Creating an Intersubjective Reality: Commentary on Paper by Arnold Rothstein

The author discusses Arnold Rothstein's paper “Compromise Formation Theory: An Intersubjective Dimension” and challenges his definition of intersubjectivity. She offers a perspective in which the import of intersubjectivity theory is less to dissolve the notion of objectivity than to grasp processes of mutual engagement, regulation, and recognition. While it is true that the recognition that the analyst is also a subject and therefore does not have exclusive knowledge is an important shift in the psychoanalytic paradigm, the author suggests that the intersubjective is far more encompassing than this. Intersubjective theory emphasizes the active creation of consensus or conflict about reality rather than merely the recognition that the analyst's perspective on reality is subjective. This cocreation produces a different emotional experience of connection, not merely a change in the quality of insight. Finally, Rothstein's case illustrates how he responds to the need for recognition and regulation. He shows us how focusing on the procedural allowed him to make an intersubjective shift, not simply an intrapsychic interpretation of compromise formation.     

The Psychoanalytic Other: Commentary on Paper by Helen K. Gediman

Dr. Gediman locates the intersection of modern Freudian and relational theory in the arena of what she calls the “disclosures of everyday analysis” (p. 242). She suggests that because Freudian analysts, like their relational colleagues, work intersubjectively, relational theory does not itself embody a paradigm shift away from the Freudian model. I disagree. Relational theories assume that the analyst's work is inevitably informed by the relational context in a way that precludes clinical certainty. Gediman, however, believes that the analyst is capable of separating her countertransference response from her subjectivity and thus can interpret from a position of clinical certainty. Each set of theoretical assumptions is associated with a somewhat different analytic stance and analytic ideal. Freudian analysts aim for a position of “methodological neutrality” that relies on considerable certainty in the countertransference while giving the analyst plenty of room within which to use her subjectivity. The relational ideal concerns the analyst's capacity to enter into an asymmetrical treatment relationship and to tolerate the uncertainty generated therein.     

Revision from the Margins: Fromm's Contributions to Psychoanalysis

Fromm's important contributions to the modern development of psychoanalytic thought are often ignored and frequently misunderstood. An early proponent of revisions of psychoanalytic theory and therapy similar to recent trends in object relations, self-psychology and interpersonal psychoanalysis, Fromm was a visionary for a Freudian theory built upon orthodoxies of the past but going beyond them. It is argued here that Fromm's unique role in helping create a new version of psychoanalysis for the 21st century was as sociological as it was intellectual. Fromm's contributions were intimately linked to his institutional positioning close to the center but on the relative margins of the discipline. This paper will outline how sociological dynamics shaped Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis. We will conclude by discussing how Fromm was able to have a more dramatic influence than other Freudian revisionists who were less favourably positioned.     

A POSTMODERN READING OF BRENNER'S LAST STORY: MEHATHALA AS PARODIC HOMAGE

In this article, I seek to examine the story “From the Beginning” from its central poetic feature, that of a congestion of literary references. These references are drawn from other Hebrew stories—from the late 1800s and the beginning of the twentieth century—about rootless male characters and their “erotic failures.” The degree of concentration of literary innuendoes, the context and the method with which they are brought to bear on Brenner's narrative, result in a deliberate exaggeration that makes “From the Beginning” a “parodic homage” of these earlier texts and their characters, including types and situations previously encountered in Brenner's other stories. “From the Beginning,” with its features of intertextuality and irony, has the characteristics of a postmodern parody, or, at the very least, invites a postmodern re-reading.     

Attachment theory and psychoanalysis Some remarks from an epistemological and from a Freudian viewpoint1

The author examines Bowlby's attachment theory and more recent versions of it from an epistemological viewpoint and subjects it to questioning on whether they are in line with central concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. He argues that Bowlby's basic tenets regarding attachment theory, which later attachment theorists never seriously questioned, do not conform to scientifi c standards, and that psychoanalytic issues such as the dynamic unconscious, internal confl icts, interaction of drive wishes and the role of defence in establishing substitutive formations are either ignored or not treated in suffi cient depth. In the light of this, Fonagy's assertion that psychoanalytic criticism of attachment theory arose from mutual misunderstandings and ought nowadays to be seen as outdated is reversed: psychoanalytic criticism can only be regarded as outdated if either basic tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis, or attachment theory or both are misunderstood.     

