Explanatory models for mental illness endorsed by Christian clergymen: The development and use of an instrument in Singapore

Researchers have attempted to elicit the explanatory models used by different populations to understand mental illness, since these models can influence how populations use mental-health treatment. However, little effort has been made to understand the explanatory models used by Christian clergymen. This is despite their important role as providers of mental-health care in many Asian and Western societies. Neither are there suitable instruments to conduct such investigations. This study attempts to present a suitable instrument for such research and explore the belief structure of this population by administering a modified version of the Opinions about Psychological Problems to a representative sample of Singaporean Christian clergymen. Factor-analytic techniques revealed five factors which were explained as (1) a Traditional Christian and (2) a Deliverance etiology, both models implicating religious causes for mental illness, (3) a Poor Coping and (4) Internal Conflicts etiology, essentially being psychological explanations and an (5) Organic etiology model. The Traditional Christian model received the greatest endorsement, followed by the Poor Coping model, while the Organic model had the least acceptance. The belief structure used by nearly half of the respondents was noted to be complex, involving a combination of religious, psychological, and organic explanations.     

Saving the Victim: Recuperating the Language of the Victim and Reassessing Global Feminism

This paper reconsiders the use of the term “victim” in feminist theory to attempt to find common ground for the intersection and interconnection of Western and indigenous feminisms. The role of the victim in the discourse of victimology, a branch of criminology, is assessed and applied to the work of Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Lata Mani who both examine the construction of women's subjectivity in the practice of “sati” in India.     

Against explanatory realism

Explanatory realism is the position that all explanations give information about whatever metaphysically determines the explanandum. This view is popular and plays a central role in metaphysics, but in this paper I argue that explanatory realism is false. In Sect. 1 I introduce explanatory realism in its weak and strong versions, and discuss the argumentative work that explanatory realism is used for in contemporary metaphysics. In Sect. 2 I present a series of problem cases for explanatory realism, including explanation by analogy, explanations involving rules, reduction ad absurdum explanations and certain statistical explanations. In Sect. 3 I consider and reject two modified versions of explanatory realism: the position that explanatory realism is true only of explanation in metaphysics, and the position that determinative explanation is the most complete form of explanation. In conclusion I consider explanatory antirealism and explanatory pluralism as alternatives to explanatory realism.     

The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations

Evolutionary explanations are not only common in the biological sciences, but also widespread outside biology. But an account of how evolutionary explanations perform their explanatory work is still lacking. This paper develops such an account. I argue that available accounts of explanations in evolutionary science miss important parts of the role of history in evolutionary explanations. I argue that the historical part of evolutionary science should be taken as having genuine explanatory force, and that it provides how-possibly explanations sensu Dray. I propose an account of evolutionary explanations as comparative-composite explanations consisting of two distinct kinds of explanations, one processual and one historical, that are connected via the explanandum's evolvability to show how the explanandum is the product of its evolutionary past. The account is both a reconstruction of how evolutionary explanations in biology work and a guideline specifying what kind of explanations evolutionary research programs should develop.     

DEFLATIONISM AND THE SUCCESS ARGUMENT

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal–explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal–explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal–explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal–explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one.     

Investigating the origins of political views: biases in explanation predict conservative attitudes in children and adults

We tested the hypothesis that political attitudes are influenced by an information‐processing factor – namely, a bias in the content of everyday explanations. Because many societal phenomena are enormously complex, people's understanding of them often relies on heuristic shortcuts. For instance, when generating explanations for such phenomena (e.g., why does this group have low status?), people often rely on facts that they can retrieve easily from memory – facts that are skewed toward inherent or intrinsic features (e.g., this group is unintelligent). We hypothesized that this bias in the content of heuristic explanations leads to a tendency to (1) view socioeconomic stratification as acceptable and (2) prefer current societal arrangements to alternative ones, two hallmarks of conservative ideology. Moreover, since the inherence bias in explanation is present across development, we expected it to shape children's proto‐political judgments as well. Three studies with adults and 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children (N = 784) provided support for these predictions: Not only did individual differences in reliance on inherent explanations uniquely predict endorsement of conservative views (particularly the stratification‐supporting component; Study 1), but manipulations of this explanatory bias also had downstream consequences for political attitudes in both children and adults (Studies 2 and 3). This work contributes to our understanding of the origins of political attitudes.     

