Differences from somewhere: the normativity of whiteness in bioethics in the United States

I argue that there has been inadequate attention to and questioning of the dominance and normativity of whiteness in the cultural construction of bioethics in the United States. Therefore we risk reproducing white privilege and white supremacy in its theory, method, and practices. To make my argument, I define whiteness and trace its broader social and legal history in the United States. I then begin to mark whiteness in U.S. bioethics, recasting Renee Fox's sociological marking of its American-ness as an important initial marking of its whiteness/WASP ethos. Furthermore, I consider the attempts of social scientists to highlight sociocultural diversity as a corrective in U.S. bioethics. I argue that because they fail to problematize white dominance and normativity and the white-other dualism when they describe the standpoints of African-American, Asian-American, and Native-American others, their work merely inoculates difference and creates or maintains minoritized spaces. Accordingly, the dominant white center of mainstream U.S. bioethics must be problematized and displaced for diversity research to make a difference. In conclusion, I give several examples of how we might advance the recommended endeavor of exploring our own ethnicity, class, and other social positioning and norms operating in U.S. bioethics, briefly highlighting "white talk" as one challenge.     

White Habits,Anti-Racism,and Philosophy as a Way of Life

This paper examines Pierre Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life in the context of race. I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intelligible how antiracist confrontation of racist ideas and institutionalized white complicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection on habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Hadot’s analysis of the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which philosophical wisdom is understood as cultivated by actions which result in the creation of wise habits. I analyze a phenomenological claim about the nature of habit implied by the “way of life” approach, namely, that habits can be both the cause and the effect of action. This point is central to the “way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the intelligent redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the context of anti-racism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff's whiteness antieliminativism, which outlines a morally defensible transformation of the habits of whiteness. I argue that anti-racism provides an intelligible context for modern day forms of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the “way of life” philosophy is embodied in the practice of whites seeing themselves seeing as white and seeing themselves being seen as white.     

How Whites Should Live in This Strange Place

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Samantha Vice is correct to claim that whites should feel shame and regret, though perhaps not guilt, at their whiteness. She is wrong, however, to suggest that there is a sense in which whites should live in silence and humility, and withdraw from public political space. In particular, I argue that this latter claim has absurd consequences, since it implies a withdrawal from non-public and non-political spaces also. Besides, whites, as complex selves, face conflicting reasons for action which Vice insufficiently grapples with. I conclude, however, that Vice is best interpreted as rightly suggesting that whites should live in careful reflective self-awareness of how their whiteness, and whiteliness, unfairly privileges them, still. This is preferable advice to Vice’s notions of silence and humility which are rightly but unnecessarily susceptible to confusion and compelling counterargument. Or so I argue.     

Metameric Whiteness and Absence of Causal Factors

Olaf Müller presents a supposedly empirically equivalent theory to Newtonian optics, which in his view is therefore threatened by underdetermination. This threat could even be expanded to modern physics, since this branch of physics is partly based on Newton’s theory. In this paper, I will show that Müller’s alternative theory contains an ill-defined concept, viz. the definition of whiteness as the absence of optical causal factors. This results from a fundamental property of whiteness: for every source of white light there exist metameric sources. I further argue that this cannot be reconciled by borrowing other concepts from modern physics, as is, I will show, tacitly presupposed in Müller’s argument. As a consequence, his alternative theory is not empirically equivalent to Newtonian optics and his argument in favour of underdetermination fails.     

Essentialising Rhetoric and Work on the Self

This paper is a response to recent student protests at South African universities, and the essentialising rhetoric and practices that characterise South African public debates. I explore the likely responses of white South Africans to views that seem to make their whiteness inescapable and necessarily morally bad.     

I Have Loved: Reply to Commentaries

In replying I explore in more depth the journey of reclaiming the lost love and the mourning of a relationship that could not be publicly or privately grieved. Disavowed love, in its melancholic haunting, compels identity. In agreement with the model of multiplicity proposed by Harris and Hill I delve further into our hybridic racialized identities. I also come to an understanding of our differences, including our experience of whiteness and our processes of racialization. Finally, I engage with the complex issues of anger and forgiveness.     

