Why Didn’t Freud Reject Pfister? A Response to Isabelle Noth and Christoph Morgenthaler

The Freud-Pfister correspondence is in some sense an Urtext for the most friendly debate imaginable between the self-identified “godless Jew” who founded psychoanalysis, and the liberal Swiss pastor who was drawn to psychoanalysis while retaining his belief in God. Why didn’t Freud reject Pfister? This article will probe this question using the tools of psychoanalysis itself. After reviewing Freud’s associations to childhood religion, the Bible, and his father (citing Rizzuto), I am proposing that Pfister functioned unconsciously for Freud not only as an admiring son and disciple, but also a father substitute—much like Freud’s beloved antiquities—who represented both a God and a father who would admire and love him, and carry Freud’s name forward in the Book of Life.     

Exit Dora: Freud's Patient Takes Leave

Why did “Dora” leave Sigmund Freud—why did she end her psychoanalytic treatment with him prematurely? This question haunts Freud's Dora study, his first extensive and perhaps most famous narrative of a psychoanalytic treatment. I pursue this question through a close reading of Freud's text. I focus not only on the interaction between Freud and Dora but also on the literary qualities of “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905)—qualities that place this work firmly in the tradition of Viennese fin de siècle drama and prose.     

The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: a look into Freud's rhetorical tool box

In my ‘Seven Sins of Pseudo-Science’ (Journal for General Philosophy of Science 1993) I argued against Grünbaum that Freud commits all Seven Sins of Pseudo-Science. Yet how does Freud manage to fool many people, including such a sophisticated person as Grünbaum? My answer is that Freud is a sophisticated pseudo-scientist, using all Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist to keep up appearances, to wit, (1) the Humble Empiricist, (2) the Severe Selfcriticism, (3) the Unbiased Me, (4) the Striking but Irrelevant Example, (5) the Proof Given Elsewhere, (6) the Favorable Compromise, and (7) the Display of Methodological Sophistication. One should note that not all strategies are disreputable in themselves. But all are used very cunningly so as to hide weaknesses in Freud's arguments. To be fair, quite a few of his methodological remarks are sophisticated enough. As Freud combines these sophisticated remarks with an appalling methodology in practice, I call him a sophisticated pseudo-scientist. I do not claim that these rhetorical strategies are specific to him.     

Images of freud: From his correspondence

Abstract

The study of the epistolary activity of Freud, because of the specific investment demonstrated by the estimated 20,000 letters which make up his correspondence, in itself affords us various insights: on Freud himself, describing himself from day to day, on the history and nature of the conscious and unconscious libidinal relationships which linked him to his principal correspondents and, taking this exceptional case as our starting point, on the specificity of the need to write and to receive letters which is present to differing degrees in every human being. Leaving to others the detailed investigation of the content of this correspondence as a source of biographical or theoretical information, this work concentrates on the comments by Freud himself on the many different aspects of the art of the letter-writer. The method used was specific: some 600 extracts from his letters were read, whereby we confined ourselves to remarks on the material circumstances in which they were written, the handwriting, the detailed records which were kept of them, their frequency, their family or conventional aspects, etc. This intentionally limited vision allows us to isolate a number of points of reference in the manifestations of a compulsion to write intended to prevent the occurrence, already feared by the young Freud of age 18 years, of “mortal boredom”.     

It really just does not follow,comments on

I discuss points of agreement and disagreement with Francis (2013), and argue that the main lesson from his numerous one-off publication bias critiques is that developers of new statistical tools ought to anticipate their potential misuses and develop safeguards to prevent them.     

Why did freud choose medical school?

