Passions in girls and women: toward a bridge between critical relational theory of gender and modern conflict theory

This paper considers (1) some aspects of the lack of dialogue among psychoanalytic schools; (2) Brenner's (1982) conception of drives and drive derivatives as inextricably linked to relationships, and some of its less-appreciated implications; (3) the debate over the importance of childhood sexuality in mental life; (4) the attempts by relational theorists to address and reintegrate the role of sexuality and gender, particularly in the study of feminine psychology; (5) the problematic role of aggression in psychoanalytic theories of women; (6) the avoidance by both men and women of women's passions and their anatomical loci, especially the clitoris, whose only function is the provision of pleasure; and (7) the suggestion that an integrated theory, including an understanding of the role of the body as well as of the passions and the defenses against them, results in the most effective clinical psychoanalytic approach. It then suggests that a bridge could be built between a relational point of view that takes into consideration the role of bodily experiences, and a classical point of view in which drive is seen as inextricably linked to relationships from birth on.     

Toward a critical theory of happiness: Philosophical background and methodological significance

Happiness is discussed in its development since the pragmatists' interpretation of the concept. From early psychological approaches onwards, the notion of happiness has existed in the tension between the normative “summum bonum” and the empirical — “subjective well-being”. Dialectical philosophy attempted to mediate between these two levels, with Hegel locating happiness in the sphere of reason, and Marx interpreting it as a consequence of social practice. Building upon this materialist notion and upon Freud's analysis of distorting forces, the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School warn against taking the subjective experience of well-being at face value. The appropriateness of their caveats is illustrated in the methodological debates over response bias in the social psychology literature. It would appear that it is quite unsatisfactory to define happiness operationally as that which is reflected directly in self-reports.     

Toward a theory of verbal behavior

This paper is a reply to an accompanying set of six commentaries by Sidman; Hayes and Barnes; Schusterman, Kastak, and Reichmuth; Tonneau and Sokolowski; Lowenkron; and Moerk. Those commentaries were prompted by our article “On the Origins of Naming and Other Symbolic Behavior” (1996), which was, in turn, followed by 26 commentaries and a reply. In the course of the present reply, we further develop the naming account to embrace more complex verbal relations such as same, different, more, and less. We also examine what we see as the lack of conceptual coherence in equivalence theories, including relational frame theory, and the disparities between these accounts and the findings from empirical research.     

Toward a quantitative theory of punishment

In two experiments, pigeons' key pecking for food on concurrent variable-interval schedules was punished with electric shock according to concurrent variable-interval punishment schedules. With unequal frequencies of food but equal rates of punishment associated with the two keys and at several intensities of shock, the response and time allocation of all six pigeons overmatched the obtained relative frequency of food. The overmatching was predicted by a subtractive model of the interaction between punishment and positive reinforcement but not by two alternative models. Increases in the k and r_e parameters of the generalized matching law could not account for the observed shifts in preference.     

Toward a perceptual theory of transparency

Theories of perceptual transparency have typically been developed within the context of a physical model that generates the percept of transparency (F. Metelli's episcotister model, 1974b). Here 2 fundamental questions are investigated: (a) When does the visual system initiate the percept of one surface seen through another? (b) How does it assign surface properties to a transparent layer? Results reveal systematic deviations from the predictions of Metelli's model, both for initiating image decomposition into multiple surfaces and for assigning surface attributes. Specifically, results demonstrate that the visual system uses Michelson contrast as a critical image variable to initiate percepts of transparency and to assign transmittance to transparent surfaces. Findings are discussed in relation to previous theories of transparency, lightness, brightness, and contrast-contrast.     

Toward a dialectic theory of concepts

The article spells out some guidelines for a dialectic theory of concepts. Concept formation is treated in terms of polemic and polar reference. The main thesis is that opposite references structure concepts by way of advocacy. On polar dimensions of comparison, (e. g., light versus dark), people select and advocate objects of comparison in agreement with the context of comparison (i.e., what is light depends on what is dark, and vice versa). In principle, any concept is subject to polemics because polarity enables opposite comparisons, (e.g., an object as dark and light with reference to lighter and darker objects, respectively). When opposite comparisons apply to the same object, reference becomes anomalous which will motivate conceptual change, (e.g., twilight accounts for a reference in between). Consequently, meaning is not secured by general rules but concepts presuppose advocated references; concepts are intentional constructs. The dialectic theory is illustrated by a case study of the environmental discourse on forest management. Conflicting references fuelled by industrial and environmental values demonstrate how opposite comparisons motivate revisions.Dialectic is a convenient technical name for the kind of thinking which takes place when human beings enter into dispute, or when they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some theory or idea. Adler, 1927, p. V