Hidden in Plain Sight: Freud's Jewish Identity Revisited

Using a contextualizing, integrative approach, the author looks at aspects of Freud's life and the multiple levels of influence in terms of his theories. While keeping a broad overview of the historical and cultural life for Jews in 19th-century Europe, including the effects of anti-Semitism, emancipation, and the enlightenment movement, the author intertwines Freud's parents' lives and personalities as they played out in Freud's own development and in his theories. The author believes that Freud formed a particular repression linking Jewishness, passivity, femininity, and religion while elevating in his theories masculinity, activity, science, and atheism. The author specifically focuses on Freud's theories of the Unconscious and the oedipal complex as particularly representative of a split between his own Jewish home and the German high culture he was educated within. Drawing on literature within psychoanalysis and the disciplines of Jewish studies and broad cultural history, the author concludes that Freud's rejection of certain parts of his own life are embedded within his theory when considered from a multiply-layered point of view.     

Hidden in Plain Sight: The Active Ingredients of Executive Coaching

We propose that I/O psychologists who coach executives have overlooked psychotherapy outcome research as a source of information and ideas that can be used to improve our executive coaching practices. This research, based on thousands of studies and many meta-analyses, has converged on the conclusion that four "active ingredients" account for most of the variance in psychotherapy outcomes. We describe how this literature has identified four primary "active ingredients" that account for most of the variance in psychotherapy outcomes: 1) Client/extratherapeutic factors (40%), 2) The relationship or alliance (30%), 3) Placebo or hope (15%), and 4) Theory and technique (15%). Working on the assumption that psychotherapy and executive coaching are sufficiently similar to justify generalization from one domain to the other, we describe these four active ingredients at length and explore how they may be at work in the executive coaching process. We also suggest that I/O psychologists have training and experience that allows us to leverage some of these active ingredients in our executive coaching (e.g., understanding of client individual differences related to coaching outcomes). But we also have areas of weakness (e.g., building a strong working relationship with an individual client) that may need to be bolstered with additional training and development experiences.     

Reply to Commentary

This commentary is a response to questions and discussion points raised by Peter Fonagy and Mary Target in “Playing with the Reality of Analytic Love.” It includes a discussion of the relationship between attachment and sexuality, in addition to issues concerning seductiveness, sadomasochism and therapeutic change.     

Reply to Commentary

In my reply to Dr. Philip Ringstrom, I acknowledge our mutual understanding of some of the impasses that we face in working with couples, particularly those whom Ringstrom describes as reflecting characteristics of “mutual inductive identification.” I reemphasize the role of the implicit domain in these and further elaborate ideas about why couples presenting in this way are so difficult to impact. These include the ways in which the brain is organized around prediction and problems in the ability to metacommunicate. I then discuss some clinical interventions to address this.     

Whiteness Revisited: Reply to Commentary

In reply to Altman's discussion, the author explores in more depth the topic of whiteness, both her South African and American whiteness. She situates American whiteness in the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and the ongoing racial discrimination of the present. When Altman points to the author's unconscious submission to the regulatory power of the larger society, she postulates that her submission is to American whiteness. She notes that, in finding a new home, that which she wished to discard—a white racist identity synonymous with the oppressor—has reappeared, to be confronted once again.     

Sociorelational Psychoanalysis and Agency: Reply to Commentary

The author notes that, overall, he and White seem to agree on many important issues that she writes about in her commentary, such as the necessity of recognizing both our shared humanity and the agency of separate, subjective selves. He argues, however, that White mischaracterizes what it means to think of the self as socially constructed, and he clarifies his views of how the concept of a socially constructed self may be related to individual differences in the same culture, and to personal agency. He responds to White's imputation that his paper implicitly prescribes a type of intervention or mandates some particular view of the Truth as a new theology, substituting a concrete environmental or social determinism for the abstract (intrapsychic) determinism that he criticizes. Finally, he responds to some interesting and insightful questions White raises about the case vignette of Mr. J that was presented in his essay.     

Of Coals and Eskimos: Reply to Commentary

I first point out that there are similarities between the Fiscalini and me, and then I try to clarify some differences. Fiscalini suggests that I may be “inadvertently taking coals to Newcastle,” in arguing in favor of a well-known concept. Coming from a Freudian orthodox background, I have learned to substantiate every step of my reasoning on nonorthodox concepts. This sort of clarification may be useful, even for those who share my point of view.

One misunderstanding is that Fiscalini classifies me as an advocate of participant observation, whereas I identify with coparticipation. After suggesting some possible explanation for this difference, I develop some of my own ideas about psychoanalysis considered in terms of analogical hermeneutics, the paradox of being both individual and communal at the same time, and the need to include the social and political context in the analytic inquiry, and transcend the pseudo-opposition between interpretation and experience.     

