THE PARTICULARITY OF ANIMALS AND OF JESUS CHRIST

Clough's theological account of animals critiques the familiar negative identification of animals as not‐human. Instead, Clough highlights both the distinctive particularity of each animal as created by God and the shared fleshly creatureliness of human and nonhuman animals. He encourages Christians to recognize Jesus Christ as God enfleshed more than divinely human, and consequently to care for nonhuman animals as those who share with human animals in the redemption of all flesh. This move risks downplaying the possibilities for creaturely specific forms of redemption; limiting the cosmic efficacy of salvation in Christ; and losing the particularity of Christ's divine and human natures. Another, possibly less risky, direction to take Clough's insights about creatureliness and well‐formed theological ethics might attend to the perverse ways that humans assess the worthiness of human and nonhuman animals by substituting particularities of use and abuse for the particularities of creation and salvation.     

THE IMAGO DEI AS THE MIND OF JESUS CHRIST

In this essay I examine David Clough's interpretation of the imago Dei and his use of “creaturely” language in his book On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology. Contrary to Clough, I argue that the imago Dei should be interpreted as being uniquely human. Using a neuroscientific approach, I elaborate on my claim that while Jesus is the image of God perfected, the imago Dei is best understood as having the mind of Christ. In regards to language, I make the case that using terms such as “creature” when referring to nonhuman animals is problematic in that it can serve to alienate human beings from their capacity to image God. In addition I argue that “creaturely” language raises concerns for the African American community given Western Christianity's history as it relates to their valuation of black bodies and human enslavement.     

MEANINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND UNIVERSALS: TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF MAN

S medslund , J. Meanings, implications and universals: towards a psychology of man. Scand. J. Psychof ., 1969, 10 , 1–15.-S-R psychology ignores the nonlawful regions between stimulus and meaning, and between intention and response. Psychology is defined: the science of phenomena as they exist for the individual person. The data in psychology: the public meanings of a person's acts, i.e. the meanings shared by all members of the person's community. Mental processes are related by implication rather than causation. Logic is a precondition for efficient mental functioning. Concepts with purely logical connotations (universals) are necessary for all higher mental functioning. No general psychological theory can perhaps exist, only development of already existing a priori conceptual schemata (common sense) and of diagnostic techniques.