A note: Is it a catch or a fumble?

Following Whiting' (1986) comments on Fischman and Schneider (1985) and Smyth and Marriott (1982), this note addresses the questions of expertise in catching, the effects of sight of the hand on timing and positioning, and the difficulties of comparing performance in different experiments on catching.     

Mental images: Specific or general,personal or impersonal?

In three experiments the relation between visual images classified in terms of the four categories of personal, impersonal, specific, and general images was explored. The results showed that subjects were able to generate all types of images, with personal images being the easiest to recall. Personal images, together with general images, were the image types being easiest to integrate with one another. Overall, the observations suggested the existence of two imagery dimensions: specific-general, and personal-impersonal. Memory was found to be best for personal images. Personal images turned out to be easier to integrate in memory than specific images. The findings were discussed in terms of different image generation models.     

Cognitive changes in pregnancy: mild decline or societal stereotype?

This research compared pregnant and non‐pregnant women's perceptions of cognitive change and their performance on 13 sensitive memory and attention tasks (Study 1) and two complex driving simulation tasks (Study 2). The pregnant, but not the non‐pregnant, women rated their cognitive abilities as worse than before, but only two performance measures from Study 1 differentiated the two groups (speed of language processing and attentional switching). Study 3 examined beliefs about pregnancy‐related cognitive decline. Women and men with and without immediate experience of pregnancy rated pregnant women's cognitive abilities as slightly worse than before pregnancy. Memory ratings were worse from women and from those with immediate experience of pregnancy. It is concluded that there may be some mild effects of pregnancy on performance of some specific cognitive functions but that cultural expectations based on a stereotype of cognitive decline also contribute to pregnant women's perception of cognitive change. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Problems in ADHD: Is it a Skills Acquisition or Performance Problem?

Recent models suggest that social skills training’s inefficacy for children with ADHD may be due to target misspecification, such that their social problems reflect inconsistent performance rather than knowledge/skill gaps. No study to date, however, has disentangled social skills acquisition from performance deficits in children with ADHD. Children ages 8–12 with ADHD (n?=?47) and without ADHD (n?=?23) were assessed using the well-validated social behavioral analysis framework to quantify cross-informant social skills acquisition deficits, performance deficits, and strengths. Results provided support for the construct and predictive validities of this Social Skills Improvement System (SSIS) alternate scoring method, including expected magnitude and valence relations with BASC-2 social skills and ADHD symptoms based on both parent and teacher report. Acquisition deficits were relatively rare and idiosyncratic for both the ADHD and Non-ADHD groups, whereas children with ADHD demonstrated cross-informant social performance deficits (d?= 0.82–0.99) on several specific behaviors involving attention to peer directives, emotion regulation, and social reciprocity. Relative to themselves, children with ADHD were perceived by parents and teachers as exhibiting more social strengths than social acquisition deficits; however, they demonstrated significantly fewer social strengths than the Non-ADHD group (d?=??0.71 to ?0.89). These findings are consistent with recent conceptualizations suggesting that social problems in ADHD primarily reflect inconsistent performance rather than a lack of social knowledge/skills. Implications for refining social skills interventions for ADHD are discussed.     

Is it life or is it Memorex? Video as a representation of reality

This paper offers an overview of research on infants’ early behavior toward televised images, followed by an account of the development of representational competence with video. Several aspects of representation are involved in young children’s understanding and use of video. From a very young age, children form mental representations of the contents of video, making sense of realistic images of familiar things. Children also notice and represent information regarding video itself (e.g., its 2-dimensionality). An important development occurs when children represent the relation between video and reality: at first, toddlers appear to categorize video as separate from reality, but eventually children recognize realistic video images as physical representations (symbols) of events they have not directly perceived. A mature representation of video takes into account genre (e.g., news, drama) and reality status based on recognition that video can (but does not always) represent real events.     

Religion,Prejudice, and Authoritarianism: Is RWA a Boon or Bane to the Psychology of Religion?

