Suicide bombings and the self

The failure to locate a unifying psychological profile of suicide bombers should prompt moves to a more extended and interdisciplinary front, availing itself of insights from disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and history of ideas, as well as from psychology. This paper aims in that direction by exploring ‘traditional’ versus ‘western liberal’ conceptions of the self, with special emphasis on their possible pathologies; and by integrating those pathologies with insights from Durkheimian suicidology. It is hypothesised that suicide bombers in the West are typically callow, malleable young men targeted by terror merchants, and that their suicide missions are, first and foremost, acts of deluded self-enhancement, which need to be understood against the backdrop of the western liberal conception of the self. Finally, some implications for moral education are suggested.     

The satanic novel: A philosophical dialogue on blasphemy and censorship

This dialogue is concerned with the problems raised by the Rushdie affair for Western intellectuals, whose thought on social issues derives either from the Christian or the Western liberal tradition. This has brought to a head the many difficulties which beset a Western European country as it develops into a multicultural one. Since the concern of the dialogue is with a crisis in the thinking of Western intellectuals about free speech, censorship, tolerance, etc., the four participants are university teachers of philosophy in a British university. They are: Ambrose Taylor, a self‐styled defender of ‘British’ and ‘Christian’ values, Archie Runciman, a progressive Christian or religious eclectic, Freddie Stuart Hill, a committed Mill type liberal and Jenny Spring, whose liberalism is tempered by the belief that the state should take a positive role in promoting certain values. The author should not be identified with any of the speakers.     

Research note: implicit conservatism in liberal religion: British Quakers as an ‘uncertain sect’

This research note takes Steve Bruce's analysis of secularisation within liberal religious groups and applies it to British Quakerism, noted for its permissiveness towards theology. It contends that Bruce has failed to allow for a conservative ‘behavioural creed’ operating to maintain conformity and elements of certainty within liberal groups. It also argues that the emphasis on a shared concept of ‘towards’ or ‘perhaps’ theology within the group, while appearing liberal, makes demands on its members which are more conformist and sectarian than may have at first appeared and which may help safeguard the future of the group. It is not that Bruce's analysis of liberal groups is necessarily wrong, but that ‘liberal’ groups may be less liberal than they first appear.     

Smokers' rights to health care: why the 'restoration argument' is a moralising wolf in a liberal sheep's clothing

Do people who cause themselves to be ill (e.g. by smoking) forfeit some of their rights to healthcare? This paper examines one argument for the view that they do, the restoration argument. It goes as follows. Smokers need more health-resources than non-smokers. Given limited budgets, we must choose between treating everyone equally (according to need) or reducing smokers' entitlements. If we choose the former, non-smokers will be harmed by others' smoking, because there will be less resources available for them than if no-one smoked. This is unfair: why should non-smokers suffer because of others' unhealthy lifestyle choices? We should therefore choose the latter and reduce smokers' entitlements. This paper criticises the restoration argument on the following grounds. In order to avoid generating unpalatable conclusions elsewhere, it must be combined with a principle according to which activities which are sufficiently ‘socially valuable’ (e.g. parenting) are immune from restoration claims. This however means that what was supposed to be one of the argument's most attractive features, its compatibility with ‘liberal neutrality’ with respect to the value of different lifestyles, doesn't really exist. Hence, the restoration argument is nowhere near as attractive as it at first appears to be.     

Toward a liberal socialist cosmopolitan nationalism

I explicate and defend a form of liberal socialist nationalism. It is also a nationalism which is cosmopolitan. Explication and explanation are crucially in order here, for it is not unreasonable to believe that ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ and ‘liberal socialist nationalism’ and even ‘liberal nationalism’ are oxymoronic. Against that I argue that there is a straightforward understanding of these concepts and their relations to each other that does not have inconsistencies or even paradoxes. Liberal socialism properly understood goes well with cosmopolitanism (both moral and institutional), and there are plausible and attractive forms of both liberalism and socialism that go together. Moreover, the only candidate for a nationalism that would survive careful reflective inquiry is a liberal nationalism: a nationalism which is neither ethnic nor civic. It is widely believed, however, that even a liberal nationalism is incompatible with cosmopolitanism. I contend in a series of arguments that in contexts where nationalism is rightly on the agenda the form that it should take is that of a liberal nationalism, and it is further argued that to be viable, nationalism requires cosmopolitanism.     

