The re-emergence of emergence,and the causal role of synergy in emergent evolution

Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations about how to define emergence but “reductionist” and “holistic” theorists hold very different views about the issue of causation. However, these two seemingly polar positions are not irreconcilable. Reductionism, or detailed analysis of the parts and their interactions, is essential for answering the “how” question in evolution—how does a complex living system work? But holism is equally necessary for answering the “why” question—why did a particular arrangement of parts evolve? In order to answer the “why” question, a broader, multi-leveled paradigm is required. The reductionist approach to explaining emergent complexity has entailed a search for underlying “laws of emergence.” In contrast, the “Synergism Hypothesis” focuses on the “economics”—the functional effects produced by emergent wholes and their selective consequences in evolutionary change. This paper also argues that emergent phenomena represent, in effect, a subset of a larger universe of cooperative, synergistic effects in the natural world.     

EVOLUTION,NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.     

Perelman’s Pseudo-Argument as Applied to the Creationism Controversy

If you want to challenge or at least weaken the adhesion to a system of values, you can basically adopt two radically opposed rhetorical strategies. Either you will attack the system in a frontal way: for instance, fundamentalists or fascists deny any validity to democratic values and human rights. Or you will pretend to argue from within the system (by saying that you accept some of its basic premises), while subtly distorting the process of reasoning in order to get to your conclusions. If the audience is naïve or poorly informed, you will be able to defend positions that are fundamentally at odds with liberal-democratic values while seeming to argue from inside the system. I would like to show how such a process of “perverse” translation works in the context of the Darwinism/Creationism “controversy”. The attacks on the teaching of evolutionary biology began approximately one century ago. The way Creationists have argued and changed several times their rhetorical strategies seems very interesting to me, in that it exemplifies an important contemporary phenomenon, which I call “perverse translation” or “the wolf in the sheepfold”.     

The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis

While the philosophical puzzles about “life” that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the “mystery of consciousness” remains unsolved due to multiple “explanatory gaps” between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the “explanatory gaps” between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the “experiential gaps” between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain.     

Quantum information in an evolutionary perspective

An approach to quantum phenomena is reviewed that deals with the possibility of their realistic interpretation in the sense that they represent manifestations of hermeneutic circles between quantum “objects” and their experimental boundary conditions. Quantum cybernetics provides an evolutionary perspective in that all higher‐level organizations like molecules, cells, living systems, etc., can be discussed under one and the same systemic viewpoint: a hermeneutic circularity between a “core” (or “nucleus") and a relevant “periphery” (or “environment") which constitutes the systems’ organization and information potential.

Generally, in realistic theories, an individual quantum system is analyzable into a local “particle‐like” nonlinearity of a generally nonlocal “wave‐like” mode of some sub‐quantum structure of the vacuum ("Dirac ether"). In this view, a “particle” can be considered as being “guided” along one specific route by the (generally nonlocal) configurations of superimposed waves, which spread along all possible paths of an experimental setup. Moreover, in the approach of Quantum Cybernetics, an additional focus is given on the fact that the energy and momentum of a particle also determine the wave behavior. Thus, “waves” and “particles” are mutually and self‐consistently defined, and Quantum Cybernetics puts particular emphasis on the circular relationship—mediated by plane waves—between a quantum system and its macroscopically defined boundary conditions.     

Beyond the image paradigm: Systemic evolution through participative planning

This paper is an attempt at introducing a formal framework for societal, participative, anticipatory, inner‐change oriented and open‐ended ‘’ learning for evolution.” The key point of our approach is that it considers the evolution of a social system not exclusively as an appropriate result of the given system structure, operating and behaving under external constraints; but mainly as an outer (or observable) consequence of some inner changes brought about from within the system of heterogenous actors‐designers in their effort to cope with complexities generated equally by external constraints and by the network of mutual relationships between them. The actors‐designers are thus trying to assess critically the courses the system could possibly take in the future and also to isolate —through a dialogue between them—the so‐called “evolutionary” ones. Consequently, a policy‐oriented approach to “social homcorhesis” is obtained. It opens the way to a participative planning outlook on societal learning.     

