Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience

The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology.     

Intentional attunement: mirror neurons and the neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations

The neural circuits activated in a person carrying out actions, expressing emotions, and experiencing sensations are activated also, automatically via a mirror neuron system, in the observer of those actions, emotions, and sensations. It is proposed that this finding of shared activation suggests a functional mechanism of "embodied simulation" that consists of the automatic, unconscious, and noninferential simulation in the observer of actions, emotions, and sensations carried out and experienced by the observed. It is proposed also that the shared neural activation pattern and the accompanying embodied simulation constitute a fundamental biological basis for understanding another's mind. The implications of this perspective for psychoanalysis are discussed, particularly regarding unconscious communication, projective identification, attunement, empathy, autism, therapeutic action, and transference-countertransference interactions.     

Mirror Neurons,Embodied Simulation,and the Neural Basis of Social Identification

The shared intersubjective space in which we live since birth enables and bootstraps the constitution of the sense of identity we normally entertain with others. Social identification incorporates the domains of action, sensations, affect, and emotions and is underpinned by the activation of shared neural circuits. A common underlying functional mechanism—embodied simulation—mediates our capacity to share the meaning of actions, intentions, feelings, and emotions with others, thus grounding our identification with and connectedness to others. Social identification, empathy, and “we-ness” are the basic ground of our development and being. Embodied simulation provides a model of potential interest not only for our understanding of how interpersonal relations work or might be pathologically disturbed but also for psychoanalysis. The hypothesis is that embodied simulation is at work within the psychoanalytic setting between patient and analyst. The notions of projective identification and the interpersonal dynamic related to transference and countertransference can be viewed as instantiations of the implicit and prelinguistic mechanisms of the embodied simulation-driven mirroring mechanisms here reviewed.     

How Children with Head Injury Represent Real and Deceptive Emotion in Short Narratives

Narratives are not only about events, but also about the emotions those events elicit. Understanding a narrative involves not just the affective valence of implied emotional states, but the formation of an explicit mental representation of those states. In turn, this representation provides a mechanism that particularizes emotion and modulates its display, which then allows emotional expression to be modified according to particular contexts. This includes understanding that a character may feel an emotion but inhibit its display or even express a deceptive emotion. We studied how 59 school-aged children with head injury and 87 normally-developing age-matched controls understand real and deceptive emotions in brief narratives. Children with head injury showed less sensitivity than controls to how emotions are expressed in narratives. While they understood the real emotions in the text, and could recall what provoked the emotion and the reason for concealing it, they were less able than controls to identify deceptive emotions. Within the head injury group, factors such as an earlier age at head injury and frontal lobe contusions were associated with poor understanding of deceptive emotions. The results are discussed in terms of the distinction between emotions as felt and emotions as a cognitive framework for understanding other people's actions and mental states. We conclude that children with head injury understand emotional communication, the spontaneous externalization of real affect, but not emotive communication, the conscious, strategic modification of affective signals to influence others through deceptive facial expressions.     

The simulating social mind: the role of the mirror neuron system and simulation in the social and communicative deficits of autism spectrum disorders

The mechanism by which humans perceive others differs greatly from how humans perceive inanimate objects. Unlike inanimate objects, humans have the distinct property of being "like me" in the eyes of the observer. This allows us to use the same systems that process knowledge about self-performed actions, self-conceived thoughts, and self-experienced emotions to understand actions, thoughts, and emotions in others. The authors propose that internal simulation mechanisms, such as the mirror neuron system, are necessary for normal development of recognition, imitation, theory of mind, empathy, and language. Additionally, the authors suggest that dysfunctional simulation mechanisms may underlie the social and communicative deficits seen in individuals with autism spectrum disorders.     

The face of memory: experiential avoidance and facial expressions during the retrieval of autobiographical memories

ABSTRACT

Experiential avoidance refers to attempts to control or suppress unwanted thoughts, feelings and emotions. We investigated whether experiential avoidance is associated with fewer facial expressions during autobiographical retrieval (i.e. retrieval of memory for personal information). We invited participants to retrieve autobiographical memories, and recall was analysed by a facial analysis software that detects and classifies emotional expressions. Participants were divided into high vs. low experiential avoidance. Analysis showed fewer emotional facial expressions in participants with high experiential avoidance than in those with low experiential avoidance during autobiographical retrieval. This low emotional expression can be regarded as an attempt by individuals with high experiential avoidance to avoid communicating the emotional load to others. This low emotional expression can be also regarded as an attempt by individuals with high experiential avoidance to control or suppress the internal events that contribute to the appearance or persistence of unwanted emotional states during retrieval.     