Sabina Spielrein: out from the shadow of Jung and Freud

Abstract: Since the 1982 publication of Aldo Carotenuto's book, A Secret Symmetry: Sabina Spielrein Between Jung and Freud, there has been renewed interest in the life and work of Sabina Spielrein. She was Jung's first psychoanalytic case at the Burghölzli Hospital in 1904, and was referred to several times in The Freud/Jung Letters. Spielrein recovered, enrolled in medical school, and went on to become a Freudian analyst. Her most famous paper, published in 1912, ‘Destruction as a cause of coming into being’, was referred to by Freud in 1920 in relation to his Death Instinct theory. In the few Freudian publications on this controversial theory since 1920, Spielrein's contribution is consistently omitted. Jung also neglected to refer to her ‘Destruction’ paper in his early 1912 version of ‘Symbols of transformation’, even though he had edited her paper and had promised to acknowledge her contribution. He did refer extensively to Spielrein's first paper, her medical thesis, ‘On the psychological content of a case of schizophrenia’, published in 1911, as yet unpublished in English. In her paper Spielrein sought to understand the psychotic delusions of Frau M, a patient at the Burghölzli, much in the style of Jung's ‘Psychology of dementia praecox’ (1907). The purpose of this paper is to explore to what extent Spielrein's Frau M paper, and its companion ‘Destruction’ paper, make an original contribution to both Jung and Freud's emerging theories on the possible creative versus destructive outcomes of neurotic or psychotic introversion, culminating in Jung's concept of the ‘collective unconscious’ (1916) and Freud's concept of a ‘Death instinct’ (1920).     

Psychoanalytic Identity: Charles Rycroft and the British Freudian Tradition

This paper explores Rycroft's views on narcissistic barriers to the formation of analytic identity, together with the analyst's relation to (or ablation of) his forbears. It sketches Rycroft's relation to his training analysts, Ella Sharpe and Sylvia Payne and the British Freudian tradition, delineating a line of descent running from Hanns Sachs, through Sharpe and Payne to Rycroft. Rycroft defined himself in creative dialogue with Freud and his own contemporaries within the British Freudian tradition.     

Conflict in psychoanalysis and in life

Abstract

Unconscious conflicts are at the center of Freudian psychoanalytic inquiry, in the psychoanalytic situation as well as in the theory of personality and pathogenesis. The core dynamic formulation, intrapsychic conflict resulting in new psychic formation, is addressed in the paper in the following steps.

First, the development of the concept of conflict throughout the history of Freudian psychoanalysis is reviewed. Next, the analytic and synthetic aspects of conflict theory are explored and the role of conflict in the development of personality organization and pathogenesis is clarified. Then, the contemporary extensions and elaborations of structural theory are presented.

To illustrate analysis focused on conflict, clinical material covering the phases of psychoanalytic process is highlighted. From the beginning stage of analyzing the patient's initial diffuse state of indifference and “weirdness”, analysis proceeds to address primary and secondary symptoms of impotence and exhibitionism and underlying passive-phallic personality organization with conflict around aggression. This leads to the patient's sense of mastery over previously enslaving and “immobilizing” internal turmoil.     

Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction Makers

Some of us have suggested that what fiction makers do is offer us things to imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative‐based but assertive activities such as journalism or history. Some of us hold, further, that it is the maker's intention which confers fictional status. Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming problems for any proposal about fiction's nature based straightforwardly on the identification of fiction with the to‐be‐imagined. I formulate a very weak version of the proposal which is not vulnerable to some objections recently presented. My formulation is in terms of supervenience. But while this version is weak, it is also quite precise, and its precision brings into view certain other problems which have not so far been attended to. To the extent that these problems are serious, the prospects for an intentional theory of fiction look, I am sorry to say, poor; the version susceptible to the objections is weak, and anything weaker still but not so susceptible could hardly be thought of as a theory of fiction, though it might supplement such a theory.     

“A disease of our time”: The Catholic Church's condemnation and absolution of psychoanalysis (1924–1975)

The present paper is focused on the evolution of the position of the Catholic Church toward psychoanalysis. Even before Freud's The Future of an Illusion (1927), psychoanalysis was criticized by Catholic theologians. Psychoanalysis was viewed with either contempt or with indifference, but nonpsychoanalytic psychotherapy was accepted, especially for pastoral use. Freudian theory remained for most Catholics a delicate and dangerous subject for a long time. From the center to the periphery of the Vatican, Catholic positions against psychoanalysis have varied in the way that theological stances have varied. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, some Catholics changed their attitudes and even practiced psychoanalysis, challenging the interdict of the Holy Office, which prohibited psychoanalytic practice until 1961. During the Cold War, psychoanalysis progressively became more and more relevant within Catholic culture for two main reasons: changes in psychoanalytic doctrine (which began to stress sexuality to a lesser degree) and the increasing number of Catholic psychoanalysts, even among priests. Between the 1960s and the 1970s, psychoanalysis was eventually accepted and became the main topic of a famous speech by Pope Paul VI. This paper illustrates how this acceptance was a sort of unofficial endorsement of a movement that had already won acceptance within the Church. The situation was fostered by people like Maryse Choisy or Leonardo Ancona, who had advocated within the Church for a sui generis use of psychoanalysis (e.g., proposing a desexualized version of Freudian theories), despite warnings and prohibitions from the hierarchies of the Church.     

