The validity of psychotherapy 1

How good is psychotherapy as a tool of research into human nature? There is an orthodox defence of it as a research tool, which relies on showing that interpretations are true of the patient when they satisfy certain criteria. This defence is examined and rejected. The reply is considered that an interpretation which ‘keeps things moving’ is true, or an approximation to the truth. This reply is rejected by comparing and contrasting an interpretation in psychotherapy with one from brainwashing sessions. Two suppositions about psychotherapy (which weaken its discovery powers) are deliberately adopted — the suppositions that the material produced is ‘perspective’ and ‘method’ dependent. An unorthodox defence of psychotherapy is then offered — by means of a watery sense of ‘discover’. This enables us to outline a weak sense in which psychotherapy is a valid enterprise, but one which is still strong enough for research purposes.     

The learning theory model of neurosis—A new approach

This paper is concerned with the development of a learning theory model of neurosis which would not be susceptible to the many criticisms which can be made of former models. Two widely favoured models—those of Freud and Skinner—are rejected because they are either non-falsifiable or tautological. The Watson and Mowrer models are rejected because they have been experimentally invalidated. The model here suggested differs from previous ones in several important respects. In the first place, it replaces the classical law of extinction by a more modern version which allows for incubation (enhancement) effects of exposure to CS-only stimuli, as well as for extinction effects. In the second place, the model emphasizes the importance of individual differences, and suggests precise relations between personality and the conditioning of neurotic behaviours. In the third place, the model lays stress on innate fear patterns and ‘preparedness’ as important factors in the genesis of conditioned fear responses. In the fourth place, the concept of ‘pain’ in the classical animal literature, and its use in creating models of neurosis, is supplemented by other concepts (‘frustrative non-reward’, ‘approach-avoidance’ conflict) which are more relevant to human neurosis. In the fifth place, and most important. the notion of ‘traumatic’, single-trial conditioning is abandoned, and a new theory based on incubation is proposed. It is suggested that the new theory is more adequate than previous ones to account for the known facts of human neurosis, and that it suggests novel types of experiment in both the animal and human fields which can be used to test its adequacy.     

Heidegger on Assertion,Method and Metaphysics

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present‐at‐hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present‐at‐hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.     

Psychosomatic breast and alexithymic breast: A Bionian psychosomatic perspective

The author develops the concept of ‘psychosomatic breast’ in both clinical and theoretical terms, a concept developed by Bion (1962b) to account for a breast in charge of primary symbolization and of the psychosomatic integration of the infant's raw physiological, emotional and sensory experiences. As such, the psychosomatic breast is a prototype, a core in the mother endowed with the capacity for reverie insofar as the transformative function of the latter not only pertains to the primary symbolization of emotional life, but also to its secondary symbolization. The author contends that a primal failure in the transformation of such raw emotional and sensory experiences through the reverie of primary objects results in the incorporation of an ‘alexithymic breast’ – a kind of obstructive object that has become impervious to communication via projective identification and has been internalized as a source of psychic and physical breakdown. This early deficiency in parental reverie is experienced by the infant as a primitive disaster that establishes a point of fixation, a fault line in psychosomatic organization which the individual is likely to regress to, at a later stage, by developing physical illness. The author illustrates the dynamics and the economy of the conflict between psychosomatic and alexithymic breasts thanks to fragments from the analysis of a woman who developed cancer in the course of her psychoanalysis and was eventually cured.     

LIFE AND MEANING

This paper addresses an apparent tension between a familiar claim about meaning in general, to the effect that the meaning of anything owes to its place, ultimately, within a ‘form of life’, and a claim, also familiar, about the meaning of human life itself, to the effect that this must be something ‘beyond the human’. How can life itself be meaningful if meaning is a matter of a relationship to life? After elaborating and briefly defending these two claims, two ways of amending and thereby reconciling them are considered and rejected. These ways involve either spiriting away the issue of life's meaning or encouraging unwelcome metaphysical views. The author then argues that, rather than remove the tension between the two claims, each should be viewed as expressing an aspect of a delicate metaphysical position. This position is distinguished from ones, like transcendental idealism and constructivism, with which it might be confused, and is then related to Daoist and Zen thought and to the later philosophy of Heidegger. Crucial to the position is the proposal that the ‘beyond the human’ which enables life to be meaningful is both ineffable and ‘intimate’ with life itself.     

The self in deep ecology: A response to Watson

ABSTRACT

Richard Watson maintains that deep ecology suffers from an internal contradiction and should therefore be rejected. Watson contends that deep ecology claims to be non-anthropocentric while at the same time is committed to setting humans apart from nature, which is inherently anthropocentric. I argue that Watson’s objection arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding of how deep ecologist’s conceive of the ‘Self.’ Drawing on resources from Buddhism, I offer an understanding of the ‘Self’ that is fully consistent with deep ecology, and does not lead to the anthropocentric contradiction that Watson identifies. The paper will proceed as follows: First, I articulate Watson’s objection, and briefly discuss the traditional deep ecology position. Next, I turn to a discussion of the ‘Self’ and show that there are conceptions of human nature that are not separate from ‘Nature.’ It will thus be shown that deep ecology is not inconsistent and need not be rejected.     

Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?

Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.     