Intelligibility,Moral Loss and Injustice

In Liberalism's Religion, I analyse the specific conception of religion that liberalism relies upon. I argue that the concept of religion should be disaggregated into its normatively salient features. When deciding whether to avert undue impingements on religious observances, or to avoid any untoward support of such observances, liberal states should not deal with ‘religion’ as such but, rather, with relevant dimensions of religious phenomena. States should avoid religious entanglement when ‘religion’ is epistemically inaccessible, socially divisive and/or comprehensive in scope. In turn, states should show special deference to religious observances insofar as they exhibit what I call integrity – whether personal or collective. The upshot of this interpretive strategy is that liberal law need not recognise religion as such. As a result, there are gaps between the liberal construal of disaggregated religion and the lived experience of religion as a uniquely integrated experience. Are these gaps morally regrettable? Are they unjust?     

Governing [through] Autonomy. The Moral and Legal Limits of “Soft Paternalism”

Legal restrictions of the right to self-determination increasingly pretend to be compatible with the liberal concept of autonomy: they act upon a ‘soft’ or autonomy-orientated paternalistic rationale. Conventional liberal critique of paternalism turns out to be insensitive to the intricate normative problems following from ‘soft’ or ‘libertarian’ paternalism. In fact, these autonomy-oriented forms of paternalism could actually be even more problematic and may infringe liberty rights even more intensely than hard paternalistic regulation. This paper contributes to the systematic differentiation of soft and hard paternalism by discussing the (legal) concept of autonomy and elaborates the moral and legal limits of autonomy-orientated paternalism.     

The effect of normative models on individual and group choice

Studied the effect of a normative model (maximization of expected value) upon group and individual choice. 109 MBA students in a Lain square research design chose between two alternatives differing in expected value and in range of outcomes. Group choices were significantly (p < .05) closer to those predicted by the normative model than were individual choices. This difference was not due only to information about the presence and applicability of the normative model but rather it was due to the persuasiveness of the model in a group as a cogent and correct solution to the choice dilemma. Task instructions emphasizing the rewards from risk taking produced significantly more choices (p < .05) of the riskier alternative, particularly by individuals as opposed to groups, than did instructions emphasizing the penalties of risk taking. ‘Risky’ and ‘conservative’ shifts in choice between groups and individuals were explicable through knowledge of the influence of the normative model in individual and group choice.     

Can liberal perfectionism justify religious toleration? Wall on promoting and respecting

Toleration is perhaps the core commitment of liberalism, but this seemingly simple feature of liberal societies creates tension for liberal perfectionists, who are committed to justifying religious toleration primarily in terms of the goods and flourishing it promotes. Perfectionists, so it seems, should recommend restricting harmful religious practices when feasible. If such restrictions would promote liberal perfectionist values like autonomy, it is unclear how the perfectionist can object. A contemporary liberal perfectionist, Steven Wall, has advanced defense of religious toleration that grounds perfectionist toleration in an innovative account of reasons of respect. He thus defends perfectionist toleration on two grounds: (i) the appropriate manner of responding to perfectionist goods like autonomy and membership is to respect the religious choices of others; (ii) citizens can acquire reasons to respect the religious choices of others through internalizing a value-promoting moral and political code. I argue that both defenses fail. The cornerstone of both arguments is the connection Wall draws between reasons to promote value and reasons to respect it. I claim that Wall’s conception of the relationship between promoting and respecting value is inadequate. I conclude that the failure of Wall’s defense of perfectionist toleration should motivate liberal perfectionists to develop more sophisticated accounts of normative reasons. The viability of a truly liberal perfectionism depends upon such developments.     

Rethinking Accountability in the Context of Human Rights

Within liberal democratic theory, ‘democratic accountability’ denotes an aggregative method for linking political decisions to citizens’ preferences through representative institutions. Could such a notion be transferred to the global context of human rights? Various obstacles seem to block such a transfer: there are no ‘world citizens’ as such; many people in need of human rights are not citizens of constitutional democratic states; and the aggregative methods that are supposed to sustain the link are often used in favour of nation-state strategic action rather than human rights. So what could accountability mean in relation to human rights? This article argues that discourse theory offers resources for approaching these problems and for rethinking a normative notion of accountability in relation to human rights. It is suggested that accountability should link political decisions to universal agreements through global rights institutions and that the link should be sustained by deliberative rather than aggregative procedures.     

