罗尔斯“分配的正义观”与诺齐克“持有的正义观”对照研究

分配正当性的根据是什么 ?人的基本权利与平等的要件如何分配才是符合正义的 ?罗尔斯和诺齐克从两个向度上对此作了深入研究。罗尔斯从平等的权利出发 ,主张用“公平正义的两个原则”来取代功利主义 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当不平等 ,否则就应当平等。并要求依据“公平的正义原则”分配公共资源和自由体系 ;诺齐克从人的不可剥夺的权利出发 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当平等 ,否则就应当不平等 ,通过“资格”理论确立“持有”的正当性。在功利主义、财产权、国家的作用、自由平等、分配模式和社会稳定的意义等方面 ,罗尔斯与诺齐克的观点也各有契合与对立。     

Virtue Jurisprudence A Virtue–Centred Theory of Judging

"Virtue jurisprudence" is a normative and explanatory theory of law that utilises the resources of virtue ethics to answer the central questions of legal theory. The main focus of this essay is the development of a virtue–centred theory of judging. The exposition of the theory begins with exploration of defects in judicial character, such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis , or sound practical judgement. A virtue–centred account of justice is defended against the argument that theories of fairness are prior to theories of justice. The centrality of virtue as a character trait can be drawn out by analysing the virtue of justice into constituent elements. These include judicial impartiality (even–handed sympathy for those affected by adjudication) and judicial integrity (respect for the law and concern for its coherence). The essay argues that a virtue–centred theory accounts for the role that virtuous practical judgement plays in the application of rules to particular fact situations. Moreover, it contends that a virtue–centred theory of judging can best account for the phenomenon of lawful judicial disagreement. Finally, a virtue–centred approach best accounts for the practice of equity, departure from the rules based on the judge's appreciation of the particular characteristics of individual fact situations.     

Virtue Jurisprudence A Virtue–Centred Theory of Judging

"Virtue jurisprudence" is a normative and explanatory theory of law that utilises the resources of virtue ethics to answer the central questions of legal theory. The main focus of this essay is the development of a virtue–centred theory of judging. The exposition of the theory begins with exploration of defects in judicial character, such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis , or sound practical judgement. A virtue–centred account of justice is defended against the argument that theories of fairness are prior to theories of justice. The centrality of virtue as a character trait can be drawn out by analysing the virtue of justice into constituent elements. These include judicial impartiality (even–handed sympathy for those affected by adjudication) and judicial integrity (respect for the law and concern for its coherence). The essay argues that a virtue–centred theory accounts for the role that virtuous practical judgement plays in the application of rules to particular fact situations. Moreover, it contends that a virtue–centred theory of judging can best account for the phenomenon of lawful judicial disagreement. Finally, a virtue–centred approach best accounts for the practice of equity, departure from the rules based on the judge's appreciation of the particular characteristics of individual fact situations.     

Fairness heuristic theory is an empirical framework: a reply to Arnadóttir

In this article on fairness heuristic theory, we point out some important flaws in Arnadóttir's (2002) claim that fairness heuristic theory is "not empirical," by which Arnadóttir meant that theory's predictions are knowable a priori, and are not contingent upon circumstances. To this end, we demonstrate that empirically testing effects predicted by fairness heuristic theory was and is important because this showed that the theory's propositions are not necessarily knowable a priori and are contingent upon circumstances. This implies that, according to Arnadóttir's definition, fairness heuristic theory clearly is an empirical framework. It would have been helpful if Arnadóttir had studied the fairness literature more thoroughly (as this would have easily revealed fairness heuristic theory to be not knowable a priori and to be contingent upon circumstances) and also if she had pointed out which of our studies fail to follow her line of reasoning. Our reply was written not as an attempt to defend fairness heuristic theory as we applaud, indeed are honored by, attempts to scrutinize our work in progress. Our only aim here was to point at some important flaws in the Arnadóttir article, because we think these will hamper rather than advance the science of psychology of justice.     

Public Opinion and Political Philosophy: The Relation between Social-Scientific and Philosophical Analyses of Distributive Justice

This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different principles of justice can yield the same concrete distributive judgments, and the ambiguity of key terms. The third part distinguishes and evaluates three versions of the claim that normative theorising about justice can profit from empirical research into public opinion: that its findings are food for thought, that they amount to feasibility constraints, and that they are constitutive of normatively justified principles of justice. The view that popular opinion about justice has a strongly constitutive role to play in justifying principles of distributive justice stricto sensu is rejected, but it is argued that what the people think (and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think) on distributive matters can be an important factor for the political theorist to take into account, for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both.     

