To Be Is to Betray: On the Place of Collective History and Freedom in Psychoanalysis

This paper explores an open frontier between psychoanalysis and critical theory, the relations between subjective experience and collective history. Its drive is a concern with the question of freedom: How might contemporary psychoanalysis help us think about freedom? How could it, as a practice, help us to be free? On the theoretical level, the paper follows the critique of psychoanalysis offered by Foucault and Adorno, particularly the latter's close reading Ferenczi in Negative Dialectics and his notion of “the spell.” I employ their critique in order to articulate the dilemma psychoanalysis faces vis-à-vis the notion of freedom in social context. I argue that, unlike traditional psychoanalytic discourse, relational psychoanalysis can address this dilemma in a generative way. I find this prospect in the readiness of relational psychoanalysis to realize the potential inherent in the psychoanalytic setting: the creation of a mutually constituted intersubjective space. I tell the story of a young woman for whom love seems impossible, and of a psychoanalytic expedition that finds her ability to love being held hostage. I suggest that what appears in one register as gender and sexual trouble appears in another as a dilemma of attachments and loyalties: my patient's ability to love is spellbound, trapped in a subjective-collective no man's land between her desire to be for herself and the unconscious demands of collective heritage. I argue that for psychoanalysis to be a practice of freedom, it must address the ways in which subjective experience answers to social forces and collective history. I question in this context the relations between freedom, guilt, and responsibility. Re-engaging Adorno, I agree that selfhood may always involve a guilty betrayal of others but argue against him that we must allow this guilt to be reconciled with living. I suggest, in conclusion, that theory is the bearer of collective responsibility.     

Discussion of “Unraveling Whiteness”: Commentary on Paper by Melanie Suchet

In this discussion I consider several influences on the contemporary project of deconstructing racism and the concept of racialized subjectivity. This discussion applauds the turn in Suchet's work toward self-examination in a consideration of the experience of race and racism. Suchet's work moves the debates about racialized subjectivities into a deeper and more complex understanding of all the ways in which identifications and attachments cross race and class lines for many individuals. This discussion focuses on Suchet's treatment of the power of hybridic and biracial identifications, beginning with autobiographical material from Suchet's own childhood in South Africa. In this discussion of “Unraveling Whiteness” I integrate psychoanalytic concepts of enigmatic signification (the work of Laplanche) into a discussion of early attachment, and relational configurations with children and nonparental caretakers. The question of trauma or potential transformation in interracial experience is discussed, and some distinctions between American and South African experience are considered.     

Reflections on Janine Puget's Paper

In my discussion of Janine Puget's deeply thought-provoking paper, I focus on her central argument that the subject's interior world and the world of intersubjective relationships answer to different logics and evolve along separate developmental paths. Puget's argument hinges on a notion of the other, and of otherness as disruptive and traumatic to the subject. My discussion aims to problematize this notion on two fronts. First, I suggest that otherness is not only external to the subject. I point to some ways in which psychoanalysis conceives of otherness and of the other as integral to the constitution and development of the subject. Further, I argue that individuals sometimes desire and actively seek otherness. I engage in this context the question of social displacement and immigration, Puget's other main concern in her paper. Life tourists, as Puget calls them, are a paradox of will and necessity, where the prospect of confronting otherness and being othered is both a threat and a life-affirming recourse. Yet there seems to be more involved in immigration than the psychology of individuals or their relationships. Drawing on my personal and clinical experience as an immigrant working with other immigrants, I suggest that beyond the self-other relation, we can recognize otherness on a third dimension, that of collective, socio-political, normative discourse. Looking at the psychoanalytic notion of Oedipus, I suggest the possibility that Puget's view of the subjective and intersubjective as disparate captures the effect this third, social dimension of human life on the construction of subjectivity and of human relating. I argue that the fault line Puget recognizes may be understood as the effect, within subjectivity, of social power.     

