Self-reported affect and core irrational thinking: A preliminary analysis

Prior tests of irrational thinking have included affect words in their irrational idea statements. Thus, because of content similarity, spuriously high correlations may have been previously observed between the endorsement of irrational ideas and self reported affect. A new measure of core irrational ideas, the Personal Beliefs Test, was given to 70 adults between the ages of 17 and 58. Results showed moderate correlations with neuroticism and self-reported negative affect, and a non-significant association with positive affect, thus supporting RET theory. Most of the explained variance in negative affect was related to the endorsement of irrational, Low Frustration Tolerance and Self Worth statements. This suggests that rational emotive therapists might devote greater time to disputing these ideas. Since most studies, including the present one, find only moderate correlations (i.e. .20 to .70) between irrational thinking and negative affect, it seems important to review the hypothesis that such thinking is theprimary cause of emotionality.He is a Fellow of the Institute for Rational Emotive Therapy and Holds the ABPP diploma in Clinical Psychology.Copies of the Personal Beliefs Test can be obtained from the author.     

Rational-emotive therapy and the religious client

The religious client presents a particular challenge to the RET therapist in that the irrational beliefs responsible for the client's problems are often created or supported by distortions in the religious belief system. This paper will discuss the connections between religious distortions and the irrational ideas, ways to deal with them, and then present the most common religiously based irrational beliefs along with biblical disputations.Constance Lawrence, M.S., is Director of the Christian Counseling Center in Norwalk, CT, and also has a private practice in Weston, CT.     

The Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms: Miracles,Monotheism, and Reason in Spinoza

Spinoza insists in the Theological Political Treatise that philosophy and theology are two separate kingdoms. I argue here that there is a basis in the psychology of the Ethics for one of the major components of the doctrine of the two kingdoms. Under the kingdom of theology, religion's principal function is to overcome the influence of harmful passion that prevents people from living life according to a fixed plan: people can live according to a fixed plan because they can obey. Through a series of arguments I show that Spinoza takes obedience to arise through devotion; devotion to associate with ideas of miracles and imaginative monotheism; and these ideas to be imaginative ideas of singular objects. On the psychology of the Ethics, ideas of this sort, although highly irrational, nevertheless give minds a power to resist harmful passion similar to that of ideas of reason. Although problems remain for the interpretation of the doctrine of the two kingdoms, this argument shows that Spinoza's psychology grounds his claim that theology, although different from philosophy, can help us to live well.     

Irrational Beliefs and Socio-Political Extremism

This paper discusses the role of irrational beliefs and socio-political extremism. A central feature of extremist ideology involves utopian beliefs regarding the perfectability of individuals or society. The relationship between these ideas and the absolute beliefs described in Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy is considered.     

Irrational Beliefs in Employees with an Adjustment,a Depressive,or an Anxiety Disorder: a Prospective Cohort Study

It remains unclear if patients with different types of common mental disorders, such as adjustment, anxiety and depressive disorders, have the same irrational ideas. The aim of this prospective cohort study (n = 190) is to investigate differences in level and type of irrational beliefs among these groups and to examine whether a change in irrational beliefs is related to symptom recovery. Irrational beliefs (IBI) and symptoms were measured at four points in time: at baseline, after 3, 6 and 12 months. Results showed that diagnostic groups differed in their level of irrational beliefs and this effect remained over time. Highest levels of irrationality were observed in the double diagnosis group, followed by the anxiety disorder group and the depression group. Participants with adjustment disorders showed the lowest levels of irrationality, comparable to a community sample. We did not find differences in the type of irrational beliefs between diagnostic groups. The level of irrationality declined over time for all diagnostic groups. No differences in decrease were observed between diagnostic groups. The magnitude and direction of change in irrational beliefs were related to the magnitude of recovery of depressive, anxiety and stress symptoms over time. These results support the application of general cognitive interventions, especially for patients with a depressive or an anxiety disorder.     

Defining Creativity: Don't We Also Need to Define What Is Not Creative?

