‘A Way Out’ and A Way In: Reply to Commentary

I express my appreciation for Michal Rieck's thoughtful and fully felt reading of my paper. I underline her points that the regression that an unobtrusive yet fully engaged analyst can allow, is not solely a phenomenon in work with more disturbed patients, and that the essence of this position is to be without separateness. I outline a process of the “flow of enactive engagement,” which fosters a narrative unfolding of the field of the treatment. I suggest that the flow of enactive engagement is a contemporary mutual form of enacted free association and that Rieck is correct in saying that from my perspective psychoanalytic cure need not involve the analyst's interpretation. The mutual enactment itself can be the interpretation.     

Further Notes on Feminist Ethics and Pluralism: A Reply to Lindgren

In a comment on my paper, “Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics” (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confronta' tional rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.     

Commentary on Paper by Lawrence J. Brown

Brown's historical overview of post-Kleinian psychoanalysis traces key steps in the evolving and diverse practice of working in the psychoanalytic situation while regarding it as a two-person field. The Barangers' “The Analytic Situation as a Dynamic Field” is central to his narrative. I develop my understanding of the originality of their contribution in theorizing a situational unconscious, and of their continuing relevance for thinking about analytic listening and intersubjective collaboration. Brown presents a countertransference dream of his own along with the dream of a patient as an example of the Barangers' concept of the “shared unconscious fantasy” of the analytic couple. A detailed alternative reading of Brown's clinical vignette reveals an absence of fit with the Barangers' views on collaboration in the analytic situation. Some uses of Bion's “dreaming” and “becoming” are implicitly questioned as they risk encouraging the idealization of special states over process.     

Re-conceptualizing Self,Speaker, and Body: Applying an Enactive and Conversation Analytic Approach to Selfhood and Cognition

In this article I review significant contributions to the subfield of Embodied Cognition that formulate an inclusive account of the body's role in cognitive processes. I argue that a reconceptualization of the mind–body problem must take into account some notion of the self as a nonlocalized, transient phenomenon that emerges through day-to-day interaction. Drawing on literature from epistemology, phenomenology, and Conversation Analysis, I aim to revise contributions that rely on essentialized notions of the self and speaker, in terms of an enactive and Conversation Analytic approach to selfhood and cognition.     

Hamlet without the Prince: Shortcomings of an activity‐based account of joint attention

In this commentary, I consider several strengths of the position adopted by Racine and Carpendale (2007) , but suggest that the authors are in danger of overstating their case. In doing so, they appear to sideline an issue that should be pivotal for accounts of joint attention: how does a child come to arrive at an understanding that people, both themselves and others, have subjective perspectives upon a shared world? I conclude with few comments on the authors' criticisms of my approach to such issues.     

Embodied female experience through the lens of imagination

Abstract: In 1971, I made a film entitled Self Portrait of a Nude Model Turned Cinematographer in which I explore the objectifying ‘male’ gaze on my body in contrast to the subjective lived experience of my body. The film was a radical challenge to the gaze that objectifies woman – and thus imprisons her – which had hitherto dominated narrative cinema. Since the objectification of women has largely excluded us from the privileged phallogocentric discourses, in this paper I hope to bring into the psychoanalytic dialogue a woman's lived experience. I will approach this by exploring how remembering this film has become a personally transformative experience as I look back on it through the lens of postmodern and feminist discourses that have emerged since it was made. In addition, I will explore how this process of imaginatively looking back on an artistic creation to generate new discourses in the present is similar to the transformative process of analysis. Lastly, I will present a clinical example, where my embodied countertransference response to a patient's subjection to the objectifying male gaze opens space for a new discourse about her body to emerge.     

Nina Farhi: Leaning on an Annealed Identification: Commentary on Paper by Nina Farhi

In my response to Nina Farhi's paper, I begin my discussion with the concept of a placental space that Farhi develops to represent the psychotic's internal experience of living in a fusion with the Other. Farhi's new concept of an annealed identification provides a useful addition to the psychoanalytic literature to describe the living conditions of a psychotic who is severely entrenched in an unyielding maternal bond. Basing her conceptualizations on Milner's psychotic patient Susan, Farhi also focuses on Milner's discovery that no repressed unconscious existed for her patient Susan. I suggest in my response that Freud's nearly forgotten idea of primal repression and Lacan's idea of maternal jouissance would shed additional light onto the psychotic experience and expand Farhi's notion of an annealed identification with the maternal figure. In addition, I argue for an inclusion of the Third whose presence is so powerfully lacking in the case discussion and in the patient's life.     

I. Mathematical modeling of election predictions: Final reply to professor Aubert

Professor Aubert's ‘three‐stage rocket’ (Inquiry, Vol. 26 [1983], No. 1) has reached periodic orbit. His comments on my earlier reply to his critique of my election predictions paper simply repeat arguments I have already refuted. In this note, I limit myself largely to pointing out Professor Aubert's misconceptions of what my position actually is. I find no reasons for revising the views stated in my original election predictions paper, nor any reasons for thinking that paper violated norms of scientific method that prevail in the natural sciences.     

