“Ought Implies Can,” Framing Effects,and “Empirical Refutations”

This paper aims to contribute to the current debate about the status of the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle and the growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it. We report the results of an experimental study which show that people judge that agents ought to perform an action even when they also judge that those agents cannot do it and that such “ought” judgments exhibit an actor-observer effect. Because of this actor-observer effect on “ought” judgments and the Duhem-Quine thesis, talk of an “empirical refutation” of OIC is empirically and methodologically unwarranted. What the empirical fact that people attribute moral obligations to unable agents shows is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC has been refuted.     

The Perils of Pondering: Intuition and Thin Slice Judgments

Intuitive processing is critical for effective social and interpersonal interactions. Previous work has found that people are able to form accurate impressions that predict certain ecologically valid outcomes from brief observations or “thin slices” of behavior. This article discusses theoretical and empirical work showing that thin slice judgments are intuitive and efficient. Thin slice judgments can be made accurately even under conditions of distraction. Moreover, such judgments are impeded by tasks that interfere with the intuitive process. Thin slice judgments are impeded by tasks involving deliberation such as reasons analyses tasks. Thus, impressionistic, evaluative thin slice judgments seem to be intuitive.     

Accurate by way of aggregation: Should you trust your intuition-based first impressions?

How much should you trust your intuition about other people's job performance? Different literatures provide different answers to this question. Social psychological research on “thin slices” suggests that untrained observers can predict a person's job performance based on a few moments of observation. Industrial/organizational psychologists have found a weaker relationship between job performance and the intuitive judgments that people make following employment interviews. This paper argues that interviewers' intuitive judgments appear to be weaker predictors than intuitive judgments of thin slices because thin slices research measures predictive validity at the aggregate-level of analysis. Intuition-based first impressions will not usually be valid predictors of job performance unless people have an opportunity to collect and combine the judgments of multiple independent raters.     

Intuitions as Evidence Facilitators

There is currently an important debate about whether philosophical intuitions are intended as evidence for the theories philosophers promote. On one side are those who argue that philosophers do rely on intuitions as evidence; on the other side are those who deny any such role for philosophical intuitions. This paper argues that both sides of this debate are partially right and partially wrong. Intuitive judgments do not, as psychological states, function as evidence in most well‐known philosophical thought experiments. Philosophers nevertheless strongly depend upon these intuitive judgments. Where both sides go awry is in assuming that the importance of intuitive judgments rests solely upon their role as evidence. We need to distinguish between evidence, as such, from various nonevidential psychological states that are needed for something else to serve as evidence. The paper calls these latter conditions “evidence facilitators” and argues that intuitive judgments belong in this category.     

Mind,Soul and Spirit: Conceptions of Immaterial Identity in Different Cultures

The cognitive science of religion has recently focused attention on whether concepts of mind, soul, and spirit derive from the same or different intuitive foundations of immaterial identity. The present research is the first to look at intuitions about these three concepts simultaneously in different cultures. Methodologically, hypothetical transplants or transfers of minds or brains have been commonly used to examine the development of inferences about the continuity of mental identity despite bodily displacement. The present research extends the transfer paradigm to compare inferences about transfers of “soul” and “spirit” as well as the “mind.” American, Brazilian, and Indonesian undergraduate participants were presented with a series of scenarios in which a character's soul, mind, or spirit is transferred to another character's body. Participants made judgments about the consequences of such transfers on behaviors selected to potentially differentiate underlying intuitive categories. Results indicate that intuitions of soul, spirit, and mind do appear to draw from different but overlapping intuitions, which are recruited in different ways depending on religion and country. For American and Indonesian participants, the mind transfer was judged more often to result in a displacement of cognitive attributes compared to bodily, social, and moral attributes. Across the three countries, the transfer of spirit led more frequently to judgments about displacement of passion than of ability; religiosity was associated with giving more weight to the transfer of the soul, thus resulting in a greater displacement of all types of attributes. The results emphasize the importance of considering how different intuitive foundations, such as essentialism, intuitive psychology, and vitalism, might be recruited by culture to highlight different aspects of immaterial identity.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

The effects of speed and accuracy strategies in an information-reduction task

Developmental changes in the ability to make relational judgments of sound intensity were examined with 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children. The hypothesis that correct judgments of “louder” precede correct judgments of “softer” was supported. The results were discussed with reference to the development of the understanding of logical relations as proposed by Piaget. The role of magnitude of perceptual information in the development of relational judgments also was discussed.     