Models and mechanisms in network neuroscience

This paper considers the way mathematical and computational models are used in network neuroscience to deliver mechanistic explanations. Two case studies are considered: Recent work on klinotaxis by Caenorhabditis elegans, and a long-standing research effort on the network basis of schizophrenia in humans. These case studies illustrate the various ways in which network, simulation, and dynamical models contribute to the aim of representing and understanding network mechanisms in the brain, and thus, of delivering mechanistic explanations. After outlining this mechanistic construal of network neuroscience, two concerns are addressed. In response to the concern that functional network models are nonexplanatory, it is argued that functional network models are in fact explanatory mechanism sketches. In response to the concern that models which emphasize a network’s organization over its composition do not explain mechanistically, it is argued that this emphasis is both appropriate and consistent with the principles of mechanistic explanation. What emerges is an improved understanding of the ways in which mathematical and computational models are deployed in network neuroscience, as well as an improved conception of mechanistic explanation in general.     

The explanatory potential of artificial societies

It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Despite that, many feel that such simulations somehow contribute to our understanding. This paper tries to clarify this intuition by investigating whether artificial societies provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds explanatory strategies differ, and how potential functional explanations can be appraised.     

Why wasn't O.J. convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference

This paper evaluates four competing psychological explanations for why the jury in the O.J. Simpson murder trial reached the verdict they did: explanatory coherence, Bayesian probability theory, wishful thinking, and emotional coherence. It describes computational models that provide detailed simulations of juror reasoning for explanatory coherence, Bayesian networks, and emotional coherence, and argues that the latter account provides the most plausible explanation of the jury's decision.     

NOT EXPLANATION BUT SALVATION: SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY, CHRISTOLOGY, AND SUFFERING

The view that Christian belief is explanatory is widespread in contemporary theology, apologetics, and philosophy of religion and it has received particular impetus from attempts to correlate science and Christianity. This article proposes an account of explanatory thinking in theology based on the principle that theological explanations should be disciplined by the internal logic of Scripture. Arthur Peacocke's biologically construed Christology and Alister McGrath's argument that suffering is an anomaly in the Christian explanatory scheme are shown to yield theological results which are inconsistent with this principle. This article's theological argument complements philosophical criticisms of the view that religious belief is explanatory.     

Explanation and categorization: How “why?” informs “what?”

Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that explanation and categorization are intimately related. This paper explores the hypothesis that explanations can help structure conceptual representations, and thereby influence the relative importance of features in categorization decisions. In particular, features may be differentially important depending on the role they play in explaining other features or aspects of category membership. Two experiments manipulate whether a feature is explained mechanistically, by appeal to proximate causes, or functionally, by appeal to a function or goal. Explanation type has a significant impact on the relative importance of features in subsequent categorization judgments, with functional explanations reversing previously documented effects of ‘causal status’. The findings suggest that a feature’s explanatory importance can impact categorization, and that explanatory relationships, in addition to causal relationships, are critical to understanding conceptual representation.     

Biased processing of stereotype-incongruency is greater for low than high status groups

Two studies assessed whether a stereotypic explanatory bias emerges primarily when members of low (compared to high) social status groups engage in behaviors inconsistent with group stereotypes. A preliminary study showed that male and female participants spontaneously showed more stereotypically biased explanatory processing of female stereotype-inconsistency (i.e., explanation of male-stereotypic behaviors performed by female compared to male actors) than male stereotype-inconsistency (i.e., explanation of female-stereotypic behaviors performed by male compared to female actors). The main experiment provided a manipulation of social status of target groups, and both external (i.e., situational) and internal (i.e., dispositional) explanations for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors were assessed. Results showed that external explanations for female stereotype-inconsistency were greater for targets described as low, not high in socioeconomic status. This research suggests that information processing is biased when members of a low status group engage in stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, whereas members of high status groups can engage in either stereotypic or counter-stereotypic behaviors without instigating biases in information processing.     

Western Theory,Indigenous Religion,and Local Material: Enhancing Learning Motivation among Students of Religious Studies in the Asian Context

One of the difficulties in teaching religious studies in Asia is that many religious theories and case studies are closely related to Western countries and therefore the knowledge and teaching material have a strong Western cultural bias. The cultural differences make teaching rather difficult and, most importantly, lower students' motivation to learn. To deal with the problem, this researcher attempted to introduce material on indigenous religions in various subjects in order to test whether such material would enhance student motivation. The material included newspaper articles, articles in books and journals, television programs, and documentary films. This paper is the result of an experiment in education and personal reflection on the use of indigenous religious materials in teaching religious studies in the Asian context.     

