Jonah: His Story,Our Story; His Struggle,Our Struggle: Commentary on Paper by Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg

The Book of Jonah, one of the best known of the biblical tales, is much more than a children's fable about a man and a whale. This brief narrative about a prophet who refuses to be a prophet is our story—how we too often give in to our nature which pulls us toward resentment, parochialism, and narrowness, too often avoid what we need to face within ourselves and our responsibilities, too often are crippled by our inability to transcend our anger and forgive. After examining Aviva Zornberg's analysis of the Book of Jonah in which she argues that the message, like the latent dream à la Freud, is obscure, I argue that the meaning of the Book of Jonah is clear. Psychic unity requires that we face our objects—God and conscience, Nineveh and storm and mother, self and other—struggle with them, stare at them, allow them to breathe and live in the same room. As God, Jonah's “psychoanalyst,” argues, it is only then that we can find our way to where His analysand Jonah never quite arrives—forgiveness of the self and of the other.     

AdJusting Jonah

In this article, I engage the theme for the WCC Busan assembly – “God of Life, Lead Us to Justice and Peace” – through a reading of the story of Jonah that listens for the currents and vibes in and from Oceania. I circle around the story of Jonah with a double‐edging (AdJusting) reading: first, listening for justice (Just ing) in the story of Jonah and second, shifting (Adjusting) the way we hear (read, view) Jonah. I hear Jonah's Wrath as a call for justice, with calm and respect of someone who is angry but at peace. Jonah did not agree with G*d from the start, seeing that Nineveh was not as wicked as G*d claimed, and at the end of the story Jonah is silent because he did not want Nineveh's countless cattle (like pigs in my culture) to be destroyed.     

Commentary on Paper by Aviva Gottlieb Zornberg

In this discussion, I stress two points. First, I have underlined the powerful understanding Dr. Zornberg brings to her exegesis of the book of Jonah via her competence as Biblical scholar, literary critic, and master of psychoanalytic theory. In her hands, Jonah becomes a fully minded person, not just a moral icon. Second, I have focused on her major thesis, that Jonah's need to escape, his repeated going down into and away from himself, evolves from his putative trauma, which is comprised of not only the horror of near death but also the shock of survival.     

Worship and Theology: Lancelot Andrewes in Durham,Easter 1617

Abstract

On Easter Day 1617, Lancelot Andrewes, one of the foremost preachers in England in the first quarter of the 17th century, preached before King James I in Durham Cathedral. This article sets the sermon in its historical and liturgical context, including the choice of an unusual text with nautical imagery – the allegory of the ‘sign of Jonah’ (Matthew 12.39–40). The preacher is shown to move subtly through the book of Jonah, his flight from God, the storm in the sea, the three days in the whale's belly, his escape to dry land, and the repentance of the people of Nineveh, applying each episode to growth in the Easter faith. The ‘three days’ in particular are seen as the ‘Sacred Three Days’ (‘Triduum Sacrum’) of patristic tradition, which point to a journey of faith that includes repentance and forgiveness, and participation not only in the sacrament of the Eucharist, but in the great sacrament of Easter as well. Andrewes emerges from this sermon as an imaginative thinker, with an original way of handling Scripture and tradition.     

THE IMAGO DEI AS THE MIND OF JESUS CHRIST

In this essay I examine David Clough's interpretation of the imago Dei and his use of “creaturely” language in his book On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology. Contrary to Clough, I argue that the imago Dei should be interpreted as being uniquely human. Using a neuroscientific approach, I elaborate on my claim that while Jesus is the image of God perfected, the imago Dei is best understood as having the mind of Christ. In regards to language, I make the case that using terms such as “creature” when referring to nonhuman animals is problematic in that it can serve to alienate human beings from their capacity to image God. In addition I argue that “creaturely” language raises concerns for the African American community given Western Christianity's history as it relates to their valuation of black bodies and human enslavement.     

Karl Barth and the Purification of Divine Simplicity

Johnson investigates Karl Barth's critical appropriation of the doctrine of divine simplicity. While Barth is critical of traditional formulations of the doctrine, he understands himself to be refining the doctrine rather than rejecting it. Barth notes that Scripture attributes a diverse set of perfections to God in describing his salvific actions. These diverse perfections, however, have a fundamental unity: God does not contradict himself, but rather his perfections describe his unified, trustworthy agency. For this reason, we can know that in God's inmost being, God is not self‐contradictory but utterly unified or simple in his self‐fidelity. Johnson points out that a key element of Barth's doctrine of God is that it can never be the mere deduction of an abstract, transcendent entity; rather, it must begin with the transcendent God's relationship to creation, and therefore must begin with Jesus Christ, who reveals the true being of God. Johnson identifies three guidelines for speaking of Barth's doctrine: each one of God's perfections must be seen as perfections of his one divine being; God's one being does not exist above and behind his revealed perfections; and God's revealed perfections are essential to his divine nature. On this basis, Johnson explores what Barth has to say about the relationship between God's freedom and his self‐fidelity, including as this regards his freedom to live his one eternal life for us.     