Measurement and the mental map

In order to test between subtractive and ratio theories of stimulus comparison, judges were asked to estimate “ratios” and “differences” of easterliness and westerliness of U.S. cities. “Difference” judgments fit the subtractive model, and “ratio” judgments fit the ratio model. However, “ratios” and “differences” were monotonically related, contrary to the theory that judges compute both relations on a common scale. Results are consistent with the theory that there is but one operation for both “ratios” and “differences.” To assume that the single operation is a ratio requires the complex interpretation that easterliness and westerliness are nonlinearly related. A simpler interpretation is provided by a subtractive theory, in which all four types of judgments are monotonically related to subjective differences on a single cognitive map.     

The perception of identity in simultaneously presented complex visual displays

Two experiments were conducted in order to examine the information processing in a visual matching task, using digit sequences of varying complexity as the stimuli. Traditionally, reaction times for “same” judgments do not fit into a single-process self-terminating feature testing model, while those for “different” judgments do. Bamber (1969) proposed a two-stage model to account for the data, and the results of these experiments support this type of model. Strong evidence implying that Bamber’s “identity reporter” has a limited capacity in terms of stimulus complexity was also found. This complexity seems to be deemed by stimulus discriminability and the number of “chunks” of information rather than by “bits” of information being transmitted (Miller, 1956).     

Social stereotypes and judgments of individuals: An instance of the base-rate fallacy

Social stereotypes may be defined as beliefs that various traits or acts are characteristic of particular social groups. As such, stereotypic beliefs represent subjective estimates of the frequencies of attributes within social groups, and so should be expected to “behave like” base-rate information within the context of judgments of individuals: specifically, individuating target case information should induce subjects to disregard their own stereotypic beliefs. Although the results of previous research are consisten with this prediction, no studies have permitted normative evaluation of stereotypic judgments. Because the hypothesis equates base rates and stereotypes, normative evaluation is essential for demonstrating equivalence between the base-rate fallacy and neglect of stereotypes in the presence of individuating case information. Two experiments were conducted, allowing for normative evaluation of effects of stereotypes on judgments of individuals. The results confirmed the hypothesis and established the generalizability of the effect across controversial and uncontroversial, socially desirable and socially underirable stereotypic beliefs. More generally, an examination of the differences between intuitive and normative statistical models of the judgment task suggest that the base-rate fallacy is but one instance of a general characteristic of intuitive judgment processes: namely, the failure to appropriately adjust evaluations of any one cue in the light of concurrent evaluations of other cues.     

A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination

In a recent issue of this journal, Björkman, Juslin, and Winman (1993) presented a model of the calibration of subjective confidence judgments for sensory discrimination which they called “subjective distance theory.” They proposed that there was a robust underconfidence bias in such judgments, that the model predicted such a bias, and that two different models were needed for the calibration of subjective confidence for cognitive judgments and for sensory ones. This paper addresses issues they raised. It points out that they have not presented a new model, but rather a portion of a more general one, the “decision-variable partition model” originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (1980). This paper explores properties of the model and shows, contrary to Björkman, Juslin, and Winman’s hypotheses, that the model does not predict under-confidence, that the “hard-easy effect” can be observed with sensory discriminations, and that the model fits not only sensory, but also cognitive judgments.     

Perceptual encoding in comparative judgments of race

Ss made comparative judgments along the black-white racial dimension using opposite response sets (“Which is blacker?” or “Which is whiter?”). Three classes of pictures were used: B (black),W (white), and M (racially mixed). I or the BM judgments. “Which is whiter?” took significantly longer. The MW and BW judgments showed no difference between response instructions. Analysis of the stimuli showed that skin tone was not the primary perceptual attribute used in racial encoding. The observation of a funnel effect in the judgment latencies is shown to be consistent with other research demonstrating the effect of response set in comparative judgments Further. the results support sociological observations about the cultural use of the linguistic labels “black” and “white”     

