意识思维和无意识思维对复杂决策的影响

以大学生为被试,以汽车作为实验材料,通过对12条汽车属性信息的操纵,设置出四款优差不同的汽车。通过对汽车的优差选择,探察在属性信息逐条呈现的情况下,有意识思维与无意识思维对复杂决策的影响。研究结果表明:在反应时上,无意识思维下的决策时间要比有意识思维下的决策时间长;在选择的正确率上,有意识思维决策的结果要优于无意识思维决策的结果;在信息回忆量上,有意识思维决策的回忆量要多于无意识思维决策的回忆量,这与无意识思维理论是相违背的。     

运动决策中的无意识思维研究

本研究以81名篮球专业的大学生为被试,通过决策篮球视频,考察运动决策中的无意识思维效应。实验1探讨了不同运动决策信息下的无意识思维决策差异,发现呈现直觉性决策信息时,无意识思维组的决策效果好于意识思维组。实验2在无意识思维阶段通过启动被试的加工方式,考察直觉性决策信息下,启动不同的加工方式对运动决策的无意识思维效应的影响,发现整体加工组的无意识思维决策效果最佳。研究结果表明,直觉性决策信息下,启动被试的整体加工方式,其无意识思维的决策效果会有所提升。     

无意识思维:理论、质疑与回应

Dijksterhuis等人发现在解决复杂问题时,无意识思维的加工结果优于有意识思维,并据此提出了无意识思维理论。本文介绍了支持无意识思维理论的基本实验证据,质疑无意识思维的相关研究及对质疑的回应研究。未来研究应重点关注改进无意识思维研究范式和寻找更多影响无意识思维效应的中介变量,无意识思维加工结果如何上升到有意识层面,无意识思维的加工方式以及其在真实和高风险任务情境中的应用。     

得失不对称：跨期选择中自我-他人决策差异

采用跨期选择任务范式,考察得失情境下自我–他人决策差异。结果发现：（1）为自己决策比为他人决策更偏好于选择即刻选项;（2）损失情境比获益情境下更偏好于选择即刻选项;（3）获益情境下为自己决策与为他人决策在选择即刻选项上不存在显著差异,而损失情境下为自己决策比为他人决策更偏好于选择即刻选项,表明得失情境下自我–他人决策差异存在不对称性。     

心理距离与决策者角色对风险决策的影响

采用改编的I0S量表测量自我与他人的心理距离,在收益和损失情境下,综合探讨了为他人和预测他人决策时心理距离对个体风险偏好的影响.结果发现:(1)与他人心理距离越远,个体决策时越偏好风险,且反应时越短;(2)个体预测他人决策时比为他人决策时更偏好风险,但两者反应时没有显著差异;(3)心理距离与决策者角色存在交互作用,即预测时个体认为远心理距离他人比近心理距离他人更冒险,而为他人决策时两者差异消失;(4)决策角色与决策框架、心理距离与决策框架存在交互作用:在收益框架下,自我他人心理距离较远时个体更偏好风险,且个体预测比为他人决策时更冒险,损失条件下无差异.依据相关理论对这些结果进行了分析讨论.     

异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策的风险偏好

使用中国文化背景下修订的Beisswanger等人的异性交友决策问卷, 采用2种方法操纵自我-他人心理距离, 考察了男女大学生在后果严重性不同的异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策风险偏好的差异。实验1发现, 被试为具体和笼统他人决策时的风险偏好无显著差异, 在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。心理距离与决策者性别的交互作用显著：男性为具体他人决策更冒险, 而女性为笼统他人决策更冒险。实验2发现, 被试为不相似他人比为相似他人决策更冒险, 在后果不严重任务上比在后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。后果严重性与决策者性别交互作用显著：男性在后果严重和不严重任务上的风险偏好无显著差异, 而女性在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险。综合两个实验的结果, 可以得出以下结论：相对于具体和笼统他人的区分而言, 相似和不相似他人的区分是一种更加稳定和有效的区分自我-他人心理距离的方法。结合相关研究及理论对结果进行了讨论。     

无意识思维结果浮现的时间目标依赖性

为探讨个体复杂决策过程中无意识思维结果浮现的计划性,考察了四组大学生被试（共101名）在“知觉不同分心时间”条件下的复杂决策。结果发现：（1）“告知分心3分钟,实际分心3分钟组（知3实3）”成绩显著优于“不知分心时间组”和“知5实3组”,但与“知3实5组”之间无显著差异,显示无意识思维结果浮现具有计划性;（2）“知3实5组”成绩显著优于“知5实3组”,与“不知分心时间组”为边缘显著,显示无意识思维结果浮现具有可延迟性;（3）“知5实3组”与“不知分心时间组”成绩之间无显著差异,显示无意识思维结果浮现具有精确的时间计划性,提前要求结果浮现不能出现无意识思维效应。上述结果支持了个体无意识思维结果浮现具有计划性的假设。     

自我—他人危机决策信息加工过程的差异:来自眼动的证据

本研究采用iView X-RED眼动仪,分两个实验来考察自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程的差异。实验一采用单因素实验设计探讨自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程,结果表明：为自我决策组的平均阅读时间、平均注视时间、平均注视次数、平均凝视时间、平均回视次数都显著高于为他人决策组。实验二采用2（任务框架：积极,消极）x2（决策者角色：为自我、为他人）混合实验设计,结果表明：在积极框架下,为自我决策组平均阅读时间、平均注视时间、平均注视次数、平均凝视时间、平均回视次数显著高于为他人决策组;在消极框架下,两个组没有显著差异。总体表现为,自我-他人危机决策的信息加工过程存在差异,且受任务框架的影响。     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。     

