To Have and to Hold: Thoughts on Admiration/Envy: Commentary on Paper by Joye Weisel-Barth

Using the author's definition of “envy,” I try to separate out fleeting feelings of envy that lead to “admiration” from very disturbing feelings of envy that have to remain hidden because they are so shameful. I try to explore the reasons why it is so unlikely that analysts will feel envy of their patients no matter how rich and famous they may be. Instead, I try to show that this really is a paper on “admiration” and quote the relevant literature on how to distinguish these two affects. A careful reading of the case material shows that the analyst's admiration of her patient's artwork served a very positive role in the treatment of a severely narcissistic man whose self-esteem had plummeted after suffering several losses. It seemed that by being a “container” and “self-object” for a long period, the analyst was able to rescue pieces of the patient's self that he felt were falling through a “colander.” The case is also used as an example of some of the work that started in the 1970s about how to work with narcissistic and nonclassical cases in a noninterpretative manner.     

Knowledge and Appraisal in the Cognition—Emotion Relationship

Abstract

Recently there has been considerable theoretical and empirical work attempting to identify specific cognitive dimensions that shape the emotional response. However, this work has almost universally neglected an important theoretical distinction between two types of cognition relevant to emotion: knowledge and appraisal. Knowledge has to do with the facts of an adaptational encounter, whereas appraisal defines the personal significance of an encounter for well-being. In the shaping of an emotion, knowledge is a distal variable which requires an additional process of appraisal to produce an emotion; appraisal is a proximal variable which directly influences whether an emotion will be generated, and if so, its kind and intensity.

In this article we examine the distinctions between knowledge and appraisal that are relevant to the emotion process, and how the failure to consider them muddies theoretical and empirical work. We examine a number of putative appraisal dimensions prominent in current theoretical systems, examine why they often constitute knowledge rather than appraisal, and discuss some of the appraisal dimensions in the emotion process. In addition, the major techniques used to study the cognition-emotion relationship are examined and their potential for providing evidence of appraisal rather than knowledge is evaluated.     

Philosophical Criteria in Whitehead and Rorty

Rorty's aversion to metaphysics is well known, so the extent of his early work on Whitehead might come as a surprise. This article examines the young Rorty's critical assessment of Whitehead to show how it demonstrates the consequences of diverging metaphilosophical orientations. It argues that Rorty's insistence on judging Whitehead's work through an exclusively epistemological frame causes him to miss its more radical existential and epistemic implications. After examining how Rorty and Whitehead operate with different cost‐benefit analyses as to the risks and benefits of speculative philosophy, it suggests that closer attention to the fuller stakes of Whitehead's project shows that his metaphysics are not opposed to the “poeticized” culture that Rorty calls for, one where the distinction between making and finding is no longer metaphysically foundational.     

Imitating Christ's Cross: Lonergan and Girard on How and Why

The article begins with the gospels’ admonition to take up one's cross and asks how Christians might understand Christ's work on the cross so that we might better imitate or participate in it. Using tools from recent advances in literary analysis and systematic theology, the article attempts to provide some answer to this question. It considers contemporary feminist and liberation theologians’ criticism of the common but problematic interpretation of Christ's cross, what is often called ‘substitutionary penal atonement.’ It compares this with Anselm's atonement theory of satisfaction and Bernard Lonergan's and René Girard's analysis of the cross as a communication of love that invites others into loving relationship. With these interpretations of Christ's work, it concludes with some thoughts on how Christians might take up their own daily crosses.     

BRICOLAGE AND THE PURITY OF TRADITIONS: Engaging the Stoics for Contemporary Christian Ethics

This essay is a response to C. Kavin Rowe's critique of my 2011 argument that certain dimensions of Roman Stoic ethics are at work in Jonathan Edwards's moral thought. Rowe raises questions about the act of selectively retrieving ideas from a philosophical tradition to support constructive work in another tradition. I argue for the importance of acknowledging how Christian thought has been shaped by what Jeffrey Stout describes as moral bricolage, the selective retrieval of ideas from various traditions, and I contend that this bricolage can continue to be a fruitful means through which Christian ethics engages external traditions. Moreover, the importance of Stoicism's retrieval in early modern philosophy makes the work of eighteenth‐century theologians such as Edwards a particularly valuable resource for exploring the plausibility of Christian engagement with the Stoics.     

Two of a kind: Perceptions of own and partner's attachment characteristics

Because it is universally relevant, and because it is formed in infancy, giving it a strong preconscious quality, attachment was chosen for a study of Allport's (1924) construct of social projection. Individuals in 301 dating couples rated themselves and their partners on each of four continuous attachment dimensions (i.e., security, dismissiveness, preoccupation, fearfulness). The individual's own rating on a particular dimension significantly predicted the individual's perception of how the partner rated on the dimension, after controlling for the partner's self-rating on the dimension. Thus people perceived their partners to be more similar to themselves than they really were, demonstrating social projection. In general, the higher the degree of emotional intimacy was, the more social projection was demonstrated.     