The Role of Consumption Emotions in the Satisfaction Response

We report 2 studies that served to clarify the role of consumption emotions in the satisfaction response. In the 1st study, we examined the role of consumption emotions within the expectancy‐disconfirmation model of consumer satisfaction and investigated whether consumption emotions are a result of product performance or disconfirmation. The findings show that both positive and negative emotions are primarily a function of product performance and influence satisfaction even when the effects of expectations, performance, and disconfirmation are controlled. In the 2nd study, we proposed and tested an alternative framework for understanding the role of consumption emotions in the satisfaction response for situations in which consumers use more of an experiential perspective to anticipate and experience consumption. According to this model, consumers form affective expectations about how consumption of the product will make them feel, experience positive or negative emotions as a result of these expectations and product consumption, and evaluate the discrepancy between experienced and anticipated emotions. All 3 variables, then, impact satisfaction. The results empirically support many of the relations in the new model of the experiential satisfaction response but also raise several interesting avenues for future research.     

Posttraumatic distress and the presence of posttraumatic growth and meaning in life: Experiential avoidance as a moderator

Existing models of trauma suggest that for recovery to occur, trauma related cues and emotions require awareness and openness while survivors continue committing action toward valued life aims (other than regulating emotions). Based on this theoretical framework, an unwillingness to be in contact with distressing thoughts and feelings (experiential avoidance) might operate together with posttraumatic distress to predict when people find benefits and meaning in the aftermath of trauma. We hypothesized that people reporting posttraumatic distress and less reliance on experiential avoidance would report greater posttraumatic growth and meaning in life compared with other trauma survivors. We administered questionnaires to 176 college students reporting at least one traumatic event. Results supported these moderation models. This is the fourth study (with different samples, measures, and methodologies) to provide evidence that a combination of excessive anxiety and a heavy reliance on experiential avoidance leads to attenuated well-being. We discuss the implications for understanding heterogeneous trauma reactions.     

What is moral about guilt? Acting "prosocially" at the disadvantage of others

For centuries economists and psychologists have argued that the morality of moral emotions lies in the fact that they stimulate prosocial behavior and benefit others in a person's social environment. Many studies have shown that guilt, arguably the most exemplary moral emotion, indeed motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic social dilemma situations. When multiple persons are involved, however, the moral and prosocial nature of this emotion can be questioned. The present article shows how guilt can have beneficial effects for the victim of one's actions but also disadvantageous effects for other people in the social environment. A series of experiments, with various emotion inductions and dependent measures, all reveal that guilt motivates prosocial behavior toward the victim at the expense of others around-but not at the expense of oneself. These findings illustrate that a thorough understanding of the functioning of emotions is necessary to understand their moral nature.     

The Developmental Trajectory of Empathy and Its Association with Early Symptoms of Psychopathology in Children with and without Hearing Loss

Empathy enables people to share, understand, and show concern for others’ emotions. However, this capacity may be more difficult to acquire for children with hearing loss, due to limited social access, and the effect of hearing on empathic maturation has been unexplored. This four-wave longitudinal study investigated the development of empathy in children with and without hearing loss, and how this development is associated with early symptoms of psychopathology. Seventy-one children with hearing loss and cochlear implants (CI), and 272 typically-hearing (TH) children, participated (aged 1–5 years at Time 1). Parents rated their children’s empathic skills (affective empathy, attention to others’ emotions, prosocial actions, and emotion acknowledgment) and psychopathological symptoms (internalizing and externalizing behaviors). Children with CI and TH children were rated similarly on most of the empathic skills. Yet, fewer prosocial actions were reported in children with CI than in TH children. In both groups, affective empathy decreased with age, while prosocial actions and emotion acknowledgment increased with age and stabilized when children entered primary schools. Attention to emotions increased with age in children with CI, yet remained stable in TH children. Moreover, higher levels of affective empathy, lower levels of emotion acknowledgment, and a larger increase in attention to emotions over time were associated with more psychopathological symptoms in both groups. These findings highlight the importance of social access from which children with CI can learn to process others’ emotions more adaptively. Notably, interventions for psychopathology that tackle empathic responses may be beneficial for both groups, alike.

     

Distress and Avoidance in Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Exploring the Relationships with Intolerance of Uncertainty and Worry

Theory and research suggest that treatments targeting experiential avoidance may enhance outcomes for patients with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). The present study examined the role of experiential avoidance and distress about emotions in a treatment-seeking sample with a principal diagnosis of GAD compared with demographically matched nonanxious controls and sought to explore their shared relationship with two putative psychopathological processes in GAD: intolerance of uncertainty and worry. Patients with GAD reported significantly higher levels of experiential avoidance and distress about emotions compared with nonclinical controls while controlling for depressive symptoms, and measures of these constructs significantly predicted GAD status. Additionally, experiential avoidance and distress about anxious, positive, and angry emotions shared unique variance with intolerance of uncertainty when negative affect was partialed out, whereas only experiential avoidance and distress about anxious emotions shared unique variance with worry. Discussion focuses on implications for treatment as well as future directions for research.     

