Ethics and the Science of Animal Minds

Ethicists have commonly appealed to science to bolster their arguments for elevating the moral status of nonhuman animals. I describe a framework within which I take many ethicists to be making such appeals. I focus on an apparent gap in this framework between those properties of animals that are part of the scientific consensus, and those to which ethicists typically appeal in their arguments. I will describe two different ways of diminishing the appearance of the gap, and argue that both of them present challenges to ethicists seeking a firm scientific basis for their claims about the moral status of animals. I argue that more clarity about the role of appeals to science by applied ethicists leads to questions about the effectiveness of such appeals, and that these questions might best be pursued empirically.     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.     

Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal Ethics

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer.     

The Regulation of Animal Research and the Emergence of Animal Ethics: A Conceptual History

The history of the regulation of animal research is essentially the history of the emergence of meaningful social ethics for animals in society. Initially, animal ethics concerned itself solely with cruelty, but this was seen as inadequate to late 20^th-century concerns about animal use. The new social ethic for animals was quite different, and its conceptual bases are explored in this paper. The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 represented a very minimal and in many ways incoherent attempt to regulate animal research, and is far from morally adequate. The 1985 amendments did much to render coherent the ethic for laboratory animals, but these standards were still inadequate in many ways, as enumerated here. The philosophy underlying these laws is explained, their main provisions are explored, and future directions that could move the ethic forward and further rationalize the laws are sketched.     

Reasonable Partiality and Animal Ethics

Moral psychology is often ignored in ethical theory, making applied ethics difficult to achieve in practice. This is particularly true in the new field of animal ethics. One key feature of moral psychology is recognition of the moral primacy of those with whom we enjoy relationships of love and friendship – philia in Aristotles term. Although a radically new ethic for animal treatment is emerging in society, its full expression is severely limited by our exploitative uses of animals. At this historical moment, only the animals with whom we enjoy philia – companion animals – can be treated with unrestricted moral concern. This ought to be accomplished, both for its own sake and as an ideal model for the future evolution of animal ethics.     

Animal confinement and use

We distinguish two conceptions of confinement – the agential conception and the comparative conception – and show that the former is intimately related to use in a way that the latter is not. Specifically, in certain conditions, agential confinement constitutes use and creates a special relationship that makes neglect or abuse especially egregious. This allows us to develop and defend an account of one important way in which agential confinement can be morally wrong. We then discuss some of the account’s practical implications, including its usefulness for decision-making in real-world contexts in which animals are confined.     

Animal experimentation

Millions of animals are used every year in oftentimes extremely painful and distressing scientific procedures. Legislation of animal experimentation in modern societies is based on the supposition that this is ethically acceptable when certain more or less defined formal (e.g. logistical, technical) demands and ethical principles are met. The main parameters in this context correspond to the “3Rs” concept as defined by Russel and Burch in 1959, i.e. that all efforts to replace, reduce and refine experiments must be undertaken. The licensing of animal experiments normally requires an ethical evaluation process, oftentimes undertaken by ethics committees. The serious problems in putting this idea into practice include inter alia unclear conditions and standards for ethical decisions, insufficient management of experiments undertaken for specific (e.g. regulatory) purposes, and conflicts of interest of ethics committees’ members. There is an ongoing societal debate about ethical issues of animal use in science. Existing EU legislation on animal experimentation for cosmetics testing is an example of both the public will for setting clear limits to animal experiments and the need to further critically examine other fields and aspects of animal experimentation. This paper was presented at the 6th International Bioethics Conference on the subject of ‘The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research’, held in Warsaw, Poland, 3–4 June 2005. The paper has been expanded from an article to be published in the forthcoming Council of Europe publication entitled “Animal Protection and Welfare”.     

试论西方伦理学的科学路径

由于文化的差异,西方伦理学在发展路径上表现出明显的科学化倾向:一方面,与中国伦理学认为通达道德境界的道路只能是修身养性不同,西方伦理学却主张科学的理性有助于达到道德的理想目标;另一方面,与中国伦理学甚至认为为道与为学在根本上是对抗的相反,西方伦理学却断言美德本身就是知识。     

医学研究实验动物伦理和福利状况调查——以药学和中药学期刊载文分析为例

调研我国27种药学和中药学期刊2018年刊发论文中实验动物伦理审查和福利状况以及期刊稿约中关于动物实验研究的伦理要求。结果发现,23种期刊声明通过动物伦理委员会审核的论文比例低于14%,25种期刊注明动物伦理审批编号的论文比例低于5%,各个期刊声明遵循有关动物使用和操作指南的论文比例均低于10%。部分论文实验动物福利状况的表述不清楚,动物实验所遵循的指南和原则表述不规范;大部分期刊稿约没有对动物实验研究伦理提出明确要求。建议尽快加强相关期刊编辑的实验动物伦理和福利意识,及时完善稿约内容。     

Neo-Pragmatism,Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds

Philosophia - According to Hutto and Satne (Philosophia, 43(3), 521–536, 2015), an “essential tension” plagues contemporary neo-Pragmatist accounts of mental contents: their...     