I argue that any attempt to define creative ideas cannot fully succeed without also defining uncreative ideas. This argument begins by defining three parameters that characterize a potentially creative thought: the idea's initial probability (p), the final utility (u), and the creator's prior knowledge of that utility (v). The three parameters then lead to a three‐criterion multiplicative definition of personal creativity, namely, c = (1 ? p)u(1 ? v), where the first factor indicates originality and the third factor surprise. Although creativity can only maximize as originality, utility, and surprise all approach unity, the same definition indicates that there are seven different ways that creativity can minimize. These alternatives were identified as (a) routine, reproductive, or habitual ideas, (b) fortuitous response bias, (c) irrational perseveration, (d) problem finding, (e) rational suppression, (f) irrational suppression, and (g) blissful ignorance. If the third parameter v is omitted, then the number of creative and noncreative outcomes reduces to just four, making creativity indistinguishable from irrational suppression. The alternative outcomes are then illustrated using the classic two‐string problem. Besides providing a more finely differentiated conception of creativity failures, the definition has critical implications regarding the processes and procedures required to generate highly creative ideas.     

Strawson's Anti-Scepticism: A Critical Reconstruction

Strawson suggests an anti‐sceptical strategy which consists in offering good reason for ignoring scepticism rather than trying to refute it, and the reason he offers is that beliefs about the external world are indispensable to us. I give an exposition of Strawson's arguments for the indispensability thesis and explain why they are not strong enough. I then propose an argument based on some of Davidson's ideas in his theory of radical interpretation, which I think can establish the indispensability thesis. Finally, I spell out the force of Strawson's anti‐sceptical strategy by arguing that we have good reason for ignoring scepticism not only because beliefs about the world are indispensable, but also because it is irrational to have both beliefs about the world and sceptical doubts.     

Beliefs and inferences—a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 3. On expectations about enjoying a party

Ninety-six subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to a party. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational or an irrational belief; (b) that they had jilted or been jilted by a partner with whom they were having an intimate relationship; and (c) that they knew or did not know other friends who would be going to the party. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their enjoyment of the party. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negatively distorted inferences than holding a rational belief, and that having been jilted by a partner would have a similar effect. There was only limited support for the hypothesis that the second two independent variables would have a moderating or amplifying effect on the negativity of inferences through interaction with the belief variable. The implications of these findings for counselling are discussed, especially with respect to challenging irrational beliefs.     

Self-reported automaticity and irrationality in spider phobia

Spider phobic women (n = 39) and nonfearful controls (n = 41) completed a 20-item questionnaire measuring the extent to which they experience their fear reactions to spiders as automatic and irrational. For the phobic sample, therapy outcome data were also collected. Results suggest that spider phobics tend to view their attitude to spiders as irrational and in this respect, they do not differ from control subjects. Furthermore, compared to control subjects, phobics more often perceive their responses to spiders as automatic, i.e., not under intentional control. Contrary to expectation, no robust correlation was found between automaticity and irrationality. Interestingly, automaticity was not related to treatment outcome, while irrationality to some extent predicted therapy outcome (i.e., the more phobics experienced their fear as irrational, the more they profited from exposure treatment).     

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HUMAN RATIONALITY

It is clear that Freud's theories have had a profound and revolutionary impact on ideas about human nature and human rationality. However, the precise nature of that impact is less clear. It is often said that psychoanalysis reveals the irrational forces at the root of even the most apparently rational forms of thought and activity; and that, in so doing, it undermines ideas about human rationality which have dominated western thought. That is undoubtedly true. However, it is only one aspect of the truth. For the implications of psychoanalysis are more complex and far-reaching than this currently fashionable view suggests.     

Personality Traits Predict Irrational Beliefs

Irrational beliefs are the focus of many psychological theories, since research has shown that holding irrational beliefs often leads to unhealthy emotions, dysfunctional behaviors, and psychological disturbances. The aim of such therapies as rational emotive behavioral therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy is to dispute irrational beliefs to promote more rational ways of thinking; however they do not take into account individual personality differences. The aim of this study was to determine whether personality traits predict rational and irrational beliefs in a mixed student and clinical sample. It was hypothesized that the domains of the five factor model of personality would predict rational beliefs as well as a range of irrational beliefs. Our findings supported the hypothesis, showing distinct associations between personality traits and each specific irrational belief. Neuroticism predicted rational beliefs as well as six out of the seven types of irrational beliefs measured. Additionally, extraversion predicted rationality and self-downing, openness predicted need for comfort and total irrationality, and conscientiousness predicted need for achievement and demand for fairness. Agreeableness did not predict any type of rational or irrational beliefs. Knowledge of these distinct relationships may increase a clinician’s ability to conceptualize a therapy case and determine the best approach to treatment.     

