Reply to Commentary

This commentary is a response to questions and discussion points raised by Peter Fonagy and Mary Target in “Playing with the Reality of Analytic Love.” It includes a discussion of the relationship between attachment and sexuality, in addition to issues concerning seductiveness, sadomasochism and therapeutic change.     

Reply to Commentary

In my reply to Dr. Philip Ringstrom, I acknowledge our mutual understanding of some of the impasses that we face in working with couples, particularly those whom Ringstrom describes as reflecting characteristics of “mutual inductive identification.” I reemphasize the role of the implicit domain in these and further elaborate ideas about why couples presenting in this way are so difficult to impact. These include the ways in which the brain is organized around prediction and problems in the ability to metacommunicate. I then discuss some clinical interventions to address this.     

Evaluating Pastoral Effectiveness: To Measure or Not to Measure

Interviews were conducted with 101 senior pastoral leaders from a variety of denominations in order to identify the ways in which pastors and those in authority positions over senior pastoral leaders measure their own effectiveness. The findings of these interviews revealed 23 measures of effectiveness in five categories, including leader outcomes, congregational outcomes, and objective outcomes. Based on the effectiveness taxonomy described in the current study, a process is suggested for a preliminary discussion among church leadership teams, congregational boards, and denominations to identify their primary mission, constituencies served, and related effectiveness priorities.     

Whiteness Revisited: Reply to Commentary

In reply to Altman's discussion, the author explores in more depth the topic of whiteness, both her South African and American whiteness. She situates American whiteness in the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and the ongoing racial discrimination of the present. When Altman points to the author's unconscious submission to the regulatory power of the larger society, she postulates that her submission is to American whiteness. She notes that, in finding a new home, that which she wished to discard—a white racist identity synonymous with the oppressor—has reappeared, to be confronted once again.     

To Act or Not to Act: Nonconsequentialism in Environmental Decision-Making

Research on environmental-decision making is usually based on utilitarian models, which imply that people's decisions are only influenced by the outcomes. This research provides evidence for values and moral positions that reflect nonconsequentialist rather than consequentialist views. In doing this, this article refers to “sacred values,” which are values that are seen as not-substitutable and nontradable. Two studies were designed to examine evidence for sacred values and their role on act versus omission choices within the environmental domain. The studies revealed that sacred values were closely associated with preferences for actions, trade-off reluctance, deontological focus, and position of moral universalism. The results suggest that it is important to account for sacred values and nonconsequentialist views in environmental decision-making research.     

To Serve or Not to Serve: Ethical and Policy Implications

The Institute of Medicine (IOM) is one of the nation's more influential health‐related non‐profit organizations. It plays a large role in shaping health policy by commissioning panels to develop “white papers” describing research and recommendations on a variety of health topics. These white paper publications are often used to help make policy decisions at the legislative and executive levels. Such a prominent institution might seem like a natural ally for policy‐related collaborative efforts. As community psychologists, we strongly endorse efforts to positively influence public policy at the national level. However, while serving on influential panels and commissions like the IOM might seem to be very much part of the ethos of our discipline, there are occasions when such institutions are pursuing a mission that inadvertently has the potential to instigate divisive friction among community activists and organizations. A case study is presented whereby I describe my decision not to accept an invitation to serve on a controversial IOM panel. I explore the ethical challenges regarding maintaining my independence from this institution and its attempt to redefine chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), as well as the process of searching for alternative avenues for collaborating with community activists to influence policy related to these debilitating illnesses.     

Reply to Commentary by Daniel N. Stern

I respond to Stern's largely affirming discussion by fleshing out a few points, for example, improvisation is more than just being spontaneous, it is ensemble work that plays off and with patterns emergent in the personalities of both parties. These patterns illuminate something about the unconscious of each from which blossom things heretofore unimagined or unarticulated. Several principles are then emphasized: First, improvisational moments arise when the “characters” in the moment draw from something real within themselves along with who they are inducing one another to become. Second, the cultivation of play in improvisation lends itself to putting to rest the myth of the perfectly analyzed analyst as not only impossible but as being both unnecessary and undesirable—a seminal point to the entire relational canon. Third, improvisation is a means for putting live flesh on the sterile bones of a host of theories now informing the contemporary psychoanalytic perspective such as chaos and complexity theory, along with dynamic systems theory. I also note that improvisational moments exhibit an emerging sense of vitality and a deepened sense of connection between the partners. Their work obtains a greater sense of focus, though not a deliberate focus as that their relational unconsciouses are “directing” them. Improvisational work feels liberating, playful, as well as affirming and recognizing what what each is bringing to their coauthorship. By contrast, when the improvisation fails, it devolves into negative thirdness or one-upsmanship, the qualities of which reflect deadness, avoidance, confusion, constriction of play, and a misrecognition of one another that devolves into a mutual sense of defeat. Responding to Stern's question about posi-traums, I affirm there is a phenomenon in which an entrenched emotional conviction of a patient's can be dramatically altered. This happens when something positive occurs that cannot be assimilated within the patient's intransigently negative belief system such that she must accommodate a new organizing principle, that is, a new emotional conviction to make sense of it. I concede, however, that it may be too soon to tell how much such phenomena penetrate the more physiologically encoded elements of trauma.     

To Tell or Not to Tell: Disclosure and the Narrative Self

ABSTRACT Drawing from a narrative identity framework, we present the results of three studies examining the nature of what people do and do not disclose about their life experiences. Across three studies, our findings indicate that (1) the major difference in what people do and do not disclose concerns the emotionality of the events and whether or not the events are transgressions; (2) for everyday memorable events, increased negative emotion is associated with greater likelihood of disclosure; but (3) for more important and/or longer retained events, increased negative and decreased positive emotion were associated with lower likelihoods of disclosure. We also found that socioemotional consequences are an important reason for nondisclosure of important past experiences and are predictably related to the extent to which events induce positive and negative emotions. Findings are considered in terms of their implications for narrative identity.     

Of Coals and Eskimos: Reply to Commentary

I first point out that there are similarities between the Fiscalini and me, and then I try to clarify some differences. Fiscalini suggests that I may be “inadvertently taking coals to Newcastle,” in arguing in favor of a well-known concept. Coming from a Freudian orthodox background, I have learned to substantiate every step of my reasoning on nonorthodox concepts. This sort of clarification may be useful, even for those who share my point of view.

One misunderstanding is that Fiscalini classifies me as an advocate of participant observation, whereas I identify with coparticipation. After suggesting some possible explanation for this difference, I develop some of my own ideas about psychoanalysis considered in terms of analogical hermeneutics, the paradox of being both individual and communal at the same time, and the need to include the social and political context in the analytic inquiry, and transcend the pseudo-opposition between interpretation and experience.