Rationalizing beliefs: evidential vs. pragmatic reasons

Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truth-conducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by non-epistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character. This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically relevant.     

On the Referential Indeterminacy of Logical and Mathematical Concepts

Hartry Field has recently examined the question whether our logical and mathematical concepts are referentially indeterminate. In his view, (1) certain logical notions, such as second-order quantification, are indeterminate, but (2) important mathematical notions, such as the notion of finiteness, are not (they are determinate). In this paper, I assess Fields analysis, and argue that claims (1) and (2) turn out to be inconsistent. After all, given that the notion of finiteness can only be adequately characterized in pure second-order logic, if Field is right in claiming that second-order quantification is indeterminate (see (1)), it follows that finiteness is also indeterminate (contrary to (2)). After arguing that Field is committed to these claims, I provide a diagnosis of why this inconsistency emerged, and I suggest an alternative, consistent picture of the relationship between logical and mathematical indeterminacy.     

Default reasonableness and the mathoids

In this paper I will argue that (principled) attempts to ground a priori knowledge in default reasonable beliefs cannot capture certain common intuitions about what is required for a priori knowledge. I will describe hypothetical creatures who derive complex mathematical truths like Fermat’s last theorem via short and intuitively unconvincing arguments. Many philosophers with foundationalist inclinations will feel that these creatures must lack knowledge because they are unable to justify their mathematical assumptions in terms of the kind of basic facts which can be known without further argument. Yet, I will argue that nothing in the current literature lets us draw a principled distinction between what these creatures are doing and paradigmatic cases of good a priori reasoning (assuming that the latter are to be grounded in default reasonable beliefs). I will consider, in turn, appeals to reliability, coherence, conceptual truth and indispensability and argue that none of these can do the job.     

Sosa on epistemic value: a Kantian obstacle

In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa’s account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa’s competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects’ beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief’s fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa’s competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.

     

Moral foundations,worldviews, moral absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories

In the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super‐individual relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns pertaining to group‐ and community‐concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well‐being (i.e., individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.     

Phenomenal Causality II: Integration and Implication

The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. Different potential types of phenomenal causality and variables that influence phenomenal causality were considered in Part I (Hubbard 2012b) of this two-part series. In Part II, broader questions regarding properties of phenomenal causality and connections of phenomenal causality to other perceptual or cognitive phenomena (different types of phenomenal causality, effects of spatial and temporal variance, phenomenal causality in infancy, effects of object properties, naïve physics, spatial localization, other illusions, amodal completion, Gestalt principles of perceptual grouping, effects of context, differences between physical and social causality, effects of learning and experience, individual differences, effects of predictability, asymmetry in phenomenal causality, differences between perceived causality and perceived force, phenomenal causality in nonhuman animals) are considered. Potential mechanisms of phenomenal causality (inference from contiguity, a priori understanding, ampliation, perceptual learning, stimulus activity, beliefs regarding kinematics, haptic experience, beliefs regarding impetus, postdiction, innateness, modularity, specific neural structures) are also considered.     

Semantic Responsibility

Abstract

In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. ‘Being semantically responsible’ is shown to involve the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly encompasses radically different classes of beliefs. In what follows I make those different types explicit, and sketch some implications for naturalisation projects in semantics and for accounts of the (putative) non-conceptual content of perceptual experiences.     

Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge

Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts.     

Fear information and the development of fears during childhood: effects on implicit fear responses and behavioural avoidance

Field, Argyris and Knowles (Behav Res Ther 39 (2001) 1259), and Field, Hamilton, Knowles and Plews (Behav Res Thera 41 (2003) 113) have developed a prospective paradigm for testing Rachman's (Behav Res Ther 15 (1977) 375) proposition that fear information is important in the development of fears and phobias in children. Despite this paradigm being an advance on retrospective reports, the research so far has been restricted to self-reported fear beliefs measured after the information is given. This gives rise to two possible shortcomings: (1) the effects could simply reflect demand characteristics resulting from children conforming to the experimental demands, and (2) although fear information changes beliefs, this might not translate into the behavioural change that would be expected if this information has a powerful effect relevant to the development of pathological fear. This paper describes an experiment that attempts to address these concerns by improving Field et al.'s (2001, 2003) basic paradigm but with the addition of two measures: (1) a behavioural measure of avoidance, and (2) an implicit attitude task that should not be susceptible to deliberate attempts to conform to experimental demands. The result showed that negative and positive information have dramatic, and opposite, effects on self-reported fear beliefs, behavioural avoidance and implicit attitudes. There were no effects of gender on any of these results. This study fully supports Rachman's model and suggests that past work does not merely reflect demand characteristics and that fear information increases behavioural avoidance as well as fear beliefs.     

Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation

Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that probabilistic accounts of coherence such as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. This paper shows, however, that those accounts have a serious common problem: the problem of belief individuation. The coherence degree that each of the accounts assigns to an information set (or the verdict it gives as to whether the set is coherent tout court) depends on how beliefs (or propositions) that represent the set are individuated. Indeed, logically equivalent belief sets that represent the same information set can be given drastically different degrees of coherence. This feature clashes with our natural and reasonable expectation that the coherence degree of a belief set does not change unless the believer adds essentially new information to the set or drops old information from it; or, to put it simply, that the believer cannot raise or lower the degree of coherence by purely logical reasoning. None of the accounts in question can adequately deal with coherence once logical inferences get into the picture. Toward the end of the paper, another notion of coherence that takes into account not only the contents but also the origins (or sources) of the relevant beliefs is considered. It is argued that this notion of coherence is of dubious significance, and that it does not help solve the problem of belief individuation.     

The influence of Platonism on mathematics research and theological beliefs

An age-old debate in the philosophy of mathematics is whether mathematics is discovered or invented. There are four popular viewpoints in this debate, namely Platonism, formalism, intuitionism, and logicism. A natural question that arises is whether belief in one of these viewpoints affects the mathematician’s research? In particular, does subscribing to a Platonist or a formalist viewpoint influence how a mathematician conducts research? Does the area of research influence a mathematician’s beliefs on the nature of mathematics? How are the beliefs regarding the nature of mathematics connected to theological beliefs? In order to investigate these questions, five professional research mathematicians were interviewed. The mathematicians worked in diverse areas within analysis, algebra, and within applied mathematics, and had a combined 160 years of research experience. Although none of the mathematicians wanted to be pigeonholed into any one category of beliefs, the study revealed that four of the mathematicians leaned towards Platonism, which runs contrary to the popular notion that Platonism is an exception today. This study revealed that beliefs regarding the nature of mathematics influenced how mathematicians’ conducted research and were deeply connected to their theological beliefs. The findings are presented in the form of vignettes that give an insight into the mathematical and theological belief structures of the mathematicians.     

How Collusion Perpetuates Racial Discrimination in Societies that Ostensibly Promote Equal Opportunity

It is shown here that injustices due to racial discrimination are best identified in light of the deleterious effects they have upon their victims, rather than the beliefs and attitudes of their perpetrators. For among participants who cooperate clandestinely to bring about racial injustice there may be broad disagreement about what it is they are doing collectively, and why; or they may disagree in principle about whether what they are doing is morally right. I employ the notion of ‘nomotropic’ behaviour to replace the oversimplified notion of ‘rule-following’ in order to explain how duplicity and hypocrisy fall shy of being regarded as irrational in social climates where implicit norms reinforce racial privileging while explicit norms denounce it. Further, examining the ‘collective utility’ of dogmatic beliefs and norms comprising part of the social architecture that covertly reinforces racial injustice (while ostensibly deriding it) may help to explain why it often seems to make so little difference whether members of an unfairly advantaged elite, whose collaborative behaviour perpetuates a social injustice, individually approve of doing so or not.     

Warranted Neo-Confucian belief: Religious pluralism and the affections in the epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472–1529) and Alvin Plantinga

In this article, I argue that Wang Yangming'sNeo-Confucian religious beliefs can bewarranted, and that the rationality of hisreligious beliefs constitutes a significantdefeater for the rationality of Christianbelief on Alvin Plantinga's theory of warrant. I also question whether the notion of warrantas proper function can adequately account fortheories of religious knowledge in which theaffections play an integral role. Idemonstrate how a consideration of Wang'sepistemology reveals a difficulty forPlantinga's defense of the rationality ofChristian belief and highlights a limitation ofPlantinga's current conception of warrant asproper function.     

the role of dimensional distinctiveness in children's and adults' artifact categorization

There are conflicting results as to whether preschool children categorize artifacts on the basis of physical or functional similarity. The present study investigated the effect of the relative distinctiveness of these dimensions in children's categorization. In a physical-distinctive condition, preschool children and adults were initially asked to categorize computer-animated artifacts whose physical appearances were more distinctive than their functions. In a function-distinctive condition, the functional dimension of objects was more distinctive than their physical appearances. Both conditions included a second stage of categorization in which both dimensions were equally distinctive. Participants in a control condition performed only this stage of categorization. Adults in all conditions and stages consistently categorized by functional similarity. In contrast, children's categorization was affected by the relative distinctiveness of the dimensions. Children may not have a priori specific beliefs about how to categorize novel artifacts, and thus may be more susceptible to contextual factors.     

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation

The status of moral testimony has recently been challenged, for both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. This paper distinguishes two methods of teaching: transmission, “classic” learning from testimony, that results in second hand knowledge, and propagation which results in first hand knowledge and understanding. Moral propagation avoids most of the epistemic and non-epistemic problems of transmission. Moreover, moral propagation can develop and refine non-cognitive attitudes too. Therefore moral testimony should (and normally does) take the form of moral propagation, not transmission.     

Understanding the relationship between posttraumatic stress disorder and trauma cognitions: The impact of thought control strategies

Several models of PTSD suggest that dysfunctional beliefs play an important role in the maintenance of PTSD. This study examined whether thought control strategies intermediated in the relationship between PTSD and dysfunctional cognitions. It was hypothesized that PTSD would be positively associated with dysfunctional cognitions and that negative thought control strategies (worry and self-punishment) would partially account for this relationship. These maladaptive strategies were predicted to be associated with increased levels of PTSD and more trauma-related beliefs. Additionally, it was predicted that positive thought control strategies (social control and reappraisal) would be associated with decreased levels of PTSD and fewer trauma-related beliefs. Finally, because the literature supports distraction as both an adaptive and a maladaptive thought control strategy, no a priori hypothesis was made. Results support worry and self-punishment as maladaptive intervening variables in the association between PTSD and dysfunctional cognitions, resulting in greater levels of PTSD and trauma cognitions. Social control and distraction emerged as adaptive strategies, resulting in lower levels of PTSD and trauma cognitions, while reappraisal showed no relationship with PTSD severity. Although the results are cross-sectional, continued focus on the effects of thought control strategies as meditational maintenance variables over time appears warranted.     

Armchair Disagreement

A commonly neglected feature of the so‐called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy.     

On Considering a Possible World as Actual: Robert Stalnaker

Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement relative to that possible world. There are no necessary a posteriori or contingent a priori propositions: rather, contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori statements are statements that are necessary when evaluated one way, and contingent when evaluated the other way. This paper distinguishes two ways that the two-dimensional framework can be interpreted, and argues that one of them gives the better account of what it means to 'consider a world as actual', but that it provides no support for any notion of purely conceptual a priori truth.
'Hell is paved with primary intensions'
English proverb