REASONS, CAUSES, AND CONTRASTS

Abstract:   The standard argument for the causal theory of action is "Davidson's Challenge": explain the connection between reasons and actions without appealing to the idea that reasons cause actions. I argue that this is an argument to the best contrastive explanation. After examining the nature of contrastive explanation in detail, I show that the causalist does not yet have the best explanation. The best explanation would appeal further to the motivational strength of reasons. Finally, I show how this undermines the argument for causalism, since noncausalists, too, can meet Davidson's Challenge by appealing to motivational strength to explain the cases at issue.     

Samesaying, Propositions and Radical Interpretation

Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy.     

Stages in the psychological response to unemployment: A (dis)integrative review

There are widespread assertions in the literature on the psychological effects of unemployment that the response to job loss takes the form of qualitatively distinct stages or phases. This review gives an exposition of the main stage accounts, suggests reasons why such accounts appear compelling, and reveals what is entailed by the decision to hold such an account. When this is made clear the empirical evidence for a stage-by-stage account of unemployment experience is seen to be ambivalent at best. Most evidence is seriously flawed. Stage accounts are further criticized for inconsistency, internal contradictions, nonspecificity of domain, overindividualism, and restrictive ethnocentricity. It is suggested that evidence apparently supportive of stage accounts may be partly artifactual. Stage accounts are not recommended.     

On Noël Carroll on narrative closure

This paper examines various claims by Noël Carroll about narrative closure and its relationship to narrative connections, which are, roughly, causal connections generously conceived to include necessary conditions for sufficient conditions for an effect. I propose supplementing the expanded notion of a cause with Michael Bratman’s notion of a psychological connection to account for the particular role that human agents play in narratives. A novel and a film are used as examples to illustrate how the concept of a psychological connection eliminates the need for Carroll's condition that narratives must be globally forward-looking.     

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRIANGULATION: LOCATING DAVIDSON'S NON-REDUCTIVE NATURALISM

Abstract: Donald Davidson has emphasized the importance of what he calls "triangulation" for clarifying the conditions that make thought possible. Various critics have questioned whether this triangular causal interaction between two individuals and a shared environment can provide necessary conditions for the emergence of thought. I argue that these critical responses all suffer from a lack of appreciation for the way triangulation is responsive to the philosophical commitments of Davidson's naturalism. This reply to Davidson's critics helps clarify several metaphilosophical issues concerning the overall significance of this use of triangulation. I illustrate how the network of commitments that make up Davidson's conception of non-reductive naturalism inform the respective problems and issues that triangulation is introduced to address. This then serves as an example of the way metaphilosophical considerations are useful in clarifying the status of a respective philosophical position and for understanding the philosophical debates surrounding it.     

The open future, bivalence and assertion

It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.     

DAVIDSON AND FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY: PARATAXIS AND SELF-EXPRESSION

Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.     

Davidson's Transcendental Externalism

One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson's later work was to show that participation in a certain causal nexus involving two creatures and a shared environment–Davidson calls this nexus "triangulation"–is a metaphysically necessary condition for the acquisition of thought. This doctrine, I suggest, is aptly regarded as a form of what I call transcendental externalism. I extract two arguments for the transcendental-externalist doctrine from Davidson's writings, and argue that neither succeeds. A central interpretive claim is that the arguments are primarily funded by a particular conception of the nature of non-human animal life. This conception turns out to be insupportable. The failure of Davidson's arguments presses the question of whether we could ever hope to arrive at far-reaching claims about the conditions for thought if we deny, as does Davidson, the legitimacy of the naturalistic project in the philosophy of mind.     

Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski, Hoffman, and Wilbur (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA.     

When two wrongs can make a right: Regulatory nonfit, bias, and correction of judgments

We propose that when people consider whether their judgments are accurate enough, feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit (inconsistency between regulatory state and strategic means) can suggest that the answer is no and enhance correction of judgments relative to feelings of rightness from regulatory fit. Results from two experiments supported that hypothesis. When we activated an accuracy motive, participants who experienced regulatory nonfit provided judgments more consistent with correction for bias when they experienced regulatory nonfit than when they experienced regulatory fit (Experiment 1). Drawing participants’ attention to an earlier event as a source of rightness feelings eliminated the effect of regulatory fit on apparent correction of judgments (Experiment 2), suggesting attribution of regulatory fit/nonfit feelings to the accuracy of those judgments.     