反应选项对时序知觉重复启动效应的影响

先前研究采用两项反应任务发现了时序知觉重复启动效应, 这可能是反应选项导致的虚假效应, 本研究采用三项反应任务对此进行了检验。实验1运用三项判断任务以消除缺乏中间选项所致的反应偏向, 结果发现重复启动显著影响“哪个图形先出现”和“两个图形同时出现”的时序判断; 实验2在实验1的基础上对“同时出现”反应选项进行两种指导语操作, 实验结果不仅与实验1一致, 而且“有把握时判断为同时出现”和“有无把握都判断为同时出现”之间没有显著差异, 说明被试能够识别时序加以判断, 不支持反应偏向的前提条件。因此, 时序知觉重复启动效应不是反应选项产生的反应偏向引发的虚假效应, 重复启动对“系列性”和“同时性”时序知觉都存在显著影响。     

Units of phonological recoding of word-like stimuli used by children and adults

Third-grade, sixth-grade, and coUege-age subjects performed a “same”-“different” task, using a phonological identity criterion for visually presented pseudowords. Consistent with Krueger’s (1978) model of single-glance “same”-“different” judgments, judgments of phonologically matching stimuli were made more quickly and less accurately than were judgments of phonologically nonmatching stimuli, and error rates and RTs were longer for phonologically similar nonmatching pairs than for phonologically dissimilar nonmatching pairs. It was concluded that subjects of all ages tested could process phonologically recoded information in a holistic fashion, and the implications of these conclusions with respect to reading processes are discussed.     

Exploring stereotypes of popular and unpopular occupations among women-in-general

To find clues to cultural meanings of highly popular and highly unpopular occupations from SVIB-W, 227 women-in-general subjects judged nine popular and nine unpopular titles on 26 semantic-differential scales. The ranges of prestige and femininity judgments were deliberately restricted, in the hope that less understood stereotypes would stand out independently of these familiar variables. Eleven scales effectively differentiated popular from unpopular occupations. These 11 polarities (a) both confirmed and disconfirmed common-sense predictions; (b) suggested themes that were not “WIG-bound,” themes probably relevant to parallel judgments in a male subculture; and (c) often echoed variables that have been treated elsewhere as “work-adjustment” needs, such as “variety,” “independence,” and “security.” Scale intercorrelations were low, with only a sprinkling of moderate relationships present; many scales helpfully tapped stereotypes that emerged independently of status perceptions. The role of a “femininity” variable remained ambiguous. Inspection of scale interrelationships suggested that factor structures of meaning in an occupational context will differ importantly from well-known structures displayed by general semantic judgments.     

‘If something doesn’t look right,go find out why’: how intuitive decision making is accomplished in police first-response

ABSTRACT

Intuition is an important mechanism by which organizational actors make significant decisions; however, precisely how intuitive decisions are taken is not well understood and hence is worthy of closer scrutiny. First-response decisions, because of the conditions under which they are executed, offer researchers an interesting and relevant context for the study of intuitive decision making in organizations. We used qualitative methods to explore how “peak performing” police officers used intuition in first-response decisions. Our findings show that intuition’s role in first-response occurs in two differing but complementary ways: “recognition-based intuition” and “intuition-based inquiry”. This finding builds on previous intuition research and informs current debates in behavioural sciences regarding “default-intervention” versus “parallel-competitive” variants of dual-process theory; it also reveals how a complex and situated mix of intuition and analysis can guide effective decision making and support peak performance in uncertain, dynamic and complex environments that typify many organizational decision processes. Our findings contribute to intuition research by extending the current theory of “intuition-as-expertise” in going beyond a simple “recognize-and-respond” model. We propose a “Perceiving-Knowing-Enacting-Closing” framework which captures the complex role that intuition in combination with analysis plays in police first-response decisions, and discuss implications for decision-making policies and practices in organizations.     

A slugfest of intuitions: contextualism and experimental design

This paper considers ways that experimental design can affect judgments about informally presented context shifting experiments. Reasons are given to think that judgments about informal context shifting experiments are affected by an exclusive reliance on binary truth value judgments and by experimenter bias. Exclusive reliance on binary truth value judgments may produce experimental artifacts by obscuring important differences of degree between the phenomena being investigated. Experimenter bias is an effect generated when, for example, experimenters disclose (even unconsciously) their own beliefs about the outcome of an experiment. Eliminating experimenter bias from context shifting experiments makes it far less obvious what the “intuitive” responses to those experiments are. After it is shown how those different kinds of bias can affect judgments about informal context shifting experiments, those experiments are revised to control for those forms of bias. The upshot of these investigations is that participants in the contextualist debate who employ informal experiments should pay just as much attention to the design of their experiments as those who employ more formal experimental techniques if they want to avoid obscuring the phenomena they aim to uncover.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.