What is Reification? A Critique of Axel Honneth

In this paper I criticise Axel Honneth's reactualization of reification as a concept in critical theory in his 2005 Tanner Lectures and argue that he ultimately fails on his own terms. His account is based on two premises: (1) reification is to be taken literally rather than metaphorically, and (2) it is not conceived of as a moral injury but as a social pathology. Honneth concludes that reification is “forgetfulness of recognition”, more specifically, of antecedent recognition, an emphatic and engaged relationship with oneself, others and the world, which precedes any more concrete relationship both genetically and categorially. I argue against this conception of reification on two grounds. (1) The two premises of Honneth's account cannot be squared with one another. It is not possible to literally take a person as a thing without this being a recognisable moral injury, and, therefore, I suggest that there are no cases of literal reification. (2) Honneth's account is essentially ahistorical, because it is based on an anthropological model of recognition that tacitly equates reification with autism. In conclusion, I suggest that any successful account of reification must (i) take reification metaphorically and (ii) offer a social-historical account of the origin(s) of reification.     

Scientists in the Swamp: Narrowing the Language–Practice Gap in Community Psychology

As a confluence of unique values and activities, the collective practice of community psychology is difficult to characterize in a simple way. Increasingly, however, professional contexts are laden with pressure to define any practice—from library work to medical interventions—in the orderly, compact language of traditional science. This trend has historically been resisted in the field by those sensing a fundamental lack of fit between the fluid, emergent aspects of community psychological practice and the fixed, precise language of classic science. In response to this “language–practice gap,” some have attempted to adapt the traditional language of science to better fit the field's practice, while others have explored alternative languages of practice seemingly more indigenous to the messy “swamp” of actual communities. While the former effort leaves some theoretical contradictions intact, the latter tends to discount scientific identity entirely. This paper proposes a potential step forward by resituating questions of disciplinary language and identity within a current philosophical discourse where the nature of social science itself remains sharply contested. This suggests shifting attention away from “should we be a science?” to “what kind of science might we be after all?”; in turn, alternative languages may be re‐cast as legitimate contributors to a kind of science more authentic to human communities—even a viable “science in the swamp.” One such language–philosophical hermeneutics—is presented as a particularly valuable supplement to traditional science. Illustrations highlight ways that hermeneutics may advance the formal language of the field towards a closer fit of what actually happens in practice, while preserving and even bolstering the empirical rigor and scientific identity of the field.     

Laying down a path in talking

This paper aims to provide a starting point for a non-representational approach to language. It will do so by undoing some of the reifying tendencies that are at the heart of the ontology of scientific psychology. Although non-representational theories are beginning to emerge, they remain committed to giving explanations in terms of ontological structures that are independent of human activity. If they maintain this commitment it is unlikely that they will displace representationalism in domains such as language. By following some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on language, I explain the phenomenon of reification by carefully considering the formative, situational flow of language—thus without invoking representations. In this way, the paper sketches a direction of approach for a non-representational theory of language, undercutting the most important assumptions that justify an explanatory ontology devoid of human activity.     

Searching for the enriching sense of otherness: The psychoanalytic psychotherapist as a meaning-bearing other

Abstract

This paper is a theoretical and clinical examination of the patient's search for the otherness of the therapist as a prerequisite for change and development in relational psychoanalytic psychotherapy. A basic assumption is that being in a relationship as well as being a personal self, is to be understood, as being with a “meaning-bearing other”; that is, someone who allows for the possibility of meaningful thoughts and feelings, either through an actual communicative presence or as a consciously, prereflective, or unconsciously imagined communication partner. The term “meaning-bearing other” is used to differentiate distinct, although often synchronic, modes of relatedness. The need for intersubjective “depth”—that is, to discover the otherness of the other, and for oneself to be recognized as an experiencing subject—is regarded as a main motivational force. Winnicott's, as well as Sullivan's developmental approaches, Mitchell and Aron's views on psychoanalytic interaction, and Heidegger and Gadamer's phenomenology and hermeneutics are used as theoretical points of reference for the present discourse. The theoretical points of view are examined and discussed through excerpts from twice-a-week psychotherapy with a six-year old girl.     