时间视角下的组织公正研究

组织公正的动态研究是在时间视角下分析组织公正的变化及其影响。根据研究中不同的时间跨度,可将该领域研究分为短期公正变化与长期公正变化研究。短期公正变化研究主要分析公正事件在日层次上的变化对组织内个体的影响。长期公正变化则分析组织内个体过往的公正经历如何影响他们当前的心理与行为。研究主要从自我调节资源的变化、长时社会交换、不确定管理及社会认知角度解释公正的动态影响。未来可从公正动态变化的特征、前因机制及其差异化影响机制开展研究。     

公正的启发理论述评

组织公正感包括分配公正、程序公正、互动公正等重要的组成要素。尽管这些公正感的构成要素有不同的内涵和影响因素,然而在许多情况下,这些要素之间有较高的一致性。与过去注重这些要素的差异性相反,Lind看到了这些公正感要素之间的一致性,提出了试图整合这些一致性的公正理论：公正的启发理论。该文比较全面地介绍了公正的启发理论的含义,如何启发等核心概念,并对启发理论存在的问题进行了分析,指出了启发理论研究的方向。     

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

Explaining the procedural justice–perceived legitimacy relationship: Relying on relational concern or instrumental concern?

People can extract relational information (i.e., relational concern) as well as instrumental information (i.e., instrumental concern) from decision‐making procedures. Thus, both instrumental and relational concerns are assumed to influence the procedural justice–perceived legitimacy relationship. Drawing from social exchange theory, the different kinds of concerns may lead to form different exchange relationships (social exchange relationship vs. economic relationship), which can be indicated by two forms of trust (affect‐based trust vs. cognition‐based trust). We built a model of trust mediation in which procedural justice predicted affect‐based and cognition‐based trust. Further, we also tested the hypothesis that high (compared with low) group identification individuals are more likely to rely on relational concern to construct procedural justice and judge legitimacy of authority, because they use procedural fairness information to infer the quality of their relationships with the authority. The results of an experiment (Study 1) demonstrated that both affect‐based trust and cognition‐based trust mediated the procedural justice–perceived legitimacy relationship. Moreover, a field study (Study 2) showed that affect‐based trust mediated the relationship between procedural justice and perceived legitimacy primarily among individuals with high group identification whereas cognition‐based trust mediated this relationship primarily among those with low group identification.     

When does procedural justice influence perceived legitimacy? The role of standing uncertainty and group identification

Many empirical studies have shown that procedural justice is the key determinant of whether an individual perceives an authority figure as legitimate. However, based on relational models of procedural justice and the uncertainty management model, there is reason to believe that the association between procedural justice and perceived legitimacy may be stronger for individuals who are uncertain about their standing as group members (moderation); this interaction might predict group identification and, in turn, perceived legitimacy (mediation). We tested this mediated moderation model in two experiments (Studies 1a and 1b) and a field study (Study 2) using different operationalizations of standing uncertainty across studies. The results of Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated that the association between procedural justice and perceived legitimacy was stronger for participants with high (vs. low) standing uncertainty. Study 2 showed that group identification mediated the association between this interaction effect and perceived legitimacy. Together, the results of the mediated moderation analysis showed that procedural justice was positively associated with perceived legitimacy through high group identification when standing uncertainty was high. The theoretical contributions and practical implications of our findings are discussed.     

Love and Justice: a Paradox?

Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.     

组织公正氛围的理论机制、研究视角及研究框架

组织公正是员工对工作场所公正环境的心理感知, 研究层面有个体与群体之分。以往研究多集中在个体层面, 以致研究结果缺乏对群体现象的有效解释。进入新世纪学者们开始关注群体层面的公正氛围研究, 并在理论和实证方面取得了较大突破。通过回顾相关研究可以发现：(1)在理论机制上, 公正氛围的形成可以通过社会信息加工理论、吸引-选择-磨合模型、公正传染概念和公正启发理论来解释; (2)在研究视角上, 主要存在维度视角、整体视角、感知来源视角、氛围属性视角和第三方视角; (3)在研究主题上, 主要涉及领导、团队和组织三方面对公正氛围的影响, 以及公正氛围对个体、团队和组织三个层面的影响效果。未来研究可着重从多种领导行为对不同公正氛围影响的比较、其他领导因素对公正氛围的影响、不同公正氛围对结果变量影响的比较、新视角公正氛围测量方法的尝试, 以及文化因素对公正氛围的影响研究等方面入手。     

Ethics and Social Science: Which Kind of Co-operation?