Abstract

After demonstrating the unsatisfactory nature of the reasons Freud gave us for his choice of medical school, the author shows how it is possible to throw new light on it on the basis of his letters to his adolescent friend Emil Fluss. This relationship played a crucial role in forcing Freud to come out of his isolation and the defensive dissection of his feelings that he used to practice, and thus experience an intimate relationship as a better source of self-knowledge and growth. This is the context in which his choice of medical school took place, which can consequently be conceptualized in terms of his unconscious—and self-concealed—pursuit of a growth-promoting and self-healing agency and experience. It thus was an interpersonal event which compelled him to deviate from his original purpose, i.e. the study of law or the humanities, and take up the “unconscious plan” to soften his defensive apparatus. This is consequently the new meaning we can attach to the experience of “rest and full satisfaction” he made in Brücke's laboratory between 1876 and 1882. What he defines as the “triumph” of his life thus also acquires a new meaning: the possibility to take up again his original interest in psychology not on an exclusively defensive basis any more, but eventually in a constructive way. Such a personal itinerary also represented one of Freud's most convincing experiences of the power of the unconscious, as he formulated it in his book on dreams—and as he articulated it in the new field of psychoanalysis. Since, in the author's opinion, the attempt at self-cure lies at the root of our own choice of our profession, this must have been also Freud's case, at a much earlier time than what is traditionally referred to as his self-analysis. At variance with what Freud himself used to claim, the study of his life remains one of the best keys to the understanding of his intellectual legacy.     

What do sensory scales measure?

It is indeed an honour to have drawn Professor Stevens' fire (1964), in view of the magnitude of his research achievement in the field of sensory scaling. If I shall differ with him on certain of his conclusions, it is in full awareness of the debt we all owe him for the experimentation and thinking which has provided much of the factual basis and theoretical stimulus to further research and development in this area.

Professor Stevens (1960, 1964) advocates a psychophysical power law, while I have questioned it (Treisman, 1961, 1962, 1963a, 1963b, 1964a). I shall here examine the main points of disagreement lying behind these differing positions.     

Paranoia or Persecution: The Case of Schreber

Many psychoanalysts base their understanding of paranoia upon Freud's analysis of Schreber. Freud thought Schreber became paranoid as a "defense" against homosexual love. Freud, and those who analyzed Schreber after him, neglected an important source of data — the writings of Schreber's father about child-rearing. The father had been an eminent German pedagogue.
I show some striking similarities between the father's methods of rearing children and some of the son's strange experiences for which he was considered paranoid.I infer from reading the father's writings that he persecuted Schreber. Schreber did not imagine he was persecuted; he was persecuted.
I propose a transactional theory of paranoia to explain Schreber's experiences. I link his experiences with his father's behavior. I part company here with all previous analyses of Schreber's paranoia. If my theory also explains other cases of paranoia, its effects could, and should be widespread.     

The fate of the oedipus complex: Dissolution or waning

Abstract

Fried R. Personal and Classical Myth; A Confrontation on the Acropolis. Int Forum Psychoanal 1997;6:715. Stockholm, ISSN 0803-706X.

On his only visit to Greece, Sigmund Freud experienced brief but unsettling feelings of alienation as he stood on the Acropolis. Haunted by this experience, Freud did not succeed in analyzing it to his own satisfaction until 32 years after the event, in 1936. His interpretation, that he had felt guilt about superseding his father, did not convince most of the critics who have commented on it. The aim of this essay is to demonstrate that while Freud's critics were right in sensing that his explanation was only partial, none were able to decipher his secret. Prominent among the reasons for these repeated failures was lack of acquaintance with the Acropolis itself. Anyone standing where Freud stood becomes enabled to understand otherwise incomprehensible details of his essay. Seeing what Freud saw, however, still is not enough unless one also attempts to acquire some of his knowledge of archaeology and mythology. His competence in these areas made him aware of contradictions (e.g. between classical and archaic architecture and myth) that do not trouble the casual tourist. But his knowledge also furnished him with the tools for mastering his anxiety, turning fear of death into confidence in immortality, and gratifying desires even more ambitious than that of superseding his father.     

Freud’s Wolf Man: A Case of Successful Religious Sublimation

This article focuses on Freud’s view that the case of Sergei Pankejeff, commonly known as Wolf Man, is an example of an unsuccessful religious sublimation. Freud focuses on the efforts by Sergei’s mother and his nurse to educate him in the Christian faith. He points out that, although these efforts were successful in making him into a piously religious boy, they contributed to the repression of his sexual attraction to his father, the arrest of his psychosexual development, and to an obsessional neurosis reflected in blasphemous thoughts and compulsive acts of religious piety. The authors suggest, however, that there was one feature of his early religious behavior that reflected a successful religious sublimation and explain why it was successful. They conclude that even small children may experience a successful religious sublimation.     