Marco Conci interviews Stefano Bolognini

Abstract

This paper suggests that the understanding of intersubjectivity, which refers to “the dynamic interplay between the analyst's and the patient's subjective experiences in the clinical situation”, is crucial for psychoanalytic work. The analyst's inner experiences, from the first moment that he or she thinks about or meets the patient, belong to an intersubjective situation. Not only are these experiences a valuable channel through which the inner experiences of the patient can be understood, but—as Theodore Jacobs puts it—they are often complementary to that which comes from the patient. The author tries to illustrate the above through the study of the analytic process in the psychoanalytic therapy of a severely disturbed patient. This therapy from its very early phase led to the reawakening of some of the analyst's old conflicts. The patient's difficulties in tolerating the limits of the analytic setting and using free association are discussed, as are his enactments. The analyst's close observation of the interaction between her and the patient, the permanent engagement with her countertransference, and the use of her inner experiences with the patient helped her to contain the enactments, defined the nature of her interventions, and contributed to the analytic process.     

The patient's transference experience of the analyst's gender: Projection,factuality, interpretation,or construction

The constructivist/relational perspective has challenged the analyst's emotional superiority, her omniscience, and her relative removal from the psychoanalytic dialogue. It at first appears to be antithetical to treatment approaches that emphasize the analyst's holding functions. In this essay I examine the holding model and its resolution from a relational perspective. I propose that the current discomfort with the holding function is related to its apparent, but not necessarily real, implications. I discuss the analyst's and patient's subjectivity during periods of holding. I believe that the holding process is essential when the patient has intensely toxic reactions to “knowing”; the analyst and is therefore not yet able to stand a mutual analytic experience. During holding, the patient experiences an illusion of analytictic attunement. This requires that the analyst's dysjunctive subjectivity be contained within the analyst, but not that it be abandoned. Ultimately, it is the transition from the holding position toward collaborative interchange that will allow analyst and patient explicitly to address and ultimately to integrate dependence and mutuality within the psychoanalytic setting and thereby engage in an intersubjective dialogue. The movement toward mutuality will require that the analyst of the holding situation begin to fail in ways that increasingly expose her externality and thus her subjectivity to the patient.     

From Survival to Creative Destiny: The Psychoanalytic Journey of Nina Farhi

Initially, this paper briefly introduces the work of my colleague, Nina Farhi, who was a highly respected psychoanalytic psychotherapist in London and who sadly died last year. After her death, I was invited to discuss both her paper, “The Hands of the Living God,” and the three commentaries by North American analysts, all published in this issue. As part of my commentary, I provide an appreciative yet critical discussion of the way Farhi uses the term “intersubjectivity.” I argue that there is a need for paternal function or a third position to be found in the mind of the analyst in the later phases of work with deeply disturbed patients. I also contribute to the hypothetical debate about whether or not experiences in the womb can be subject to analytic work, using the Lacanian concept of the “Real” and Piontelli's work on fetal and child observation. After this, I explore some of the ways Lacan revised drive theory and discuss these in relation to psychic devolution in later life, essential aloneness and creative human destiny. Finally, I look at how Farhi's paper's posthumous publication may have affected the commentary.     

Mind the baby: The role of the nanny in infant observation

The influence of nannies and other significant caregivers on a child's psychological and emotional development may be profound and if unrecognized may contribute to psychopathology in adulthood. However, the significance of the nanny has been relatively neglected within the psychoanalytic literature. In this paper I will discuss the impact of early caregivers other than the biological mother on the psychic development of the child, and the role of the nanny within the family dynamics as a figure attracting powerful unconscious phantasies and unwanted projections. These ideas will be illustrated by a detailed account of a year‐long observation of an infant who had a succession of several different nannies in her first three months before her parents employed a more permanent nanny. It is proposed that the baby's emerging attachments to her two primary caregivers, mother and nanny, developed in parallel and influenced each other, with observable impact on her behaviour and developing personality. The paper concludes with a review of the place of infant observation within psychoanalytic training and how the experience of witnessing the earliest infant‐caregiver relationships in an extra‐analytic setting both refines understanding of developmental theory and builds a foundation for psychoanalytic practice.     

Identifications Annealed,Adhesive and Political: Commentary on Paper by Nina Farhi

Farhi's fascinating paper pays tribute to and extends those segments of Milner's clinical work that Milner hesitated to theorize explicitly herself. Seeking to understand the latter, I trace psychoanalytic politics in general and the history of Milner's relationships with Winnicott, Klein, and Riviere in particular to explore how her dutiful compliance to the rigid taxonomy of psychoanalytic power of her time bore on the trajectory of her becoming an analyst with a mind of her own. It is in accounting for how she struggled to disentangle herself from that web, that we discover how Milner was able to creatively refashion her work with her patient Susan, a process by which Susan was greatly impacted.