The Particularities of Form: Reply to Commentary

In this brief reply to Bollas's commentary on our paper about his work, the cycles of intersubjective dialogue endlessly sustaining should be apparent. We begin with an example of the form—content distinction and attempt to use it as a springboard for further disentangling some of the nuances of Bollas's intersubjective theorizing. Bollas's emphasis on form over content as a means of conceptualizing the analyst's contribution to the analytic process is indeed compelling. We all know from both sides of the couch the profoundly different meanings and messages that an analyst's mien invites: whether she's abrupt, verbose, meditative, tranquil. Yes, the medium is the message, and, thus, whether the analyst conveys a message through the effects of form that Bollas points out, such as “We have all the time you need for the nuances of unconscious figuring” versus “This is hot—we hafta figure it out now” surely does have an effect on the psychic material produced in the analytic process. We go on to add to Bollas's discussion of form by considering the particularities of form and how these too affect the analytic process.     

The Whole of the No-thing: Reply to Commentary

We attempt to apply our conceptualization of the absence–presence dialectic and the capacity to disappear to our understanding of the experience and the treatment of trauma. Francisco Gonzalez challenges us to encounter the place of destruction and void where the absence is simply uncontainable. We suggest that the transformational meeting place between patient and therapist entails a reawakening of the movement between absence and presence, being and not-being, some-thing and no-thing, which were previously a frozen or derailed dialectic. The therapist's capacity to surrender to the temporary nihilation of the self within the therapeutic relationship is seen as the turning point in the reestablishment of movement and the creation of meaning.     

Reply to Commentary by Daniel N. Stern

I respond to Stern's largely affirming discussion by fleshing out a few points, for example, improvisation is more than just being spontaneous, it is ensemble work that plays off and with patterns emergent in the personalities of both parties. These patterns illuminate something about the unconscious of each from which blossom things heretofore unimagined or unarticulated. Several principles are then emphasized: First, improvisational moments arise when the “characters” in the moment draw from something real within themselves along with who they are inducing one another to become. Second, the cultivation of play in improvisation lends itself to putting to rest the myth of the perfectly analyzed analyst as not only impossible but as being both unnecessary and undesirable—a seminal point to the entire relational canon. Third, improvisation is a means for putting live flesh on the sterile bones of a host of theories now informing the contemporary psychoanalytic perspective such as chaos and complexity theory, along with dynamic systems theory. I also note that improvisational moments exhibit an emerging sense of vitality and a deepened sense of connection between the partners. Their work obtains a greater sense of focus, though not a deliberate focus as that their relational unconsciouses are “directing” them. Improvisational work feels liberating, playful, as well as affirming and recognizing what what each is bringing to their coauthorship. By contrast, when the improvisation fails, it devolves into negative thirdness or one-upsmanship, the qualities of which reflect deadness, avoidance, confusion, constriction of play, and a misrecognition of one another that devolves into a mutual sense of defeat. Responding to Stern's question about posi-traums, I affirm there is a phenomenon in which an entrenched emotional conviction of a patient's can be dramatically altered. This happens when something positive occurs that cannot be assimilated within the patient's intransigently negative belief system such that she must accommodate a new organizing principle, that is, a new emotional conviction to make sense of it. I concede, however, that it may be too soon to tell how much such phenomena penetrate the more physiologically encoded elements of trauma.     

Dual Visions,Dual Voices Reply to Commentary

An overarching thematic implication of both Grand's discussion of my article and my reply to her discussion is the need for sharing and integration of knowledge and concepts belonging to the separate fields of psychoanalysis and the trauma/dissociation. Grand and I have different expressive voices, both singular and plural, which, I conjecture, are in part reflective of different traditions. Grand's response demonstrates eloquently a problem facing both psychoanalysis and the field of trauma treatment: the tendency of fields, like individuals, to proceed in isolation deprives all from the benefit of shared information. Procrustean beds cannot be shared.     

To See or Not to See: Blinded by Guilt: Reply to Commentary

In response to Annabella Bushra's discussion and her focus on what is missing in the clinical material, the author speculates about the repetition of the historical trauma of purifying mixed race in the face of its complexity—trying to neatly package race despite it not so neatly fitting into any one category—and losing the individual by overly focusing on skin color. The author considers the silence, secrecy, and transgression in the treatment and, in this context, a few of Bushra's key points are addressed—sorting out the nature of hate in relation to Susan, passing as transgression, and White guilt. A distinction is made between a malevolent, destructive hate and a loving hate, and White guilt is considered as a defense against recognition of the other.     