James Hillman: the unmaking of a psychologist Part one: his legacy

This two‐part essay offers a critical assessment of Hillman's archetypal psychology and enquires into its viability as a psychological model. The first part explores his legacy and reviews the metapsychological frame in which his work operates. It considers the relation between his thought and Jung's, and argues that Hillman's work is not so much post‐Jungian as pre‐Jungian. The second part is primarily intrapsychic; it explores Hillman's character, as discerned through his writings and interviews, and considers his work as an expression of the puer aeternus. It is argued that the puer prefers to live in an eternal dream‐state resistant to growing up: yet denial of the maturational impulse will only lead to it happening anyway but in a negative form. The paper considers how Hillman's model was ‘unmade’ by the missing developmental element of his thought. Development is an archetypal and bio‐psychological necessity, and if rejected it can ruin any system that refuses to take it seriously. In Hillman's case this manifested in the form of a repressed masculine shadow, destroying the credibility of his earlier work. The two‐part paper attempts to weave an objective appraisal with a running commentary based on the author's personal engagement with the man and his work.     

What is the Doctrine of the Trinity For? Practicality and Projection in Robert Jenson's Theology

This articles engages the theology of Robert Jenson with three questions in mind: What is the doctrine of the Trinity for? Is it a practical doctrine? If so, how, and with what implications? It seeks, on the one hand, to identify whether Jenson's trinitarian theology ought to count as a “social” doctrine of the Trinity, and to what extent he puts it to work for human socio‐practical purposes. On the other hand, in light of Jenson's career‐long worries about Feuerbach and projection onto a God behind or above the triune God revealed in the economy, the article interrogates his thought with a view to recent critiques of social trinitarianism. The irony is that, in constructing his account of the Trinity as both wholly determined in and by the economy and maximally relevant for practical human needs and interests, precisely in order to avoid the errors of Feuerbachian “religion,” Jenson ends up engaging in a full‐scale project of projection. Observation of the human is retrojected into the immanent life of the Trinity as the prior condition of the possibility for the human; upon this “discovery,” this or that feature of God's being is proposed as a resolution to a human problem, bearing ostensibly profound socio‐practical import. The article is intended, first, as a contribution to the work, only now beginning, of critically receiving Jenson's theology; and, second, as an extension of general critiques of practical uses of trinitarian doctrine, such as Karen Kilby's or Kathryn Tanner's, by way of close engagement with a specific theologian.     

Theology and Religious Studies at the Turn of the Millenium: Reconceiving the Field

This article originated as a lecture at the celebration of 150 years of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies in King's College of the University of London. Professor Ford argues that our good practice as teachers has outstripped any available paradigm of the field, so it is necessary to reconceive it. He proposes four dimensions that unite theological and religious studies: how to study the phenomena of religions; how to establish norms and responsibilities; how to cope with radical, self-involving particularity; and how to involve the divine in academic studies.     

DOUBLE-VOICE IN S. Y. AGNON'S “HANIDAḤ”: OVERTURES TO A DEVELOPING DISCOURSE

It is widely acknowledged that S.Y. Agnon's story, “Hanida?” (1919), represents a significant artistic transition for the author. Beyond the transitional and inaugural aspects of the story's themes and structure, I wish to consider how its discursive style itself constitutes a significant development in Agnon's literary work. Particular qualities in the story's narrative discourse, more so than in his previous work, anticipate Agnon's later literary achievements. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of discourse in the novel, I will also seek to demonstrate how the story's dialogic, polyphonic qualities, not only anticipate these later works, but suggest some new hermeneutic avenues to reading Agnon.     

Kant on the normativity of taste: The role of aesthetic ideas

For Kant, the form of a subject's experience of an object provides the normative basis for an aesthetic judgement about it. In other words, if the subject's experience of an object has certain structural properties, then Kant thinks she can legitimately judge that the object is beautiful—and that it is beautiful for everyone. My goal in this paper is to provide a new account of how this ‘subjective universalism’ is supposed to work. In doing so, I appeal to Kant's notions of an aesthetic idea and an aesthetic attribute, and the connection that Kant makes between an object's expression of rational and the normativity of aesthetic judgements about it.     

Kant's Opus Postumum and McDowell's Critique of Kant

In this article, I have a modest goal: (1) to sketch how Kant can avoid the charge of “subjective idealism” advanced against him by John McDowell and (2) to do so with reference to Kant's last work, the so‐called Opus Postumum. I am interested in defending Kant on this point because doing so not only (a) shows how we need not—at least not because of this point about idealism—jump ship from Kant to Hegel (as McDowell and others think), but also (b) suggests that the Opus Postumum is a text that ought to be explored more by Kantians and those interested in Kant. A subsidiary, implicit point is that (c) we need not shy away from McDowell's reading of Kant in order to oppose McDowell's criticism of Kant. In order to defend against McDowell's charge, I focus on the argument of the Refutation of Idealism, showing how this argument evolves in Kant's later works, especially the Opus Postumum.     

Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

This paper presents a novel conceptualization of a type of untruthful speech that is of eminent political relevance but has hitherto been unrecognized: epistemically exploitative bullshit (EEB). Speakers engaging in EEB are bullshitting: they deceive their addressee regarding their unconcern for the very difference between truth and falsity. At the same time, they exploit their discursive victims: they oblige their counterparts to perform unacknowledged and emotionally draining epistemic work to educate the speakers about the addressees' oppression, only to discredit their epistemic trustworthiness. I argue that EEB is irreducible to various recently discussed untruthful speech, and in particular to Frankfurtian bullshit, as well as to epistemic exploitation or other epistemic injustices. Taking inspiration from Sartre's analysis of anti-Semitic discourse, where bullshitting and epistemic exploitation are essentially interlinked, I instead suggest that recognizing the distinctiveness of EEB allows for a more refined conceptualization of these discursive phenomena. Specifically, I show how bad faith and the ensuing collective diffusion and delegation of epistemic responsibility play a so far neglected but key role here. I ultimately demonstrate that with Sartre's help, we can grasp how the existential, interpersonal and institutional dimensions involved in the negotiation of truth seamlessly intersect better than we would with the lens of analytic or critical epistemology alone.     

Investigating how ostracizing others affects one’s self-concept

Abstract

Social relationships are connected with an individual’s self-concept, so events that influence one’s relationships subsequently influence one’s self-concept. Ostracism, being excluded and ignored, is an aversive experience involving both a target (the one being ostracized) and source (the one ostracizing). We will discuss previous limitations of source paradigms and how we addressed them when developing our paradigms. We will also highlight current source research, from a co-edited special issue, and how this research is relevant to an individuals’ self-concept. Lastly, we will suggest how cognitive dissonance work can ground source research within a larger theoretical framework and inspire future research. We consider how one’s self-concept influences cognitive dissonance related to knowingly harming others through ostracism.     

What you don't know can hurt you: The effects of performance criteria ambiguity on sex differences in self-confidence1

Previous investigators have suggested that women display lower self-confidence than men across almost all achievement situations. The empirical validity of this suggestion is assessed in an experiment testing the hypothesis that performance evaluation guidelines moderate sex difference in self-confidence. Undergraduates read the guidelines by which their performance on an impending test would be evaluated. Guidelines were: ambiguous (A); clear—specifying the dimensions of performance to be examined, but not providing any examples of others' performance against which subjects' work would be compared (C); or clear with performance examples (CE). Subjects then completed the test and estimated how will they had done. Results showed the predicted pattern in conditions A and C: While women underestimated their actual performan?e much more than men when guidelines were ambiguous, they did not do so when guidelines were clear. Further, the rise in self-confidence for women from conditions A to C was greater than that for men. Also as predicted, both sexes' self-confidence and performance were higher in condition C than in condition A. Finally, although condition CE was expected to depress only women's self-confidence and performance, both sexes showed this effect. It is concluded that sex differences in self-confidence are moderated by situation variables and that programs designed to reduce such differences might be improved by a greater focus upon women's response to clearly specifiable factors in achievement settings.     

Implicational Meaning (Re)Creation in Bereavement as a Lifeworld Dialogue: An Existential–Constructivist Perspective

This article draws on Robert A. Neimeyer's work on meaning reconstruction in bereavement, focusing on an aspect of meaning that has elsewhere been termed implicational meaning and developing an account of relevant meaning-making processes against the background of existential understandings of the 4-dimensional lifeworld structure. The article emphasizes that meaning reconstruction in bereavement can be seen as a deeply emotional, transactional, and creative process, which implies verbal and nonverbal dialogue and transformation across multiple layers and dimensions that can be seen to constitute the person and their lifeworld.     

On Heidegger's Root and Branch Reformulation of the Meaning of Transcendental Philosophy

Over the past decades there has been increasing interest in the idea that Heidegger was a “transcendental philosopher” during the late 1920s. Furthermore, a consensus has started to emerge around the idea that Heidegger must be thought of as a transcendental thinker during this time. For the most part this means to first experience how Heidegger's work inherits this term from Kant or Husserl so that one can then experience how Heidegger creatively adapts this inheritance. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach is unhelpful. The aim of this paper is instead to show that transcendental philosophy bears a wholly renewed meaning in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and that this meaning must be understood in an intrinsic connection with the fundamental-ontological problem of transcendence. Articulating this connection will show how Heidegger makes transcendental philosophy properly phenomenological.     

“Words with Power” for Social Transformation: An Anatomy of Biblical Criticism for Theological Education

Abstract. The proliferation of methods of literary criticism in biblical studies raises the question of how to introduce students to the field. This article argues that the work of Northrop Frye is useful for teaching the existential meaning and social impact of the Bible. The first section introduces relevant aspects of Frye's literary theory. The second presents the author's teaching as a case study. The third section concludes with implications for a philosophy of theological education.