“Breaking Her Spirit” Through Objectification,Fragmentation, and Consumption: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Domestic Sex Trafficking

It is now recognized that sex trafficking is an issue present in the United States as victims are frequently children and adults who were born and raised in the United States. Anti-trafficking researchers and advocates state that the problem is one of supply and demand and that trafficking of vulnerable individuals will continue until the demand for commercial sex ceases. One goal of this article is to show how Carol Adams’ model of violence against women is uniquely applicable to the issue of sex trafficking. In particular, this article outlines the ways in which objectification, fragmentation, and consumption allow commercial sexual exploitation through sex trafficking to continue. The article also explores links between pornography and sex trafficking as well as the processes traffickers use to groom individuals for exploitation through prostitution in a manner that helps to ensure compliance. Finally, the article seeks to implore clinicians to increase their understanding of the issues unique to sex trafficking survivors and take an integrative theoretical approach when working with trafficked individuals.     

Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism

Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated by David Miller, are vulnerable to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls’s political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls’s work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist’ focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism’ of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism.     

Tolerant Paternalism: Pro-ethical Design as a Resolution of the Dilemma of Toleration

Toleration is one of the fundamental principles that inform the design of a democratic and liberal society. Unfortunately, its adoption seems inconsistent with the adoption of paternalistically benevolent policies, which represent a valuable mechanism to improve individuals’ well-being. In this paper, I refer to this tension as the dilemma of toleration. The dilemma is not new. It arises when an agent A would like to be tolerant and respectful towards another agent B’s choices but, at the same time, A is altruistically concerned that a particular course of action would harm, or at least not improve, B’s well-being, so A would also like to be helpful and seeks to ensure that B does not pursue such course of action, for B’s sake and even against B’s consent. In the article, I clarify the specific nature of the dilemma and show that several forms of paternalism, including those based on ethics by design and structural nudging, may not be suitable to resolve it. I then argue that one form of paternalism, based on pro-ethical design, can be compatible with toleration and hence with the respect for B’s choices, by operating only at the informational and not at the structural level of a choice architecture. This provides a successful resolution of the dilemma, showing that tolerant paternalism is not an oxymoron but a viable approach to the design of a democratic and liberal society.     

Developing a new post‐liberal paradigm for British religious education 1

The aim of this paper is to articulate a new ‘post‐liberal’ paradigm for religious education in Britain. As criticisms of British religious education have mounted over the last few decades, it is becoming increasingly obvious that familiar inherited ways of conceptualising the nature and practice of religious education in schools are inappropriate to contemporary educational needs. A new model is required to structure, justify and direct learning and teaching in religious education. This paper reviews the commitments, assumptions and beliefs that together constitute the current ruling ‘liberal’ paradigm, identifies and exposes its weakness and concludes by providing a tentative first draft of a new ‘post‐liberal’ paradigm for religious education, which holds more promise of realising socially positive educational aims than the current paradigm.     

Rational Natural Law and German Sociology: Hobbes,Locke and Tönnies

While the roots of modern German sociology are often traced back to historicism, the importance of rational natural law in the inception of the founding work of German sociology, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft by Ferdinand Tönnies, intended as a ‘creative synthesis’ between rational natural law and romantic historicism, should not be overlooked. We show how in his earliest scholarly work on Thomas Hobbes and John Locke the shift in the meaning of the two concepts ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’ represents a departure from early liberal enlightenment to a Weltanschauung marked by romantic authors such as Fichte, Novalis and Haller, by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Spencer and Marx, notwithstanding Tönnies' adherence to the political and social values of a liberal civil society.     

