Criticism in Need of Clarification

It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for being critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism?     

The Virtuous Arguer: One Person,Four Roles

When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situation: what seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well be called a vice in another. This paper will present the idea that there are in fact two sets of virtues an arguer has to master—and with them four sometimes very different roles.     

The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play.

     

Pragmatic Inconsistency and Credibility

A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsistent propositions. If so, any such charge seems to be irrelevant. The questions to be answered in this essay are: what, if any, is the dialectical rationale for this type of criticism, and in what situations, if any, is this kind of charge dialectically legitimate? It will be shown that these attacks can be dialectically legitimate, in special circumstances, and that they can be seen as strategic?manoeuvres where a party attempts to reconcile his dialectical and his rhetorical objectives.     

Open-Mindedness as a Critical Virtue

This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of how open-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can be eased or resolved by clarifying the nature of open-mindedness and by construing open-mindedness in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for making open-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical virtue.     

The control of alcohol-related aggression: Redirecting the inebriate's attention to socially appropriate conduct

Forty male undergraduates ingested either a high dose of alcohol or a placebo, and were either provided with a nonaggressive norm or not, prior to being provoked by an opponent during a competitive reaction time task. Aggression was assessed by the intensity of shocks administered by the subject to the bogus opponent. Results suggest that the provision of an explicit nonaggressive norm enabled highly intoxicated subjects to moderate their aggressive responding even in a highly competitive situation. These findings are discussed in terms of current cognitive disruption models of alcohol-related aggression which assume intoxicated persons are unable to process information concerning appropriate standards of conduct.     

Effects of norms and norm-violations on inhibition and instigation of aggression

It was hypothesized that in a competitive interaction in which an opponent first used threats and fines a) subjects would use the highest level of coercion that could be justified by the available norms, b) subjects would be inhibited by a norm that justified using only low levels of coercion, but c) when the opponent used a magnitude of coercion which exceeded the norm, subjects would also violate the norm and retaliate with an equally high magnitude of coercion, and d) subjects would use the maximum levels of coercion when engaging in a competitive game without norms. These hypotheses were examined in a 3 × 2 factorial experiment in which the amount of coercion allowable by a norm (Low Norm, High Norm, and No Information) and the level of coercion (Low or High) were manipulated. As predicted, aggressive reactions by subjects were inhibited when the provoker conformed to a low norm by using a low level of coercion. On the other hand, subjects retaliated by using a high level of coercion when the level of coercion used by a provoker violated the norm. Subjects who could justify their behavior by the availability of a high punitive norm tended to use all of the coercive power available to them even when the provoker used a low level of coercion. © 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Attacker's intent and awareness of outcome,impression management,and retaliation

Female Japanese students who were engaged in a calculation task were given electric shocks by a female opponent. The subjects were informed that the opponent had an intent to shock them either severely or mildly. In addition, the opponent's awareness of the outcome of attack was independently manipulated: (1) the subjects received shocks whose intensity corresponded to the opponent's intent, (2) the subjects received shocks whose intensity was inversely proportional to the intensity intended by the opponent and were informed that the opponent did not know about it, or (3) the subjects received reversed shocks as in condition (2), but were further informed that the opponent was well aware of it. An ANOVA of the measure of retaliation in terms of the intensity of shocks delivered to the opponent indicated that (1) the subjects showed more aggression of greater intensity against an opponent who apparently had an aggressive intent than the one who did not, regardless of the actual level of shock intensity; (2) when the severe attack failed, the subjects lowered aggression when the opponent was apparently aware of it as opposed to when she was not; and (3) when the subjects received severe shocks accidentally, they increased aggression when the opponent was apparently aware of it compared to when she was not. These results led us to interpret retaliation as being mediated both by the attribution of intent to the attacker and by self-presentation to the attacker and the experimenter.     

Are Fallacies Vices?

Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice(s). Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if there is some sense of argumentation where an argument is (1) truth-propagating and not (2) put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be the vicious element in arguments that undermines (1), most often because the arguer’s goal is only (2). From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character.     

