Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge

In a series of works Sosa (in: Knowledge in perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; ‘How Competence Matters in Epistemology’, Philos Perspect 24(1):465–475, 2010; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or ‘grades’ of knowledge, animal and reflective. One of the most persistent critics of Sosa’s attempts to bifurcate knowledge is Kornblith (in: Greco (ed) Ernest sosa and his critics, Wiley, Hoboken, 2004; ‘Sosa in Perspective’, Philos Stud 144(1):127–136, 2009; On reflection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012). Our aim in this paper is to outline and evaluate Kornblith’s criticisms. We will argue that, while they raise a range of difficult (exegetical and substantive) questions about Sosa’s ‘bi-level’ epistemology, Sosa has the resources to adequately respond to all of them. Thus, this paper is a (qualified) defence of Sosa’s bi-level epistemology.

     

Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling

Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy (see Augustine in Treatises on various subjects, New York, Fathers of the Church, 1952; Kant in Practical philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Chisholm and Feehan in J Philos 74: 143–159, 1977; Mahon in Int J Appl Philos 21: 181–194, 2007; Carson in Lying and deception, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010). However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers (e.g., Sober, From a biological point of view, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; Hauser in: Whiten, Byrne (eds) Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The evolution of animal communication, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005; Skyrms, Signals, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) have endorsed the broader view that deception only requires that a deceiver benefit from sending a misleading signal. Moreover, in order to facilitate game-theoretic study of deception in the context of Lewisian sender-receiver games, Brian Skyrms has proposed an influential formal analysis of this view. Such formal analyses have the potential to enhance our philosophical understanding of deception in humans as well as animals. However, as we argue in this paper, Skyrms’s analysis, as well as two recently proposed alternative analyses (viz., Godfrey-Smith in Review of signals: evolution, learning, and information by Brian Skyrms, Mind, 120: 1288–1297, 2001; McWhirter in Brit J Philos Sci 67: 757–780, 2016), are seriously flawed and can lead us to draw unwarranted conclusions about deception.

     

Metaphysical and absolute possibility

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility (Kripke in Naming and necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980; Lewis in On the plurality of worlds, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; van Inwagen in Philos Stud 92:68–84, 1997; Rosen, in: Gendler and Hawthorne (eds) Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker (ed) Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree” (1980, p. 99). Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib(le) without qualification (1997, p. 72).” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense (2003, p. 203).” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it.

     

Feyerabend’s well-ordered science: how an anarchist distributes funds

To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend’s pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce’s account of the economics of theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a ‘well-ordered science’ as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981–990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (J Philos 87:5–22, 1990), Strevens (J Philos 100(2):55–79, 2003) and Weisberg and Muldoon (Philos Sci 76(2):225–252, 2009), unwittingly make use of this problematic assumption. I conclude by outlining a proposed model of resource allocation where funding is determined by lottery and briefly examining the extent to which it is compatible with the position defended in this paper.

     

A Comparison of Psychopathic Trait Latent Profiles in Service Members

This study used latent profile analysis (LPA) to identify differing classes of psychopathic traits in a large sample of military personnel (90.7% Army National Guard) and examined how membership across profiles can be differentiated by mean scores on external correlates relevant to psychopathy and/or to military service (e.g., aggression, posttraumatic stress symptoms, impulsivity). Psychopathy was operationalized via the three-factor model of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scales (LSRP; Brinkley et al. 2008; Levenson et al. 1995). LPA revealed optimal fit for a four-profile solution. Three profiles had roughly equivalent within-profile means across the three factors, characterized by below average, average, and above/high average LSRP scores. The fourth profile emerged as qualitatively different: high on LSRP-Callous but below average on LSRP-Egocentricity and LSRP-Antisocial. The four profiles were differentiable based on their mean scores on external correlates, suggesting varied implications for externalizing and internalizing features across psychopathic trait configurations in a military sample. Implications for studying psychopathy in military and other novel samples are discussed.

     

Towards a Unitary Case for Russellian Panpsychism

One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, Topoi, 39, 1073–1088, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (Philosophical Studies, 175, 1423–1440, 2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.