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing (“prediction-signal”, “error-signal”, “prior”, “likelihood”, and “posterior probability”). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the ‘representation wars’; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak’s IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

We: Commentary on Papers by Trevarthen,Ammaniti & Trentini,and Gallese

In my discussion of papers by Trevarthen, Ammaniti & Trentini, and Gallese, I situate their work within an emerging paradigm of intersubjectivity. This new model finds philosophic grounding in the work of the phenomenologists (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Nancy) as it draws from the multiple sources that come together to comprise the new field of cognitive and affective neurosciences. These papers hold the potential to make relational psychoanalysis more relational by providing new foundations for rethinking the biological, developmental and clinical. What emerges is an intersubjective theory based in motor action and perception that serves as the embodied basis for human culture and community, a shared “we” space of basic human affinity. I extend this conception into the analytic setting with a brief introduction to enactive participation in clinical process.     

Bringing it all back home: how I became a relational analyst

This paper traces the similarities between the cluster of influences that informed my own training and practice as a British developmental Jungian analyst and those that led to the creation of intersubjective and relational analysis in America. Having outlined five main themes of relational analysis, I show how these were anticipated by several trends in British analysis, especially the work of R.D. Laing and the theory of couple interaction developed by the Institute of Marital Studies at the Tavistock Centre in London. I then show the parallels between relational thinking and Jung's approach to clinical practice and discuss some of the dilemmas around the analyst's subjectivity and personal participation in the analytic relationship that are common to both traditions. My aim is to show that a relational approach to the practice of Jungian analysis is both ‘traditional’ and ‘radical’, being rooted in the traditions of the past while opening up pathways towards future development and clinical innovation.     

Bribery and Intimidation: A Discussion of Sandra Lee Bartky's Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression

A review of my undergraduate students’ commentaries on two of Bartky's essays serves as the occasion for elaborating on Bartky's analyses of factors that sustain and perpetuate the subjection and disempowerment of women. In my elaboration I draw from John Stuart Mill's statement: “In the case of women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined.” I conclude by raising the question, How is personal transformation possible?     

The Dialectics of Relational Psychoanalysis and Group Psychotherapy: Commentary on Paper by Robert Grossmark

In this commentary, I address the question of why so few psychoanalysts become group therapists as I respond to the thoughtful and impressive paper written by Robert Grossmark on his work with a psychotherapy group, now in its 10th year of meeting. Prior to discussing the clinical material, and to set the stage for a discussion of Grossmark's work, I comment on my sense of the prevailing attitudes on group affiliations and group therapy within our culture and field as they have progressed over time. I then discuss my reactions to Grossmark's handling of his group session. Many of his conceptualizations of group treatment are in accordance with my own beliefs. There are some differences, however, in how I view my role as a leader and some ideas I have about group treatment that Grossmark did not address.     

On Kant's Conception of Inner Sense: Self‐Affection by the Understanding

Among the extensive literature on the first Critique, very few commentators offer a thorough analysis of Kant's conception of inner sense. This is quite surprising since the notion is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy, and it is very difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of this notion. In this paper, I first summarize Kant's claims about inner sense in the Transcendental Aesthetic and show why existing interpretations have been unable to dissolve the tensions arising from the conjunction of these claims. Secondly, I present my own reconstruction of Kant's model of inner sense, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B‐version of the Transcendental Deduction. My main idea is that inner sense, for Kant, is a passive faculty that gets affected by the understanding performing its figurative synthesis on material given in outer sense. In the remainder of the paper, I highlight a few consequences of my interpretation and outline ways to deal with some objections.     

Aqua vitae,aqua permanens: dreaming,drowning, swimming and surfing in analysis

In response to the question ‘Who is My Jung?’, this paper describes the profound personal impact of Jung's creative / artistic approach to the unconscious, beginning with my discovery of The Red Book at the age of twelve. Echoing the flow of my own dream‐life, I trace the course of two analyses through the alchemical process of solutio, which began with numinous dreams of tidal waves and plunged us into inter‐ and intra‐psychic analytic relationships that evoked vestigial memories of our first aquatic world in utero.     

Silence and Memories of War: An Autoethnographic Exploration of Family Secrecy

A personal journey and a scientific challenge, this is an autoethnographic study about my own family's secrecy. I knew my grandfather had been a German prisoner of war during World War II. We all knew. But nobody talked about it. Then one day I decided I wanted to do systematic research on the issue of family secrecy around my grandfather's war experiences. Researching one's own family can be called autoethnography. It could be said that autoethnography is an approach to research that aims to describe and systemically analyze (graphy) personal experience (auto) to understand social and cultural phenomena (ethno). This scientific approach is quite new in the field of family therapy. This study has been an important personal quest, but it also led to important reflections on silences in families, on my own professional development, and on methodological issues concerning autoethnographical research. For one thing, it highlights some of the positive aspects of family secrecy and silences, and invites us—when confronted with family secrecy in clinical practice—to carefully consider the potential destructive and life‐giving aspects of the silence.