The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering

Unlike conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering does not aim to identify the content that our current concepts do have, but the content which these concepts should have. For this method to show the results that its practitioners typically aim for, being able to change meanings seems to be a crucial presupposition. However, certain branches of semantic externalism raise doubts about whether this presupposition can be met. To the extent that meanings are determined by external factors such as causal histories or microphysical structures, it seems that they cannot be changed intentionally. This paper gives an extended discussion of this ‘externalist challenge’. Pace Herman Cappelen’s recent take on this issue, it argues that the viability of conceptual engineering crucially depends on our ability to bring about meaning change. Furthermore, it argues that, contrary to first appearance, causal theories of reference do allow for a sufficient degree of meaning control. To this purpose, it argues that there is a sense of what is called ‘collective long-range control’, and that popular versions of the causal theory of reference imply that people have this kind of control over meanings.

     

Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds

We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a “meeting of minds.” The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics. If concepts are convex, it will in general be possible for interactors to agree on joint meaning even if they start out from different representational spaces. Language is discrete, while mental representations tend to be continuous—posing a seeming paradox. We show that the convexity assumption allows us to address this problem. Using examples, we further show that our approach helps explain the semantic processes involved in the composition of expressions.     

Early conceptual and linguistic processes operate in independent channels

Language and concepts are intimately linked, but how do they interact? In the study reported here, we probed the relation between conceptual and linguistic processing at the earliest processing stages. We presented observers with sequences of visual scenes lasting 200 or 250 ms per picture. Results showed that observers understood and remembered the scenes' abstract gist and, therefore, their conceptual meaning. However, observers remembered the scenes at least as well when they simultaneously performed a linguistic secondary task (i.e., reading and retaining sentences); in contrast, a nonlinguistic secondary task (equated for difficulty with the linguistic task) impaired scene recognition. Further, encoding scenes interfered with performance on the nonlinguistic task and vice versa, but scene processing and performing the linguistic task did not affect each other. At the earliest stages of conceptual processing, the extraction of meaning from visually presented linguistic stimuli and the extraction of conceptual information from the world take place in remarkably independent channels.     

Coexisting and conflicting self-referential conceptual systems: A model for describing malfunctioning in the contemporary family-implications for therapy

In the proposed model, intra- and interpersonal conflicts are formalized as information-processing problems created by inconsistent self-referential conceptual systems. Three self-referential conceptual systems corresponding to the three forms of family lifetraditional-rural, industrial-nuclear, information-transactional-coexist and intermingle, creating difficulties in the coordination of interactions.Each of these ecotheories is viewed as a constellation of hierarchically-ordered, dynamic, cognitive-emotional structures which express the particular family system's perceptions of itself in relation to its environment and life in general. The model correlates in an integrative manner phenomena at the level of societal change with evolving patterns of intrapersonal and familial dynamics and provides a framework for guiding preventive and therapeutic interventions. The evolving ecotheory model presented in this work follows the metatheoretical paradigms of cognitive science, self-reference and self-organization. The attempted synthesis has been achieved in the context of the unifying concepts and principles of General Systems Theory.     

Concepts and conceptual structure

Research and theory on categorization and conceptual structure have recently undergone two major shifts. The first shift is from the assumption that concepts have defining properties (the classical view) to the idea that concept representations may be based on properties that are only characteristic or typical of category examples (the probabilistic view). Both the probabilistic view and the classical view assume that categorization is driven by similarity relations. A major problem with describing category structure in terms of similarity is that the notion of similarity is too unconstrained to give an account of conceptual coherence. The second major shift is from the idea that concepts are organized by similarity to the idea that concepts are organized around theories. In this article, the evidence and rationale associated with these shifts are described, and one means of integrating similarity-based and theory-driven categorization is outlined.     

In defense of abstract conceptual representations

An extensive program of research in the past 2 decades has focused on the role of modal sensory, motor, and affective brain systems in storing and retrieving concept knowledge. This focus has led in some circles to an underestimation of the need for more abstract, supramodal conceptual representations in semantic cognition. Evidence for supramodal processing comes from neuroimaging work documenting a large, well-defined cortical network that responds to meaningful stimuli regardless of modal content. The nodes in this network correspond to high-level “convergence zones” that receive broadly crossmodal input and presumably process crossmodal conjunctions. It is proposed that highly conjunctive representations are needed for several critical functions, including capturing conceptual similarity structure, enabling thematic associative relationships independent of conceptual similarity, and providing efficient “chunking” of concept representations for a range of higher order tasks that require concepts to be configured as situations. These hypothesized functions account for a wide range of neuroimaging results showing modulation of the supramodal convergence zone network by associative strength, lexicality, familiarity, imageability, frequency, and semantic compositionality. The evidence supports a hierarchical model of knowledge representation in which modal systems provide a mechanism for concept acquisition and serve to ground individual concepts in external reality, whereas broadly conjunctive, supramodal representations play an equally important role in concept association and situation knowledge.     