EXPLAINING EMERGENCE: TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF LEVELS

The vitalism/reductionism debate in the life sciences shows that the idea of emergence as something principally unexplainable will often be falsified by the development of science. Nevertheless, the concept of emergence keeps reappearing in various sciences, and cannot easily be dispensed with in an evolutionary world-view. We argue that what is needed is an ontological non reductionist theory of levels of reality which includes a concept of emergence, and which can support an evolutionary account of the origin of levels. Classical explication of emergence as “the creation of new properties” is discussed critically, and specific distinctions between various kinds of emergence is introduced for the purpose of developing an ontology of levels, framed in a materialistic and evolutionary perspective. A concept of the relation between levels as being inclusive is suggested, permitting the “local” existence of different ontologies. We identify, as a working hypothesis, four primary levels and explicate their nonhomomorphic interlevel relations. Explainability of emergence in relation to determinism and predictability is considered. Recent research in self-organizing non-linear dynamical systems represents a revival of the scientific study of emergence, and we argue that these recent developments can be seen as a step toward a final “devitalisation” of emergence.     

Facing the third millennium: An evolutionary crisis

We are witnessing the birth of the first global civilization on our planet earth due to the accelerative progress of science and technology. This is also accompanied by a crisis in health care, pollution and other environmental disasters, a rising wave of violence and crime, stresses due to globalization, and so on. Recently, we formulated “An Action Plan for Human Survival” (Reference 24).

This article explores in depth the challenges in bringing about a peaceful transition to a global civilization. It explores global civilization, environmental crisis and population. It reveals that the stresses generated by globalization and environmental crisis cannot be resolved by dualistic thought, or concepts, or ideals, or intellectual constructions; as these are sterile in bringing mutation in the human psyche. We see that the emergence of global consciousness is not keeping pace with the globalization, and it is feared that globalization may turn out to be abortive and ultimately self‐destructive.

The crisis is not political, or economic, or social. It is evolutionary in character. We have to explore nature's evolutionary impulse. The challenge is to resolve the “crisis of perception,” or to allow the mutation to happen in the mind‐brain system. The only technology for radical transformation or mutation of human psyche is purification or deconditioning of the human psyche. This leads to new relationship between man and man, and between man and environment. It ends all pain, sorrow and travails and ushers a new era of freedom, peace and bliss. This is the key to human survival, progress and fulfillment.     

The topological inventions of life: From the specialization of multicellular colonies to the functioning of the vertebrate brain

The evolution of biological (intermediary) complexity strongly depends upon the information‐processing advantages it confers to cells and organisms. As a matter of fact, highly complex biological structures such as the cellular signaling system and the vertebrate nervous system have been evolved in order to inform the living system about its surround, subsequently orienting the internal, productive activities. The evolutionary success of these types of informational structures ("infostructures") exemplifies that, almost universally, the “bit” may act as a successful substitute for the “joule”. Recent molecular biology research on cellular signaling systems has disclosed their amazing information‐processing sophistication and the crucial role they play in the formation and functioning of the vertebrate brain. In the neurosciences, duality theory has highlighted the way in which the cortical maps and the cerebral substructures of the vertebrate brain are “topologically” integrated in order to perform an adaptive information‐processing. The development of comprehensive conceptualizations relating brain processing and intracellular processing may well be a strategic step in the development of a vertical “information science”.     

Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self‐awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body‐ness” or “mine‐ness” but not a sense of “I‐ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self‐awareness have wide‐ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected.     

INEVITABLE HUMANS: SIMON CONWAY MORRIS'S EVOLUTIONARY PALEONTOLOGY

Abstract. Simon Conway Morris, noted Cambridge University paleontologist, argues that in evolutionary natural history humans (or beings rather like humans) are an inevitable outcome of the developing speciating processes over millennia; humans are “inherent” in the system. This claim, in marked contrast to claims about contingency made by other prominent paleontologists, is based on numerous remarkable convergences—similar trends found repeatedly in evolutionary history. Conway Morris concludes approaching a natural theology. His argument is powerful and informed. But does it face adequately the surprising events in such history, particularly notable in unexpected co‐options that redirect the course of life? The challenge to understand how humans are both on a continuum with other species and also utterly different remains a central puzzle in paleontology.     