Wavelength Theory of Colour Strikes Back: The Return of the Physical

There have been a number of criticisms, based on visual processes, of the Australian view that colour is an objective property of the world. These criticisms have led to subjective theories about colour. These visual processes (metamers, retinex theory, opponent processes, simultaneous contrast, colour constancy, subjective colours) have been examined and it is suggested that they do not carry their supposed critical weight against an objective theory. In particular, it is argued that metamers don't occur in nature and primate colour vision evolved without metamers. Thus normal colour vision occurs without the problem of metamers. This argument, in conjunction with evidence against the critical roles of opponent processes and retinex theory in colour vision, is taken to suggest that colour can be given a photon energy/wavelengthrealism explanation. This proposal allows an account of the many microstructural bases of colour generation put forward by Nassau (1983). It is argued that neither disjunctive realism or reflectance realism are adequate objective explanations of colour.     

Attributions and organizational conflict: The mediating role of apparent sincerity

When individuals behave in a provocative, conflict-inducing manner, they often attribute such actions to external causes (e.g., “I'm only following orders”). It was hypothesized that when such statements are perceived as accurate (sincere), they will mitigate negative reactions and reduce subsequent conflict. However, when they are viewed as inaccurate (insincere), opposite effects will result. It was also hyothesized that the impact of such attributional sincerity is greater in the context of high than low pressure to reach an agreement. In Study 1, male and female subjects negotiated with an accomplice who behaved in a conflict-inducing manner and who attributed such actions, either accurately or falsely, to external causes. These negotiations occurred under either high or low pressure to reach an agreement. Results offered support for both hypotheses. Under high but not low pressure to reach agreement, subjects rated the accomplice as less honest and reported stronger preferences for handing future conflicts with him in nonconciliatory ways (e.g., through avoidance or competition) when this person's attributional statements appeared to be false than when they appeared to be accurate. Surprisingly, however, subjects actually made more and larger concessions to an attributionally insincere than attributionally sincere opponent under both pressure conditions. In Study 2, officers of an urban fire department reported on how they would react to conflict with another member of their department under conditions where this person's provocative behavior stemmed from various causes. Results agreed closely with those of the laboratory study. Subjects reported the most negative reactions under conditions where their opponent falsely attributed his conflict-inducing actions to external causes.     

The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts

This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and second that when an arguer is in fact trying to induce an effect above and beyond rendering a reason manifest, the effect intended—the use to which his or her argument is put—need not be that hearers “do” what the stated reasons are reasons for “doing.” Where the actual or intended effect of making a reason R for “doing X” manifest is something other than “doing X,” I call it an oblique—as opposed to a direct—effect of making that reason manifest. The core of the paper presents an overview or map of the main categories of effect which arguments can have, and the main sub-types within each category, calling attention to the points at which such effects can be indirect or oblique effects. The purpose of that typology is to make it clear (i) how oblique effects can come about and (ii) how important a role they can play in the conduct of argumentation.     

The effects of hormones,Type A behavior pattern,and provocation on aggression in men

Thirty-eight male college students, classified as either Type A or Type B based on their Jenkins Activity Survey (JAS-T) scores, competed in a reaction time task that allowed them to administer shocks to an increasingly provocative fictitious opponent. Salivary testosterone and cortisol were measured both prior to and after the task. Aggression was defined as the level of shock the subject was willing to set for the opponent. The results of this study indicate that a relationship exists between endogenous testosterone levels in men and direct physical aggression. Some evidence for the moderating effects of hormones on the level of aggression expressed by Type As was observed. No direct relationship between Type A and aggression was found.     

Physical aggression: Effects of ethnicity of target and directionality of aggression

Physical aggression of members of a powerful majority ethnic group against an opponent either from a powerless and discriminated against minority or from their own group was tested as a function of aggression directionality and aggressor's attitudes. It was hypothesized that under bidirectional aggression where the opponent could aggress as well, members of the powerful majority group would adjust their aggressive responses to that of their opponent's regardless of his ethnic origin and regardless of aggressor's attitudes. However. under unidirectional aggression where the opponent was powerless, it was expected that those subjects who held unfavourable attitudes toward members of the minority group would be more aggressive against an opponent of that group than against an opponent of his own ethnic group. Subjects who had neutral attitudes would be equally aggressive toward all opponents. Ninety-six 11th grade vocational high school male students of Western origin, were given the opportunity to administer electric shocks to an opponent who was either of Western or Oriental origin in a competitive situation, Subjects were selected according to their attitudes toward Oriental Jews. Half expressed negative attitudes, the other half neutral attitudes. Half of the subjects expected their opponent to reciprocate shocks, the others did not. Contrary to expectations it was found that the attitudes of subjects of Western origin towards Orientals did not effect their aggressive behaviour. When aggression could not be reciprocated, all subjects were more aggressive toward an opponent of Oriental than of Western origin. The findings showed that when aggression was bidirectional, all subjects adjusted their aggressive behaviour, to their opponents'. However, they were less aggressive towards an opponent of Oriental than of Western origin.     