     

Effects of Discontinue Rules on Psychometric Properties of Test Scores

This paper provides results on a form of adaptive testing that is used frequently in intelligence testing. In these tests, items are presented in order of increasing difficulty. The presentation of items is adaptive in the sense that a session is discontinued once a test taker produces a certain number of incorrect responses in sequence, with subsequent (not observed) responses commonly scored as wrong. The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales (SB5; Riverside Publishing Company, 2003) and the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (KABC-II; Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004), the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (Kaufman and Kaufman 2014) and the Universal Nonverbal Intelligence Test (2nd ed.) (Bracken and McCallum 2015) are some of the many examples using this rule. He and Wolfe (Educ Psychol Meas 72(5):808–826, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164412441937) compared different ability estimation methods in a simulation study for this discontinue rule adaptation of test length. However, there has been no study, to our knowledge, of the underlying distributional properties based on analytic arguments drawing on probability theory, of what these authors call stochastic censoring of responses. The study results obtained by He and Wolfe (Educ Psychol Meas 72(5):808–826, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164412441937) agree with results presented by DeAyala et al. (J Educ Meas 38:213–234, 2001) as well as Rose et al. (Modeling non-ignorable missing data with item response theory (IRT; ETS RR-10-11), Educational Testing Service, Princeton, 2010) and Rose et al. (Psychometrika 82:795–819, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11336-016-9544-7) in that ability estimates are biased most when scoring the not observed responses as wrong. This scoring is used operationally, so more research is needed in order to improve practice in this field. The paper extends existing research on adaptivity by discontinue rules in intelligence tests in multiple ways: First, an analytical study of the distributional properties of discontinue rule scored items is presented. Second, a simulation is presented that includes additional scoring rules and uses ability estimators that may be suitable to reduce bias for discontinue rule scored intelligence tests.

     

A response to Chisholm’s paradox

Essentialists suppose that for every individual, if that individual exists at any possible world, then necessarily that individual exemplifies some non-trivial qualitative property essential to it, as such. Anti-essentialists deny this. One important argument leveled by some anti-essentialists against essentialism takes the form of a thought experiment, one originally introduced by Chisholm (Nous 1(1):1–8, 1967), sometimes referred to as Chisholm’s Paradox (CP). In this essay, I defend essentialism against CP. I begin by presenting the argument and showing how it leads to a contradiction of the essentialist thesis. I then consider one of the most popular solutions to CP to date, that given by Salmon (Midwest Stud Philos 11:75–120, 1986, Philos Rev 98(1):3–34, 1989, Philos Top 21(2):187–197, 1993). Next, I critique Salmon’s proposal and show that it is an insufficient response on behalf of the essentialist. And finally, I propose a novel solution to the paradox and discuss why it is that many metaphysicians in the past have found CP plausible, despite being fallacious.

     

On the paradox of reversible processes in thermodynamics

This paper discusses an argument by Norton (in: European Philosophy of Science—Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 17, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 197–210, 2014, 2016) to the effect that reversible processes in thermodynamics have paradoxical character, due to the infinite-time limit. For Norton, one can “dispel the fog of paradox” by adopting a distinction between idealizations and approximations, which he himself puts forward. Accordingly, reversible processes ought to be regarded as approximations, rather than idealizations. Here, we critically assess his proposal. In doing so, we offer a resolution of his alleged paradox based on the original work by Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjeva on the foundations of thermodynamics.

     

Does vision extract absolute distance from vergence?

Since Kepler (1604) and Descartes (1637), ‘vergence’ (the angular rotation of the eyes) has been thought of as one of our most important absolute distance cues. But vergence has never been tested as an absolute distance cue divorced from obvious confounding cues such as binocular disparity. In this article, we control for these confounding cues for the first time by gradually manipulating vergence and find that observers fail to accurately judge distance from vergence. We consider several different interpretations of these results and argue that the most principled response to these results is to question the general effectiveness of vergence as an absolute distance cue. Given that other absolute distance cues (such as motion parallax and vertical disparities) are limited in application, this poses a real challenge to our contemporary understanding of visual scale.

     

Relative Necessity and Propositional Quantification

Following Smiley’s (The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28, 113–134 1963) influential proposal, it has become standard practice to characterise notions of relative necessity in terms of simple strict conditionals. However, Humberstone (Reports on Mathematical Logic, 13, 33–42 1981) and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley’s now standard account of relative necessity. In their recent article, Hale and Leech (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 1–26 2017) propose a novel account of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems facing the standard account. Nevertheless, the current article argues that Hale & Leech’s account suffers from its own defects, some of which Hale & Leech are aware of but underplay. To supplement this criticism, the article offers an alternative account of relative necessity which overcomes these defects. This alternative account is developed in a quantified modal propositional logic and is shown model-theoretically to meet several desiderata of an account of relative necessity.