Epistemological notes on recent studies of social perception

Among three possible avenues toward a good society — revolutionary Marxism, liberal‐democratic reform, and radical citizenship education — this paper examines and advocates the third. Societies are held to be ‘good’ so long as the Most Basic Rights are in fact enjoyed by all (i.e. the right (1) to stay alive, (2) to remain unmolested, and (3) to be free to develop one's potentialities). Some key propositions in ‘contract theory’ as represented by such diverse theorists as Socrates, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Tussman and Meiklejohn are discussed, and an alternative tradition, ‘freedom theory’, is sketched, with contributions from Socrates, Godwin, Thoreau, and Camus. An argument is then developed to the effect that the contract theorists have all contributed to the basis on which the contemporary ‘liberal make‐believe’ rests. This term refers to the myth that our society is democratic, i.e. that working (only) within the system of our constitutional procedures will or can lead toward a just society. Finally, it is argued that the highest priority in citizenship education is to destroy this liberal make‐believe, and that freedom theory provides a better foundation than contract theory in the struggle for human rights, and for mankind's survival.     

Evil acts not evil people: their characteristics and contexts

Abstract: The problem of evil has vexed philosophers and theologians for centuries and anthropologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists in more recent times. Numerous theories have been proposed but there is still little agreement on such basic questions as the nature of evil, what constitutes and motivates an evil act, and how we resolve conflicts between individuals and groups in which evil acts are being committed. I am proposing that evil should be used as an adjective, and not as a noun. As such it should be employed to qualify acts of persons rather than their character. This change would enable us to eschew foundational explanations of evil and, therefore, to examine evil acts in their contexts and so better discern their nature and motivation. I will contend that evil acts begin when an individual makes, or members of a group make, assertions about the ‘naturalness’ of their own acts and, correspondingly, the ‘unnaturalness’ of the acts of others. I will suggest that this results from the anxiety that ensues when they cannot adequately signify their experience of these acts. When this occurs, those so treated are dispossessed of their ‘personhood’, allowing members of the ‘natural’ group to violate their ‘boundaries' with impunity. These violations can range from the relatively innocuous such as being ignored to the extreme such as genocide. I am asserting that all these acts should be termed evil as they derive from the same semiotic process of ‘naturalizaton’. I will discuss ways of preventing individuals or groups from embarking on the process of ‘naturalization’ and describe the types of contexts that might reduce or eliminate the commission of evil acts by those already engaged in their perpetration. To demonstrate these ideas I will use examples from my personal experience, from analytic theory and from the ‘troubles' in Northern Ireland.     

Attitudes toward religious diversity among American exemplars of Christian virtue

An important concern within contemporary Western societies is how religious adherents view and engage religious diversity. This study attempts to further understandings regarding religious diversity in contemporary society through the accounts of American Christian religious exemplars whose religious identification spans the conservative evangelical, liberal Protestant and Roman Catholic traditions. Ninety‐six in‐depth interviews were conducted with individuals recognized by their congregational leadership as exemplifying Christian virtues and thereby Christian commitment. Weak denominational allegiances, accompanied by salient identification with broad Christian religious traditions were found. Mainline/liberal Christians tended to identify conservative/evangelical Christians as ‘others’, while conservative/evangelical Christians identified Mormons as ‘others.’ Also, a shift in attitudes toward Catholics was found among Protestants, and attitudes toward non‐Christian religions were respectfully civil across a range of theological understanding of these religions. The implications of these findings for religious identity in contemporary society are explored with particular attention to religious diversity.     

Mixing virtue and vice: combining the immediacy effect and the diversification heuristic

Many of the most significant choices that people make are between vices, which exchange small immediate rewards for large delayed costs, and virtues, which exchange small immediate costs for large delayed rewards. We investigate the consequences of making a series of such choices either simultaneously or sequentially. We made two predictions. First, because many alternatives chosen under simultaneous choice will only be experienced following a delay, and because hyperbolic time discounting predicts that people will prefer delayed virtues but immediate vices, we predicted that people would choose more virtues in simultaneous than sequential choice. Second, due to the tendency to diversify portfolios of choices, we predicted a greater mix of virtues and vices in simultaneous than sequential choice. These predictions were confirmed in two experiments involving real choices; one between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ movies, and the other between ‘instant‐win’ and ‘prize‐draw’ lottery tickets. We conclude by posing the question of whether simultaneous or sequential choice results in decisions that more closely approximate what people ‘really’ want. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.