Damasio’s body-map-based view,Panksepp’s affect-centric view,and the evolutionary advantages of consciousness

Although dualism has the advantage of being intuitively plausible, it is not compatible with a 21^st-century (scientific) world view. Jaak Panksepp and Antonio Damasio are contemporary writers who reject dualism, and whose views take the form of “biological naturalism”. I first discuss how their views compare in five specific respects; and then I look more closely at how the different emphases of the views affect their ability to account for the evolutionary advantages of consciousness, specifically. Both authors agree that “consciousness” provides creatures with a survival advantage in terms of their ability to produce novel and/or flexible responses, their ability to plan ahead, and their motivation to promote their own survival – but the exact means by which they think these advantages are conferred, in each of these respects, differ. One might say that, whereas Damasio thinks the main evolutionary advantages of “consciousness” (the “higher reaches” of which are unique to humans) have to do with enabling creatures to work out what to do to promote their well-being, Panksepp thinks the main advantage of “consciousness” is that being “conscious” of affective feelings urgently motivates creatures to take action when their well-being is threatened. Considering that “working out what do” is only possible for a small selection of cognitively sophisticated organisms, I argue that Panksepp’s account is more plausible than Damasio’s account.     

Inclined to see it your way: Do altercentric intrusion effects in visual perspective taking reflect an intrinsically social process?

It has been suggested that some aspects of mental state understanding recruit a rudimentary, but fast and efficient, processing system, demonstrated by the obligatory slowing down of judgements about what the self can see when this is incongruent with what another can see. We tested the social nature of this system by investigating to what extent these altercentric intrusions are elicited under conditions that differed in their social relevance and, further, how these related to self-reported social perspective taking and empathy. In Experiment 1, adult participants were asked to make “self” or “other” perspective-taking judgements during congruent (“self” and “other” can see the same items) or incongruent conditions (“self” and “other” cannot see the same items) in conditions that were social (i.e., involving a social agent), semisocial (an arrow), or nonsocial (a dual-coloured block). Reaction time indices of altercentric intrusion effects were present across all conditions, but were significantly stronger for the social than for the less social conditions. Self-reported perspective taking and empathy correlated with altercentric intrusion effects in the social condition only. In Experiment 2, the significant correlations for the social condition were replicated, but this time with gaze duration indices of altercentric intrusion effects. Findings are discussed with regard to the degree to which this rudimentary system is socially specialized and how it is linked to more conceptual understanding.     

Theology,Anti-Theology and Atheology: From Christian Passions to Secular Emotions

The nineteenth-century transition from talk of passions and affections of the soul to talk of “emotions” in English-language psychological thought is taken as a case-study in the secularisation of psychology. This transition is used as an occasion to re-evaluate the methodologies of John Milbank and Richard Webster, who interpret certain secular scientific accounts as forms of theology or anti-theology “in disguise”. It is suggested, in the light of the study of the emergence of the secular concept of ‘emotions’, that the category of “atheology” be used to supplement their methodology. “Atheological” texts are not merely theology or anti-theology in disguise but are a novel form of discourse, which is alienated from the assumptions and metaphors of traditional theologies (and which replaces them with physiological evolutionary narratives) but which is not necessarily atheistic or anti-theological.     

MATRIX THINKING: AN ADAPTATION AT THE FOUNDATION OF HUMAN SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND ART

Intrigued by Robinson and Southgate's 2010 work on “entering a semiotic matrix,” we expand their model to include the juxtaposition of all signs, symbols, and mental categories, and to explore the underpinnings of creativity in science, religion, and art. We rely on an interdisciplinary review of human sentience in archaeology, evolutionary biology, the cognitive science of religion, and literature, and speculate on the development of sentience in response to strong selection pressure on the hominin evolutionary line, leaving us the “lone survivors” of complex, multiple lines of physical and cultural evolution. What we call Matrix Thinking—the creative driver of human sentience—has important cognitive and intellectual features, but also equally important characteristics traced to our intense sociability and use of emotionality in vetting rational models. Scientist, theologian, and artist create new cultural knowledge within a social context even if alone. They are rewarded by emotional validation from group members, and guided by the ever present question, “Does it feel right?”     

