An Evaluation of the Effects of Graphic Aids in Improving Decision Accuracy in a Continuous Treatment Design

Educators, school psychologists, and other professionals must evaluate student progress and decide to continue, modify, or terminate instructional programs to ensure student success. For this purpose, progress-monitoring data are often collected, plotted graphically, and visually analyzed. The current study evaluated the impact of three common formats for visual analysis (scatter plots, scatter plots with trend lines, and scatter plots with trend and aim lines) on the decision accuracy of 52 novice analysts. All participants viewed 18 time-series graphs that depicted student growth on a continuous metric (e.g., oral reading fluency). Participants rated each graph as depicting substantial progress, minimal progress, or no progress. The magnitude of the true slope for each graph was fixed to 3.00 (substantial progress), 0.75 (minimal progress), or 0 (no progress). Inferential analyses were used to determine the probability of a participant correctly identifying different magnitudes of trend in the presence of different visual aids (no visual aid, trend line, and trend line with aim line). The odds of correctly identifying trend were influenced by visual aid (p < .01) and trend magnitude (p < .01). The addition of a trend line resulted in a sharp increase in the probability of making a correct decision. Graphs depicting minimal progress reduced the probability of a correct decision.     

直觉在军事决策中的应用

直觉决策是以决策者经验为基础的无意识的决策过程.现代战争的动态性、不确定性、复杂性和模糊性要求指挥员在战场当中要善于利用直觉进行快速决断.受到决策的双系统理论以及再认启动决策模型思想的影响,美军从20世纪80年代后期开始重视直觉决策在制定作战计划中的作用,相关研究机构积极探索培养指挥员直觉决策能力的方法,作战条令中也逐渐融入了直觉决策的理念.美军的研究发现和实践结果不仅揭示了基于经验的直觉决策过程的内在心理机制,而且对我军培养适合于未来战争的优秀指挥人才具有启示作用.     

On the Role of Intuition in Decision Making and Some Ways of Multicriteria Aid of Intuition

Practical experiences in decision-making—including the experience in the reform of the system of funding of scientific research in Poland—lead to the conclusion that it is important to understand better the role of intuition in decision-making processes. For this purpose a more specific definition of intuition is proposed. One of the conclusions from this definition is that multicriteria aid for decisions should concentrate more on supporting earlier stages of decision processes that precede choice. The role of and possible tools for multicriteria aid for model simulation and analysis are presented. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.     

Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

Cost-Benefit Determinants of Decision Process and Accuracy

Both costs and benefits were manipulated in monetary terms in a business relocation task in an effort to test cost-benefit models of decision making (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Results indicated that both information costs and awards significantly affected depth, variability, and latency of search. Effects of cost of information on decision accuracy were mediated primarily by depth of search. The strongest support for cost-benefit models of decision making consisted of the very large difference between experimental conditions and a control condition to which costs and rewards were not manipulated. Future research should further explore the importance of cost-benefit manipulations and the impact of decision process variables on decision accuracy.     

Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making

What produces better judgments: deliberating or relying on intuition? Past research is inconclusive. We focus on the role of expertise to increase understanding of the effects of judgment mode. We propose a framework in which expertise depends on a person's experience with and knowledge about a domain. Individuals who are relatively experienced but have modest knowledge about the subject matter (“intermediates”) are expected to suffer from deliberation and to benefit from a more intuitive approach, because they lack the formal knowledge to understand the reasons underlying their preferences. Individuals who are high (“experts”) or low (“novices”) on both experience and knowledge are expected to do well or poorly, respectively, regardless of decision mode. We tested these predictions in the domain of art. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that intermediates performed better when relying on intuition than after deliberation. Judgments of experts and novices were unaffected. In line with previous research relating processing style to judgment mode, Experiment 3 showed that the effect of processing style (global versus local) on judgment quality is similarly moderated by expertise. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

Development and Validation of a New Measure of Intuition: The Types of Intuition Scale

The Types of Intuition Scale (TIntS) measures three types of intuition identified in a literature review by Pretz and Totz (2007): holistic, inferential, and affective. Holistic intuitions integrate diverse sources of information in a Gestalt‐like, non‐analytical manner; inferential intuitions are based on previously analytical processes that have become automatic; and affective intuitions are based on feelings. Current intuition measures inadequately assess these distinct types. We report four validity studies: Study 1 reports the reliability and factor structure of the TIntS and correlations with extant intuition and personality measures. Study 2 presents a confirmatory factor analysis. Studies 3 and 4 examine the predictive validity of the TIntS with respect to clinical decision making in occupational therapy and musical performance. Scales were internally consistent and stable over time, and factor analyses supported the predicted distinctions among them. Correlations with existing measures of intuition, personality, and behavior showed that the TIntS is unique in its assessment of all three types of intuition in one measure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