青少年学生疏离感的理论构建及量表编制

通过文献分析和实证研究 ,构建了疏离感的理论维度 ,并据此编制了青少年学生疏离感的测量量表。对量表进行探索性因素分析和验证性因素分析后表明 :疏离感是一个多层次、多维度的体系 ,本身包含 2个层次和 9个维度 ,该研究所构建的疏离感理论体系比较合理。疏离感量表具有较好的信度和效度 ,可以作为青少年学生疏离感研究的测量工具     

Counterproductive Work Behavior Among Chinese Knowledge Workers

The purpose of this study was to investigate the frequency and antecedents of Chinese knowledge workers’ counterproductive work behavior (CWB) by using a self‐developed indigenous scale. The paper consisted of two studies. Study 1 developed an indigenous measure of knowledge workers’ CWB. Study 2 investigated the frequencies and antecedents of Chinese knowledge workers’ CWB using the indigenous measure with a sample of 366 participants. The results showed that CWB among Chinese knowledge workers was rather prevalent. The results also showed that personality variables (i.e., agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and locus of control) were more important than other variables (e.g., demographic and job characteristics) in predicting CWB.     

Models of reduction and categories of reductionism

A classification of models of reduction into three categories — theory reductionism, explanatory reductionism, and constitutive reductionism — is presented. It is shown that this classification helps clarify the relations between various explications of reduction that have been offered in the past, especially if a distinction is maintained between the various epistemological and ontological issues that arise. A relatively new model of explanatory reduction, one that emphasizes that reduction is the explanation of a whole in terms of its parts is also presented in detail. Finally, the classification is used to clarify the debate over reductionism in molecular biology. It is argued there that while no model from the category of theory reduction might be applicable in that case, models of explanatory reduction might yet capture the structure of the relevant explanations.Thanks are due to David Hull, Michael Martin, Ken Schaffner, Abner Shimony and William Wimsatt for many valuable discussions of these issues and for comments and criticism of an earlier version of this paper. This paper was partly written during the tenure of a grant from the Boston University Graduate School.     

CULTURAL ADAPTATIONS AND DIFFUSION FOR MANAGERIAL STRATEGIES AND RESPONSES IN HONG KONG

This paper addresses the issue of cultural adaptations and diffusion for managerial strategies in host societies to which work enterprises are not indigenous in terms of their capital and management or either. With illustrations drawn from a series of case-studies of work organisations in Hong Kong managed respectively by Chinese, British and Japanese capital, there was an appearance of support for the thesis of ‘cultural’ determinism and its implications for strategical adaptations in work organisations. The implication was drawn that the Oriental nexus of altruism, trust and subtlety could be rooted in the more laudible and perhaps global influence of Confucianism. Some subsequent issues are raised. First, the problem of cultural adaptation is not specific to multinationals or foreign firms visiting from outside but also applies where the management and their ethic background are not indigenous. The other issue is the extent of cultural adaptation within work organisations, as determined by the degree of affinity with a common mother culture. The paper suggests that a common denominating mother culture can serve a strategical starting point to bring about intra-organisational and organisation-society link and harmony.     

Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience

In a recent paper, Kaplan (Synthese 183:339–373, 2011) takes up the task of extending Craver’s (Explaining the brain, 2007) mechanistic account of explanation in neuroscience to the new territory of computational neuroscience. He presents the model to mechanism mapping (3M) criterion as a condition for a model’s explanatory adequacy. This mechanistic approach is intended to replace earlier accounts which posited a level of computational analysis conceived as distinct and autonomous from underlying mechanistic details. In this paper I discuss work in computational neuroscience that creates difficulties for the mechanist project. Carandini and Heeger (Nat Rev Neurosci 13:51–62, 2012) propose that many neural response properties can be understood in terms of canonical neural computations. These are “standard computational modules that apply the same fundamental operations in a variety of contexts.” Importantly, these computations can have numerous biophysical realisations, and so straightforward examination of the mechanisms underlying these computations carries little explanatory weight. Through a comparison between this modelling approach and minimal models in other branches of science, I argue that computational neuroscience frequently employs a distinct explanatory style, namely, efficient coding explanation. Such explanations cannot be assimilated into the mechanistic framework but do bear interesting similarities with evolutionary and optimality explanations elsewhere in biology.