Academic procrastination and irrational thinking: a re-examination with context controlled

As a test of the theory that academic procrastination is due to irrational thinking, undergraduate students at two universities were given the Procrastination Assessment Scale for Students (PASS), a measure of academic procrastination, and the Irrational Beliefs Inventory (IBI), an improved measure of irrational thinking. Because earlier research in this area had not adequately controlled for context effects (Council, 1993), the measures were administered at 2–3 week intervals as if they were separate research projects. Self-reported procrastination correlated with both a global measure of irrational thinking and with the subscale of problem avoidance. Implications for procrastination intervention strategies are discussed.     

Self-Compassion,Self-Esteem,and Irrational Beliefs

Assumptions associated with Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) suggest that self-compassion, but not self-esteem, should be incompatible with irrational beliefs and with the emotional disturbances that they produce. In this study, 184 university students responded to a self-compassion scale along with measures of irrational beliefs, self-esteem, depression, and anxiety. As expected, self-compassion correlated negatively with irrationality, predicted better mental health, and explained inverse connections of self-esteem with irrational beliefs. In support of REBT, the irrationality of low frustration tolerance also partially mediated the inverse self-compassion relationship with anxiety. Other findings for self-esteem and for the irrational belief of self-worth, nevertheless, suggested complexities for the REBT conceptual framework. These data most importantly confirmed self-compassion as part of what REBT would describe as an effective personal philosophy.     

Another Search for the “Hot” Cognitions: Appraisal, Irrational Beliefs, Attributions, and Their Relation to Emotion

One study examined the hypothesized status of appraisal and irrational beliefs relative to attributions, as proximal antecedents of emotion. In our study, which looked at 4 pairs of functional and dysfunctional negative emotions (i.e., concern/anxiety, sadness/depression, remorse/guilt, annoyance/anger), undergraduates (N = 120) reported on their attributions, appraisal, irrational beliefs, and emotions during past encounters associated with various negative events. Congruent with both Smith and Lazarus' (1993) appraisal theory and Ellis' (1994) cognitive theory of emotion, the results of this study indicate that the emotions (both functional and dysfunctional negative emotions) were more directly associated with appraisal and with irrational beliefs (dysfunctional negative emotions only) than they were with attributions. Also, irrational beliefs were strongly associated with appraisal; while demandingness (DEM) was associated more with primary appraisal, awfulizing/catastrophizing, low frustration tolerance, and global evaluation of human worth (including self-downing) were associated more with secondary appraisal. Dysfunctional emotions seem to involve primary appraisal associated with DEM while functional emotions involve primary appraisal associated with preferences. These findings lend to support the status of appraisal and irrational beliefs as the proximal cognitive antecedents of emotion and the status of irrational beliefs as a differencing factor between functional and dysfunctional emotions.     

Measurement of Positive Irrational Beliefs (Positive Cognitive Illusions)

The role of positive irrational beliefs (positive cognitive illusions) in mental health has been debated over several decades. The measurement of such beliefs has usually been through inferential assessment, which has been heavily criticised. This paper sought to establish a measure for the direct assessment of such beliefs and to assess their relationship to subjective wellbeing (SWB). Over two studies this new measure was found to have a factor structure consistent with its design, assessing self-enhancing beliefs, beliefs rejecting imperfection, overly optimistic beliefs, and irrational beliefs of control. When combined, these beliefs account for 17.6 % of the variance with SWB. This is driven largely by a higher order factor, which demonstrates a positive relationship to SWB. However, individually the different types of irrational beliefs demonstrate a variety of relationships with SWB. It is therefore concluded that positive irrational beliefs, when directly assessed, provide a greater depth of information than they do when assessed inferentially.     

