Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of Reason

Reason has regularly been portrayed and understood in terms of images and metaphors that involve the exclusion or denigration of some element—body, passion, nature, instinct—that is cast as “feminine.” Drawing upon philosophical insight into metaphor, I examine the impact of this gendering of reason. I argue that our conceptions of mind, reason, unreason, female, and male have been distorted. The politics of “rational” discourse has been set up in ways that still subtly but powerfully inhibit the voice and agency of women.     

Reason and Sensibility: The Ideal of Women's Self-Governance in die Writings of Mary Wollstonecraft

It is standard in feminist commentaries to argue that Wollstonecraft's feminism is vitiated by her commitment to a liberal philosophical framework, relying on a valuation of reason over passion and on the notion of a sex-neutral self. I challenge this interpretation of Wollstonecraft's feminism and argue that her attempt to articulate an ideal of self-governance for women was an attempt to diagnose and resolve some of the tensions and inadequacies within traditional liberal thought. ¹ 1 I use the terms “autonomy” and “self-governance” interchangeably in this article, although only the latter term was used by Wollstonecraft. My tendency, however, is to stick with Wollstonecraft's own term.
     

Two sides of the same coin: The differentiating role of need satisfaction and frustration in passion for screen-based activities

Rooted in Self-Determination Theory, the present research sought to investigate whether the “bright” and “dark” side of human functioning (need satisfaction and need frustration, respectively) would, as determinants, differentially predict harmonious passion (HP) and obsessive passion (OP) for screen-based activities such as Facebook use, TV series watching, online gaming, and smartphone gaming. For this purpose, four cross-sectional studies were carried out (N_total = 1,065). Results showed that, across all activities, need satisfaction was negatively related to OP, but not HP. A similar pattern emerged with need frustration: It was positively related to OP, but not HP. Moreover, even after controlling for the self-reported amount of time spent on the activities, HP predicted adaptive, activity-specific outcomes, whereas OP predicted maladaptive ones. These findings suggest that general need satisfaction may be a protective factor against the compensatory function of OP, but need frustration may be a potential risk factor of OP and both should be taken into account in the case of passion for screen-based activities.     

Is Colour incompatibility analytic?

It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft-ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place.     

The Suffering of Passion: Metamorphoses and the Embrace of the Stranger

In this paper I use the concept of the “suffering of passion” to explore how human beings endure personal metamorphoses. I suggest that the affirmation of passion, which is both self-interested and self-surrendering, is necessary in order to embark on the journey from self-sameness to otherness. Inasmuch as this transitional path simultaneously entails the “embrace of the stranger” of one's own growth and of the subjectivity of another person, the suffering of passion is both a developmental and ethical achievement. The mutual interchange of giving and receiving, mediated by gratitude and generosity, inspires the passion necessary to construct a relational bridge of conscience from self-sameness to otherness. When the mutuality of giving and receiving breaks down, shame may lead to the negation and disowning of one's passion. The resulting inversion of passion into passivity may then culminate in a narcissistic loyalty to “one's own kind.” A case vignette of a young man is presented to illustrate the difficulty of suffering the passion of one's own growth.     

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals

We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, “if she watered the plants they bloomed,” when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, “if the sun shone they bloomed” decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from “the plants did not bloom” to “therefore she did not water them”). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, “if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed,” when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, “she did not water the plants and they did not bloom” increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from “she did not water the plants” to “therefore they did not bloom”) is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new “switched-suppression” effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, “if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed”: modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning.     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

Framing of imprecise quantities: When are lower interval bounds preferred to upper bounds?