On White Ignorance,White Shame,and Other Pitfalls in Critical Philosophy of Race

This article examines Samantha Vice's essay ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’ (2010), which sparked a storm of controversy in South Africa, as a starting point for interrogating understandings of whiteness and racism that are dominant in critical philosophy of race. I argue that a significant body of philosophical scholarship on whiteness in general and by white scholars in particular obfuscates the structural dimension of racism. The moralisation of racism that often permeates philosophical scholarship reproduces colourblind logics, which provide individualistic explanations for structural problems, thereby sustaining white dominance. In the process, I show that notions of white guilt, white habits, white ignorance, white invisibility, white privilege, and white shame as they are theorised in much critical philosophy of race share a crucial limitation: they minimise white people's active interest in reproducing the racist status quo. Studies, such as Vice's, that frame racism as a moral dilemma while silencing its institutionalisation and the central cause for its existence and longevity – that is, white people's investment in maintaining economic, political, and symbolic power – further naturalise white supremacy.     

The invisibility of richness: A critique of Vice’s ‘strange place’

Abstract

This article builds on Samantha Vice’s argument on the problem of whiteness in contemporary South Africa. I will explore the thesis of invisibility regarding whiteness and argue for its relevance to the rich per se. This thesis demonstrates how white privilege and affluence, despite being glaringly visible in a concrete sense, is rendered invisible together with the mostly black poverty by which it is contrasted. The invisibility of whiteness translates and flows into the so-called ‘invisibility of richness’, which involves anyone who is economically affluent in this country and has the same effect of rendering poverty invisible. The massive and ever-growing divide between rich and poor means that both have fundamentally incommensurate experiences of life in this country, which is why post-apartheid South Africa is such a strange place to live in for all of its inhabitants. In the latter part of the article, a suggestion will be made about what the appropriate response to the injustices of this strange place might look like for whites.     

PSYCHOPHYSICAL INVARIANTS OF ACHROMATIC COLOUR VISION: I. The multidimensionality of achromatic colour experience

L ie . I. Psychophysical invariants of achromatic colour vision. I. The multi-dimensionality of achromatic colour experience. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1969, 10, 167–175.—The literature relevant to the question of multidimensionality of achromatic colour is briefly reviewed. An experiment confirms that the achromatic scale is bidimensional, and indicates that the dimension of brightness is a direct function of the luminance of the local area inspected, while the dimension of whiteness is a direct function of luminance relations of adjacent areas in the visual field.     

The response criterion,the stimulus configuration,and the relationship between brightness contrast and brightness constancy

Four experiments were designed to investigate the nature of the relationship between brightness contrast and brightness constancy while controlling the response criterion, the area of the surround, the stimulus configuration, and the mode of appearance of the modulus target. Ten Os in each of the four experiments estimated the apparent whiteness or brightness of targets with different contrast ratios. All targets were viewed at several illumination levels. Most constancy (whiteness and brightness) functions displayed shallow slopes that reflected a good approximation to constancy. The functions within Experiments I, III, and IV were vertically displaced and parallel; those in Experiment II were vertically displaced and increased in slope. This suggests that decreasing the contrast ratio had no effect on the tendency towards constancy when the area of the surround was greater than that of the target but resulted in a decrease in constancy when the area of the surround was equal to that of the target.     

DEPTH ADJACENCY AND WHITENESS CONTRAST

LIE, I. Depth adjacency and whiteness contrast. A reply to Mershon. Scand. J. Psychol. , 1971, 12, 303–304.–Further examination of diverging results regarding the effects of depth separation on contrast, leads to the conclusion that the experiment of Gogel & Mershon should be repeated, employing the traditional matching procedure for assessment of contrast.     

Whiteness Revisited: Reply to Commentary

In reply to Altman's discussion, the author explores in more depth the topic of whiteness, both her South African and American whiteness. She situates American whiteness in the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and the ongoing racial discrimination of the present. When Altman points to the author's unconscious submission to the regulatory power of the larger society, she postulates that her submission is to American whiteness. She notes that, in finding a new home, that which she wished to discard—a white racist identity synonymous with the oppressor—has reappeared, to be confronted once again.     

The Revenge of the Gay Nihilist

Bodies and Pleasures has been characterized as a confessional discourse that manages to subvert confessional practice. Here it is characterized and discussed as an askesis that works to transform confessional practice as it transforms the writer/reader. Two questions emerge through that transformation: (I) How is race (in particular, whiteness) to be lived? (2) What are the possibilities for political subjectivity in the absence of dualism and the intensification of awareness of our normalization?     

