共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
相似文献
Phillip MontagueEmail: |
2.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
3.
Andrew Kania 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(1):65-71
I discuss Gregory Currie’s taxonomy of explanations of the fictional. On the one hand, there is an important kind of relation
between internal and external explanations of some fictional truths that Currie leaves out, where both are salient and yet
in a relation of harmony with each other. On the other hand, I do not see that he has established that there is a genuine relation of tension between some pairs of internal and external explanations, and thus I question the usefulness of the category of collapse. I also consider a further kind of explanation: the exterior explanation.
相似文献
Andrew KaniaEmail: |
4.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
相似文献
Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
5.
Timothy Chan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):395-414
In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually
contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the
functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA),
the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean
assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are,
in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I
explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive
relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions.
相似文献
Timothy ChanEmail: |
6.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
7.
Jorn Sonderholm 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):233-236
In a paper from 2001, Michael C. Rea considers the question of what pornography is. First, he examines a number of existing
definitions of ‘pornography’ and after having rejected them all, he goes on to present his own preferred definition. In this
short paper, I suggest a counterexample to Rea’s definition. In particular, I suggest that there is something that, on the
one hand, is pornography according to Rea’s definition, but, on the other hand, is not something that we would intuitively
describe as being an instance of pornography.
相似文献
Jorn SonderholmEmail: |
8.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
9.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
10.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |
11.
Christopher Cowley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):495-504
Richard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.
相似文献
Christopher CowleyEmail: |
12.
Veronica Vasterling 《Human Studies》2007,30(2):79-95
In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narrativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which
approach is more adequate for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum) or the one influenced
by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is
due to her application of cognitive theory.
相似文献
Veronica VasterlingEmail: |
13.
Seth Shabo 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):63-74
In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative
possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this
link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues,
she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper,
I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe
maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety.
相似文献
Seth ShaboEmail: |
14.
Darrell P. Rowbottom 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):335-349
In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an ‘Objective Bayesian’ interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the
logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation
suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his
analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views, and show how, and
why, they are highly similar. Second, I argue that the logical interpretation is not manifestly inferior, at least for the
reasons that Williamson offers. I suggest that the key difference between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views is in
the domain of the philosophy of logic; and that the genuine disagreement appears to be over Platonism versus nominalism (within
weak psychologism).
相似文献
Darrell P. RowbottomEmail: |
15.
Michael Nelson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):455-471
I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and
the Barcan formulas.
相似文献
Michael NelsonEmail: |
16.
Michael Martin 《Sophia》2007,46(1):75-77
In this note I show that Noreen Johnson misunderstands my argument and consequently fails to refute my thesis that God’s omnipotence
conflicts with his omniscience.
相似文献
Michael MartinEmail: |
17.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
18.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
相似文献
Melissa FrankelEmail: |
19.
Towfic Shomar 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(2):321-349
There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism,
which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist,
because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist on the level of models. Such a realist position
is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr’s debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to
prove that Bohr was such a realist.
相似文献
Towfic ShomarEmail: |
20.
Dorothée Legrand 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):67-87
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that
one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other
hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness
of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree,
however about which modes of givenness are involved.
相似文献
Dorothée LegrandEmail: URL: http://dorotheelegrand.googlepages.com |