The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox

The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the “No Friday Argument,” which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the “Unprojectible Announcement Argument,” the “Wright & Sudbury Argument,” and the “Epistemic Blindspot Argument.” The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick.     

Wilhelm Reich in Soviet Russia: Psychoanalysis,Marxism, and the Stalinist reaction

Abstract

In 1929, Wilhelm Reich lectured on “Psychoanalysis as a natural science” before the Communist Academy in Moscow; he was the only Freudian-trained Central European psychoanalyst to do so. That same year, his article “Dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis” was published in the Academy's journal, Under the Banner of Marxism, in both Moscow and Berlin. By this time, Reich's involvement with political activism aligned with the Austrian Communist Party was increasing, while simultaneously psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union was in decline. Our paper places these events in their proper historical context and includes a discussion of the various attempts to determine the compatibility of psychoanalysis and Marxism. We offer analyses of both the article, “Dialectical materialism and psychoanalysis,” and the lecture, “Psychoanalysis as a natural science,” and the reactions to both by Reich's Russian critics. We show the ways in which responses to his lecture foreshadow what becomes the standard Soviet assessment of psychoanalysis. As an appendix to this paper, we provide the first English translation of the Russian account of his lecture, as published in the Herald of the Communist Academy.     

EFFECTIVE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE WITHOUT EFFECTIVE GLOBAL GOVERNMENT: A CONTEMPORARY MYTH

Although the recent collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union has significantly reduced the near-term probability of nuclear disaster, it constitutes wishful thinking to imagine that meaningful and effective global governance is possible in today's world. The term “global governance” suggests and implies a degree of order and control in the international community far beyond that which presently exists, and that in fact could only be achieved by means of a global government. The global governance myth has emerged to help people cope with the uncongenial and presumably unavoidable reality that we are living in a world in which global government is impossible, and in which therefore the international condition is most accurately described as “international anarchy.” A dysfunctional myth is a belief that not only is false, but that discourages and deters thought and action toward overcoming uncongenial realities which are not, in fact, unavoidable. Global governance, in all likelihood, falls into the category of dysfunctional myth.     

A neglected response to the paradoxes of confirmation

Hempel's paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation, Goodman’s “grue” paradox and the “tacking” (or “irrelevant conjunct”) paradox. What these paradoxes reveal, I argue, is that a presumption of causal realism is required to ground any confirmation; but once we grant causal realism, we have no reason to accept the central principles giving rise to the paradoxes.     

Killing kids: The juvenile death penalty and community sentiment

In the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, “community sentiment” plays a central if not dispositive role in determining if a punishment is disproportionate. To gauge sentiment on the death penalty for juveniles, two experiments with death-qualified subjects were run, where age (a 15–25 age range) and case (heinousness) were varied in the first, and type of defendant (principal, accessory, or felony-murder accessory) and an extended age range (13–25) varied in the second. Significant age effects occur in both experiments, with approximately 75% and 65% refusing to give the death penalty for the youngest (13–15) and next youngest (16–18) groups, whereas 60% give the death penalty for the 25-year-old. In their reasons for their decisions, the killing kid was judged less blameworthy and death-worthy. Although politicians have called for “a man-sized punishment for a man-sized crime,” this community does not see that “man-sized” punishment fitting the kid.     

Søren Kierkegaard and the Impossibility of (Un)Forgiveness

Discussions of forgiveness within Christian theology have tended to focus on the conditions in which forgiveness may be a moral or divine imperative for believers. With regard to Søren Kierkegaard’s theological ethics, this article explicates a radical perspective. For the Kierkegaardian Christian lover, no definitive relational break with the other (however objectionable) can occur. As Kierkegaard emphasizes in Works of Love, in a discourse which bears this sentiment as its title, “love abides.” Indeed, I illustrate how in three consecutive discourses in Works of Love—“VI: Love Abideth,” “VII: Mercy, a Work of Love,” and “VIII: The Victory of the Reconciliation in Love”—Kierkegaard’s ethical vision is grounded in Christian love’s immutability. For Kierkegaard, if Christian love is present, then forgiveness is redundant, and unforgiveness is impossible.     