Freud and the Visual Arts

Freud was more interested in literature than painting and sculpture, as Louis Fraiberg and Richard Sterba note. The question is how this affected his analysis of Leonardo's paintings and Michelangelo's sculpture of Moses The author argues that because he regarded them as intellectual puzzles to be psychoanalytically deciphered, he reduced them to a species of literature, suggesting his reluctance to recognize their aesthetic significance, and perhaps his inability to do so. The visual work of art becomes something to be read rather than seen. Its sensuousness is given short shrift. For example, Freud makes no mention of chiaroscuro and sfumato in his study of Leonardo—just those elements for which his art is famous as art. As Freud said, his analytic turn of mind kept him from obtaining any pleasure from what he could not rationally explain. The author traces Freud's elevation of the literary over the visual, and with that of the analyzable over the unanalyzable, to his critique of Charcot, whom he described as a visuel,' a man who sees his patients (and photographed them) rather than listens to them. Finally, Freud's dislike of modern art is contrasted with Karl Abraham's appreciation of its sensuous uniqueness. The general point is made that Freud didn't understand that the key to art was the artist's engagement with the medium.     

The dual impact of Freud's death and Freud's death instinct theory on the history of psychoanalysis

Since I have ranged over a rather large territory in this presentation I will summarize my main points. I claim that the very way Freud created psychoanalysis made it impossible for it to continue to grow and develop as a unified movement after his death. Unlike other sciences, psychoanalysis had no way of differentiating its basic findings from what is yet to be discovered. I then reintroduced my differentiation between heretics, modifiers, and extenders, claiming that after Freud’s death there was less opportunity for heretics and more space for modifiers. I assigned a crucial role to the fact that Anna Freud did not succeed in expelling the Kleinians. In the second part of the paper I presented the view of those who made use of Freud’s death instinct theory and those who opposed it. Many analysts preferred to ignore dealing with it rather than state their opposition. My presentation was biased in favor of those who chose to work with the death instinct as a clinical reality,highlighting Ferenczi’s construction. I made the claim, so far as I know never made before, that Freud’s death instinct theory had a traumatic impact on the psychoanalytic movement because it greatly limited the belief in the curative power of our therapeutic work. After his announcement of the dual-instinct theory Freud withdrew his interest in psychoanalysis as a method of cure. By doing so he inflicted a narcissistic wound on psychoanalysis. I believe that the creativity of psychoanalysis will improve if we face this difficult chapter in our history.     

G. C. Lichtenberg: dreams, jokes, and the unconscious in eighteenth-century Germany.

The German physicist and writer Lichtenberg (1742-1799) was well known during the nineteenth century as a humorist, thinker, and psychologist. He was also a favorite author of Freud, who read him beginning in his teens, quoted him frequently, and called him a "remarkable psychologist." Despite this, he has been ignored by psychoanalysts and historians of psychiatry alike, and most of his writing is still unavailable in English. An introduction to Lichtenberg as a psychologist is provided, stressing material dealing with dream analysis, association theory, and drives. Relevant excerpts are translated into English. Lichtenberg is shown to have insisted upon the need for a systematic and rationalistic study of dreams, to have analyzed individual dreams (describing them as dramatized representations of thoughts, associations, and even conflicts from his own waking life), and to have emphasized the functional link between dreams and daydreams. His remarks on drives and commentary on eighteenth-century association theory represent a significant practical application, and thus refinement, of Enlightenment rationalistic psychology. These achievements are assessed in light of Freud's early fascination with him; it is argued that Lichtenberg is an example of the relevance of the historical and cultural background of psychoanalysis to clinical practice.     