Language and know-how

I address the assumption that communicative interaction is made possible by knowledge of a language. I argue that this assumption as it is usually expressed depends on an unjustified reification of language, and on an unsatisfactory understanding of ‘knowledge’. I propose instead that communicative interaction is made possible by (Rylean) know-how and by the development of (Davidsonian) passing theories. We then come to see that our focus ought to be, not on propositional knowledge of a language which we internally represent, but on the practical application of know-how in our understanding and interpretation of others.     

Genesis and Intersubjectivity: Levels of Mediation

I will make a brief comment on the thesis of José C. Loredo-Narciandi and José C. Sánchez-González (2012) “Neither Dichotomies Nor Dualism; Simply Genesis”. Denying any reductionism and reification, they insists the importance of inseparable relation between subject and object, then discuss about genesis. I pointed out that their argument lacks an important element, i.e., mediator that differ from mere physical object. After discussing mediators nature, I discriminate the three level of interaction which mediated by mediator. The first is the pre-interaction level, the second is physical interaction level and the third is sign or language interaction level. The last argument of mine is about how we can solve the problem of reification and reductionism. In the argument it is pointed out that intersubjectivity is key concept for understanding and solving the problem appropriately.     

Interactional expertise as a third kind of knowledge

Between formal propositional knowledge and embodied skill lies ‘interactional expertise’—the ability to converse expertly about a practical skill or expertise, but without being able to practice it, learned through linguistic socialisation among the practitioners. Interactional expertise is exhibited by sociologists of scientific knowledge, by scientists themselves and by a large range of other actors. Attention is drawn to the distinction between the social and the individual embodiment theses: a language does depend on the form of the bodies of its members but an individual within that community can learn the language without the body. The idea has significance for our understanding of colour-blindness, deafness and other abilities and disabilities. They say that love's a word, a word we've only heard the meaning of.     

Substitution in a sense

The Reference Principle (RP) states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, (RP) looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: (RP) transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use (RP) to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘( ) is a horse’ does not refer to a property is point out that ‘( ) is a horse’ and ‘the property of being a horse’ are not everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. However, when we understand ‘substitution’ in the simplest and most straightforward way, (RP) is no truism; in fact, natural languages are full of counterexamples to the principle. In this paper, I introduce a new notion of substitution, and then develop and argue for a version of (RP) that is immune to these counterexamples. Along the way I touch on the following topics: the relation between argument forms and their natural language instances; the reification of sense; the difference between terms and predicates; and the relation between reference and disquotation. I end by arguing that my new version of (RP) cannot be used to settle metaphysical debates quite as easily as some philosophers would like.     

ACTIONS AS THE TIES THAT BIND Love, Praxis, and Community in the Thought of Gustavo Gutiérrez

Gustavo Gutiérrez develops an account of human action or praxis that I—borrowing the language of Charles Taylor—label expressivist. Human action must be understood as expressing an underlying potential or impulse that only becomes real through expression in action. Gutiérrez's expressivism is fundamental to his view of the relationship between faith and love, his notion of three dimensions of liberation/salvation, and his understanding of the fundamental option as a yes or no in response to grace. Moreover, it supports a valuable approach to community as defined more by shared actions than a shared tradition or narrative. The final section briefly indicates two limitations to Gutiérrez's vision—especially with regard to the conception of community—and suggests the direction that a constructive appropriation of his thought might take.     