In research on religiosity and prejudice, right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) has been studied alongside variables such as fundamentalism and orthodoxy. Four concerns regarding research on the relationship between RWA and religiosity are identified: (1) the overlap of religiosity and prejudice within the RWA scale; (2) the inflation of relationships by correlating part‐whole measures; (3) covariation in the extremes of the construct hiding the possible independence of components within RWA; and (4) statistical artifacts arising in multiple regression from the combination of these factors. We elaborate these four issues and then demonstrate how they can lead to different interpretations of some previously published data. The article concludes with suggestions for the management and resolution of these issues that may allow RWA to continue to be used in religiosity and prejudice research and how it might evolve to become the boon to researchers that they seek.     

Prejudice and peace: Is the Swedish youth neutral in its attitudes?

Two hundred and sixty Swedish students attending grade 9 were given a semantic differential to measure their attitudes towards four countries, Sweden, West Germany, USA, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union received significantly more unfavourable ratings on nearly all variables than the other countries, which received mainly favourable or neutral ones. Most interesting, the Soviet Union is rated as "enemy", whilst the other countries are rated as "friends". Implications for peace education are discussed.     

Demonstrating “Reasonable Fear” at Trial: Is it Science or Junk Science?

This paper explores how scientific knowledge is used in a criminal case. I examine materials from an admissibility hearing in a murder trial and discuss the dynamics of contesting expert scientific opinion and evidence. The research finds that a purported form of “science” in the relevant scientific community is filtered through, tested by, and subjected to legal standards, conceptions, and procedures for determining admissibility. The paper details how the opposing lawyers, the expert witness, and the judge vie to contingently work out what will count in court as appropriate scientific authority, methods and evidence, and as a scientifically valid and legally admissible account of “reasonable fear.” When science becomes enmeshed in legal controversies, science does not trump law. Rather, it is the court’s canons of proper procedure and measures of substantive adequacy that take precedence.

Desire for personal feedback: Who wants it and what does it mean for psychotherapy?

Individual differences in desire for feedback did not exhibit any significant correlations with a variety of self-report personality dimensions. Additional survey studies indicated that a higher proportion of individuals in nonclinical as compared to clinical samples reported a strong desire to receive feedback about themselves. Subsequent studies revealed that the higher as compared to lower desire for feedback individuals: (1) were more willing to seek psychological help and to participate in therapy once in treatment; (2) exhibited more positive expectancies for change at the beginning of therapy; and (3) were more “responsive” to diagnostic feedback. Within the limitations of the present findings, the potential “adaptiveness” of desire for feedback is discussed and the negative motivational therapeutic consequences associated with a low desire for feedback are explored.     

Implicit personality theory: Is it illusory?1

Several studies have found a substantial association between subjects' judgments about the co-occurrence of personality items and the items' actual co-occurrence, lending support to the validity of implicit personality theory. This work has recently been called into question by an investigation of Mirels (1976) that reported a nonsignificant relationship between judged probabilities of item pairs and the pairs' empirical coendorsement probabilities (actually calculated conditional probabilities) derived from self-report responses. Using Mirels' data as well as new data, an appreciable and highly significant association between judgments of behavioral co-occurrence and empirical coendorsement was found, when the latter was measured by correlational-type indexes instead of conditional probability. This outcome indicates that the divergent results in the Mirels investigation were due to its use of the conditional probability index as a measure of empirical coendorsement. These findings add to the accumulating body of evidence pointing to the validity of implicit personality theory.     

Configurality in judgment: Is it a bias?

Past research has shown that the relationship between cue and judgment often depends on the level of other cues (configural relationship). It is not clear, however, if this relationship is environmentally appropriate. To examine this issue, I compare configural models of the judgment with configural models of the criterion associated with this judgment. Two databases are analyzed. In one, the cues are the parents’ educational level, the judgment is the educational expectations of the child, and the criterion is the actual educational achievement. In the other, the cues are the MMPI scores of psychiatric patients, the judgment is the clinical psychologists’ estimation of the degree of pathology, and the criterion is the actual pathology. The analysis of both databases revealed that configurality characterizes the judgment but not the criterion.     

Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me,is it the group or are we all to blame?

According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally, perhaps morally, and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration.     

Is it emotion or is it stress? Gender stereotypes and the perception of subjective experience

Two studies of college undergraduates (ns = 95 and 92, primarily non-Hispanic whites and Asian Americans) investigated gender stereotypes of stress and emotion, as well as variables that influence the perception of gender-related differences. Study 1 assessed how gender stereotypes differ from the self-reports of men and women. When asked to choose a label for the subjective experience of the average man and the average woman in a series of problematic hypothetical situations, participants generally tended to believe that the average female would feel ‘emotional,” but that the average male would feel “stressed.” By contrast, the label participants chose to describe their own subjective experience was not significantly affected by their gender. In addition, participants believed the average woman and man differed more in the intensity of their emotions than in the intensity of their stress, a belief contradicted by their own self-reports. Results of Study 2 indicated that gender-related differences in estimations of stress and emotion for the self were reduced or eliminated when specific information about experience-eliciting situations was provided. We would like to thank Matthew Dank for his help in preparing the stimulus materials.     

Is it Safe to Disagree?

This paper offers a new account of the epistemic significance of disagreement which is grounded in two assumptions; (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief and, (ii) that the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. These assumptions motivate a modal definition of epistemic peerhood, which is much easier to operate on than the more traditional definitions of epistemic peerhood. The modal account of the epistemic significance of disagreement yields plausible results regarding cases of disagreement. Furthermore, it is able to tap into the intuitions that have motivated the conformist and the nonconformist positions and it locates a fruitful middle‐ground between these two conflicting positions. It will be shown that the conformist is correct in that cases of real peer disagreement force us to suspend our judgment. The reason for this is that in cases of real peer disagreement our beliefs fail to be safe. The nonconformist, on the other hand, is right in that disagreement in itself does not have any epistemic power. It is only by the grace of nature that we gain knowledge. The fact that someone disagrees with you does not mean that you do not have knowledge.     

Your Self: did you find it or did you make it?

Abstract: In this paper ¹ 1 This is a slightly edited version of a paper that was pre‐circulated to members of the Society of Analtyical Psychology for discussion at the monthly meeting of the ‘analytic group’ on 4^th November 1991. Sub‐headings and some references have been added by the Editor, Warren Colman.
, written in draft form in 1991 and now posthumously published, the late Louis Zinkin ² 2 The late Louis Zinkin was a practising analytical psychologist and group analyst, a training analyst of the S.A.P., honorary consultant psychotherapist and senior lecturer at St George's Hospital, London, and associate of the Group‐Analytic Practice, London. He died on 13^th March 1993.
presents a constructivist view of the self. He considers some of the paradoxes in Jungian definitions of the self and compares these to Winnicott's ‘forbidden question’ regarding the transitional object: ‘Did you find it or did you make it?’. He argues that, for the purposes of a coherent scientific theory, these apparent paradoxes need to be formulated in an internally consistent way. Bemused by the many contradictions in Jung's thinking, he proposes making a fresh start by thinking in terms of people in social interaction with each other rather than as solitary subjects, as Jung did. This leads him to the view that the self comes into existence through continuing interaction with other people. Drawing on the work of Harré and Vygotsky, he suggests that the public self is prior to the private self and that one becomes real through recognition by other people in and through language and culture. The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Society of Analytical Psychology in November 1991 and an edited version of the taped discussion follows.     

Connectionism: Is it a paradigm shift for psychology?

Connectionism is a method of modeling cognition as the interaction of neuron-like units. Connectionism has received a gread deal of interest and may represent a paradigm shift for psychology. The nature of a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) is reviewed with respect to connectionism. The reader is provided an overview on connectionism including: an introduction to connectionist modeling, new issues it emphasizes, a brief history, its developing sociopolitical impact, theoretical impact, and empirical impact. Cautions, concerns, and enthusiasm for connectionism are expressed.