人事决策信息利用和效能预测模型

本研究以 1 2 2名人事管理人员为被试 ,采用问卷测量法 ,分析了企业人事决策信息利用的现状 ,信息利用指标和效能的关系。结果发现 :1企业人事决策中比较重视能力要求信息、组织环境信息和个人档案材料 ,忽略心理特点信息的利用 ;2非程序信息、人职匹配信息对效能指标的直接预测力较强 ,其他指标的预测力较弱 ;3能力要求、考核成绩、个人档案材料等信息通过人职匹配信息的利用对效能指标产生影响。文章还构建了人事决策的效能预测模型 ,并讨论了研究结果对企业人事决策诊断和发展的理论和实际意义。     

Improving Accuracy on Bayesian Inference Problems Using a Brief Tutorial

Research suggests that most people struggle when asked to interpret the outcomes of diagnostic tests such as those presented as Bayesian inference problems. To help people interpret these difficult problems, we created a brief tutorial, requiring less than 10 minutes, that guided participants through the creation of an aid (either graph or table) based on an example inference problem and then showed the correct way to calculate the positive predictive value of the problem (i.e., likelihood that positive tests correctly indicate presence of condition). Approximately 70% of those in each training condition found the correct response on at least one problem in the format for which they were trained. Just under 55% of those in the control condition (i.e., no training) were able to find the correct response on at least one table or graph problem. We demonstrated a relationship between numeracy and performance on both problem formats, although we did not find evidence for a relationship between graph literacy and performance for either problem format. Potential improvements to and applications of the tutorial are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lay Perceptions of Selection Decision Aids in US and Non‐US Samples

Understanding why decision makers resist using standardized approaches to employee selection requires understanding basic feelings and beliefs about different approaches for collecting and combining assessment information. This study examines lay perceptions of selection decision aids, using a sample of 418 working adults. Holding constant the attributes measured, participants from the United States perceive holistic integration to be superior to mechanical integration for combining interview scores, as well as for combining test scores. Participants from outside of the United States prefer holistic integration of interview scores, but slightly prefer mechanical integration of test scores.     

Hindsight Bias,Visual Aids,and Legal Decision Making: Timing is Everything

Once individuals learn the outcomes of events, they tend to overestimate the ability with which they could have predicted the event (hindsight bias). We discuss the relation between processing fluency and hindsight bias in the context of visual animations designed to clarify complex events. Visual reconstructions, by increasing clarity while masking gaps or uncertainty in the underlying data, have been shown to increase hindsight bias in legal settings. More generally, any computer‐generated visual may not only clarify data sets, but breed overconfidence. Further, by taking a broader view of judgments shift over time, a clearer portrait of hindsight bias may be achieved.     

Human covariation judgment: Accuracy and strategy

Judgment strategy is proposed as a contributor to the variability of findings in past research on human covariation judgment. Mathematically sophisticated judgment strategies will accurately judge all event covariations. However, faulty judgment rules will also produce correct judgments of many event relationships. Several methods have been used in past research to identify subjects' strategies of covariation judgment. Each of these methods indicates that humans employ simplistic, error-prone rules to judge event relationships. Shifts in covariation strategy use are proposed as a source of past findings that judgment accuracy depends on the decision conditions.     

Improving Decision Making by Means of Dissent1

Antidotes to problems associated with uniformity of viewpoints have generally involved dissent in one form or another (Katzenstein, 1996), one being “devil's advocate.” Research on authentic dissent has documented additional advantages in that it stimulates divergent and original thought (Nemeth, 1995). In this study, authentic disscnt was compared with devil's advocate and with no dissent. Findings indicate that authentic dissent was superior in (a) stimulating a greater proportion of original thoughts, (b) considering the opposite position, and (c) direct attitude change. Devil's advocate was found to stimulate cognitive boistcring of the initial position, thus raising concerns about the unintended consequences of techniques such as devil's advocate and the subtle task facing attempts to foster original thought and yet maintain cohesion.