Antiracist Moral Identities,or Iris Murdoch in South Africa

Abstract

I argue that Samantha Vice understates the moral resources white people have available to them to minimize their falling into distorted ways of perceiving and responding to the world caused by bare white advantage. In doing so, she paints an unjustifiably pessimistic picture of white civic involvement in South Africa, and anywhere where white people are unjustly advantaged, such as the United States. I delineate two similar but distinct antiracist moral identities—the ‘white ally’ and the ‘person committed to racial justice’—that can guide civic engagement, as well as provide a counterweight to the distortions of whiteness. I argue that Vice’s recommendation of withdrawal from public engagement in humble silence is not the most morally appropriate response to white privilege.     

Shame and Silence

Abstract

Samantha Vice’s proposal on how to live in ‘this strange place’ of contemporary South Africa, includes an appeal to the concepts of shame and silence. In this paper, I use Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben to move the discussion of shame from a moral to an existential question. The issue is not about how one should feel, but about the kind of self that whiteness in South Africa makes possible today. Shame desubjectifies. Vice’s recommendation of silence is then taken as witnessing/listening, which I argue grounds the possibility of a recovery of the self.     

Calling a Thing What It Is: A Lutheran Approach to Whiteness

The July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman in killing of African American teenager Trayvon Martin and the aftermath demonstrated that America is not yet cured from “the cancer of whiteness” that infects the heart of American Christianity. This article interrogates “whiteness” as a pressing American and religious issue. It looks to Martin Luther's theology of the cross as a way to both expose the sinfulness of whiteness and to offer a framework for dislodging it.     

Basements and Intersections

In this paper, I revisit Kimberlé Crenshaw's argument in “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” (1989) to recover a companion metaphor that has been largely forgotten in the “mainstreaming” of intersectionality in (white‐dominated) feminist theory. In addition to the now‐famous intersection metaphor, Crenshaw offers the basement metaphor to show how—by privileging monistic, mutually exclusive, and analogically constituted categories of “race” and “sex” tethered, respectively, to masculinity and whiteness—antidiscrimination law functions to reproduce social hierarchy, rather than to remedy it, denying Black women plaintiffs legal redress. I argue that in leaving the basement behind, deployments of “intersectionality” that deracinate the concept from its origins in Black feminist thought also occlude Crenshaw's account of the socio‐legal reproduction of hierarchical power.     

Whiteness constancy: Inference or insensitivity?

Two general viewpoints were advanced as explanations of whiteness constancy: (a) an inferential process, in which noise illuminance variation) is suppressed, and (b) an insensitivity hypothesis, in which Os show an insensitivity to illuminance variation in well-articulated fields. Category judgments of illuminance and albedo variation were given by three Os to either unpatterned (isolated surface) or patterned (two surfaces, one of which was constant in albedo) stimuli. Judgments of the patterned stimuli differed from judgments of the unpatterned stimuli in that Os showed increased sensitivity to real albedo variation (whiteness constancy) and a corresponding decreased sensitivity to real illuminance variation, allowing the interpretation that stimulus conditions producing whiteness constancy are also those producing insensitivity to illuminance variation.     

Slavery in the White Psyche

This article was born out of the hypothesis that slavery—as historical reality, signifier, and symbol—has deep psychological implications for contemporary white Americans. Using data collected in an exploratory, qualitative study, my participants’ responses serve to illuminate the psychic structure of whiteness, which functions as a distortion that gets passed down intergenerationally (and horizontally) through a white collective unconscious. Housed in individual psyches, I suggest that this distorted structure of self actively resists and prevents white Americans (as a collective) from making contact with the racialized realities, both past and present, that would potentially lead to opportunities for choice, reparation, and transformation.     

Depth adjacency in simultaneous contrast

The Gelb phenomenon, as an example of whiteness contrast, was investigated with three amounts of separation in depth between the test and induction disc. The cue of binocular disparity was used to vary the perceived depth between the discs. It was found that the magnitude of the contrast effect decreased with an increase in the perceived depth between the two discs. This change was regarded as an instance of the adjacency principle. The problem of whether the binocular disparity cue per se or perceived depth was the significant variable was discussed. The consequences of the results were considered with respect to the relation between whiteness constancy and whiteness contrast and the problem of neural localization of the contrast effect.