Ethics education in science and engineering: The case of animal research

Conclusion The past one hundred fifty years of debate over the use of animals in research and testing has been characterized mainly byad hominem attacks and on uncritical rejection of the other sides’ arguments. In the classroom, it is important to avoid repeating exercises in public relations and to demand sound scholarship. This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993.     

Discerning the Division of Cognitive Labor: An Emerging Understanding of How Knowledge Is Clustered in Other Minds

The division of cognitive labor is fundamental to all cultures. Adults have a strong sense of how knowledge is clustered in the world around them and use that sense to access additional information, defer to relevant experts, and ground their own incomplete understandings. One prominent way of clustering knowledge is by disciplines similar to those that comprise the natural and social sciences. Seven studies explored an emerging sense of these discipline-based ways of clustering of knowledge. Even 5-year-olds could cluster knowledge in a manner roughly corresponding to the departments of natural and social sciences in a university, doing so without any explicit awareness of those academic disciplines. But this awareness is fragile early on and competes with other ways of clustering knowledge. Over the next few years, children come to see discipline-based clusters as having a privileged status, one that may be linked to increasingly sophisticated assumptions about essences for natural kinds. Possible mechanisms for this developmental shift are examined.     

Christian Ethics,Religious Ethics,and Secular Ethics: A Contemporary Reappraisal

In this essay, I argue that Christian ethicists should not think of themselves as religious ethicists. I defend this claim by arguing that the concept of religious ethics, as it has come to be understood as a discipline that is distinct from secular ethics, is incoherent. In part one, I describe the fraught attempts by theologians in the 20th century to identify the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. In part two, I argue that certain accounts of natural law unwittingly reinforce a problematic conception of secular ethics. Part three examines some trends in religious studies and comparative religious ethics to highlight problematic conceptions of religion. Drawing together these strands of inquiry, I contend that that the secular-religious dichotomy in contemporary ethics should be rejected, but by the same token, I suggest that comparative ethics remains a worthwhile enterprise.     

论现代医学视野中的伦理与现代伦理视野中的医学

医学与伦理的关系从古代、近代到现代,经过了一个浑然一体、相互分离和重新融合的否定之否定过程。通过对这一过程的简要考察和分析,着重阐述了现代医学视野中的伦理与现代伦理视野中的医学应当所具有的本质形相。在现代医学视野中,现代医学伦理是来自人类伦理遗产和对现实生命道德问题的伦理认识结果两方面的理论交汇。现代伦理应当是多层次的理论与实践系统,其中包括道德哲学层次的思考;生命伦理中的道德原则和规范的构建;关于生命道德规范长入现代医学的机制问题的思考;现代医学伦理的发展与相关学科的相互借鉴的研究。在现代伦理的视野中,现代医学的本质在于,现代“大医学”的概念已经取代了对医学的传统认识;医学作为现代社会文化构成部分的特质逐渐地被揭示出来;现代医学已经成为特定社会职业群体以科学技术为主体的重要社会活动。站在现代医学和现代伦理各自的立场认识和了解对方,对全面把握二者之间的关系和推进二者之间的有机结合具有重要意义。     

基于非侵入性脑刺激的认知增强：方法、伦理和应用

作为人类追求卓越的方式之一,基于非侵入性脑刺激的认知增强成为众多学科和公众关注的问题。首先阐述了非侵入性脑刺激的两种主要技术手段(经颅磁刺激和经颅直流刺激)的技术原理及其在提升健康个体认知功能上的应用,并分析了这两种技术可能带来的安全、自主选择、公平等伦理问题,最后总结了该认知增强技术在体育和军事等两个具体领域的应用。未来可进一步提高技术手段的深部脑区刺激能力及该增强技术的持续和真实效果。     

“认知科学”与“第二代认知科学”刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换。以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的立场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向。第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析中的变量之间的交互作用关系”,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮。第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重大问题重新思考     

对药品临床试验的伦理性与科学性的思考

药物临床试验首先要符合伦理学原则,同时又必须具备科学性。伦理学原则要求受试者最大程度受益和尽可能避免伤害。随机、双盲对照的方法在保障科学性的同时,对伦理学提出了挑战。     

"认知革命"与"第二代认知科学"刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换．以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的赢场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向、第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析巾的变量之间的交互作用关系,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮,第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重夫问题重新思考。     

Theological Ethics, Moral Philosophy, and Natural Law

The article deals with the relationship between theological ethics and moral philosophy. The former is seen as a theoretical reflection on Christian ethics, the latter as one on secular ethics. The main questions asked are: (1) Is there one and only one pre-theoretical knowledge about acting rightly? (2) Does philosophy provide us with the theoretical framework for understanding both Christian and secular ethics? Both questions are answered in the negative. In the course of argument, four positions are presented: theological ‘unificationism’, philosophical ‘unificationism’, theological ‘separationism’ and Lutheran ‘dualism’. It is argued that the latter position is most convincing. It is dual in the sense of being both a theory of Christian ethics and of including a recognition of natural law. Hence, it unites a particularistic and a universalistic point of view. In the last section a reformulation of the Lutheran position is attempted in making use of the ethical theory of Knud E. Løgstrup's The Ethical Demand.