The Analyst as Comic and the Comic in Analysis: Reply to Commentary

This discussion elaborates aspects of the use of humor and jokes in clinical psychoanalysis. The use of humor, like dreams or other symmetrical processes, facilitates the patient's development of the capacity to symbolize unconscious experience and mitigates the need to evacuate unconscious experiences and fantasies into the external world. In focusing on specific clinical interventions I highlight three dimensions of the process: the concept of coconstruction in the emergence of humor in the psychoanalytic relationship, the authority of the patient's psychopathology and affective and cognitive development, and the analyst's willingness to take the risks of self-exposure and possibly hurting the patient implicit in the use of humor and jokes in the analytic relationship. Different forms of humor are described in relation to the different clinical situations, including mutually created jokes, caricatured enactments, cartoonlike images, and self-depreciating commentary on the analytic process. In using jokes and humor in psychoanalysis we introduce the possibility of pleasure within an intense, intimate moment which allows for the transformation of unacceptable aspects of both patient and analyst as they become joined within a broader human experience.     

Everyone Must Get a Turn: From Omnipotence to Respect for Otherness: Reply to Commentary

The authors conceptualize Davies's account of the difficult session with her patient Karen as a mentalization mismatch: an expectable failure on the analyst's part to understand the mental state of the patient. In response, the patient used projective identification to re-create the link to the analyst that was temporarily severed. They argue that the therapeutic impasse produced by Karen's successful externalization of a persecuting part of her self is more than repetition of a past relationship. It is the current experience of a disorganized self: a pervasive state for the borderline patient, and a temporary but no less disorganized state in the analyst.     

Reply to Commentary by Collins: Distinguishing Proximal and Distal Levels of Explanation

Two analytical methods are proposed to evaluate the extent to which the age-related influences in a set of variables are independent of one another. Application of the methods to 16 different data sets, representing a total of 169 variables and 4505 subjects, reveals that as few as one or two distinct factors may be sufficient to account for a large proportion of the age-related variance in a variety of cognitive variables. These results therefore imply that a relatively small number of independent "causes" may be responsible for a substantial percentage of the age-related declines apparent in many measures of cognitive functioning.     

The Search for Objectivity in the Study of Subjectivity Reply to Commentary

Two central questions raised by Spezzano's commentary have to do with the extent to which we seek objectivity in psychoanalytic theory and practice, and the extent to which one or another set of methods (e.g., clinical observation) is adequate or optimal for generating that knowledge. A discipline and treatment devoted to understanding subjectivity is nevertheless devoted to objective knowledge about a patient's subjectivity, defenses, and so forth and requires valid theories to guide exploration, inference, and intervention. Seeking objective knowledge does not require a naïve empiricism ignorant of the limits of objectivity. We would do well to use multiple methods to learn about how the mind works and what leads to therapeutic change.     

Hidden in Plain View: Feminists Doing Engineering Ethics, Engineers Doing Feminist Ethics

How has engineering ethics addressed gender concerns to date? How have the ideas of feminist philosophers and feminist ethicists made their way into engineering ethics? What might an explicitly feminist engineering ethics look like? This paper reviews some major themes in feminist ethics and then considers three areas in which these themes have been taken up in engineering ethics to date. First, Caroline Whitbeck’s work in engineering ethics integrates considerations from her own earlier writings and those of other feminist philosophers, but does not use the feminist label. Second, efforts to incorporate the Ethic of Care and principles of Social Justice into engineering have drawn on feminist scholarship and principles, but these commitments can be lost in translation to the broader engineering community. Third, the film Henry’s Daughters brings gender considerations into the mainstream of engineering ethics, but does not draw on feminist ethics per se; despite the best intentions in broaching a difficult subject, the film unfortunately does more harm than good when it comes to sexual harassment education. I seek not only to make the case that engineers should pay attention to feminist ethics and engineering ethicists make more use of feminist ethics traditions in the field, but also to provide some avenues for how to approach integrating feminist ethics in engineering. The literature review and analysis of the three examples point to future work for further developing what might be called feminist engineering ethics.     

The Analyst's Uses of Theory and the Theory the Analyst Uses: Reply to Commentary

Where Slochower focuses her discussion on the analyst's multiform uses of theory, I focus my response on how the theory we each use informs a quite different way of understanding what is at issue for my patient in the apparent disengagement that marks her quest for help. More broadly, I consider how the theoretical perspective Slochower brings to her rendering of my clinical understanding and position makes for a reading that diverges significantly from my own view of what transpired in the treatment process I present.