Following the trail of Farhi's ideas around this process and considering her thoughts around their psychic meanings for both analyst and patient, I explore their clinical implications. I focus on the transferential iterations of these dynamics to consider Farhi's suggestion that an annealed bond needs to be established in the treatment of patients who have, early in life, failed to develop annealed identifications. This opens up questions around how such bonds can malignantly colonize the analyst's mind and psychic reality, raises questions of self-care in the analyst and contributes to prognostically anticipating certain sets of enactments in the course of long-term psychoanalyses.     

Some Questions About Divergences and Similarities Between Kleinian and Intersubjective Approaches: Reply to Commentaries

In this response I focus on some key issues raised by the different approaches of Kleinian and intersubjective clinicians. In particular, I raise questions about how the analyst's subjectivity is to be understood, given that the analyst needs to offer something that is over and above her pure subjective reaction. I also discuss projective identification and its implications for understanding the analyst's subjectivity.     

Discussion of Holly Levenkron's “Love (and Hate) With the Proper Stranger”

I agree with Holly Levenkron that the value of an intersubjective perspective is pragmatic: It directs the analyst toward more effective technique. Also, I agree with her view that a successful analytic process is a negotiation between analyst and patient. However, I question Levenkron's idea that the analyst must loosen her hold on her own subjectivity in order for the negotiation to proceed. An analyst cannot and need not diminish her subjectivity. Rather, what is required for clinical analytic work to unfold is that the analyst include the patient within the analyst's subjectivity—or, in other words, that the analyst come to love the patient.     

Poetics in the shadow of the other's language: The melancholic discourse of the trilingual poet Amelia Rosselli

In this paper, I propose a psychoanalytic reading of some of the writings of Amelia Rosselli, a trilingual poet who, at the age of seven, lost her father Carlo, who was persecuted and murdered by Mussolini's regime. History and her history conflate into personal and collective trauma which defies human possibilities to work through and mourn. Rosselli's work testifies to such predicament of the human subject of the 20th century, his/her dislocation, alienation and internal irreconcilable divisions. In particular I examine Diary in three tongues, which is the most autobiographical of her works and a self‐analytic piece, written after the conclusion of her second analysis. In the Diary, Rosselli employs textual strategies which convey the fragmentation and destructuring of language, where her traumatic experience resides as a wound inflicted to the symbolic order. I propose that her writings contain her unconscious memories in an estranged and melancholic language which becomes the crucible to express her impossible mourning, in a complex mixture of Eros and Thanatos which allowed her to survive psychically and to create a very personal experimental poetic discourse which made her a literary figure of international acclaim. My primary engagement will be with Freud's theory of mourning and melancholia and its successive elaboration by Kristeva, who maintains that the melancholic discourse finds its expression in the pre‐verbal and infra‐verbal aspects of language, which she calls ‘semiotics’, in dialectic articulation with its symbolic components. Drawing on literary texts, significant inferences can be made on the psychoanalytic listening to the prosodic aspects of language as the carrier of inchoate forms of representation of that which exceeds language: trauma, raw affects, mnemic traces, that is, the unrepresented and/or unrepresentable.     

When the Frame Doesn't Fit the Picture

I reconsider the function and construction of the psychoanalytic frame from an intersubjective, relational perspective. The analytic frame is meant to create and stand for, both practically and symbolically, a therapeutic structure with clear and safe boundaries in which the process of therapy unfolds. From my perspective, the establishment of the frame is, at the same time, an integral part of the process itself and reflects conscious and unconscious aspects of both patient and analyst. I explore this paradox and its implications for both practice and theory. In theorizing the functions of the frame, I draw on Goffman's frame theory, Bateson's anthropological and ethological studies, Ferenzci's perspective on the elasticity of technique, and a number of contemporary relational theorists. Several clinical vignettes are presented as illustrative of a new perspective on the analytic frame as cocreated and contextual, reflecting the variability of the psychoanalytic situation and the uniqueness of each dyad.     