     

Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale: a Psychometric Examination in Chinese Youth

There remains a need for a disorder-specific inventory of children’s depression and anxiety that can reliably screen anxious and depressive disorder symptomatology in Chinese children. The Revised Child and Anxiety Depression Scale (RCADS) is a self-report questionnaire assessing anxiety and depression in children (Chorpita et al., 2000; Piqueras et al., 2017). This study sought to evaluate its psychometric properties in a Mainland Chinese sample. Students from the 4th to 11th grades (N?=?1001) participated in this study. Each of the RCADS subscales, by age and sex, possessed reliability coefficients ranging between .63 and .81. Means and standard deviations for RCADS subscales calculated for the age and sex sub-samples were reported. Participants reported slightly lower levels on five subscales than for Chorpita et al. (2000) normative sample. The scales were significantly and strongly correlated with the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) subscales (somatic, withdrawal, anxiety) as well as CBCL internalizing scores. Fit statistics suggested marginal to adequate fit for the six-factor model for the Chinese youth. The present study provides foundational support for the psychometric properties of the RCADS in a large sample of Chinese youth yet indicates that factor structure might be improved through enhanced sampling of culturally relevant symptom expressions.

     

Can Happiness Apps Generate Nationally Representative Datasets? - a Case Study Collecting Data on People’s Happiness Using the German Socio-Economic Panel

In the last few years, apps have become an important tool to collect data. Especially in the case of data on people’s happiness, two projects have received substantial attention from both the media and the scientific world: “Track your happiness” from Killingsworth and Gilbert (Science, 330, 932-932, 2010), and “Mappiness,” from MacKerron (2012). Both happiness apps used the experience sampling method to ask people a few times per day how they feel, what they do, with whom, and where. The collected data are then displayed for the participants in simple graphs to help them understand what makes them happy and what does not. Both studies have collected considerable data without giving participants any financial rewards. But quantity is not everything that matters with respect to data collection, and thus, understanding whether nationally representative datasets can be collected using such happiness apps is crucial. To address this question, we built a new happiness app and ran a case-study with over 4000 participants of the innovation sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (Richter and Schupp in Schmollers Jahrbuch, 135(3), 389–399, 2015). Participants were informed that the app collects data on everyday happiness after a household interview and asked whether they would like to use the app. In the first year (2015), participants did not receive any reward, and in the second year (2016), a different group of participants received a 50 Euro Amazon voucher for their participation. The results showed that our happiness app cannot generate nationally representative datasets if it is not controlled that all demographic sub-groups have access to a smartphone, are highly motivated with a sufficient reward and data is collected with quota sampling.

     

The value of knowing how

Know-how has a distinctive, non-instrumental value that a mere reliable ability lacks. Some, including Bengson and Moffett (in: Bengson, Moffett (eds) Knowing how, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–195, 2011) and Carter and Pritchard (Australas J Philos 93(4):799–816, 2015b) have cited a close relation between knowhow and cognitive achievement, and it is tempting to think that the value of know-how rests in that relation. That’s not so, however. The value of know-how lies in its relation to the fundamental value of autonomy.

     

Introducing Identity

The best-known syntactic account of the logical constants is inferentialism . Following Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is use, inferentialists argue that meanings of expressions are given by introduction and elimination rules. This is especially plausible for the logical constants, where standard presentations divide inference rules in just this way. But not just any rules will do, as we’ve learnt from Prior’s famous example of tonk, and the usual extra constraint is harmony. Where does this leave identity? It’s usually taken as a logical constant but it doesn’t seem harmonious: standardly, the introduction rule (reflexivity) only concerns a subset of the formulas canvassed by the elimination rule (Leibniz’s law). In response, Read [5, 8] and Klev [3] amend the standard approach. We argue that both attempts fail, in part because of a misconception regarding inferentialism and identity that we aim to identify and clear up.

     

Two Sexes,Two Genders Only: Measuring Attitudes toward Transgender Individuals in Poland

Transphobia is an under-examined but important type of prejudice to study in Polish culture. Poland is a country where a majority of transgender people feel discriminated against. There is a need for a more evidence-based measures for researchers and practitioners to better understand transphobia. The main purpose of the present three studies (n?=?300 participants for each study) was to validate the Genderism and Transphobia Scale (GTS; Hill and Willoughby 2005) and the Transphobia Scale (TS; Nagoshi et al. 2008) in Polish culture and to identify the possible psychological and demographic factors that matter in forming attitudes toward transgender individuals. The results confirm that Polish versions of both the GTS and the TS are reliable instruments to measure attitudes toward transgender individuals. Moreover, the studies revealed that both traditional and modern homonegativity, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, religious fundamentalism, attitudes toward gender roles, and biological and cultural beliefs about the origins of gender differences were significant predictors of transphobia. As in previous studies, men were more prejudiced toward gender nonconformists in comparison to women. These studies contribute well-adapted tools for measuring transphobia and data-driven collection of significant predictors of transphobia.