Chinese Marxist Philosophy Since Reform and Opening-Up

Since reform and opening-up began in 1978, Chinese Marxist philosophy has undertaken the double mission of enhancing the emancipation of the mind in society and of realizing its own ideological emancipation. It has gone through an evolutionary process from “extensive discussion about the criterion of truth” to “reform of philosophical textbooks”; from the proposal of the philosophical conception of “practical materialism” to reflection on “modernity”; and from the carrying-out of dialogues among Chinese, Western, and Marxist philosophies to the exploration of “new forms of civilization.” Chinese Marxist philosophy has shifted its way of doing research with practical materialism as a core conception, and it changed such modes of thinking as the intuitive theory of reflection based on na?ve realism, the theory of linear causality based on mechanical determinism, and the reductionism of essence based on abstract substantialism. As a result, it has boosted changes that were already underway in Chinese philosophy, worldviews, theories of truth, conceptions of history, and views of development, and it has further endowed the discourse system of Marxist philosophy with laudable subjectivity and originality.     

EXPLORING OLD AND NEW PATHS IN THEODICY

Christopher Southgate's work raises questions about God, evolution, and suffering. In this article, I begin by contributing an alternative to Southgate's “only way” argument and by offering a third option in speculations about the nature of nonhuman animals in heaven. The second half of the article starts with Southgate's approach of evolutionary theodicy as “an adventure in theology” and proposes a new path branching off his work. “Compassionate theodicy” is a reworking of the method and audience of traditional theodicy in the hope that it might become something that could offer theological resources to those who suffer.     

GENOCIDAL MUTATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINITION

Abstract: The optimum definition of the term “genocide” has been hotly contested almost since the term was coined. Definitional boundaries determine which acts are covered and excluded and thus to a great extent which cases will benefit from international attention, intervention, prosecution, and reparation. The extensive legal, political, and scholarly discussions prior to this article have typically (1) assumed “genocide” to be a fixed social object and attempted to define it as precisely as possible or (2) assumed the need for a fixed convention and sought to stipulate the range of events that should be denoted by the term. Even if its meaning is a matter of convention, however, “genocide” is not a fixed object but varies by context and evolves in methods and forms over time. In fact, as relevant laws, legal interpretations, and political commitments develop, so do would‐be perpetrators modify what genocide is in order to avoid political and legal consequences. This article advances an approach to a definition of “genocide” that allows even legal definitions to keep pace with this evolutionary process.     

Priming a natural or human-made environment directs attention to context-congruent threatening stimuli

Research suggests that attention is attracted to evolutionary threats (e.g., snakes) due to an evolved “fear-module” that automatically detects biological threats to survival. However, recent evidence indicates that non-evolutionary threats (e.g., guns) capture and hold attention as well, suggesting a more general “threat-relevance” mechanism that directs attentional resources toward any potential danger in the environment. The current research measured how selective attentional resources were influenced both by the type of threat (e.g., snake vs. gun) and by the context in which the threat was encountered. Participants were primed with either natural or human-made environments to assess how these contexts influence attention to evolutionary and non-evolutionary threats, as measured by a spatial-cueing task. The results indicate that whether biological or non-biological threats receive greater attentional processing is determined by the context in which they are encountered.     

Social contexts modulate neural responses in the processing of others’ pain: An event-related potential study

Two hypotheses have been proposed regarding the response that is triggered by observing others’ pain: the “empathizing hypothesis” and the “threat value of pain hypothesis.” The former suggests that observing others’ pain triggers an empathic response. The latter suggests that it activates the threat-detection system. In the present study, participants were instructed to observe pictures that showed an anonymous hand or foot in a painful or non-painful situation in a threatening or friendly social context. Event-related potentials were recorded when the participants passively observed these pictures in different contexts. We observed an interaction between context and picture in the early automatic N1 component, in which the painful pictures elicited a larger amplitude than the non-painful pictures only in the threatening context and not in the friendly context. We also observed an interaction between context and picture in the late P3 component, in which the painful pictures elicited a larger amplitude than the non-painful pictures only in the friendly context and not in the threatening context. These results indicate that specific social contexts can modulate the neural responses to observing others’ pain. The “empathic hypothesis” and “threat value of pain hypothesis” are not mutually exclusive and do not contradict each other but rather work in different temporal stages.