Between practice and theory: Melanie Klein,Anna Freud and the development of child analysis

An examination of the early history of child analysis in the writings of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud reveals how two different and opposing approaches to child analysis arose at the same time. The two methods of child analysis are rooted in a differential emphasis on psychoanalytic theory and practice. The Kleinian method derives from the application of technique while the Anna Freudian method is driven by theory. Furthermore, by holding to the Freudian theory of child development Anna Freud was forced to limit the scope of child analysis, while Klein's application of Freudian practice has led to new discoveries about the development of the infant psyche.     

From Passive Psyche to Dynamic Dasein

This article is a study in contrasts between Freudian psychoanalytic metapsychology, shaped by the physical–mechanistic scientific model of the Helmholtz School of Medicine, and Boss's Daseinanalytic psychotherapy, formed by the human science model derived from the Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. It begins with Binswanger's initial attempt to replace the Freudian metapsychology with Heidegger's analytic of the human being as an active agent in the world. Following this path, the article shows the radical new direction Boss gives to psychotherapy by shifting the focus of therapy from the analysis of an abstract and disembodied psyche driven by forces toward an analysis of the person as a free and responsible agent engaged in the world. Although Boss maintains a high regard for Freud's great achievement, I suggest that he failed to appreciate fully the true magnitude of his new contribution and, due to his hermeneutic of generosity toward psychoanalysis, underestimated the reciprocal influence between Freud's metapsychology and his therapeutic advice and techniques. It is my basic contention that a radical shift of a psychotherapy's philosophical anthropology transforms the entire theory, as a whole, in all its dimensions.     

The Ties That Bind

In this paper, I define a psychoanalytic object broadly, as an object that “matters” to an individual. My focus is on how someone becomes a psychoanalytic object and how our ideas about this process lead us to a particular conception of an analyst’s mutative role. Further, I examine the function of a psychoanalytic object in one’s inner world. One view of the object leads to a “dynamic” emphasis, examining the object’s role in a system of unconscious conflict and compromise, whereas a second, overlapping line of thought leads to a “structural” focus, emphasizing the object’s role in developing, stabilizing, and often maintaining compromised internal psychic capacities. These capacities are developmental achievements that form the context of conflict and compromise. Dynamic and structural emphases lead to different clinical stances. In considering the object and evolving conceptions of the object within Freudian psychoanalysis (my focus), we simultaneously review the evolution of Freudian psychoanalysis itself.     

The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.     

Consensus and normative validity 1

A weak and a strong version of discourse theory can be distinguished. In the strong version the only source of normative validity in the nonspecific sense is rational consensus, where all parties concerned accept a norm for the same reasons, which are rationally convincing in the same way for all. In the weak version both rational and overlapping consensus can be sources of validity in the nonspecific sense. It is argued that the weak version is the more adequate, since it can accommodate cases which the strong version cannot, and which it is unreasonable to view as cases of compromise. Discourse theory needs a weaker general discourse principle and a more flexible notion of normative consensus than is found in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms (1996).     

Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars – including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber – take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue – pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz – that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence.     

Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

Jean piaget and george kelly: Toward a stronger constructivism

Among constructivist metatheoretical approaches, a strong version is defined as that which reveals reality to be actively and subjectively constructed rather than passively incorporated as objective environmental or innate “facts” by the subject. Given this definition, however, ambiguities arise concerning the potential and limits of construct integration over the course of development. Piaget's stronger constructivist model is offered as a means of clarifying and broadening the strong constructivist position on knowledge evolution. Piaget's genetic epistemology model places dramatic emphasis on the organizational capacity of the subject, specifying personal development as a strongly continuous and subsuming process. Discussion of commonalities between Piaget's position and Kelly's personal construct theory concludes this article.     

Field of Vision: Radical Uncertainty and the Analyst's Conduct: Commentary on Paper by Donnel B. Stern

There is a relationship between biography and theory. The analyst's ideas or formulations about his patients—theories really—must be determined, to some degree, by the certain and uncertain impact of his own history. Harry Stack Sullivan brought psychoanalysis squarely into the ambit of the relational/historical world by insisting that the mind is thoroughly and inherently social. In doing so, he staked a claim for the link between history, that is, social experience, and personhood. Our personalities and our theories are social-historical constructions. In relation to this, some differences between the interpersonal/relational and Bionian concepts of field theory are provided. One important difference pertains to the role of the analyst's conduct. Two meanings of conduct—to behave or to organize behavior—are at the center of what distinguishes the interpersonal/relational view of the analyst's position in the field from the Bionian view. For the relational analyst, action in the analytic field, including enactment, is conduct, and conduct is always bidirectional. The analyst, then, is a medium to alter, to reconstruct the self. He does not provide experience, he is experience. The form of an analytic exchange gives shape to the field and its content.