     

Defending the Democratic Argument for Limitarianism: A Reply to Volacu and Dumitru

In this paper, I argue that limitarian policies are a good means to further political equality. Limitarianism, which is a view coined and defended by Robeyns (2017), is a partial view in distributive justice which claims that under non-ideal circumstances it is morally impermissible to be rich. In a recent paper, Volacu and Dumitru (2018) level two arguments against Robeyns’ Democratic Argument for limitarianism. The Democratic Argument states that limitarianism is called for given the undermining influence current inequalities in income and wealth have for the value of democracy and political equality. Volacu and Dumitru’s Incentive Objection holds that limitarianism places an excessive and inefficient burden on the rich in ensuring political equality. The Efficacy Objection holds that even if limitarianism limits excessive wealth it still fails to ensure the preservation of political equality. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections fail, but on separate grounds. I argue that the Incentive objection fails because one could appeal to limitarian policies that are different from the ones discussed by Volacu and Dumitru and which escape the problem of reduced productivity. I argue against the Efficacy Objection that limitarian policies are a partial but highly valuable step towards establishing political equality, and that they can and should complement or be complemented by other strategies.

     

Review of Growth Modeling: Structural Equation and Multilevel Modeling Approaches (Grimm,Ram & Estabrook, 2017)

Research questions that address developmental processes are becoming more prevalent in psychology and other areas of social science. Growth models have become a popular tool to model multiple individuals measured over several time points. These types of models allow researchers to answer a wide variety of research questions, such as modeling inter- and intra-individual differences and variability in longitudinal process (Molenaar 2004). The recently published book, Growth Modeling: Structural Equation and Multilevel Modeling Approaches (Grimm, Ram & Estabrook 2017), provides a solid foundation for both beginners and more advanced researchers interested in longitudinal data analysis by juxtaposing both the multilevel and structural equation modeling frameworks for several different models. By providing both sufficient technical background and practical coding examples in a variety of both commercial and open-source software, this book should serve as an excellent reference tool for behavioral and methodological researchers interested in growth modeling.

     

Dreams,agency, and judgement

Sosa (Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 79(2): 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects” (2005: p. 7). The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine” (2005: p. 7). According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions are not “real” insofar as they are all merely imagined beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions. This paper assesses the epistemic implications of Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming. Section 1 outlines and assesses the reasons Sosa gives for thinking that his imagination model of dreaming introduces a new dimension to debates about dream scepticism. Sosa argues that his imagination model of dreaming invites a more radical version of dream scepticism, and also makes available a novel and more powerful response to dream scepticism. Objections are raised to both of those claims. This leads to a challenge to Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming. This is the concern that Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming lacks the resources to accommodate the intuition that there is something illusory or misleading about one’s situation when one is dreaming, and as a result his account of dreams fails to accommodate the common intuition that there is a sceptical problem about dreaming but not about dreamless sleep. Section 2 of the paper elaborates a version of the imagination model of dreaming that can overcome that challenge. This version of the imagination model of dreaming goes beyond what Sosa explicitly commits to when he outlines his view of dreams, however, it exploits ideas that are integral to a key theme in Sosa’s recent writings on virtue reliabilism—namely his proposal that epistemic agency should be accorded a central place in that approach to knowledge, and his related proposal that agency is exercised in conscious judgement. An implication of this version of the imagination model of dreaming is that an elucidation of a connection between the wakeful condition and our capacity to exercise agency over our mental lives should be central to an account of the nature, and epistemic significance of, wakeful consciousness. The final section of the paper considers whether this version of the imagination model of dreaming has anything novel to contribute to debates about dream scepticism.

     

Military Moral Injury: An Evidence-Based and Intercultural Approach to Spiritual Care

How can spiritual care help veterans struggling with military moral injury? An evidence-based, intercultural approach to spiritual care is proposed. Evidence-based care uses research on military moral injury and religious and spiritual struggles to understand when religious and spiritual practices, beliefs, and values are helping or harming veterans. Intercultural spiritual care recognizes the complex, distinctive ways veterans’ values, beliefs, coping, and spiritual practices are shaped by interacting cultural systems, especially military training and cultures. Pastoral theologian Larry Graham’s (Sacred Spaces: The E-Journal of the American Association of Pastoral Counselors 5, 146–171, 2017) writing on moral injury and lamentation is used to develop two spiritual care strategies: sharing anguish and interrogating suffering. Spiritual care begins with lamenting the shared anguish of moral injury using intrinsically meaningful spiritual practices to help veterans compassionately accept the emotions arising from moral injury so intensely felt in their bodies. The second strategy is sharing the lament of interrogating suffering through exploring values, beliefs, and coping arising from moral injury. A literary case study of a young female veteran based on Cara Hoffman’s (2014) novel Be Safe, I Love You illustrates this evidence-based intercultural approach to spiritual care of military moral injury.