学前期儿童执行功能和语言的双向关系:社会经济地位的调节

采用追踪研究考察258名学前儿童执行功能与语言的双向关系,及二者关系是否受社会经济地位调节。交叉滞后结果表明,学前儿童语言发展与执行功能三个子成分（抑制控制、认知灵活性、工作记忆）存在双向关系;T1时儿童语言对T2时认知灵活性的预测作用受家庭社会经济地位调节：在高社会经济地位家庭中,T1时间儿童的语言能显著正向预测T2时认知灵活性,低社会经济地位家庭中预测作用不显著;其余双向关系中调节作用均不显著。本研究表明,学前儿童执行功能三个子成分与语言均存在双向关系,且社会经济地位在部分关系中起到调节作用。     

Transnationalism and Its Personal and Social Consequences for Chinese Transmigrants

In this essay, I investigate the origins of Chinese migrant transnationalism and its personal and social consequences. I propose a theoretical perspective that turns on a synthesis that I shall call “cultural functionalism,” a synthesis that attempts to reconcile functionalism and postmodernism. My argument is that Chinese transmigrants overcome (post)modern alienation through a two-way approach: first, a strong participation in and full commitment to community development and connectivity within the Chinese diaspora; and, second, a religio-cultural renaissance—both being conceived of as constituting a putative “cultural contract” and “social capital” nexus.     

The first formalized proof of the indestructibility of a subsistent form

The article presents a formalization of Thomas Aquinas proof for the indestructibility of the human soul. The author of the formalization—the first of its kind in the history of philosophy—is Father Joseph Maria Bocheński. The presentation involves no more than updating the logical symbolism used and accompanies the logical formulae with ordinary language paraphrases in order to ease the reader’s understanding of the formulae. “The fundamental idea of the Thomist proof is of utmost simplicity: things which are destructible are destructible either per se or per accidens; but the human soul is destructible neither per se nor per accidens: therefore the human soul is not destructible”. Bochenski’s words required him to devote considerable effort for the sake of precision of the symbolic language that would be maximally adequate to Thomas’ discourse. Moreover, I have thought it necessary to provide an ample commentary to the traditional and contemporary semantical presuppositions of Aquinas philosophical anthropology in light of Bocheński’s interpretation thereof.     

Working Memory and Spoken Language Comprehension in Young Children

This study has two theoretical dimensions: (a) to explore which components of Baddeley's (1986) working memory model are associated with children's spoken language comprehension, and (b) to compare the extent to which measures of the components of this fractionated model and an index of a unitary model (listening span) are able to predict individual differences in spoken language comprehension. Correlational analyses revealed that within a group of 66 4– and 5-year-old children both listening span and phonological memory, but not visuospatial memory, were associated with vocabulary knowledge and spoken language comprehension. However, of the proposed measures of central executive function—dual task coordination, sustained attention, verbal fluency—only the latter was related to children's ability to understand spoken language. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that variance in vocabulary knowledge was best explained by phonological memory skills, whereas individual differences in spoken language comprehension exhibited unique and independent associations with verbal fluency.     

Dichotic listening pattern in conduction aphasia

This paper reports a finding of hemispheric brain asymmetry for speech in short-gestation infants (mean gestational age = 36 weeks). Using a new measure—degree of reduction in limb tremors following exposure to speech stimuli compared to two control groups, one hearing orchestral music, the other no patterned stimuli—we found that speech disproportionately affected right limb movements. It is not clear whether the effect is due to asymmetries in cortical or subcortical processing. This provides evidence against the notion that brain specialization for language functions necessarily appears over time; rather, specialization for some functions (e.g., speech reception) must be present at birth.     

A Tale of Two Tales

Cromwell's Being Human: Human Being (2010) covers a broad array of theoretical and practical arenas that can impact how we all—but psychologists in particular—conceptualize the nature and function of human mentation. In this article, I will abstract an overarching theme from the book that explains how (and even why) humans evolve as storytellers—first to serve intrapersonal goals, but eventually to social ends (which themselves reflect back onto intrapersonal purposes). The tale begins with each person's own private invention of time, space, and self via the constructed linkage between separate stimuli, and continues through the concoction and communication of complex theoretical frameworks. Each step of this journey involves the human being constructing a bridge between events; in other words, composing a story. Finally, the theme of “human being as storyteller” will be applied reflexively to Cromwell's decision to and action of authoring Being Human: Human Being.     