Frequency of relation type as a determinant of conceptual combination: a reanalysis

C. L. Gagne and E. J. Shoben (1997) proposed that concepts are combined via external relations and that lexical entries include information about which relations are frequent for every modifying noun. As evidence for this view, they showed that relations associated with the modifier affected the interpretation of combinations in several studies in which subjects had to decide whether the combinations were sensible. The authors evaluated the methods and stimuli used in Gagne and Shoben's experiments and present findings suggesting that the effect of relation frequency is likely due to differences between the familiarity and plausibility of different combinations. Although relation frequency could be involved in conceptual combination, the authors concluded that better evidence is needed for this variable, controlling for other more general differences between the combinations.     

概念加工深度影响道德概念水平方位隐喻联结

通过6个实验探究了不同概念加工深度下道德概念与水平方位的隐喻联结。实验1采用迫选任务范式, 实验2、实验3和实验4均采用空间Stroop范式, 实验5和实验6均采用启动范式。结果发现：(1)在思维迫选中存在道德与左、不道德与右的隐喻联结; (2)在较深、中等概念加工深度下发现了隐喻一致性效应, 在较浅概念加工深度下未发现这种效应; (3)在较浅概念加工深度下始源域和目标域之间的映射均不存在, 即未在启动范式中发现隐喻联结。结果表明：道德概念与水平方位存在隐喻联结, 这种隐喻联结中左表征道德、右表征不道德, 并同时受到始源域和目标域加工深度的影响。     

The conceptual centrality of causal cycles

How do causal cycles affect judgments of conceptual centrality? Generally, a feature is central to a concept to the extent that other features in the concept depend on it, thereby rendering it immutable from the concept (Sloman, Love, &; Ahn, 1998). Previous research on conceptual centrality has focused primarily on features involved in four major types of dependency structures: simple cause-effect relations, causal chains, common-cause structures, and common-effect structures. Causal cycles are a fifth type of dependency structure commonly reported in people’s real-life concepts, yet to date, they have been relatively ignored in research on conceptual centrality. The results of six experiments suggest that previously held assumptions about the conceptual representation of cycles are incorrect. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of theory-based concepts.     

Situated language understanding as filtering perceived affordances

We introduce a computational theory of situated language understanding in which the meaning of words and utterances depends on the physical environment and the goals and plans of communication partners. According to the theory, concepts that ground linguistic meaning are neither internal nor external to language users, but instead span the objective-subjective boundary. To model the possible interactions between subject and object, the theory relies on the notion of perceived affordances: structured units of interaction that can be used for prediction at multiple levels of abstraction. Language understanding is treated as a process of filtering perceived affordances. The theory accounts for many aspects of the situated nature of human language use and provides a unified solution to a number of demands on any theory of language understanding including conceptual combination, prototypicality effects, and the generative nature of lexical items. To support the theory, we describe an implemented system that understands verbal commands situated in a virtual gaming environment. The implementation uses probabilistic hierarchical plan recognition to generate perceived affordances. The system has been evaluated on its ability to correctly interpret free-form spontaneous verbal commands recorded from unrehearsed game play between human players. The system is able to "step into the shoes" of human players and correctly respond to a broad range of verbal commands in which linguistic meaning depends on social and physical context. We quantitatively compare the system's predictions in response to direct player commands with the actions taken by human players and show generalization to unseen data across a range of situations and verbal constructions.     

An ABSURDIST model vindicates a venerable theory

Can relations between concepts in one system be sufficient on their own for locating matching concepts in another system? This question in concept semantics has been contentious. Now, contrary to one important theory, the answer appears to be yes. Robert Goldstone's and Brian Rogosky's new neural-net program, ABSURDIST, has demonstrated what purely theoretical considerations suggested could not be accomplished, showing once again the power of experimental computer modeling.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.     