The Ways of Criticism

This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal to some kind of norm, argumentative or other. Third, they each have a particular illocutionary force, which may include that of giving strategic advice to the other. Fourth, a critical reaction occurs at a particular level of dialogue (the ground level or some meta-level). The concepts here developed shall be applied to discussions of critical reactions by Aristotle and by some contemporary authors.     

Ad Hominem Fallacies, Bias, and Testimony

An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized.     

Audience perceptions of candidates' appropriateness as a function of nonverbal behaviors displayed during televised political debates

Compared to televised debates using a single-screen format, such debates using a split screen presenting both debaters simultaneously show viewers the nonverbal reactions of each debater's opponent. The authors examined how appropriate or inappropriate such nonverbal behaviors are perceived to be. Students watched one of four versions of a televised debate. One version used a single-screen format, showing only the speaker, whereas the other three versions used a split-screen format in which the speaker's oppodent displayed constant, occasional, or no nonverbal disagreement with the speaker. Students then rated the debaters' appropriateness. Analysis indicated that the opponent was perceived to be less appropriate when he displayed any background disagreement compared to when he did not. The students perceived the speaker as most appropriate when his opponent displayed constant nonverbal disagreement.     

The opponent process theory and affective reactions

Solomon (1980) proposed an opponent process theory to account for motivational and affective dynamics. This theory asserts that the brain avoids extremes of emotional experience by countering the stimulation it receives with an opposite or opponent reaction. Opponent processes are thought to be responsible for the characteristic changes in affective experience that occur over time, and to account for the dynamics of affective response to such stimuli as skydiving and sauna bathing, which have heretofore been difficult to explain. However, the relevance of this theory for affective experiences in general (beyond physical stimuli and addictions) has yet to be demonstrated. The present paper examines opponent process theory predictions in two settings, involving affective responses to situation-scenarios and emotion-provoking slides. In each study, significant habituation to both positive and negative affective stimuli was found, as the opponent process theory would predict. Subjects also showed a reversal of affect when the stimuli were reversed from positive to negative or vice versa. However, contrary to opponent process theory predictions, there was no evidence that withdrawal responses were greater after habituation to the affective stimulus. The only instance of a significant difference in withdrawal responses was actually in a direction opposite to that which the opponent process theory predicts. All other predicted differences were not significant. The opponent process theory, therefore, was not supported in these data and appears to need revision or qualification as to its domains of application.     

The effects of verbal and behavioral noncompliance on third party instigation of aggression

Females, assigned to one of four conditions defined in terms of a confederate's behavior, suggested which shock intensity the confederate ought to set for an opponent during a reaction time competition, should the opponent lose the trial (had slower reaction time). Confederates either verbally complied or disagreed with suggestions to set high shock, while either actually setting the intensity suggested or setting a lower intensity. Over trials, the opponent became increasingly provocative. Results revealed the main effects and interaction of confederate's verbal and actual behaviors, as well as provocativeness of the opponent, significantly influenced the level of shock subjects suggested. Subjects with verbally and behaviorally compliant confederates suggested more intense shock than subjects who encountered any noncompliance.     

Homophobia and physical aggression toward homosexual and heterosexual individuals

This study examined the relationship between homophobia (defined as self-reported negative affect, avoidance, and aggression toward homosexuals) and homosexual aggression. Self-identified heterosexual college men were assigned to homophobic (n = 26) and nonhomophobic (n = 26) groups on the basis of their scores on the Homophobia Scale (HS; L. W. Wright, H. E. Adams, & J. A. Bernat, 1999). Physical aggression was examined by having participants administer shocks to a fictitious opponent during a competitive reaction time (RT) task under the impression that the study was examining the relationship between sexually explicit material and RT. Participants were exposed to a male homosexual erotic videotape, their affective reactions were assessed, and they then competed in the RT task against either a heterosexual or a homosexual opponent. The homophobic group reported significantly more negative affect, anxiety, and anger-hostility after watching the homosexual erotic videotape than did the nonhomophobic group. Additionally, the homophobic group was significantly more aggressive toward the homosexual opponent, but the groups did not differ in aggression toward the heterosexual opponent.