Infinite Responsibility in the Bedpan: Response Ethics,Care Ethics,and the Phenomenology of Dependency Work

Because Levinas understands ethical response as a response to the radical alterity of the other, he contrasts it with justice, for which alterity becomes a question of equality. Drawing upon the practice of dependency work and the insights of feminist care ethics, I argue that the opposition between responding to another's singularity and leveling it via parity‐based principles is belied in the experience of care. Through a hermeneutic phenomenology of caring for my post‐stroke grandfather, I develop an account of dependency work as a material dialectic of embodied response involving moments of leveling, attention, and interruption. Contra much of response ethics’ and care ethics’ respective literatures, this dialectic suggests that they complement each other in ways that productively illuminate themes of each. I conclude by suggesting that when response and care ethics are thought together through the experience of dependency work, such labors produce finite responsibility with infinite hope.     

Managed Care,Ethics, and Counseling

In this article, the author addresses issues of managed care and ethics and how they relate to counseling. Specifically, a recent article published in The Counseling Psychologist (C. C. Cooper & M. C. Gottlieb, 2000) is reviewed. Implications for counselors and counselor educators are then explored.     

Graphic Somatography: Life Writing,Comics, and the Ethics of Care

This essay considers the ways in which graphic caregiving memoirs complicate the idealizing tendencies of ethics of care philosophy. The medium’s “capacious” layering of words, images, temporalities, and perspectives produces “productive tensions. . . The words and images entwine, but never synthesize” (Chute 2010, 5). In graphic memoirs about care, this “capaciousness” allows for quick oscillation between the rewards and struggles of care work, representing ambiguous, even ambivalent attitudes toward care. Graphic memoirs effectively represent multiple perspectives without synthesis, part of a structural and thematic ambivalence that provides a provocative counterpart to the abstract idealism of ethics of care philosophy.     

Health Care Ethics Consultation: 'Training in Virtue'

In philosophy, intelligence is less important than character, or so Wittgenstein once argued. In this paper, in a similar vein, I suggest that in health care ethics consultation character is of preeminent importance. I suggest that the activity of ethics consultation can be understood as "training in virtue," and what distinguishes the good health care ethics consultant from his/her average colleague are differences in traits of character. The underlying assumption is that one's use of knowledge and abilities are ultimately a function of who one is and how one perceives and confronts situations of moral uncertainty and conflict. In discussing the original case presented by Mark Bliton, I focus on the virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, compassion and humility.     

军事医学伦理中的友谊、群体和关怀

医学伦理禁止医务人员将患者划分等级.然而,在军事中,特别是战争境遇下,由于医疗资源匮乏,其医学伦理却要求首先救助同胞士兵.社群主义者、关怀伦理提出了针对同盟者、朋友和家人的特殊责任:在小群体成员有医疗关怀需求时,不管谁的伤势更重,道德都会要求优先治疗同胞士兵,而后才是同盟或敌方士兵.     

Commitment and Partialism in the Ethics of Care

It is plausible to think that practices of caring are partly constituted by a caregiver's commitment to a cared‐for. However, discussions of caring often contain no explicit discussion of such commitments, and do not attempt to draw any philosophical conclusions from the nature of caring relations as committed. A discussion of caring practices that emphasizes the importance of commitment therefore has the potential to generate important new insights for our understanding of caring. This essay begins that project by arguing that a commitment‐centric conception of caring entails the truth of moral partialism. Although many care‐ethicists are sympathetic to partialism, the arguments in its defense remain controversial. As I show in this article, however, partialism is necessarily true given the committed nature of caring. This is because the concept of commitment is itself a necessarily partial one: to say that we are equally committed to everyone or everything is equivalent to saying that we are not committed to anything. Thus, when viewed as a species of commitment, it is part of the concept of caring that it requires us to put the needs of those we care for before the needs of those unknown to us.     

Supererogation in an Ethics of Care

Most philosophers who advance an ethics of care do not claim that their theories are meant to account for all of morality, or that they can, or should, replace the traditional Western philosophical approaches to moral theory. However, one care ethicist, Michael Slote, holds that his theory can be used to understand all of individual and political morality. Moreover, while Kantianism, utilitarianism, and both ancient and contemporary Aristotelian ethics are all uncomfortable with supererogation and are typically committed to assumptions that rule out the possibility of someone acting beyond the call of duty, Slote claims that the way in which his theory accommodates supererogation constitutes a real advantage over other approaches to ethics. My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the truth of this claim by showing that Slote’s theory has considerable difficulty accommodating supererogation.     

Foster Care Youth Share Stories of Trauma Before,During, and After Placement: Youth Voices for Building Trauma-Informed Systems of Care

Many research studies address child trauma experiences that take place before foster care placement. However, few studies focus on the types and patterns of trauma experiences that reportedly take place during and after foster care placement; that is, after entry into adult living. This study examined the testimony of 43 foster care youth who spoke to a listening panel comprised of state legislators, child welfare professionals, and university educators. Qualitative analyses of transcribed text data revealed 3 main themes. First, the youth reported experiencing trauma before, during, and after placement. Second, the youth described trauma events and situations that were chronic (i.e., intense, composite, or cumulative). Third, youth offered suggestions for reducing traumatic experiences for foster care youth. They recommended earlier family interventions, access to people who listen and care, improved parenting skills for foster parents, continuity of relationships, and opportunities for leadership for foster youth. Foster youth voices offer important suggestions for building, strengthening, and evaluating trauma-informed systems of care.     

Rehabilitating Self-Sacrifice: Care Ethics and the Politics of Resistance

ABSTRACT

How should feminists view acts of self-sacrifice performed by women? According to a long-standing critique of care ethics such acts ought to be viewed with scepticism. Care ethics, it is claimed, celebrates acts of self-sacrifice on the part of carers and in doing so encourages women to choose caring for others over their own self-development. In doing so, care ethics frustrates attempts to liberate women from the oppression of patriarchy. Care ethicists have responded to this critique by noting limits on the level, form, or scope of self-sacrifice that work to restrict its role in their theories. While we do not here take issue with the initial feminist critiques of self-sacrifice, we suspect that the strategies offered by Care ethicists in response are importantly flawed. Specifically, these responses undervalue the positive roles that self-sacrifice can play in fighting patriarchal oppression. As a result, in attempting to restrict an oppressive norm, these responses risk foreclosing on valuable means of resistance. Our aim is to explore these positive roles for self-sacrifice and thereby rehabilitate its standing with feminists.