Permanent Contributions in Philosophy

Has any school or movement in all of Western philosophy made a permanent contribution, permanent in the sense that it will last as long as philosophy does? More narrowly, has there ever been put forward a thesis that has achieved lasting consensus? After carefully defining “philosophical thesis” and “consensus,” so as to forestall uninteresting answers, this paper argues that the ancient Greeks made one or two such contributions, and the Analytic philosophers (ca. 1890–1960) made a few, but there have been no others. Moreover (a) the Analytic contributions were more empirical than philosophical, and (b) they were almost entirely negative. So, the basic short answer to our question is “no.” The paper concludes by asking in what way(s) there has been progress in philosophy.     

Deviance‐construction in Stalinist societies: A critical analysis

This study is concerned with the definition of deviance and the processes of constructing deviance in Stalinist societies. Deviances created by the state in these societies are analyzed, especially from functionalist and phenomenologist aspects and by applying Foucault's approach. Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago is used as a starting point for the analysis. In his work, Solzhenitsyn dwells at length on the “deviances” and the process of deviance construction in Stalinist Soviet Union. It is suggested that, in these societies, “total state deviance” fits in a desacralized, demodernized world view. Finally some consequences of this deviance image still at work are discussed.     

The Hydraulic Principles Governing the Function of the Cochlea

General equation. Rejecting all fantastic “anatomical” data, that is, not making any anatomical assumptions but those of facts which are clearly visible under the microscope, but, on the other hand, taking conscientiously into account everything that can thus be seen, we derive a general equation describing the hydraulic functions of the mammalian cochlea.

Statement of the chief aim of the theory. Whenever anything occurs on the outside which deserves to be called a sound in the sense of the physicist, and which varies more or less periodically with the time, we want to know first, what length or lengths of the phragma will be involved, because this determines the number of sensitive cells stimulated and thereby the magnitude of the nervous flux (or “the sensation intensity,” loudness); and we want to know second, how frequently per time unit these various lengths of the phragma are shaken, because this determines the nature of the stimulation and accordingly the quality of the chemical process resulting in each of those sensitive cells (or “the sensation quality,” pitch). Thus, our most important aim must be the establishment of a relation between l and t.

Solution of the equation. The equation is solved in special cases for two-fold verificaton: (1) by auditory observation; (2) by experimentation on a large, transparent, hydraulic model.

Thirty years without adverse criticism. The hydraulic theory during its life of thirty years has received some praise by the few who were willing to read it, has been viciously misrepresented by some who would not or could not comprehend it, has been innumerable times dogmatically rejected by those who did not even know what it consists in. We invite serious criticism of its basic assumptions, its mathematical analysis and, last but not least, its agreement with the facts of hearing.

The concept of a “traveling” bulge is not a part of the hydraulic theory. The author requests textbook and magazine writers to cease misquoting him. He has never either enounced or supported any “traveling” bulge theory.     

Motives Don't Matter? Motive Attribution and Counterterrorism Policy

Across three studies, two experiments, and two different countries (Israel and the United States), we examine how perceptions among members of the public regarding the motives of terrorists' influence support for counterterrorist policy. We find that while perceptions that terrorists are motivated by “hatred” (rather than by a “lack of opportunity”—economic or otherwise) strongly correlate with support for harsher counter-tactics, and that these perceptions can be changed by providing information from “experts” on the “true” motivations of the outgroup, these changes in perception do not appear to cause change in support for counterterrorism policy. Our findings suggest that among the public, counterterror policy is not as instrumentally driven as much current research assumes.     

Is Colour incompatibility analytic?

It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft-ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place.     

