Moral Madness

One clear reason why human agents often act badly is because they are insufficiently attentive to moral considerations and concerns, or tempted to ignore these in pursuit of more immediate satisfactions. In so far as madness, insanity or mental instability may be regarded as undermining moral agency, it might also be supposed that such madness attaches more to the non‐moral than the moral reasons or motives of agents. Still, the well‐known quote from Chesterton at the start of this paper may give pause to conventional thought on this matter. With reference to the ideas of Plato and Freud, as well as attention to literary and cinematic “case studies,” this paper argues that moral reasons and motives – of an apparently Chestertonian kind – may be a prime source of morally “insane” conduct.     

Remembering as Necessary for Forgiving

As Japan marks the 75th anniversary of World War II in 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not offer a fresh apology and maintained that future generations should not have to keep apologizing for past mistakes. This paper uses the unresolved war issue of the military comfort women system as a context to discuss what it means for political apologies to be more than mere political gestures founded on political interests and discusses what it takes to facilitate forgiveness. It will examine the features of a repentant wrongdoer who deserves forgiveness based on how one relates to one’s past wrongdoing in order to distinguish political apologies that are genuine from those that are mere gestures aimed at hasty reconciliation. This will be discussed through the works of Jacques Derrida and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Next, through Jankélévitch’s and Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of forgiveness, it will be discussed how matters of justice and forgiveness should be understood as well as how the history of past wrongs and injustice is necessary for a genuine apology and makes forgiveness possible. It is also a moral responsibility for both perpetrators and victims to remember history in order to achieve personal forgiveness as well as begin social and political reconciliation.

     

Madness as religious experience: The case of Allen Ginsberg

Various writers have considered madness to be a religious experience. On the basis of the literature in the area and conversations with psychiatric patients, it is argued that madness as a religious experience can be viewed as a four-stage developmental process. The four stages are: 1) The hurt-and-be-hurt state of being, 2) The self-induced psychedelic experience, 3) The confusion-and-dread reaction, and 4) The reconstruction-with-insight world view. To clarify how these four stages make up a religious experience, the poet Allen Ginsberg's so-called psychotic episode is organized around each of the stages.     

Madness in Society

The author discusses briefly ways in which madness has been defined, controlled, appropriated, and treated during the evolution of western civilization. “Grand theories” of the aetiology of madness are considered, including physiological, social, and psycho-social explanations. The work of Michel Foucault is examined for its major impact on the understanding of social factors in the categorization and definition of those deemed to be mad. It is noticeable how the role of the unconscious is omitted from much of contemporary theorizing about madness, including in the work of Foucault, where it is relegated to the status of a cultural artifact. The author argues that by incorporating a genuinely psychoanalytic definition of the unconscious into theories of madness, it becomes possible to identify forms of individuality and constructive resistance that supersede the pessimism of Foucault's assessment of human agency. The paper concludes with a criticism of contemporary psychotherapies, especially in welfare state healthcare systems, that fail to address the objective, maddening circumstances of modern life. The resulting overdetermined location of contradiction and conflict in the human mind promotes illusory strategies of reconciliation and harmony that can betray the lived experience of those seeking help. A further consequence of this political and ethical confusion is to underscore the Cinderella status of psychotherapy in many countries.     

Madness strikes back

This commentary is concerned with the involvement of mental health service users in research. It will argue that research carried out by service users is one way of giving voice to a previously silenced group—the mad. It is one way in which ‘Madness Strikes Back’. The main theoretical model to be used is that of the early Foucault. I will not be concerned with what has become known as ‘Foucauldian discourse analysis’ since nowhere in Foucault's writing is there reference to conversation or talk. I will, however, be concerned with power as mental health service users are amongst the most disempowered of groups in all societies. I will also be concerned with Foucault's claim that, since the Enlightenment, madness has been positioned as the antithesis of reason, as ‘unreason’. This distinction can be argued to persist in the field of research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Religion and Madness

The question I try to answer in this paper is: How should we distinguish mad from sane religious belief? After looking at the clear-cut but opposed answers of Freud and Jung, I then examine the modern psychiatric answer, particularly as presented in the DSM IV. After arguing that each of the three answers is unsatisfactory, I look at what I take to be the more promising approach of Con Drury, Wittgenstein’s friend and biographer, in an essay called “Madness and Religion,” where, drawing on the religious histories of Joan of Arc, George Fox and Tolstoy and three of his own psychiatric patients, Drury suggests that there is no objective yet ethical way to make the distinction. This leads to my own answer, which is that the best we can do is to distinguish mad from neurotic religious belief; and hence that the safest position, although not the most comfortable, is the neurotic one.     

Concerning Madness and Human Suffering

Pastoral Psychology - Few behavioral scientists have attempted a penetrating examination of the problem of suffering. Eschewing its etiology as a moral issue, they have left it to philosophers and...     

Clergy Who Experience Trauma as a Result of Forced Termination

Forced termination of clergy is a demeaning and psychologically distressing experience. Clergy who experience a forced termination are subjected to mobbing (psychological harassment) and other activities meant to publicly or privately demean a minister in such a way that they resign their ministry position. In a purposive convenience sample of 55 ministers who had been forcibly terminated, participants scored above the known cut-off score for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and scored high on a measure of burnout and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Forced termination has been anecdotally connected to PTSD and GAD, this project sought to empirically link PTSD and GAD to the forced termination of clergy. This study raises concern for the long-term mental health effects of ministers who have been forcibly terminated and provides implications for future clinical study on this group of clergy. Findings in this research indicate there may be a process to forced termination, which could be developed into a theory on forced termination of clergy.     

Antigone's Mirrors: Reflections on Moral Madness

Sophocles's Antigone continues to attract attention for its portrayal of the themes of moral agency and sexual difference. In this paper I argue that the contradictory factors which constitute Antigone's social identity work against the possibility of assessing her actions as either “virtuous” or not. I challenge readings of the play which suggest either that individual moral agency is sexually neutral or that women's action is necessarily and simply in direct opposition to the interests of the public sphere.     

Leaning Into Termination

Ending treatment is inevitably filled with multiple and disparate losses for the analytic dyad. The author sets forth a call for reconsidering termination from a Relational perspective. She argues that many, if not all, terminations, are primed for enactment. The mutual processes of attaching and detaching, of growing close and then saying goodbye elicit powerful feelings and equally powerful dissociative processes. Specifically, she suggests that termination can be understood as co-created enactments of complex unconscious processes between patient and analyst. There is some necessary integrative work that may possible only when ending treatment. Key to this integrative work is the acceptance of both the achievements and the limitations of analytic work for both participants. She argues that we need to suspend our analytic ambition and begin to formulate what a co-created and mutually enacted good-enough ending would look like.