Music as a way of knowing: tentative steps towards extending the boundaries of traditional music philosophy

Based on Howard Gardner's theory of Multiple Intelligences and Ray Jackendoff s theory of a Universal Musical Grammar this article proposes that music be regarded as a way of knowing by which man endeavours to make sense of, interpret and articulate—by means of a system of sound symbols—an aspect of reality which cannot be expressed in any other way. The four main points of this hypothesis are: (1) Music refers to a reality that is neither solely a product of my imagination, my feelings or the constitution of my body, nor to a reality that can be explained solely in empirical terms. Rather, it includes both these dimensions, but at the same time is more than both of them put together. (2) The language of music is unique in that it is structured like no other language; it is structured in accordance with the reality it refers to. (3) Unlike mathematics (or even spoken language), the language of music, in its manifestation as culturally diverse musics, is semantically and ethically not a neutral language. (4) The emergence of art music can be explained particularly well by means of the model of music as a way of knowing.     

The (social) construction of the world – at the crossroads of Christianity and Humanism

Abstract

In early modem philosophy the motive of logical creation emerged in reaction to the Greek-Medieval legacy of a realistic metaphysics. The dominant nominalistic trends of thought since Thomas Hobbes and Inimanuel Kant explored its rationalistic implications. The latter drew the radical (humanistic) conclusion that the laws of nature are present in human thought a priori (i.e. before all experience). The irrationalistic side of nominalism emphasized the uniqueness and individuality of events - thus leading to the historicism of the 19th century and the subsequent linguistic turn. Kant influenced Husserl who, in turn, provided the point of departure for the ideas of Schutz, Berger and Luckmaim - compare the joint work of Berger and Luckmann: Social construction of reality (1967). The contemporary “postmodem” idea that we create the world in which we live (either through thought, through language or through social practices) merely continues core elements of (early) modem philosophy.

The underlying idea of autonomy highlights the difference between modern Humanism and a Christian view of reality, for in the latter human subjectivity is appreciated as being correlated with universal and constant principles that can only assume a positive shape through human activities of positivization (form-giving). The autonomy ideal of modern Humanism reifies the typical human freedom to positivize underlying principles. At the same time this reification on the one hand collapses the distinction between conditions and being conditioned and on the other it does not provide a basis for supra-individual standards of behaviour.     

The health of employed women and men: work,family, and community correlates

Research into clarifying the relationship between social roles and health has increasingly focused on studying the particular circumstances in which occupying multiple roles may enhance or diminish well‐being. This study examined the association between a general measure of well‐being—self‐rated health—and the perceived quality of work, family and community in a sample of employed urban‐dwelling Canadians in a mid‐size city, and whether the nature of the association differed for men and women. Few gender differences were found in the perceived quality of work, family and community. However, men and women differed significantly in the specific type of quality measures associated with general health. For women, satisfaction with one's partner/spouse and in the money available to meet basic family needs had a stronger association with self‐rated health. For men, the significant correlates were satisfaction with family relationships (other than one's partner) and the community physical environment. For both women and men, a more socially cohesive community was associated with better self‐rated health. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What, if anything, is the medial temporal lobe, and how can the amygdala be part of it if there is no such thing?

Should the medial temporal lobe (MTL) of primates--which includes allocortical structures such as the hippocampus, neocortical structures such as the parahippocampal cortex, and nuclear structures such as the basolateral amygdala--be considered a single "thing"? According to the prevailing view, here termed the reification theory, the answer is yes. According to this theory, the MTL functions as an amalgamated entity that provides the neuronal mechanisms for declarative memory; the greater the damage to the MTL or any of its components, the greater the deleterious effects on declarative memory. A countervailing view, here called the balkanization theory, holds that the various components of the MTL process and store different kinds of information. According to this theory, damage to each part of the MTL causes a unique set of behavioral deficits-some involving memory, others involving perception, and yet others involving response selection. The empirical neuropsychological evidence favors the balkanization theory, as do some new concepts in theoretical neuroanatomy.