Luther's Small and Large Catechisms: Defining and Confessing Christian Faith From the Centre in a Religiously Plural World

Abstract : In this article, the author argues that in his Small and Large Catechisms, which were both written in 1529, Martin Luther centres the Christian faith in a way that others can recognise as authentic and faithful to the Gospel vis‐à‐vis the relativism that is posited as the appropriate Christian articulation of the Gospel in a world of religious diversity. Luther's non‐negotiable centring on God for us in Jesus Christ, through whom God is uniquely and decisively revealed, speaks to the contemporary intra‐Christian and inter‐religious questions. The author finds evangelical and persuasive resonance in Lesslie Newbigin's call to indwell the Christian story and George Lindbeck's argument to attend to the grammar of the faith.     

Luther on vocation,by Gustaf Wingren: A twenty‐first‐century theological‐literary reading

In this article, the author offers a critical, appreciative appraisal of The One Mediator, Luther on Vocation, by Gustaf Wingren (English translation, 1957), which continues to be a seminal text for understanding Luther's teaching on the theme of vocation. The author points out that the reader needs to keep in mind both the difference between Luther's world of the sixteenth century and the world of the early twenty‐first century, and the sobering reality that pursuing the neighbor's good continues to be an essential, definitive calling that every Christian has. Further, the author calls attention to Wingren's indisputable reminder that, for Luther, vocation is about the way of the Christian in human society. That way of being in pursuit of the neighbor's good is consequent upon the forgiveness of sins, which God bestows on the sinner who receives it through faith in Jesus Christ. It is God alone who is the decisive actor, even though in the former—seeking the neighbor's good—God's work is hidden; that is, the human actor is a “mask of God.”     

Experience and the Absolute other

In Experience and the Absolute (2004) and other works, Jean‐Yves Lacoste develops a phenomenology of a way of life he calls “liturgy,” in which one refuses one's being‐in‐the‐world in favor of a more basic form of existence he calls “being‐before‐God.” In this essay I argue that if there is indeed such a thing as being‐before‐God, Lacoste has not sufficiently considered the possibility that it is characterized in part by a disturbance of one's being‐in‐the‐world similar to, or perhaps even identical with, the disruptive encounter with the human other that constitutes the self as responsible according to Levinas's unique notion of ethics. Lacoste's dismissal of Levinas, evidently based on a misunderstanding of what Levinas means by the word “ethics,” leads him to overlook the potential relevance of Levinas's ideas to his phenomenological project at a number of significant points in his work.     

GOD OF THE GAPS OR THE GOD OF “DESIGN AND DOMINION”? RE-VISITING NEWTON'S THEOLOGY

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it.     

‘We Pray by His Mouth’: Karl Barth,Erving Goffman,and a Theology of Invocation

Rereading the opening question of the Westminster Catechism, “What is the chief end of man?”, I contend in this essay that the act of invocation — giving God thanks, praise, and petitions — is the act in and through which human being itself is founded, constituted and achieved. I take important cues from Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics and The Christian Life, and from sociologist Erving Goffman's work on the shifting “footings” involved in everyday interactions. I argue for an account of the human being as a being‐with‐God, human acting as acting‐with‐God, and human salvation as a restoration to the genuine human partner's work — indeed, the true leitourgia— of thanks, praise and petition to God.     

Struggling with reason

The purpose of this article is to suggest an interpretation of Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov as an advanced theological critique of practical reason. Dostoevsky deals with Kant's understanding of the relation between will and reason within morality already in his Notes from underground. He criticises Kant indirectly by proposing an alternative kind of imperative for human action where the will is regarded to be free in another sense than within Kantian theory. Dostoevsky develops this approach further in The Brothers Karamazov. The author of this article argues that Dostoevsky's critique of rationalism can be described as three different models of a struggle with reason. These three models are represented by the figures of the three brothers Karamazov and are analysed in relation to the question of the existence of God as it is dealt with in the novel.     

The Life of Spirit: The Self and Sanctification in Søren Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death

Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is often overlooked as an author in the Christian spiritual tradition. This paper answers Christopher Barnett's call to investigate themes of Christian spirituality in Kierkegaard's writing. In this paper, I argue that we can construct of vision of sanctification from Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death. While Kierkegaard does not directly deal with themes of sanctification in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus does demonstrate the ‘spiritless’ life of despair. The ‘spiritless’ life, as Anti-Climacus defines it, is a life that is not truly a ‘self’. Anti-Climacus systematically demonstrates four categories of despair, and all people not living in faith, whether they realise it or not, fit into one of these categories of ‘spiritless’ existence. I argue that by constructing the opposites of Kierkegaard's categories of despair I demonstrate that a ‘spirit-filled’ life exemplifies a vibrant Christian life of sanctification.     

