Burden of Proof Rules in Social Criticism

The article discusses burden of proof rules in social criticism. By social criticism I mean an argumentative situation in which an opponent publicly argues against certain social practices; the examples I consider are discrimination on the basis of species and discrimination on the basis of one's nationality. I argue that burden of proof rules assumed by those who defend discrimination are somewhat dubious. In social criticism, there are no shared values which would uncontroversially determine what is the reasonable presumption and who has the burden of proof, nor are there formal rules which would end the debate and determine the winner at a specific point.     

The Nurturing Stance: Making Sense of Responsibility without Blame

Mental health‐care clinicians report that they hold patients responsible for morally objectionable behaviour but at the same time consider blaming attitudes to be inappropriate. These practices present a conundrum for all Strawsonian theories of responsibility. In response to this conundrum, Pickard has proposed severing the Strawsonian connection between being responsible and being an appropriate target of blaming attitudes. In this article I will argue that her solution fails to explain the practices at stake and provide an alternative solution that uncovers an under‐theorized stance we take towards those whose abilities are underdeveloped or compromised.     

Attributions and Race Are Critical: Perceived Criticism in a Sample of African American and White Community Participants

The current investigation had two principal goals: (a) to examine whether attributions regarding the intentions underlying criticism from one’s relative predict perceived criticism from that relative and (b) to explore differences between African Americans and Whites in attributions and perceived criticism. A new measure, the Attributions of Criticism Scale, was employed in the present study to assess attributions of perceived criticism. Results showed that the attributions scale demonstrated good psychometric properties in a sample of African American (n = 78) and White (n = 165) community participants. As hypothesized, attributions were correlated with perceptions of criticism. When racial differences in attributions and perceived criticism were explored, results showed that African Americans made more positive attributions but also perceived more destructive criticism than Whites. No racial differences were observed on overall and constructive criticism, but there was some evidence to suggest that African Americans made more negative attributions than Whites. However, these results were inconsistent across recruitment method. Taken together, these findings suggest that positive and negative attributions are important factors in the perception of criticism and that mean levels of attributions and perceived criticism may differ by race. Possible explanations for effects as well as clinical implications and directions for future research are considered.     

《创世记》1-3章之历史批评法回眸

历史批评法研究《创世记》1-3章,通常以来源批评法、形式批评法、传统-历史批评法,以及编辑批评法等组成。这些方法之间,没有绝然的分野和对立。历史批评法诠释《创世记》1-3章,为读者揭示了两个创造故事。本文批判地回顾了学者对两个创造故事的来源、所使用的场景、传递的过程,以及编修的痕迹等方面的研究,认为尽管历史批评法受到许多质疑和挑战,但它仍然是研究希伯来圣经的基础方法。     

Ecofeminist Literary Criticism: Reading The Orange

Ecofeminism, a new vein in feminist theory, critiques the ontology of domination, whereby living beings are reduced to the status of objects, which diminishes their moral significance, enabling their exploitation, abuse, and destruction. This article explores the possibility of an ecofeminist literary and cultural practice, whereby the text is not reduced to an “it” but rather recognized as a “thou,” and where new modes of relationship—dialogue, conversation, and meditative attentiveness—are developed.     

The Ways of Criticism

This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal to some kind of norm, argumentative or other. Third, they each have a particular illocutionary force, which may include that of giving strategic advice to the other. Fourth, a critical reaction occurs at a particular level of dialogue (the ground level or some meta-level). The concepts here developed shall be applied to discussions of critical reactions by Aristotle and by some contemporary authors.     

