The Role of Visual Perception in the Reproduction of Bender-Gestalt Designs

Four groups (controls, organics, acute and chronic schizophrenics) of 14 Ss each were matched for age, sex and intelligence. The principal tasks involved (1) reproducing the designs and (2) matching according to similarity a series of 8 design-choices with varying degrees of distortion from most-like to least-like the stimulus designs. The results confirmed the hypotheses (1) that perception of the B-G designs does not significantly differentiate between normal subjects and subjects manifesting psychopathology while (2) there exists a significant difference regarding reproduction of the designs between the groups. These findings are considered to be in agreement with current conceptualization of perception.     

Connotative Meaning as a Determinant of Response to Test Item Content

The purpose of this study was to determine if responses of like or dislike to Perceptual Reaction Test (PRT) designs — and thus, its ability to discriminate among criterion groups — were related to the connotative meaning of the designs. Seventy-four Ss were administered the PRT designs to which they responded on the traditional like-dislike alternatives as well as rating each design on a semantic differential. Correlations between the like-dislike dimension of the PRT designs and the semantic differential ratings of those designs indicated that when a S checks like for a design, he is expressing a positive evaluation of that design and probably sees it as less potent than those designs for which he checked dislike. Expression of like or dislike for a design appears to be inconsistently related to the activity dimension of meaning.     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.     

Externalism and Modest Contextualism

Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes a step farther and relativizes knowledge not just to the circumstances of the knower, but to the circumstances of the person attributing knowledge. I reject this more radical form of contextualism and suggest that it confuses (or that it can, at least, be avoided by carefully distinguishing) the relativity in what S is said to know from the relativity in whether S knows what S is said to know.     

Note on the Psychopathology of Genius

Summary

Twenty male Ss earned money by pulling a knob. Ss also could avoid or escape an aversive tone by pressing a button (a nonaggressive response) or by hitting a padded cushion (aggressive response). Control group Ss worked alone during two 90-minute sessions of an extinction condition in which knob pulling was no longer rewarded after 20 had been earned. Experimental group Ss, who worked alone only during the first session of extinction, were paired with an aggressive model in the second session. Experimental group Ss showed higher magnitudes of punching when the aggressive model was present than when he was absent. Control group Ss showed a reduction in high-magnitude punches across extinction conditions. It was concluded that the mere presence of a nonrewarded aggressive model was sufficient to evoke imitative aggression.     

Knowledge without credit,exhibit 4: extended cognition

The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p. Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived), the most salient feature explaining S’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S, that is, it might be a feature of S’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S, and hence, CTK is false.     

(ANTI)‐Anti‐Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed.     

Safety and epistemic luck

There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.     

Real knowledge

Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief and justification conditions are not accidentally conjoined. Two of those requirements have received considerable attention in recent literature by the defeasibility theorists and the causal theorists. I argue that a third requirement is needed to block the merely coincidental cosatisfaction of the belief and justification conditions and to capture our intuitions about the epistemic agent who possesses real knowledge. That condition ascribes a disposition to the real knower to believe all and only justified propositions in virtue of his/her belief that the propositions are justified. Two consequences of that requirement are discussed: (1) if S really knows that p, then S knows simpliciter that S knows simpliciter that p and (2) the iterative feature of real knowledge mentioned in (1) provides a basis for the rejection of a particularly pernicious form of scepticism.     

Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

Contextualism, in its standard form, is the view that the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ vary according to the context in which they are uttered. One possible objection to contextualism appeals to what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertability maneuver (or WAM), according to which it is not our knowledge sentences themselves that have context-sensitive truth conditions, but what is pragmatically conveyed by the use of such sentences. Thus, proponents of WAMs argue, the context sensitivity of knowledge attributions is not a semantic phenomenon but a pragmatic one. I examine a number of WAMs and show that each (i) is seriously flawed, or (ii) undercuts standard contextualism if we hold a minimalist conception of semantic content. I propose an alternative form of contextualism that accommodates minimalism and is immune to the second type of WAM, and show that this new form of contextualism shares the virtues of standard contextualism.     

A method of successive cumulations for the scaling of pair-comparison preference judgments

The present model treats the scaling of pair-comparison preference judgments among a unidimensional set of stimuli across a population of individuals. Given a setS ofn stimuli,S = {S ₁,S ₂, ,S _n }, the model yields a partially ordered metric on the interstimulus distances which may be used to construct an interval scale of values forS. Obtained also are a set of predictionsP = {P ₁,P ₂, ,P _n } whereP _i is the proportion of individuals in the population whose first choice among the elements ofS isS _i . A numerical illustration is offered and comparisons are drawn with Coombs' unfolding technique.This work was supported in part by Grant GB 2345 from the National Science Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was prepared while the author was a consultant to Proctor & Gamble Co. during the summer of 1964.Now with Proctor & Gamble Co.     

Individual Interpretation Of Psychoneurotic Inventory Items

The usual finding of greater resistance to extinction (Rn) following partial reinforcement (PR) as compared to continuous reinforcement (CR) has not been well documented with the use of human S s in instrumental conditioning. One hundred twenty male and female college students practiced discrete trials on the pursuit rotor. Resistance was measured by the number of trial S was willing to continue under instructions that S would terminate the experiment. Those S s receiving knowledge of results during 25%, 50%, or 75% of the first 24 trials showed greater Rn (p < .01) than Ss receiving knowledge of results on all 24 trials.     