Imprecisely known quantities (e.g., predictions) are often described in approximate terms as “more than X” or “less than Y” (e.g., “Ann will earn more than $50 000” or “less than $60 000”). Such phrases carry both quantitative and qualitative (pragmatic) information. Three studies are reported showing that lower limit estimates (more than, over, minimum) are generally more frequent, and considered more appropriate than upper limit estimates (less than, under, maximum) over a wide range of contexts. This is partly due to scalar properties of the number system, where lower numbers are attained before, and included in higher numbers, but not vice versa. As a result, upper limit statements are perceived as negations, and carry more specific information about the speaker's communicative concerns. Upper limit statements are preferred with amounts or quantities that can be perceived as small, whereas lower limit statements can be used both to indicate large quantities and as a default. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An Ethos of Affirmative Laughter in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (2006), Nietzsche presents Zarathustra as a sage and parodic prophet, who acquires and offers insight over the narrated journey of his spiritual development. Nietzsche’s conception of Zarathustra as a gift (to “all and none”) endorses learning as the kind of emulation condensed into Zarathustra’s complex formulation: rather than “corpses that I carry with me wherever I want . . . I need living companions who follow me because they want to follow themselves—wherever I want.” Thus I aim, firstly, to follow the text closely to see what is given. However, noting that Zarathustra is deeply imbued with figures of laughter, I also impose an interpretation. “Repeating differently,” as demanded by Zarathustra, I outline a practicable, spiral-shaped “learning curve” of traversal and return to various “shades of laughter,” advancing from the worst laughters to “golden laughter,” which embraces complexity. This represents what it means to laugh well. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate that the complex ethos of affirmative laughter in Zarathustra remains strikingly pertinent for a contemporary era urgently tasked with embracing complexity.     

Concepts as Tools Not Rules: a Commentary on (Re-) Defining Racism

In (Re-) Defining Racism, Alberto Urquidez argues that conflicting philosophical accounts over the definition of racism are at bottom linguistic confusions that would benefit from a Wittgensteinian-inspired approach. In this essay, I argue that such an approach would be helpful in disputes over the definition of metaphysically contested concepts, such as “race,” or semantically contested concepts, such as “racialization.” I disagree, however, that such insights would prove helpful or do very little for disputes concerning normatively contested concepts, such as “racism.”

     

Personal Identity and National Identity: An Analogy

Simone Weil writes in one of her notebooks: “When one arrives at the absolute one can only express oneself by identities … – For identity alone expresses the unconditioned” (Cahiers, in Œuvres complètes, t. VI, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), 113). Thus, it is that “the good is the good”, one and the same, unconditionally. Certainly, an individual is unique, a nation is equally so. Nevertheless, personal identity – or “character” – and the identity of a nation are not absolutes. When we wish to treat them as absolutes, we ignore the fact that the “person,” as well as the “nation”, only exists within relationships that they are subject to exterior circumstances and that their identity is situated in time. Is one correct to suppose that the character of an individual or the identity of the nation are “invariables that one continues to find throughout various manifestations”, (“Notes sur le caractère”, Écrits de Marseille, in Œuvres complètes, Op. cit., t. IV, vol. 1 (2008), 87) observed or probable? We hypothesize here that one can apply to national identity what Simone Weil wrote about the notion of character, in notes composed in Marseille and in her commentary on the Our Father (“À propos du Pater”, ibid., 337-345).     

ON WHAT THERE IS

Abstract: This paper programmatically outlines a case for “nominalism”. If brown and colored are so related logically that being colored is nothing over and above being brown, then whatever “exists”other than concreta is nothing over and above concreta. Possibilities of rain and “universals” like the shape, circularity (= the logical possibility of being so shaped), lack “existence” in another sense. (“There are things that don't exist” shows that ‘there are’ is used even more broadly than ‘there exist’.) The univocity of ‘exist’ is disproved by “A prime number between 6 and 10 exists” being analytic despite the invalidity of ontological arguments.     

Public Theologies of Love in the Civitas Dei and Civitas Terrena: Sexuality and the Transformation of Sydney,Australia 1960–2010

This article discusses the emergence of a public LGBTQI culture in Sydney that both challenged hetero-normative philosophies and praxes of love and sexuality, and engaged with Christian urban theologies to give voice to alternative, queer-affirming forms of eros, agape, and philia. This case study is situated in the context of the problematic relationship between Christianity and the urban throughout history; the ideal Civitas Dei negated the real Civitas Terrena, faithful Jerusalem triumphed over decadent Sodom. Public theologies, initially formulated by Christians, were hijacked to expose tensions resulting from notions of “proper” and “improper” love being mapped onto urban spaces. Churches and other “official” structures represented planning in the service of institutional religion and heterosexual married love (a Civitas Dei), and the clean, modern city as eschatological ideal (the heavenly Jerusalem). The existence of ruins and “undesirable” places, temporary heterotopias where “unnatural” acts of love and sex took place, challenged this order (a Civitas Terrena or Sodom). We argue that public theologies, mainstream and fringe, play a vital creative role in the planning, regulation, and lived experience of the modern city of Sydney.     

