‘My Senses Couldn’t Always Deceive Me’

Philosophia - Gilbert Ryle and a number of other philosophers have argued that Descartes’ claim his senses could always deceive him is false. Ryle’s argument is the well-known...     

Don’t be fazed by PHASER: Beginning exploration of a cyclical motivational system

An earlier article in this journal (Townsend, 1991) reviewed in general terms the PHASER software and manual. The present paper illustrates how PHASER may be used in investigation of a nonlinear dynamic psychological model and exhibits several of PHASER’s facilities and attributes.     

Aging: I don’t want to be a cyborg!

Examination is made of a range of cyborg solutions to bodily problems due to damage, but here with particular reference to aging. Both technological and animal implants, transplants and prosthetic devices are phenomenologically analyzed. The resultant trade-off phenomena are compared to popular culture technofantasies and desires and finally to human attitudes toward mortality and contingency. The parallelism of resistance to contingent existence and to becoming a cyborg is noted.     

Dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists (nor should they be)

Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who hold the first view also hold the second. In fact, many philosophers just assume that substance dualists ought to, or perhaps even have to, accept anti-criterialism. But I aim to show that this assumption is baseless. Substance dualism doesn’t entail, suggest, support, or in any way motivate anti-criterialism, and anti-criterialism confers no benefit on dualism. Substance dualists have no special reason—and, indeed, no good reason at all—to accept anti-criterialism. Or so I shall argue. My aim isn’t to defend substance dualism, nor is it to attack anti-criterialism. My aim is to show that, contrary to a long-standing trend, dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists. Nor, as it will turn out, should they be.     

Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide

More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be. In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory. In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection.     

“I don’t want to be an artificial man”: Narrative reconstruction of sexuality among prostate cancer survivors

After interviewing prostate cancer support group members, I use narrative analysis to examine survivors’ post-illness stories of changes in sexual activity and identity. The main events in the narratives were the choice of a treatment option and the post-treatment changes in survivors’ sex lives, whether described as the end of the sex life or the beginning of a modified one. Survivors characterized their wives as uninterested in sex and seldom described support group peers as helpful sources of sex-related information. The value of health took precedence over the desire for sex among men who experienced erectile dysfunction. My observations suggest implications related to (a) masculine identity, (b) sex among the elderly, (c) the social construction of sexuality, (d) defining and redefining sexuality, (e) physician-patient interaction, (f) sex talk among social support group members, and (g) the apparent clash between the values of sex and health.     

On Failing to be Cartesian: Reconsidering the ‘Impurity’ of Descartes’s Meditation

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired.     

Don’t make a fetish of faults: a vindication of moral luck

Philosophical Studies - Is it appropriate to blame people unequally if the only difference between them was a matter of luck? Suppose Alice would drive recklessly if she could, Belen drove...     

Why We Shouldn’t Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros

Victor Tadros thinks the idea that in a conflict both sides may permissibly use force should (typically) be rejected. Thus, he thinks that two shipwrecked persons should not fight for the only available flotsam (which can only carry one person) but instead toss a coin, and that a bomber justifiably attacking an ammunitions factory must not be counterattacked by the innocent bystanders he endangers. I shall argue that Tadros’s claim rests on unwarranted assumptions and is also mistaken in the light of the moral reasoning that he himself offers in support of his ‘means principle’.     

Categorical perception of tonal intervais: Musicians can’t tellsharp fromflat

Six musicians with relative pitch judged 13 tonal intervals in a magnitude estimation task. Stimuli were spaced in .2-semitone increments over a range of three standard musical categories (fourth, tritone, fifth,). The judged magnitude of the intervals did not increase regularly with stimulus magnitude. Rather, the psychophysical functions showed three discrete steps cor-responding to the musically defined intervals. Although all six subjects had identified in-tune intervals with >95% accuracy, all were very poor at differentiating within a musical category— they could not reliably tell “sharp” from “flat.” After the experiment, they judged 63% of the stimuli to be “in tune,” but in fact only 23% were musically accurate. In a subsequent labeling task, subjects produced identification functions with sharply defined boundaries between each of the three musical categories. Our results parallel those associated with the identification and scaling of speech sounds, and we interpret them as evidence for categorical perception of music.     