抗生素应用与细菌耐药性产生的辩证关系

临床上抗生素的不适当使用,造成了细菌耐药性问题日益严重,已成为目前医学上一个难题。从微生态平衡的角度,辩证地对抗生素使用和细菌耐药性产生的关系进行了分析,并提出了控制细菌耐药性产生的策略。为有效合理使用抗生素,预防和控制细菌耐药性产生提供了思路和方法。     

The Relationship Between Automatic Thoughts and Irrational Beliefs Predicting Anxiety and Depression

Cognitive behavioral approaches differ in their views on core cognitions and their hypothesized role in the etiology of depression and anxiety. The present study provides empirical evidence regarding the relationship between irrational beliefs and components of automatic thoughts and their role in the etiology of depression and anxiety. The present study utilized newer and improved questionnaires to assess components of irrational belief. Based on prior research by Safren et al. (Cogn Ther Res 24(3):327–344, 2000), a three-factor structure of the combined automatic thought questionnaires were utilized to measure components of automatic thoughts as they relate to depression and anxiety. Factor analytical methods were utilized to confirm the factor structure of the irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts components. Advanced path modeling was utilized to model the relationship between irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts in predicting anxiety and depression. The study used a sample of N = 542 undergraduate psychology students during stressful exam times. Results indicated that the irrational belief Demandingness represents a primary factor, followed by the secondary irrational beliefs as proposed by Rational Emotive Behavioral Theory. Selfdowning beliefs were fully mediated by depressive automatic thoughts in the case of depressive affect. Low frustration tolerance contributed unique variance to anxious and depressive affect that was not fully mediated by automatic thoughts. Results from the present study add empirical evidence that irrational beliefs indeed represent core and intermediary beliefs that lead to specific automatic thoughts, which is congruent with cognitive behavioral theory as proposed by Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy.     

Paranoid disorders: family sources of the delusional system

Several family transactional patterns seem to play a critical rôle in the creation of the patient's paranoid constructions. A philosophy of life characterized by inflexible rules, irrational beliefs, distrust, apprehensive-ness and hate is prominent in a great number of families with paranoid patients. The family members typically intrude on each others' actions and feelings with mutual reinforcement of the paranoid ideas. Schreber's family appears to be a characteristic demonstration of the important implications of interactional transactions within the family in the genesis of a paranoid system.     

Beliefs and inferences: a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 2. On the prospect of seeing a spider

96 subjects were asked to imagine that they were about to enter a room in which there may have been one or more spiders. They were also asked to imagine that (a) they either held a rational or an irrational belief about spiders, (b) they were about to enter the room either alone or with someone, and (c) that the room was either dark or light. Having absorbed their assigned role, the subjects were then asked to make inferences about various elements of their situation. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences. It was also found that the lighting conditions in the room and whether the subject was alone or with someone affected the negativity of the inferences made. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way interactions between the independent variables which indicated that entering a light room or being with someone else tended to moderate the negativity of inferences made by those holding a rational belief rather than the opposite, amplifying the negativity of inferences made by those holding an irrational belief. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B), and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).     

Sex role identification and young women's irrational beliefs

The present study was designed to examine the relationship between young women's beliefs about approval, frustration, and dependency and their sex-role identification. Sixty-six college women responded to a questionnaire which contained the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1969) and the Multidimensional Sex Role Inventory (MSRI; Bernard, 1981). As predicted, women who score high in irrational beliefs concerning approval, frustration, and dependency also scored higher on the MSRI scale pertaining to anxiety and neuroticism than did their more rational counterparts. Also, the high irrational group scored lower than did the low irrational group on the MSRI scale measuring instrumental-agentic traits. These results have two implications for feminist RET psychotherapists. First, they clarify the value of using instruments to assess both irrational beliefs and sex role identification in treatment planning. Secondly, they sensitize the psychotherapist to the impact of sex-role socialization and identification on the psychological adjustment of young women.This article is based in part on a master's thesis completed by Tracy L. Vining, M.A.The authors thank William Tooke, Ph.D., for his helpful advice.Tracy L. Vining, M.A., is a School Psychologist at the Wayne Finger Lakes BOCES in Rushville, N.Y. William P. Gaeddert, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Psychology Department at SUNY-Plattsburgh, and Naomi B. McCormick is a Professor in the Psychology Department at SUNY-Plattsburgh and a Fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy.