ways in which psychoanalytic theory and technique have advanced, taking as my starting point Dr. Summers' chosen schools of thought. I then go on to elaborate what I see as a difference in our understanding of Philip Bromberg's and Donnel Stern's ideas about therapeutic action, suggesting that they actually contribute in bolstering Summers' argument.     

Response to Karen Lebacqz and Stephen Palmquist

I respond here to the essays by Karen Lebacqz and Stephen Palmquist, beginning with my debt of gratitude to Lebacqz for her understanding of the methodological depth I try to bring to the analysis of bioethical issues. I further illustrate that observation here by reviewing the logic of my approach to the issue of wrongful life. At the same time, in connection with human genetic enhancement, I acknowledge that I may have not properly appreciated the seriousness of the problem of sin. To Palmquist's assertion that my criticisms of Kant's treatments of grace miss the way Kant has confined himself to being a philosophical (as opposed to biblical) theologian, I argue that Kant's problem lies instead in his poor application of his own compelling insights about the depths of human sinning. I close with an appreciation of Palmquist's observation of some important points of contact between Kant's understanding of sin and that of Kierkegaard.     

Response to Alcoff,Ferguson, and Bergoffen

This paper responds to comments, queries, and criticisms offered by Alcoff, Bergoffen, and Ferguson at a scholar's session on my work held at the annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in October 2001. Responding to Alcoff, I highlight my understanding of liberation in the context of a Nietzschean and a Latin American feminism and the politics of conceptualizing “resistance” in postcolonial theory. Responding to Ferguson, I address, among other issues, the often misunderstood distinction between postcolonialism and postmodernism, as well as related implications regarding some postcolonial feminists' qualified appeals to universals and women's rights. Responding to Bergoffen, I advocate on behalf of cultural formations supportive of the feminist affirmation of life and of radical subjectivities that challenge gender orthodoxies.     

Backward Referral,Flash-Lags,and Quantum Free Will: A Response to Commentaries on Articles by Pockett,Klein, Gomes,and Trevena and Miller

The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the whole concept of backward referral. The relevance of the flash-lag illusion to possible measurement errors in the Libet/Trevena and Miller paradigm is addressed next. Finally, I have a few words to say on the relationship between quantum mechanical ontology and free will.     

Language games,or As you like it: A reply to Gergen

Afrer noting some areas of common ground, in particular my acceptance of the fact that causal analysis is not sufficient to capture motivation and meaning, the main disagreement is pinpointed: in my view causal explanations are relevant to human actions. In response to Gergen's contention that cross-cultural replications have no bearing on theories, which essentially turn on language games, I submit that his account of cross-cultural work is in several respects misleading. It is suggested that ignoring the striking regularities of social behaviour runs the risk of a return to empty scholasticism.     

Borges and the Art of Mourning

In my reply to Susi Federici-Nebbiosi, I emphasize and elaborate on the points of agreement between us, as well as the points where our thinking differs. My primary point of difference regards the suggestion that my accepting Yossi for short-term treatment was acquiescence to his request. This is only partially true. From his point of view, I offered him a treatment substantially longer than the one he wanted, thus I was agreeing and not agreeing to his request simultaneously.

The main idea that I put forth in my paper is that we always construct our setting together with our patients and that this is, in itself, a therapeutic factor. I share Federici-Nebbiosi's observation that the setting has undergone a great deal more change in practice than is reflected in the literature, and that there is unease discussing the issue of setting. I offer some thoughts on this and express the hope that the present exchange of ideas will lead to further discussion.     

Reconsidering P-Prims Theory From the Viewpoint of Situated Cognition

Andrea diSessa's work appears to be representative of the 1980s research on the preconceptions and epistemology of physics. His theoretical framework also seems to be representative of 1980s cognitive science theory such as mental models. Although my theoretical perspective, based on a Gibsonian and situated cognition viewpoint, is different from diSessa's, I agree with him on many points. At the same time, however, I also feel that we have to reinterpret his contributions from a different perspective. In this commentary, therefore, I summarize how the situated cognition view can reinterpret diSessa's work as representative of 1980s research on the epistemology of physics.     

A Response to “Participation: A Religious Worldview” by James M. Gustafson

This response offers an interpretation of James Gustafson's “Participation: A Religious Worldview,” which thinks with Gustafson on the theme of “participation,” while highlighting points where my own thoughts diverge from his. The essay begins by drawing the reader's attention to Gustafson's style, arguing that the simple elegance of his writing constitutes part of his larger claim about the need to remove ourselves from the center of our thought. Next, the essay analyzes Gustafson's use of “participation” by putting it in context and connecting it with his broader methodology. Finally, I draw the reader's attention to important loci in the text in order to show how Gustafson's essay helps address various extant misinterpretations of his thought but also to point to ways in which my “thinking with” Gustafson leads me to think otherwise than he does.     

DECONSTRUCTING THE SECULAR MAGISTERIUM: VOICES PAST AND PRESENT FOR CONVERSATIONS OF THE FUTURE

In this paper I offer a possible approach to accomplishing Benedict's goal proposed in his Regensburg address. 1 I take his goal to be twofold. First, we must expand our concept of reason beyond the privileged position of scientific empiricism and philosophical reasoning, both of which form what I have called the Secular Magisterium, put in place as the dominant intellectual force by the Enlightenment. Second, the motivation for expanding our concept of reason is for the purpose of greater dialogue across cultures, across religions and across academic disciplines. Since I take Benedict's goal to be twofold, my paper will address these issues in two parts, the second building from the first. In the first section, I will revisit the counter‐Enlightenment thinking of some well known, yet significantly marginalized voices, with the goal of hearing them again and reviving their critique to inform our own. By the end of this section, I will offer what I take to be a counter‐Enlightenment approach to knowing our world by means of an expanded concept of reason. In the second section, I will address what I take to be some of the more intellectual challenges to the possibilities for conversation across cultures, religions, and disciplines. It is my goal to show how an embodied version of the counter‐Enlightenment approach I offer in the first section can allow for genuine conversation that not only provides opportunities to better know our conversation partners, but also offers the possibility of honest persuasion in which the other sees reality differently and considers this way better.