Instinct,Heredity, and Social Tradition

Summary

The influence of physical attractiveness and warmth of a model on imitation and social perception in adults was assessed in this study with the use of 108 male and female college students. The Ss were randomly paired with a model who, depending on experimental conditions, was either a male or female, of high or low facial attractiveness, and who interacted with the S in a warm or cold manner. The Ss were then placed in a task situation which provided an opportunity to imitate the model, after which the Ss were asked to rate their experience and the model's personality. Warmth of the model was a more influential determinant of imitation, personality rating, and experience than physical attractiveness. However, the warmth affect was influenced by sex of the model and sex of the S. Possible explanations for the warmth effect were explored.     

The Representation of the Body Self in Human Figure Drawings

The matching of 25 frontal drawings of the female human figure with 25 frontal photographs of the college women who drew the figures was attempted by 30 male graduate psychology students and 30 women religious graduate students of art. The drawings and photos were arranged in envelopes according to a balanced lattice design, and presented to each of the judges in different envelopes in an order determined by randomized latin squares. Both groups matched the drawings with the photographs of the same Ss at significantly higher than chance expectancy (p<.01). These findings suggest that this matching technique may be of some value in testing the hypothesis of objective body self projection in human figure drawings.     

A sensitive rank test for comparing the effects of two treatments on a single group

By taking advantage of an experimental design which increases the number of observations per subject, the sensitivity of the proposed test is increased. In the first of a series of subexperiments, the score of a randomly selected experimentalS is ranked with the scores of the remaining (control)Ss, and the experimentalS is discarded. This procedure is repeated until oneS remains. The test criterion,R _n , is the sum of ranks of the experimentalSs; its exact sampling distribution, a normal approximation, and the sensitivity of the test relative to the WilcoxonT, are described. Because of the large number of scores obtained, the test is particularly useful when preparingSs is more costly than testing them, e.g., in tests following involved conditioning procedures. Since eachS is discarded after experimental treatment, the test fills a real need in studies involving radiation, ablation, or other irreversible treatments.The test criterion, the associated experimental procedure, and the measure of sensitivity are due to SHR; the generating function, tables, and large sample approximation are due to JNC.     

Delayed matching in the capuchin monkey with brief sample durations

Two capuchin monkeys were trained in a delayed matching-to-sample task in which the duration that the sample was available for viewing was very brief, 0.075 to 0.45 sec. The matching performance of one animal was above chance with delay (retention) intervals as long as 4 min; the other S showed significant matching with a 2-min retention interval. The performance of both Ss was independent of sample exposure duration, indicating that their capacity to match successfully at long retention intervals is not dependent on repeated viewing of the sample stimulus. The marked practice effect shown by one S with prolonged training at 2-min delay suggests the capacity of “learning how to remember.” A constant high performance level on 2-sec delay control trials indicates that the observed practice effect was not the result of enhanced attending to the sample stimulus.     

An Evaluation of Sex Hormone Replacement in Aged Women

Six same-different matching tests, both verbal and nonverbal, in three modalities, along with a set of reading tests, were administered to 120 Israeli children in second, third, and fourth grade. The main effects of all S variables, except sex (grade, socioeconomic level, and ability) were significant, as were the test factors of modality (visual, auditory, cross-modal) and form (verbal-nonverbal), but interactions between S and test factors were small. Multiple regression analysis revealed that overall matching test scores accounted for 35% of the variance in reading scores, although the additional contribution of specific subtests was negligible. Performance on the visual-visual tests was virtually perfect. Auditory-auditory matches were more difficult than auditory-visual matches with nonverbal stimuli, while the reverse was true with verbal stimuli.     

A Note on Schema and Exemplar Approaches to Motor Skill Representation in Memory

Given the need for a memory representation of well-learned motor skills, a common assumption in motor behavior is that this knowledge is stored in a central, abstracted form. Active production of motor skills has not been used in experimental designs that have provided empirical support for this view of representation, however. Much of the faith in centralized, abstracted forms of memory representation for motor skills is due to the popularity of Schmidt's schema theory, which has adapted the prototype abstraction model from category learning research to the representation of motor skills. Since schema theory was proposed, however, an alternative view that seriously questions the preeminence of the prototype abstraction model for the central representation of knowledge has arisen in the category learning literature. This particular view, termed the specific exemplar model, has led a number of researchers in cognition to develop mixed models that involve both prototypic abstraction and specific exemplar elements. This note, then, identifies what can be perceived as a gap in the empirical knowledge base in motor behavior and discusses the possibility of using the debate about representation for category learning as a stimulus for initiating a similar investigation into the representation of motor skills. A hypothetical specific exemplar model for the memory representation of motor skills is outlined, and possible empirical comparisons between this model and the schema abstraction model are suggested.     

The assessment of knowledge and learning in competence spaces: The gain–loss model for dependent skills

The gain–loss model (GaLoM) is a formal model for assessing knowledge and learning. In its original formulation, the GaLoM assumes independence among the skills. Such an assumption is not reasonable in several domains, in which some preliminary knowledge is the foundation for other knowledge. This paper presents an extension of the GaLoM to the case in which the skills are not independent, and the dependence relation among them is described by a well‐graded competence space. The probability of mastering skill s at the pretest is conditional on the presence of all skills on which s depends. The probabilities of gaining or losing skill s when moving from pretest to posttest are conditional on the mastery of s at the pretest, and on the presence at the posttest of all skills on which s depends. Two formulations of the model are presented, in which the learning path is allowed to change from pretest to posttest or not. A simulation study shows that models based on the true competence space obtain a better fit than models based on false competence spaces, and are also characterized by a higher assessment accuracy. An empirical application shows that models based on pedagogically sound assumptions about the dependencies among the skills obtain a better fit than models assuming independence among the skills.