Becoming and Being an Analyst in the British Psychoanalytical Society

The articles of Elizabeth Spillius and Jennifer Johns exemplify contrasting ways in which an analyst may form her psychoanalytic identity. She may recognize and accept a particular theoretical standpoint as valid, and form an analytic identity around that position. Or she may engage with a variety of viewpoints, and form an analytic identity through the interaction between these and her own internal self-experience. These approaches coexist in the British Psychoanalytical Society. There has been the potential for creative discussion between them, especially as regards their implications for analytic training. These six articles together, however, reveal how hard it has been for such discussion to take place. Spillius describes the disparity between the Society's three groups in relation to candidates' choice of supervisors, and I discuss this further. It seems to reflect an underlying difference in approach to psychoanalytic training, based on these different views of how an analyst's identity is formed. I suggest that the difficulty in debating this freely reflects a fear that opening up the issue might lead the Society to split. In 2005 the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement, which for 60 years governed group balance in the British Society, was formally abolished. In the light of this, I consider what is needed for a Society creatively to contain divergent philosophies of training.     

Incognito or not? the patient's subjective experience of the analyst's private life

This paper examines the meaning for the patient of the analyst's personal life and personality which are ostensibly banished from the consulting room. The therapist has a not‐always‐so‐secret “secret life”; that the patient is supposed to “not know”; about. Yet, more or less unconscious perceptions, impressions, and fantasies about extratherapeutic aspects of the analyst are omnipresent and significantly color the psychoanalytic enterprise.

Moreover the analyst as a person generally plays a critical and underacknowledged role in the patient's experience of the endeavor. Constructing multiple overlapping images of the analyst and of the analytic relationship, the patient discovers himself or herself in the matrix of these relationships with various images of the analytic other. The analysand is motivated to make sense of the analyst as wholly as possible, the better to place into context the analyst's interventions. The patient's resulting view of the analyst's subjective experience acts as a lens that filters and subtly alters the meaning of the analyst's communications.

I illustrate these points by relating my work with a patient whose dreams uncannily picked up on a (consciously) unknown aspect of my private life—my having a handicapped son. The treatment thereafter centered on the patient's identification with my child (as someone “disabled") and on the meaning of her having dreamt something so personal about her therapist.     

The Unobtrusive Relational Analyst

I describe an unobtrusive relational approach to the psychoanalytic treatment of nonalive and nonspeakable states and ways of being. I build upon a contemporary relational sensibility that values the intersubjective engagement of analyst and patient and the enactment of dissociated and unformulated states, together with the concepts of regression and the unobtrusive analyst central to the work of the British independent analysts, with a special focus on Michael and Enid Balint. I stress that in being unobtrusive, the analyst is not neutral or abstinent, but deeply engaged and becomes the analyst the patient needs. A case is offered as an account of analytic work that was enhanced and made possible by my engaged but unobtrusive presence, and the privileging of the patient's own idiom, object relating and early developmental needs. I offer a contemporary rendition of regression that encompasses mutuality, regulation and accompaniment. I suggest a concept of “benign regressive mutual regulation” and outline and differentiate some of the influences from the contemporary psychoanalytic field.     

First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement

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Crash: What We Do When We Cannot Touch: Commentary on Paper by Meira Likierman

This commentary aims to show the congruence and difference between Likierman's position on recognizing otherness and working with enactment and her relational, intersubjective position. Differences in my reading of the case include stressing the repetition of early attachment trauma, the level of implicit procedural relating, and the patient's contribution to the shared third of rupture and repair. I try to show that enactments arise not merely because the patient is able to pull the patient into forbidden behavior but because the dissociated parts of the patient pull the analyst into dissociation even when the analyst is acting “properly.” The rupture or collision—the “crash”—that the patient helps to formulate represents an opportunity to see the life-giving element in what we, analysts along with patients, inevitably also experience as frightening and even life-threatening.     

Commentary on Paper by Lawrence J. Brown

Brown's historical overview of post-Kleinian psychoanalysis traces key steps in the evolving and diverse practice of working in the psychoanalytic situation while regarding it as a two-person field. The Barangers' “The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field” is central to his narrative. I develop my understanding of the originality of their contribution in theorizing a situational unconscious, and of their continuing relevance for thinking about analytic listening and intersubjective collaboration. Brown presents a countertransference dream of his own along with the dream of a patient as an example of the Barangers' concept of the “shared unconscious fantasy” of the analytic couple. A detailed alternative reading of Brown's clinical vignette reveals an absence of fit with the Barangers' views on collaboration in the analytic situation. Some uses of Bion's “dreaming” and “becoming” are implicitly questioned as they risk encouraging the idealization of special states over process.