The relation between ethics and social science is often conceived as complementary, both disciplines cooperating in the solution of concrete moral problems. Against this, the paper argues that not only applied ethics but even certain parts of general ethics have to incorporate sociological and psychological data and theories from the start. Applied ethics depends on social science in order to asses the impact of its own principles on the concrete realities which these principles are to regulate as well as in order to propose practice rules suited to adapt these principles to their respective contexts of application. Examples from medical ethics (embryo research) and ecological ethics (Leopold's land ethic) illustrate both the contingence of practice rules in relation to their underlying basic principles and the corresponding need for a co-operation between philosophy and empirical disciplines in judging their functional merits and demerits. In conclusion, the relevance of empirical hypotheses even for some of the perennial problems of ethics is shown by clarifying the role played by empirical theories in the controversies about the ethical differentiation between positive and negative responsibility and the relation between utility maximisation and (seemingly) independent criteria of distributive justice in the context of social distributions.     

心理学对经济学的涉入——从理性自利到社会偏好的决策框架

理性认知能力与社会偏好存在紧密的关联。文章简要回顾了经济决策理论从理性模型到有限理性模型和社会偏好模型的发展进程,论述了人们理性的局限性及其根源,并进一步探讨理性认知能力与社会偏好的关系。对人类以及灵长目动物的研究显示,有限理性可能是由根源于演化的适应性机制所导致。人类不公平厌恶的起源、个体公平能力的发展规律和表征公平的大脑结构上的证据表明,理性认知能力能让人更好地抑制自私性,实现更高层次的公平。     

The lottery of life and moral desert: An empirical investigation

As John Rawls makes clear in A Theory of Justice, there is a popular and influential strand of political thought for which brute luck – that is, being lucky (or unlucky) in the so-called “lottery of life” – ought to have no place in a theory of distributive justice. Yet the debate about luck, desert, and fairness in contemporary political philosophy has recently been rekindled by a handful of philosophers who claim that desert should play a bigger role in theories of distributive justice. In the present paper, we present the results of our attempts to fill in some of the missing empirical details of this debate. Our findings provide some preliminary evidence that, contrary to what most contemporary political philosophers have assumed, people are not as worried by natural luck as previously thought. Instead, people’s worries seem to be focused exclusively on inequalities generated by social luck.     

同事公正氛围：构念、测量、效能与展望

以往对公正氛围的探讨主要集中于源自权威的公正氛围上,而对来自同事的公正氛围关注较少。同事公正氛围是指团队成员对团队内同事之间相互对待公正性的共同知觉。本文首先对比总结界定了同事公正氛围的概念,明晰了其结构维度与测量工具,然后着重梳理评价了同事公正氛围的影响效能。未来研究应致力于：加强探讨同事公正氛围的前因变量,探讨同事公正氛围影响效能的内在机制和边界条件,运用纵向设计研究同事公正氛围的形成机制及影响效能,以及探索同事公正氛围研究的本土化。     

Political reconciliation at the level of global governance1

This article applies the idea of political reconciliation to current debates on the role and legitimacy of global governance. My underlying thesis is that the idea of reconciliation fits better with the non-ideal circumstances of global injustice. To this end, I will first of all develop a three-tiered model of political reconciliation and introduce the related concept of restorative justice. I will then look at some of the most obvious forms of international and global injustice – historical injustice, economic exploitation, and political domination – and argue that a normative theory of political reconciliation provides better proposals for feasible global governance reforms than do theories of corrective, retributive, or distributive justice. Finally, I will make a few comments on the role of political philosophy as a medium of ‘narrative reconciliation’.     

家长式领导与组织公正感的关系

以428名企事业单位员工为调查对象,采用问卷法,探讨了家长式领导与组织公正感的关系,结果表明：（1）仁慈领导对组织公正感各维度有显著的积极影响;德行领导对组织公正感各维度有显著的积极影响;权威领导对领导公正有显著的消极影响;（2）在分配公正、程序公正上,德行与权威领导有显著负交互效应;在领导公正、领导解释上,仁慈与权威领导有显著负交互效应。最后,对研究的理论和实践意义作了探讨,并提出了未来的研究方向     

When fairness neither satisfies nor motivates: The role of risk aversion and uncertainty reduction in attenuating and reversing the fair process effect

It is widely acknowledged that procedural justice has many positive effects. However, some evidence suggests that procedural justice may not always have positive effects and may even have negative effects. We present three studies that vary in method and participant populations, including an archival study, a field study, and an experiment, using data provided by the general American population, Indian software engineers, and undergraduate students in the US. We demonstrate that key work-related variables such as people’s job satisfaction and performance depend on procedural justice, perceived uncertainty, and risk aversion such that risk seeking people react less positively and at times negatively to the same fair procedures that appeal to risk averse people. Our results suggest that one possible reason for these effects is that being treated fairly reduces people’s perception of uncertainty in the environment and while risk averse people find low uncertainty desirable and react positively to it, risk seeking people do not. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of procedural justice including the uncertainty management model of fairness, the fair process effect, and fairness heuristic theory.