Davidson on First-Person Authority

Davidson's explanation of first-person authority in utterance of sentences of the form 'I V that p ' derives first-person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth-bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker's knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first-person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker's meaning. Davidson's account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person V s that p , he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson's conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein's.     

Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism

In a number of articles Donald Davidson has argued that the charitable nature of his method of radical interpretation rules out the possibility of massive error and thus refutes Cartesian skepticism. The diversity of such arguments and the suggestions that are all being made under the name of the principle of charity have prompted a large body of conflicting responses, adding only to the obscurity of the issues that are generally associated with the question of skepticism. In this paper I propose to consider the debate in a new light by reconstruing the principle of charity as a supervenience constraint on belief attribution. This would help explain some of the puzzling features of Davidson's arguments, like the idea of an omniscient interpreter, and the ensuing commentaries. Having provided an analysis of the limitations of Davidson's arguments, I shall then suggest an alternative explanation of the purported necessity of the principle of charity. Finally, having construed the principle of charity as a supervenience constraint, I shall examine what consequences this construal has for the logical status of the principle itself and its alleged epistemic potentials.     

Patterning of the minority's responses and their influence on the majority

In reaction to the decades of research that tended to assume that social influence is synonymous with conformity, recent work has concentrated on the ability of a minority, by having a system of answers of its own, to influence the majority in the direction of their judgments. A study by Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969) demonstrated this phenomenon but found that consistency of response, in the sense of repetition, was necessary for minority influence to be effected. They assumed that repetition was necessary to give the minority judgment the same value as that of the majority and to intensify the conflict that was engendered by the differences in opinion. Our position is that the lack of repetition in that study was construed to mean that the minority did not really have a position in which they were confident. As such, they were discounted. Thus, it is the attribution of consistency and confidence that leads to minority influence, not intensification of the conflict. The present study found that non-repetitious behavior by a minority could be seen as reflecting consistency and confidence and could lead to minority influence provided the inconsistency was patterned with some property of the stimulus. Such ‘inconsistency’ was perceived as favorable and as effective as any other condition and even more effective than one of the repetitious conditions.     

Neither Mereology nor Magic,but Teleology

Contemporary theories of universals have two things in common: first, they are unable to account for necessary connections between universals that form a structure. Second, they leave teleology out of their accounts of instantiation. These facts are not unrelated; the reason why contemporary theories have such trouble is they neglect the ancient idea that universals are ends at which nature aims. If we want a working theory of universals, however, we must return to this idea. Despite its unpopularity among realists, teleology is not a disposable eccentricity, and its dismissal is not an improvement on ancient views.     

Time perception,attention, and memory: A selective review

This article provides a selective review of time perception research, mainly focusing on the authors' research. Aspects of psychological time include simultaneity, successiveness, temporal order, and duration judgments. In contrast to findings at interstimulus intervals or durations less than 3.0–5.0 s, there is little evidence for an “across-senses” effect of perceptual modality (visual vs. auditory) at longer intervals or durations. In addition, the flow of time (events) is a pervasive perceptual illusion, and we review evidence on that. Some temporal information is encoded All rights reserved. relatively automatically into memory: People can judge time-related attributes such as recency, frequency, temporal order, and duration of events. Duration judgments in prospective and retrospective paradigms reveal differences between them, as well as variables that moderate the processes involved. An attentional-gate model is needed to account for prospective judgments, and a contextual-change model is needed to account for retrospective judgments.     

TOWARD AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE A PRIORI TRUTHS

Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and a kind of interpretive failure in the case of irrationality) are produced by independent psychological mechanisms, they have distal causes that turn out to be related in ways that—once language enters the picture—yield epistemically accessible necessary connections between the referents of their corresponding terms.     

Centered assertion

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.