Borges and the Art of Mourning

In my reply to Susi Federici-Nebbiosi, I emphasize and elaborate on the points of agreement between us, as well as the points where our thinking differs. My primary point of difference regards the suggestion that my accepting Yossi for short-term treatment was acquiescence to his request. This is only partially true. From his point of view, I offered him a treatment substantially longer than the one he wanted, thus I was agreeing and not agreeing to his request simultaneously.

The main idea that I put forth in my paper is that we always construct our setting together with our patients and that this is, in itself, a therapeutic factor. I share Federici-Nebbiosi's observation that the setting has undergone a great deal more change in practice than is reflected in the literature, and that there is unease discussing the issue of setting. I offer some thoughts on this and express the hope that the present exchange of ideas will lead to further discussion.     

MOURNING,DREAMING, AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

The author argues that the structure of mourning and the structure of the Oedipus complex are triadic, the latter being obvious and easy to conceptualize, while the former is quite subtle. When it is the father who is mourned, the son must repeatedly invoke the dead object so that libidinal cathexis can be reinvested in living objects. Such was the situation in which Freud found himself in 1896 when his father died—the triadic nature of the Oedipus complex ironically not yet discovered by him. In the author's belief, Freud's mourning and his attendant rich dream life occurring between 1896 and 1897 gave him access to the unconscious raw material that would eventually help him conceptualize the triadic structure at the instinctual core of the Oedipus complex.     

Freud and the Psychoanalysis of Telepathy: Commentary on Claudie Massicotte’s “Psychical Transmissions”

Freud was interested in and eventually accepted the diverse forms of telepathic communication as psychoanalytic rather than occult phenomena, particularly as manifested in dreams. Massicotte revisits the topic of Freud and his interest in the occult in a manner that invites serious reconsideration of this aspect of his work, long the subject of intense controversy in the history of psychoanalysis. In my response to Massicotte’s paper I argue that Freud’s interest in telepathy or thought transference belongs to his psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious and transference. His approach to telepathy parallels his approach to religious beliefs: He accounts for both as creations of the human mind as individuals attempt to make sense and meaning of their real experiences. What Freud meant by telepathy is what contemporary psychoanalysis refers to as unconscious communication, and the strange, often inexplicable forms it takes in clinical contexts. For Freud, instances of telepathy or unconscious communication are to be understood contextually and relationally, revealing important data about the nature of affectively charged human relationships.     

Some sources for a slip in a translation by Freud

Among Freud's papers, we find instances in which Freud describes the "psychopathology of everyday life" as he found it in himself and in others. "A Religious Experience" (Freud, 1928) contains examples of both kinds. In addition, this paper contains a slip of which Freud appears to have been unaware. Freud's paper interprets a religious conversion described in a letter written to him in English. In the translation of this letter into German, Freud inserted material that was not present in the original. He mentions another slip he made in speaking about the letter. These slips and some associated details in the paper indicate persisting unconscious conflict. The content of these slips and details points to an association with Freud's childhood anxiety dream reported in The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900). Freud's associations and discussion of that dream lead to the Philippson Bible of his childhood, which provides additional connections to the paper of 1928.     

Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality

Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is considering, since different starting points will typically produce different assessments of what the evidence is and how it should be weighed. Feldman argues that there cannot be equally reasonable starting points, but his extension of the postulate of completely shared evidence to evidence for starting points involves an illicit assimilation of ordinary cases of evidence assessment to cases in which substantial agreement about background assumptions is lacking. I also clarify why even if Feldman were correct about what epistemic norms require, his conclusion would not show that we should actually suspend judgment about religious or anti-religious truth claims.     

Grant Me the Knowledge of What I Want Because All I Know Is That I Want: A Lacanian View of Hysteria

ABSTRACT

Freud’s work with hysterics led him to the discovery of the unconscious and the founding of psychoanalysis. The dream of the beautiful butcher’s wife, one of Freud’s patients, is examined following Lacan’s added insights that give full credit to his well known statement: “The unconscious is structured like a language.” Three basic identifications are presented by Lacanian analysis and I add a clinical vignette that exemplifies my work in the treatment of a couple.