Investigating the actor effect in moral emotion expectancies across cultures: A comparison of Chinese and Canadian adolescents

The study investigated adolescents' moral emotion expectancies for actions versus inactions across cultures (Chinese vs. Canadian) and different moral rule contexts (rules that prohibit antisocial behaviour vs. rules that prescribe prosocial actions) while controlling for judgements of obligatoriness of moral actions. The sample consisted of 372 teenagers from three grade levels (7–8, 10–11, and 1st–2nd year university). Participants were provided with scenarios depicting moral and immoral actions of self or others. Moral emotion expectancies were assessed following each scenario by asking participants to rate the intensity of various emotions they anticipate for themselves in the given situation. Actions were related to stronger self‐evaluative and other‐evaluative moral emotion expectancies than inactions in both cultures. Whereas perceived obligatoriness of moral actions was associated with moral emotion expectancies, it did not account for the actor effect. Moreover, Chinese adolescents tended to report stronger negatively charged other‐evaluative emotions when observing others engaging in antisocial behaviour and less positive emotions for moral actions. Overall, the study indicates that moral emotion expectancies hinge upon universal moral principles (as exemplified by the actor effect) that interact with cultural values and individuals' moral judgement in complex ways.     

Emotions in action through the looking glass1

Abstract: The paper aims at highlighting how our primary understanding of others’ actions is rooted in the mirror mechanism. To this end, the anatomical architecture of the mirror neuron system for action will be outlined as well as its role in grasping goals and intentions in others’ motor behaviour. One further step through the looking glass of social cognition will be referring to the ubiquitous emotional colouring of actions and considering its links with the motor domain. This will allow a clearer perspective on the mechanism underlying our abilities for emotional understanding and on cases in which these abilities are amiss, as in autistic spectrum disorders.     

On boredom: Lack of challenge and meaning as distinct boredom experiences

Boredom is a common experience that affects people on multiple levels, including their thoughts, feelings, motivations, and actions. Not much research, however, has examined what makes the experience of boredom distinct from other affective experiences. Based on earlier research on boredom and our meaning-regulation framework, we conducted a series of four studies that demonstrate the distinct experiential content of boredom. More than other negative affective experiences (sadness, anger, and frustration), boredom makes people feel unchallenged while they think that the situation and their actions are meaningless (Study 1). The distinct experiential content of boredom is associated with boredom proneness (Study 2) and with state boredom experiences (Study 3). In addition, the distinct experiential content of boredom is affected by contextual features (Study 4). This series of studies provides a systematic understanding of what people feel, think, and want to do when bored, distinctive from other negative experiences.     

Experiential Avoidance and Emotion Regulation in Borderline Personality Disorder

Many of the severe behavioral difficulties observed among persons with BPD (e.g., self-harm, suicidal behaviors) have been conceptualized as attempts to avoid or escape unwanted emotional experiences. As such, experiential avoidance likely plays a prominent role in the difficulties faced by persons with BPD. Individuals with BPD have demonstrated heightened levels of experiential avoidance in several studies. Several key features of BPD may contribute to experiential avoidance among persons with BPD, including a vulnerability to negative or distressing emotions, difficulty regulating emotions, and distress intolerance. Some research also suggests that a vulnerability to negative emotions among persons with BPD may be partly due to the use of experiential avoidance strategies to cope with emotional experiences. Within this paper, we review the literature on experiential avoidance and possible mechanisms underlying experiential avoidance among persons with BPD, and discuss the research and clinical implications of this literature.     

Emotion,Evaluation, Desire,Behavior and Goals: a <Emphasis Type="Italic">Eudaimonistic</Emphasis> View

In this essay I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their corresponding evaluations, desires, behavior and goals. Such conceptual relation is of the utmost importance in order to account for the unity or oneness of emotion, for if the different aspects of emotion are linked conceptually, then to have one such aspect would imply having all the others. After I discuss how emotions are related to their corresponding evaluations, desires and behavior, I show how each aspect of emotion is related to the others. Next, I argue that indeed there is such conceptual or quasi-conceptual relation between emotions, evaluations and conative or desiderative states (i.e. desires or wishes). However, while intentional behavior in terms of actions is conceptually related to some emotions, other times the emotion-specific desires are either non-forward-looking, and thus do not give rise to intentional actions, or they may be overridden, and the resultant behavioral manifestations are not conceptually related to emotion. Next, I argue that emotions are eudaimonistic, in the sense that they are essentially concerned with important goals, concerns and attachments that comprise our conception of the good life and well-being. Finally, I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their respective goals, and argue that while emotions logically presuppose such goals, the reverse is not the case.     

Classifying emotion: a developmental account

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology.     

Positive and Negative: Infant Facial Expressions and Emotions

One path to understanding emotional processes and their development is the investigation of early facial expressions. Converging evidence suggests that although all infant smiles index positive emotion, some smiles are more positive than others. The evidence stems both from the situations in which infants produce different facial expressions and from naive observers' ratings of the emotional intensity of the expressions. The observers' ratings also suggest that similar facial actions—such as cheek raising—lead smiles to be perceived as more positive and lead negative expressions (cry-faces) to be perceived as more negative. One explanation for this parsimony is that certain facial actions are associated with the intensification of both positive and negative emotions.