观点采择因素对3～4岁儿童延迟满足决策的影响

通过采用延迟满足决策任务,要求儿童分别为自己和他人做出决策,本研究考察了观点采择因素对儿童情感决策发展的影响。实验一选取3岁和4岁儿童各40名,结果发现3岁儿童和4岁儿童在为自己选和为他人选两种条件下的表现均无显著差异,都倾向于做出延迟选择。实验二选取3岁和4岁儿童各60名,在为他人的选择中进一步区分了不同的观点提示条件,并增加了观点采择测验任务。结果发现,4岁儿童的观点采择能力得到了初步的发展,在不同的观点提示条件下为他人选择时分别表现出了与为自己选择不同的决策趋势;3岁儿童尚未获得观点采择能力,在各种不同观点提示条件下为自己和为他人做选择时差异均不显著。本研究结果表明,观点采择能力对儿童情感决策的影响是发展性的。随着观点采择能力的发展,儿童逐渐能够确立正确的延迟动机,为他人做出有效的决策。     

Self-observation of social behavior and metaperception.

In 3 experiments (Ns = 68, 72, and 101) the authors tested the hypothesis that the opportunity to observe oneself in social interaction increases the accuracy of metaperception (prediction of others' social judgments of oneself). Small groups were videotaped during a decision-making task, after which group members judged each other's social anxiety. Participants watched either the videotape of their group's interaction or a videotape of another group's interaction. After watching the videotape, participants predicted how they were judged by each member of the group. Results from the 3 experiments confirmed the hypothesis that self-observation increases the accuracy of metaperception. Presumably, self-observation provides objective information about one's behavior, which increases the ability to determine how one is judged by others, assuming self and others share meaning systems.     

"... As you would have them do unto you": Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action?

Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.     

直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

Predicting Soccer Matches After Unconscious and Conscious Thought as a Function of Expertise

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, we investigated the effects of expertise and mode of thought on the accuracy of people's predictions. Both experts and nonexperts predicted the results of soccer matches after conscious thought, after unconscious thought, or immediately. In Experiment 1, experts who thought unconsciously outperformed participants in all other conditions. Whereas unconscious thinkers showed a correlation between expertise and accuracy of prediction, no such relation was observed for conscious thinkers or for immediate decision makers. In Experiment 2, this general pattern was replicated. In addition, experts who thought unconsciously were better at applying diagnostic information than experts who thought consciously or who decided immediately. The results are consistent with unconscious-thought theory.     

A process-dissociation examination of the cognitive processes underlying unconscious thought

Conscious and unconscious thought have been previously found to differentially impact decision-making quality. However, little research has directly measured the processes underlying these modes of thinking. We propose that both thinking modes are characterized by rule-based and intuitive processing. In two experiments, we used the Process Dissociation Procedure to independently measure these cognitive processes. We tested three competing hypotheses: (a) conscious thinking evokes both increased rule-based and decreased intuitive processing compared to unconscious thinking; (b) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of intuitive processing but conscious thinking enhances rule-based processing; and (c) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of rule-based processing but unconscious thinking enhances intuitive processing. Experiment 1 used base-rate and law-of-large-numbers decision-making problems, whereas Experiment 2 used decision-making problems similar to the “apartment” problem that is often used in unconscious thought studies. In both experiments we found support for hypothesis (b).     

Effects of processing style on responsiveness to affective stimuli and processing fluency

In the present study, we provide direct evidence for effects of global versus local processing on responsiveness to and reliance on affective information in judgement and decision-making. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed an increased responsiveness to affective stimuli among participants in a global processing mode. Experiment 3 showed similar effects for processing fluency; participants adopting a global processing style showed an increased reliance on fluency. Experiment 4 replicated our findings in a more mundane judgement task in which participants judged apartments. We discuss our findings in relation to the distinction between intuitive versus deliberative modes of thinking.     

Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in social decision making

In 4 experiments, the authors studied the influence of social motives on deception and strategic misrepresentation. In a newly developed information provision game, individuals faced a decision maker whose decision would affect both own and other's outcomes. By withholding information or by giving (in)accurate information about payoffs, participants could try to influence other's decision making. Less accurate and more inaccurate information was given when the decision maker was competitive rather than cooperative (Experiment 1), especially when participants had a prosocial rather than selfish value orientation (Experiments 3 and 4). Accurate information was withheld because of fear of exploitation and greed, and inaccurate information was given because of greed (Experiment 2). Finally, participants engaged in strategic misrepresentation that may trick competitive others into damaging their own and increasing the participant's outcomes.     

A Social Values Analysis of Self–Other Differences in Decision Making Involving Risk

Three experiments tested our social values analysis of self–other differences in decision making under risk. In Experiment 1, we showed that people make riskier decisions for others in domains where risk taking is valued but not in those where risk is not valued. Experiment 2 documented that it is considered more inappropriate to make a risk-averse decision for another person than for oneself in situations where risk is valued. Experiment 3 showed that self–other differences in decision making occur even when there are no self–other differences in prediction and for decisions made for a typical student as well as for a friend. We use these results to argue that decision making for others is based predominantly on the perceived value placed on risk, leading to a norm for how to decide for others in situations where such a social value exists.     

奖赏和损失情境下男性海洛因戒断者的风险决策缺陷

摘 要 采用修改版的多伦多赌博任务考察决策情境对海洛因戒断者风险决策的影响。研究结果主要发现,海洛因戒断者在损失情境下的风险寻求决策比率与吸毒年限显著正相关,这种相关提示了风险决策背景下海洛因成瘾者持续使用毒品与其较低的损失敏感性之间的复杂交互作用。其次,海洛因戒断者在做出风险决策后收到消极反馈时的风险规避倾向可以负向预测其风险寻求决策比率,这可能进一步反映了海洛因戒断者风险感知的钝化或其对消极反馈信息的整合加工存在异常。