A Systems Dilemma

The current shift of interest, reflected in public policy, from the production of goods to the provision of services, has caused a major re-examination of the nature of the services the individual can expect from his society. This re-examination is producing a number of insights, some of them shocking. In particular, we are learning that many of the systems we have created to deliver services are, in the name of “progress” and “civilization,” contributing to the conditions of human distress they were designed to alleviate. Much has been written lately about how service systems of one kind or another subvert their announced goals—how a welfare system perpetuates poverty, or how the medical profession creates iatrogenic illness. There has not been very much written, however, about how several systems inadvertently combine in their day to day operations in such a way as to frustrate each others' activities, and how, in so doing, they destroy in varying degrees the lives of people, or render it difficult for them to improve their lives. We have all been much too tightly locked in our own niches by training, experience, and various types of private interest to see this kind of interlock. It comes into sharp perspective only when one studies the problems of a single person in terms of his total life space, his “ecology.” This paper represents an effort to describe one such situation in a family as viewed from a community health services program designed to approach human crises as ecological phenomena, and to explore and respond to them within this framework. We have found that the best way to organize our view of the environmental field people move in is according to the diverse systems which make it up, so we have labeled our theoretical base “ecological systems theory.” ( 1 ) What is of particular interest to the behavioral scientist in the situation described is that neither individual nor family diagnosis, nor the contributions of the larger systems (in this case a housing system and a system of medical care) will, if viewed separately, explain the state of the man in question. Only when the contributions of all of these systems are made clear, and their interrelationships explored, do the origins of the phenomena described begin to emerge.     

Re‐framing systemic paradigms for the art of learning

Thoughtful people are increasingly concerned that the current paradigms for social, corporate, and educational activities are in disgraceful disarray. The “problem‐solving” or analytical model, the competitive or game model, the commercial or consumer model, the bureaucratic or institutional model, and the disease or illness model which prevail in public discourse are proving to be especially unwholesome. We cannot, however, educate ourselves without paradigms. A credible educational paradigm must be generally accessible without being simplistic, informative without being monothematic, and accommodating as well as discriminating. Given our disquiet with the current cognitive situation, a renewing paradigm must be somehow novel; given the character of human nature, a sustaining paradigm must be somehow familiar.

For a very long time now, professional Sciences have committed themselves to paradigms about “reality out there,” while professional Arts have devoted themselves to expressing “imagination from within here.” The more these two worldviews polarize in opposition to one another, the more room there is—and the more human heed there becomes—for mediation by an applied philosophy which accommodates the “real” as well as the “imaginary” in a complementary way. Such a philosophy would address not only “what do you know?” and “how do you do?” but also “how do you know?” and “why do you do?” In earlier times, people would have been considered neither educated nor wise unless they appreciated the Sciences and the Arts whole. In our time, we may not survive unless we can re‐integrate our fractured perceptions. How might we proceed to do so? There may be a systemological way.     

An Evolutionary Account of Suicide Attacks: The Kamikaze Case

Explanations for suicide attacks abound. Yet the literature remains conceptually fragmented, with different authors focusing on different attitudes, incentive structures, values, psychological processes, strategic imperatives, and cultural, historical, and personal circumstances. Curiously, however, there have been few efforts to cast suicide bombing within the extensive evolutionary literature on human altruism—in which it clearly belongs. Neither have there been more than occasional efforts to mobilize the distinction between “proximate” and “ultimate” explanations, with most proposed explanations being proximate. Here we draw on content analyses from materials written by Japanese Kamikaze pilots to propose an evolvable cognitive algorithm—by hypothesis, species typical—that (1) specifies environmental circumstances under which such “heroic” behavior is likely; (2) is consistent at the proximate level with the Japanese data; and (3) that is not inconsistent with many of the diverse proximate attitudes, values, and psychological mechanisms that dominate discussions of contemporary suicide campaigns. The evolutionary perspective is not an alternative to most of the proximate explanations offered in discussions of contemporary cases but is, rather, a paradigm around which diverse proximate explanations can be organized.     

NÉCESSITÉ ET SIGNIFICATION DES RECHERCHES COMPARATIVES EN PSYCHOLOGIE GÉNÉTIQUE

Need and meaning of comparative studies in genetic psychology. — The comparative studies in the field of genetic psychology are indispensable for Psychology in general and also for Sociology, because only such studies allow us to separate the effects of biological or mental factors from those of social and cultural influences on the formation and the socialization of individuals. Relevant to this discussion is the well-known issue between culturalistic psychoanalysts like Fromm, Horney, etc., and classical freudian psychoanalysts who reduce the whole individual development to an endogenous evolution of « instinct ». In the field of cognitive functions to which this paper is devoted, at least four kinds of various factors must be distinguished, the respective influences of which can be separated through comparative studies : I. Biological factors depending on the “epigenetic” system (maturation of nervous system, etc.). These factors probably explain the sequential aspects (constant and necessary order) of the stages in the development of operative intelligence. However, if only these factors were acting, the stages would not only appear in a sequence, but at the same ages, whereas in fact, the ages where a stage appears differ from one environment to another. 2. Equilibration or autoregulation factors, determining behavior and thought in their various specific activities. They correspond to the sequential forms in general coordination of the actions of individuals as interacting with their physical environment; such intervening regulations are probably at the origin of the mental operations themselves, especially logical - mathematical operations. 3. General socialization factors, which are identical for all societies : cooperations - discussions - oppositions - exchanges, etc., between children or between adults or between adults and children. These factors 3 are closely related with the factors 2, because the general coordination of actions concerns inter-individual as so as intra-individual actions. 4. Factors related to educational and cultural transmission, which differ from one society to another; they are those we usually have in mind when we say briefly “social factors”. To discuss the influence of these four factors, Mohseni's study on Teheran school children and illiterate rural children is given as an example. Three results were obtained : (1) For “conservation” tasks, the same stages of intellectual development are observed for urban and rural children, in Iran as well as in Europe. (2) For these same tasks, a systematic delay of two to three years is observed among rural children with respect to Teheran children. (3) For performance tests (i.e. Porteus, Goodenough, etc.) there is a delay of four and primarily five years. These data seem to show that there is some sequential order of the stages which depends partially on the factors I. But, the ages for each stage are not constant, showing the factors 2 and 3 are intervening in a probably inseparable way. On the other hand, the difference between the actual operative results and the performance tests seems to indicate that a distinction might be made between the factors of general coordination (factors 2 and 3) and the educational transmissions (factors 4). About these last factors, the three and four year delays observed by Canadian psychologists working in Martinique with school children (French curriculum) in operative tasks (like conservations) seem to indicate that the general operations depend less on school than on the activities themselves of children or in general on the adult stimulations in the environment. We must pay special attention to the problems raised by language. In some precise and systematic experiments in Geneva, Sinclair shows children on the “preoperative” level (i.e. with no conservation…) do not spontaneously use the same language as operative children : the former use chiefly “scale” words (“much” or “many”, “little” or “few”, “large”, “small”) and the latter use chiefly “vector” words (“more”, “less”). If the younger subjects are submitted to a verbal training, they do learn to use the older children's language, but it only results in very little operative improvement (about one case out of 10 subjects on the average). Therefore, replicating the same experiments in countries speaking different languages would be very interesting. For instance, in the Turkish language, there is only one “vector” word, i.e. “again”; so that the Turk says “again much, again many” to say “more”. Then, the question is to know whether a change will be observed for the stages of logical-mathematical operations or whether these operations will be found everywhere with their identical common background; it seems that this last conclusion has already been observed in Aden (Hyde), Hong Kong (Goodnow), South Africa (Price-Williams). In conclusion, the kind of psychology we develop in our social environments, remains conjectural as long as comparative extensive and systematical research is not available; a great effort is still to be made in this direction.     

In the Beginning Was the Deed

Winch's readings of Wittgenstein and Weil call for a significant rethinking of the relation between “metaphysics” and “ethics.” But there are confusions, perhaps to be found in all three of these writers, that we may slip into here. These are linked with the tendency to see idealist tendencies in Wittgenstein, and with his remark that giving grounds comes to an end, not in a kind of seeing on our part, but in our acting. The sense that we think we see in this suggestion is dependent on a distorted conception of “justification.” Getting clear about this involves coming to appreciate just how much of our nature as ethical beings is engaged when we do philosophy.     

The Baby Boomer bias: The negative impact of generational labels on older workers

While generational labels (e.g., Baby Boomers) are popular in the media, few studies have explored whether using these labels leads to discrimination against older workers. Using an inbox task, we examined whether the label “Baby Boomer” led older workers to be viewed more negatively than the label “older employee” in four workplace scenarios. Data were collected from 304 management students (mean age = 30.92 years, SD = 9.21). Individuals identified as Baby Boomers were viewed more negatively across all four different scenarios and this effect was modified by social dominance orientation and power distance orientation in the hiring scenarios. Overall, our results suggest the use of generational labels such as Baby Boomers may negatively impact the workplace experiences of older workers.