The Theological Foundation of Hobbesian Physics: A Defence of Corporeal God

In 1668, the octogenarian Hobbes finally affirmed openly a doctrine that was unavoidable given his longstanding embrace of both theism and materialism: God is corporeal. However, this doctrine has generally been downplayed or dismissed by scholars, who have alleged that Hobbes's corporeal theism is irreconcilable with his more orthodox theological pronouncements or with his fundamental metaphysical principles. This paper defends the coherence of Hobbes's corporeal God against particularly vigorous criticisms of Douglas Jesseph and others. The aim of the paper is not, however, to situate Hobbes's deity safely within the boundaries of seventeenth century protestant theology, as defenders of Hobbesian theism have often wanted to do. Rather, the paper places the corporeal God at the metaphysical foundations of Hobbes's natural philosophy. Despite his early reticence about theological speculation, Hobbes eventually relied on God to provide a continuous, resistance-free source of motion or conatus to a material plenum whose parts would otherwise quickly slow to an infinitesimal crawl. Hobbes's late theology, while certainly heterodox in content, is not so different in function from that of contemporaries like René Descartes and Henry More, whose religious sincerity is rarely questioned. Hobbes' corporeal deity deserves a place in the seventeenth century pantheon.     

The ‘true religion’ of the sceptic: Penelhum reading Hume's Dialogues

According to Terence Penelhum, Philo's confession in the last part of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveals on the side of the author a reconciliatory and pacifying attitude towards the liberal moderate clergy of his days. This article investigates whether another reading of this intriguing text is not more appropriate. It defends the idea that Philo's speeches and Cleanthes' reactions to it in the last part of the Dialogues reveal on Hume's side an attitude of mild despair and isolation towards the religious culture of eighteenth-century Scotland, in both its orthodox and more moderate form.     

Jonah and Applied Psychoanalytic Dialogue: Introduction

This introduction to a series of fascinating papers on the biblical book of Jonah provides a brief schematic outline of the narrative as well as an orientation to the place of the book in the Jewish liturgy. An explanation is given for why a secular psychoanalytic audience might well be interested in such an effort at applied psychoanalysis. This rationale has to do with the story's universal as well as particularistic significance. Jonah himself may be viewed as attempting to escape from dialogue, but this lively and engaged psychoanalytic dialogue examines and debates the meaning of his story.     

Death and Dying in Camus' The Plague

ABSTRACT: Albert Camus' allegorical novel The Plague provides meaningful insight into the process of death and dying. As with other literary masterpieces the author shares with his audience his concern with and knowledge of the vicissitudes of the human condition. In The Plague Camus employs the reactions and responses of a community and its citizenry to an epidemic of the bubonic plague as a symbolic representation of the individual's grappling with death and dying. His main themes are those of separation and exile, despair and despondency, and helplessness and hopefulness.     

The Staurocentric Logic of Eberhard Jüngel: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology

Ecclesiology and pneumatology remain two areas of Eberhard Jüngel's thought that are repeatedly critiqued as being ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘deficient’ due to his reliance on an Augustinian grammar in describing the Holy Spirit. This article argues for a revised understanding of both Jüngel's trinitarian theology and ecclesiology in light of his commitment to staurocentrism. Jüngel's staurocentric doctrine of God, for which he is so often lauded, is only possible because of the Augustinian grammar he accepts for his pneumatology. Only as the bond of love, the relation between the relations, can the Spirit make clear how it is that the triune God, fully identified with the life of Jesus, can die. Ultimately, Jüngel builds on Augustine's doctrine of the Spirit to demonstrate two distinct, yet interrelated, theological principles: first, that the person of the Spirit is indispensible within the event of God's triune being; and second, that within the church it is the Spirit's personhood, uniquely, which makes possible ecclesial correspondence to God.     

The doubled movement of infinity in Kierkegaard and in Sūfism

S?ren Kierkegaard was a very rigorous critic of traditional philosophical thinking and speculative systems. According to his theory it is possible that there is a logic system, but not a system of life. If such a system exists, it can be known only to God. Man can attain the meaning of life only by his own relationship to God. However, this relationship cannot be explained by philosophy because it has to do with a transcendent ‘double movement of infinity’ which takes place between God and the individual. Like philosophy, mysticism cannot explain one's relationship to God. The difference is that philosophy neglects God as the absolute starting point, while mysticism forgets that an individual—after he has experienced divinity—may return to the real world. The self need not disappear in divinity. The dialectic of the relationship between God and man implies that both poles (God and man) are present, thus ‘the infinite difference between God and man’ does not disappear. Since Sūfism is a type of Islamic mysticism, it may be said that a Sūfi cannot witness God's truth if he remains in his union with God. It is therefore relevant to draw some parallels between Kierkegaard's view and a comparable Sūfi view about the human relationship to God.     

God,the Future,and the Fundamentum of History in Wolfhart Pannenberg

The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between Wolfhart Pannenberg's idea of God and his conception of history, with the intention of determining the precise nature of the link that, in his view, connects both philosophical and the theological reflection on the meaning of history. We shall first analyze Pannenberg's response to the traditional criticism of Christianity as an anthropomorphic projection of the human being. Then we shall pay attention to the features of any possible fundamentum of history. We will show that, according to Pannenberg, a transition from a philosophical into a theological consideration of history is needed in order to provide a rationally acceptable foundation for both the unity and the meaning of universal history.