Metacognition in nurse practitioner students: How nurse educators can best serve their students

The dynamic and changing healthcare environment requires educators to prepare nurse practitioner students with more than knowledge and skills. Healthcare providers need to be prepared with enhanced skills related to critical thinking and decision making. Metacognition training has been used by many disciplines within and outside of healthcare to prepare individuals to work in an environment that has volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and delayed feedback (VUCAD). This retrospective exploratory study uses computerized strategic management simulation (SMS) data to address the question: What parameters of metacognition do master's level nurse practitioner (NP) students excel versus underperform? Elements of Presentation: Presentation will include SMS parameters linked with the National Organization of Nurse Practitioner Faculties (NONPF) Core Competencies. In doing this, faculty can better assess students' individualized learning needs and tailor their academic education to address specific needs. Fifty-nine master's level students completed SMS, measuring five unique parameters of metacognition (Crisis, Task, Strategy, People & Information Management). Students' mean and median scores were observed to be high range for crisis management; and moderate range for task management, strategy management, and people management. Conversely, mean and median scores were in the low range for information management. Knowledge gained from this study can be used for curriculum development and planning to ensure that the parameters of metacognition are demonstrated throughout the curriculum's content delivery, training exercises, and evaluation methods. Knowledge related to areas in which NP students score in the low range can be added to courses to assist students better.     

道德的市场与企业道德行为的合理性

古典政治经济学的经济人命题和社会达尔文主义的生物学竞争理论为道德和市场的二元分裂提供了理论支持,从而在经济领域形成了一个企业活动非道德性的神话。经济实践活动面临的各种伦理道德问题,彰显企业非道德神话的谬误。鲍曼认为当代市场经济社会是一个"道德的市场",企业作为道德人士比作为自利的"经济人"更能理想地实现自己的效用;从博弈论的观点来看,企业的道德性行为也是合乎理性的。当代市场活动对伦理道德的需求,宣告了企业非道德性神话的破灭。     

Self-Help,Moral Philosophy,and the Moral Present

In this paper I argue that the lack of interest, among analytic moral philosophers, in the contingencies of our moral present, produces an impoverished moral philosophy, unable to address the moral problems and quandaries of ordinary people. What is needed to remedy this is a broadening of the scope of the moral philosopher’s thought to include a rich attention to moral phenomena of the present. One such phenomenon, attended to by sociologists and critical journalists over the past few decades, is the contemporary proliferating genre of psychologically oriented self-help literature. I display a range of sociological responses to self-help in order to point out aspects of morality that are made visible in these discussions, whereas they often remain invisible in standard moral philosophy. The aim is not to suggest a specific methodology for including such material into philosophical discussions, but rather to urge philosophers to reconsider the range of materials they attend to in their work, in order to produce a more lively engagement with and understanding of contemporary morality.     

Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation

I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) need to assign moral agents such as a motive, and (ii) that possession of this motive, when properly understood, is morally admirable.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Development and validation of the Moral Outcomes of Relationship Aggression Scale: A measure of moral distress following intimate partner violence perpetration

Research with military veterans has established that distress may arise in response to perpetrating violent behaviors that violate individuals' moral beliefs. To date, no studies have similarly examined morally-related cognitive and emotional responses specifically among intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetrators. However, research on moral cognitions and emotions in response to IPV perpetration may inform understanding of the behavior and potential mechanisms for intervention. In the current series of four studies, we used classical test theory to develop a measure of moral distress following IPV perpetration that focuses on thoughts about the actions (assimilated cognitions), thoughts about the self due to one's actions (accommodated cognitions), and emotions experienced due to one's actions (moral emotions). Items were developed and tested among two samples of undergraduate students, and psychometric properties of the final measure were confirmed among two community samples. The final measure consists of three subscales consisting of five items each. Results demonstrate support for internal consistency and test–retest reliability, convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity, and factor structure. This measure can be used in future research designed to examine how individuals respond to their IPV perpetration, and to study the implications this may have for long-term outcomes and behavioral change.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.