The Nonconscious Nature of Power: Cues and Consequences

Power – asymmetric control over valued resources – is a fundamental dimension of social relations. Classical conceptualizations of power emphasize its conscious nature. In this review, we reveal how power often operates nonconsciously and identify the different methods and paradigms used to activate or create a psychological sense of power outside of conscious awareness. First, we establish that cues of power are often attended to nonconsciously, which explains why people can be so accurate at determining their own and others’ level of power yet so inaccurate at identifying the specific cues diagnostic of possessing power. Second, we discuss how people are often unaware of how the possession of power fundamentally alters basic psychological and behavioral tendencies and describe the range of methodologies – roles, cues, episodic recall, conceptual priming – used to identify the nonconscious effects of power. Power produces two broad types of effects: It increases abstraction in thought and approach in behavior, both of which make individuals more focused on their own goals and internal states. Like other psychological constructs and processes, even ones that are inherently social and relational, power’s cues and consequences do not have to be conscious for its profound influence on basic psychological and interpersonal processes to emerge. We discuss the implications of the nonconscious nature of power for limiting the corrupting, dark side often revealed among the powerful.     

The Burden of Dementia: A Medical and Research Perspective

Alzheimer's disease remains the most common form of dementia. Dementia symptoms vary depending on individual personality, life experience, and social and cultural influences. As dementia progresses, involvement of multi-disciplinary health care professionals is needed to manage the disease. Alzheimer research is progressing rapidly. While 5% of all Alzheimer's disease may be genetically determined, the majority is not. Susceptibility genes can reveal the risk of contracting Alzheimer's disease. Early life risk factors such as education, nutrition, and vascular disease may increase the likelihood of dementia in later life. In the United States, two acetylcholinesterase inhibitors have been approved as cognitive enhancers. Possible prevention and symptomatic treatment interventions have focused on estrogen replacement therapy, antioxidants, and anti-inflammatory medications. Research advances have improved the clinical management of dementia. Ethical implications to the patient, family, and society are multiple and remain challenging.     

Society Against Societies: The Possibility of Transcultural Criticism

This paper argues against particularism about social criticism of the form presented by Walzer. I contend that while limitation of the scope of criticism depends on the existence of our shared meanings, which are not shared by them, shared meaning itself depends on society. So, an account of society showing that societies are not discrete and mutually inaccessible refutes particularism. I argue for such an account. I deal with the objection that the focus of particularism is culture, not society, and conclude that the conditions of possibility of shared meaning have anti-particularist consequences. This paper draws on Samuel Clark, Living Without Domination: The Possibility of an Anarchist Utopia (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 2007), chapter 2. I would like to thank Gideon Calder, and two anonymous referees for Res Publica, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

The Beyond Must Also be Useful: The Burden of Alternative Approaches

Advocates of many different approaches have, for years, attempted to usurp cognitive psychology’s dominance in the field of psychology. Unfortunately, none of these approaches have yet made a convincing case that they could take cognitive psychology’s place. Because of its explicit use of the mind-as-computer model, cognitivism gains a false sense of concreteness, and becomes pragmatically useful. Because their models are implicit, alternatives, such as phenomenology, gain a false sense of ambiguity and lose their pragmatic potential. In addition, alternative theories often alienate potential sympathizers through unnecessarily harsh criticism. This leads to a professional attitude in which one must take sides, rather than an attitude that appreciates the benefits of diversity, and may lead to the emergence of other beneficial models. If alternative approaches, such as Dr. Flores-González’s (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Sciences, 2008), could push through to the point of immediate usefulness, and present themselves in a less adversarial way, they would be much better placed make meaningful contributions.

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Law Enforcement Officers: The Consequences of Exposure to Violence

Law enforcement officers are exposed to victims of violence, are themselves victims of violence, and, at times, use violence against offenders. The authors discuss methods that officers have developed for handling violent situations and explore some of the effects this exposure to violence has on both their mental and physical health. Suggestions are developed for counselors working with law enforcement personnel and others who need to cope with the direct and indirect effects of violence.     

The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism

A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to ensure that the relevant counterfactuals, while not true, are still assertible. I argue that regardless of which of these two strategies we choose, the natural ways of implementing these strategies all share a surprising consequence: they commit us to a particular metaphysical view about chance.