New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives,Consistency, and Quantifiers*

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: “kiss me and hug me” is the conjunction of “kiss me” with “hug me”. This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, I argue. “If you love me, kiss me”, a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent (“you love me”) with an imperative consequent (“kiss me”); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three‐valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic.     

A critical commentary on follow-up studies and “desistance” theories about transgender and gender-nonconforming children

ABSTRACT

Background: It has been widely suggested that over 80% of transgender children will come to identify as cisgender (i.e., desist) as they mature, with the assumption that for this 80%, the trans identity was a temporary “phase.” This statistic is used as the scientific rationale for discouraging social transition for pre-pubertal children. This article is a critical commentary on the limitations of this research and a caution against using these studies to develop care recommendations for gender-nonconforming children.

Methods: A critical review methodology is employed to systematically interpret four frequently-cited studies that sought to document identity outcomes for gender-nonconforming children (often referred to as “desistance” research).

Results: Methodological, theoretical, ethical, and interpretive concerns regarding four “desistance” studies are presented. The authors clarify the historical and clinical contexts within which these studies were conducted to deconstruct assumptions in interpretations of the results. The discussion makes distinctions between the specific evidence provided by these studies versus the assumptions that have shaped recommendations for care. The affirmative model is presented as a way to move away from the question of, “How should children's gender identities develop over time?” toward a more useful question: “How should children best be supported as their gender identity develops?”

Conclusion: The tethering of childhood gender diversity to the framework of “desistance” or “persistence” has stifled advancements in our understanding of children's gender in all its complexity. These follow-up studies fall short in helping us understand what children need. As work begins on the 8th version of the Standards of Care by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, we call for a more inclusive conceptual framework that takes children's voices seriously. Listening to children's experiences will enable a more comprehensive understanding of the needs of gender-nonconforming children and provide guidance to scientific and lay communities.     

The Zhuangzi on Coping with Society

Stories in the Zhuangzi detailing expert artisans and other extraordinary people are often read as celebrations of “skills” or “knacks.” In this paper, I will argue that they would be more accurately understood as “coping” stories. Taken as a celebration of one’s “skill” or “knack” they transform the Zhuangzi into an implicit advocate of conforming to, or even identifying with, one’s social roles. I will argue that the stories of artisans and extraordinarily skilled people are less about cultivating one’s talents so as to “find one’s calling,” better fulfill social expectations, or achieve oneness with Dao, than they are concerned with developing strategies for coping with natural and social contingencies. Read in this way, there is much to learn from the Zhuangzi when reflecting on contemporary social and political issues, especially those related to meritocratic hubris.     

The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology

This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well‐supported theories all predict that this “Discovery Model” of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative “Negotiation Model” of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating compromises—promises to reduce polarization by fostering a progressive willingness to “work across the aisle” to settle moral issues cooperatively. This article then examines potential methods for normatively evaluating polarization, arguing there are prima facie reasons to favor the Negotiation Model over the Discovery Model based on their hypothesized effects on polarization. Finally, I outline avenues for further empirical and philosophical research.     

The Exorcist and the Spiritual Problem of Modern Woman

The archetype is not evoked by will; it appears in a situation which demands compensation (spontaneous archetypal intervention). Religion calls such happenings “God's will.” A situation may present one with illness or endanger one's life. Consciousness finds this state overwhelming. Even people who boast no particular religious belief find themselves forced involuntarily to give way to prayer: that is, the archetype of a helpful being is constellated producing at the last moment a turn which is felt to be miraculous

C. G. Jung A letter (modified), written February 1960, in Spring, 1961.

It appears almost incredible to us that late into the 18th century it should have been possible that emotional confusions and erotic abberations of phantasy were brought in relation to demons and witchcraft. States of “ possession,” “obsession” or certain types of “imagination,” but above all “anaestesia,” the stigma diaboli par excellence, mutism, sleep-walking and convulsive states. were all condemned as the work of demons

Liliane Frey-Rohn from The Beginning of Depth Psychology     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.