Concepts and conceptual change

This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what concepts are, I propose a view of concepts as complex computational structures. This account suggests that conceptual change can come in varying degrees, with the most extreme consisting of fundamental conceptual reorganizations. These degrees of conceptual change are illustrated by the development of the concept of an acid.I am grateful to Michael Ranney and Gilbert Harman for comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

A dissociation between two implicit conceptual tests supports the distinction between types of conceptual processing

Subjects studied words in a classification task (to what categories does it belong?) or in a production task (producing associates to the word) and then completed one of two implicit memory tests—category association or free association. The classification study task and the category-association test emphasize categorical relations between concepts, and the production study task and the free-association test draw on associative relations. As predicted by the transfer-appropriate processing principle, priming in the category-association test was larger for words studied under the classification task than for those studied under the production task, whereas the opposite was true in the free-association test. This crossover dissociation is the first obtained between two implicit conceptual tests, and it provides support for the claim that it is necessary to distinguish between different types of conceptual processing.     

Beyond belief bias: Reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation

Mental models constitute an alternative to the rule-based systems in the explanation of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In this paper, we claim that the concept of believability generally used to categorize content and context effects is of little use within a semantic theory. Thus, we propose the use of categories that are directly extracted from subjective relations among concepts within the reasoning problem. We demonstrate that manipulations based on this kind of categorization produce predictable patterns of responses in reasoning problems. We present two experiments to test our predictions, using conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems, and in both cases, we demonstrate the influence of conceptual knowledge not only in natural contexts, but also in experimentally created artificial contexts.     

Continuous information processing in conceptual identifications

Summary This investigation was aimed at the analysis of processes of the conceptual object identification. Three experiments were performed which utilized a response preparation paradigm developed by Miller (1982). The results confirm the psychological validity of a distinction between sensorily and categorially represented concepts proposed formerly by the authors. The process of identification of objects as belonging to sensory concepts was analysed in more detail. The experimental results suggest that it may be a sequential feature matching process which is characterized by continuous information processing. Early in the process the figurative features allowing an identification of an object as belonging to a more general sensory concept are processed. In following processing stages this first conceptual identification is more and more specified by an additional checking of more detailed figurative features. More importantly, the results indicate that the information about the general conceptual identity of an object is not only available early in the identification process but can also be used for the preparation of following processes or processing stages even before the object is fully identified. Possible influences of the early information on the control of the conceptual identification itself and on the selection and control of motor behavior are discussed.We wish to thank the following psychology students at the Humboldt University in Berlin for their help in performing the experiments: Kathrin Hänel, Erika Küchler and Christina Matthé. Furthermore, we wish to thank the two anaonymous reviewers and Johannes Engelkamp for their helpful comments on a first draft of our paper     

The competition-among-relations-in-nominals theory of conceptual combination: implications for stimulus class formation and class expansion

One way in which new concepts are added to the conceptual system is through conceptual combination. The competition-among-relations-in-nominals (CARIN) theory (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) proposes that conceptual combination involves specifying a thematic relation (e.g., noun MADE OF modifier) to link the constituent concepts (e.g., chocolate and bee). This theory claims that relations have different strengths for various concepts that correspond to how often a modifier and relation have been paired in previous encounters with combined concepts and that this relational knowledge strongly affects the ease with which combined concepts can be formed. A mathematical model that incorporates key claims of the theory is presented, and empirical findings that are relevant to evaluating the CARIN theory are reviewed. The parallels between the CARIN theory and approaches to stimulus class formation are also discussed.     

Number words in young children's conceptual and procedural knowledge of addition, subtraction and inversion

Three studies addressed children's arithmetic. First, 50 3- to 5-year-olds judged physical demonstrations of addition, subtraction and inversion, with and without number words. Second, 20 3- to 4-year-olds made equivalence judgments of additions and subtractions. Third, 60 4- to 6-year-olds solved addition, subtraction and inversion problems that varied according to the inclusion of concrete referents and number words. The results indicate that number words play a different role in conceptual and procedural development. Children have strong addition and subtraction concepts before they can translate the physical effects of these operations into number words. However, using number words does not detract from their calculation procedures. Moreover, consistent with iterative relations between conceptual and procedural development, the results suggest that inversion acquisition depends on children's calculation procedures and that inversion understanding influences these procedures.     

On the origins of the conceptual system

Contrary to the conventional view of infancy as a sensorimotor period without conceptual thought, research over the past 20 years has shown that preverbal infants are capable of at least 3 conceptual functions: forming concepts with which to interpret the world, recall of the past, and engaging in conceptual generalization. Research is described indicating that the 1st concepts tend to be global in scope, such as animal or container, and that the course of conceptual development in the first 2 years is largely one of differentiating global concepts into more detailed concepts, such as dog or cup. A theory of how the 1st global concepts are formed from spatial information is briefly presented, including (a) a mechanism that redescribes spatial information into simpler but accessible form and (b) the primitives it uses for this purpose. Finally, the way concepts become more complex by means of language and analogical extension to nonspatial information is discussed.