I can’t get no satisfaction: Potential causes of boredom

A variety of causes of boredom have been proposed including environmental, motivational, emotional, and cognitive factors. Here, we explore four potential cognitive causes of boredom: inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and executive dysfunction. Specifically, we examine the unique and common associations between these factors and boredom propensity. Recent research has established that the two most commonly used measures of boredom propensity (BPS and BSS) are not measuring the same underlying construct. Thus, a second goal of the present project is to determine the unique and common roles of inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity and poor executive system functioning in predicting the BPS and BSS specifically. The findings reveal that inattention, hyperactivity and executive dysfunction predict boredom propensity, with shared variance accounting for the greater part of this effect. Further, executive dysfunction and hyperactivity uniquely predict boredom propensity as measured by the BPS and BSS, respectively.     

Why we should(n’t) be discretionists about free will

One of the projects Shaun Nichols takes up in Bound is to provide a folk psychological diagnosis of the problem of free will. As part of this diagnosis, Nichols suggests that the dispute between eliminativists (those who claim free will does not exist) and preservationists (those who claim free will does exist) depends to some extent on assumptions about the way ‘free will’ refers. In light of this, he argues that we might have good reason to accept a discretionary view of free will. Here, I will focus on teasing out some of the more fine-grained features of the discretionary view Nichols proposes. In so doing I will challenge the idea that there is a tenable strategy for consistently preserving two main features of the view: (1) that eliminativists and preservationists can both speak truly, and (2) that the apparent disagreement between them can be diffused by appealing to the role that different practical interests play in the context of utterance. I will conclude with some suggestive remarks on how the spirit of the discretionary view Nichols offers might still be preserved despite the challenge I raise, and why there are good reasons to pursue this kind of view further.     

Risk should be objectively defined: comment on Pelé and Sueur

Pelé and Sueur (2013) propose that optimal decisions depend on delay of reinforcement, accuracy (probability or magnitude of reinforcement), and risk. The problem with this model is delay and accuracy are easy to define, but according to Pelé and Sueur the third, risk, depends on the animal’s perceived or “interpreted” risk rather than actual (experienced) risk. Thus, choice of the smaller more immediate reward over the larger delayed reward (the delay discounting function) is viewed by the authors as optimal because delay is associated with increased risk (due to potential competition or predation). But perceived risk is assessed by the decision made (e.g., the slope of the discounting function), and since there is virtually no actual risk involved, by default if there is no independent means of measuring risk, according to Pelé and Sueur, all choices can be viewed as optimal. Thus, optimality is an untestable concept. We suggest that risk be defined by the actual risk (given sufficient experience to judge it) and under conditions in which there is no actual risk (or risk is controlled), when animals choose an alternative that provides a lower rate of access to food, that one considers such choice to be suboptimal.     

Why Richard Swinburne Won’t ‘Rot in Hell’: A Defense of Tough-minded Theodicy

In his recent paper in Sophia, ‘Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?’ Nick Trakakis endorses the position that theodicy, whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious enterprise. My aim in this paper is to defend theodicy from this accusation. I concede that God the Creator is a moral monster by human standards and neither to be likened to a loving parent nor imitated. Nonetheless, God is morally perfect. What is abhorrent is not tough-minded theodicy but the hubris of imitating God. I further claim that it is no accident that the same sort of objection is made to act utilitarianism as to tough-minded theodicy if the latter is misinterpreted as implying a guide for human action.     

What you don’t know can’t hurt you: realism and the unconceived

Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006, Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper, I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.

Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’

Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.

Don’t look! don’t touch! inhibitory control of eye and hand movements

Inhibitory control of eye and hand movements was compared in the stop-signal task. Subjects moved their eyes to the right or left or pressed keys on the right or left in response to visual stimuli. The stimuli were either central (angle brackets pointing left or right) or peripheral (plus signs turning into Xs left or right of fixation), and the task was either pro (respond on the same side as the stimulus) or anti (respond on the opposite side). Occasionally, a stop signal was presented, which instructed subjects to inhibit their responses to the go stimulus. Stop-signal reaction times (SSRTs) were faster overall for eye movements than for hand movements, and they were affected differently by stimulus conditions (central vs. peripheral) and task (pro vs. anti), suggesting that the eyes and hands are inhibited by different processes operating under similar principles (i.e., a race between stop and go processes).