‘I am not crying. I am rubbing my eyes’: Annie and the hollow object

This article explores the relationship between the development of severe eczema and asthma in an eight-year-old girl and her difficulties with experiencing psychic pain and conflict. The author focuses on the transference dynamics that preceded and surrounded the psychosomatic reaction in the session. The observations in this case may explain why patients, despite feeling taken over by intense physical sensations, can display flatness and superficiality of affect giving the appearance that they are emotionally ‘hollow’. The author proposes that these patients experience an emotional sense of emptiness in themselves and in their objects that is the result of a very early defence of dissociation caused by overwhelming anxieties of annihilation that are lived out in and through the body. The appearance of a psychosomatic symptom during the session can follow the emergence of sudden and intense raw hostile feelings towards the primary object, accompanied by a sense of danger and profound anxiety, as the hated object is also desperately needed for the subject’s own physical/emotional survival. The analyst can contribute to triggering these episodes by failing to contain the patient’s projections, which may lead to the patient feeling forced to re-introject unprocessed and unbearable ‘psycho-physical’ emotions. This article discusses the different degrees – and forms – of symbolic functioning in connection to this girl’s experience of her eczema and asthma and their manifestation in the transference relationship to the therapist.     

What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Trading Refugee Quotas?

The tradable refugee quota scheme constitutes one proposal for institutionalising the general right to asylum. The scheme allows states to purchase and sell quotas of refugees that are initially assigned to them through a collectivised status-determination process. In this paper I focus on examining the ethical dimensions of one particular component of the tradable refugee quota scheme: the market. I consider three objections against the quota trading practices: ‘the preference objection’, ‘the dignity objection’, and ‘the exploitation objection’. The first objection suggests that the tradable quota scheme is problematic due to the fact that it fails to consider refugees’ desires regarding the final country in which asylum is provided. The second objection claims that the scheme demeans refugees and violates their dignity. The final objection claims that the scheme leads to the exploitation of weak countries. I argue that the objections fail to show that the tradable quota scheme is inherently problematic. I conclude that either the examined objections can be rejected or it is possible to address the concerns through specific institutional arrangements.     

Sympathy for the Error Theorist: Parfit and Mackie

Derek Parfit claims that “Williams and Mackie…do not use the normative concepts that I and other Non-Naturalists use.” Whatever we think of Parfit’s interpretation of Williams, his interpretation of Mackie should be rejected. For understandable historical reasons, Mackie’s texts are ambiguous. But if we apply to the interpretation of Mackie the same principle of charity Parfit employs in interpreting Williams, we find decisive reason to interpret Mackie as using the same normative concepts as Non-Naturalists.     

Category mistakes and figurative language

Category mistakes are sentences such as ‘The number two is blue’ or ‘Green ideas sleep furiously’. Such sentences are highly infelicitous and thus a prominent view claims that they are meaningless. Category mistakes are also highly prevalent in figurative language. That is to say, it is very common for sentences which are used figuratively to be such that, if taken literally, they would constitute category mistakes. (Consider for example the metaphor ‘The poem is pregnant’, the metonymy ‘The White House decided to change its policy’, or a fictional use of ‘The tree was happy’.) In this paper I argue that the view that category mistakes are meaningless is inconsistent with many central and otherwise plausible theories of figurative language. Thus if the meaninglessness view is correct, the theories in question must each be rejected, and conversely, if any of the theories in question is correct, the meaninglessness view must be wrong. The debates concerning the semantics of figurative language and concerning the semantic status of category mistakes are closely connected.     

Monadic Interaction

Leibniz has almost universally been represented as denying that created substances, including human minds and the souls of animals, can causally interact either with one another or with bodies. Yet he frequently claims that such substances are capable of interacting in the special sense of what he calls ‘ideal’ interaction. In order to reconcile these claims with their favored interpretation, proponents of the traditional reading often suppose that ideal action is not in fact a genuine form of causation but instead a merely apparent influence which serves to ‘save the appearances.’ I argue that this traditional reading distorts Leibniz's thought and that he actually considers ideal action a genuine (though non-standard) form of causation.     

A Perennial Illusion? Wittgenstein,Quentin Skinner's Contextualism and the Possibility of Refuting Past Philosophers

Contemporary philosophers often purport to ‘borrow’ or ‘refute’ claims made by past philosophers. In doing so they contravene a contextualist methodological prohibition once defended by Quentin Skinner in his seminal paper “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”. Skinner's methodology has been much debated by theorists of textual meaning and interpretation, and yet the precise nature of the logical path from his premises to his prohibitory conclusion remains elusive. This paper seeks to refute two of the most promising variants of an argument for his methodological prohibition on ‘refutation’, one of which draws on his appeal to Wittgenstein's conception of ‘meaning as use’, and the other of which draws on his appeal to speech act theory.     

Artificial legal standards in mental/emotional injury litigation

The courts historically have viewed mental and emotional injuries with suspicion. In attempting to ensure the genuineness of those claims that are brought to trial, most courts require that plaintiffs meet standards that go beyond those that are imposed for claims of physical injury, even though the value and validity of these additional standards have not been empirically assessed. Although the development of legal standards in the absence of empirical data is troubling, of particular concern is the fact that some of the imposed standards are artificial in that they refer to factors not directly related to the injury claimed. This study explores the impact of these standards on the litigation of claims for emotional injuries. The paper discusses the effects that artificial standards had upon claims pursued at the trial court level. According to these data, artificial standards are not warranted.     

Death and Immortality

The thought that consciousness fades into oblivion with death is, to many, inconceivable. The hope and desire for immortality is based not only on a fear of death and an inner desire for fulfilment, but on the revelation of God and the human response to it. Much of religion testifies to experiences of God as loving and personal. It is upon the truth of these claims that the hope of immortality becomes reasonable. Consciousness is empirically dependent on the body, dying with it. Nevertheless, it is logically feasible that consciousness can be ‘recreated’ and ‘rehoused’ by God in a ‘spiritual body’. As long as there are mental links between the different modes of being, even though there is a definite break, it is still possible to speak of the ‘same person’. Immortality becomes dependent upon an act of God, rather than being an innate property of humankind. Paradoxically, while death robs life of ultimate meaning, it also imparts meaning.     

Malebranche and the General Will of God

Central to Nicolas Malebranche’s theodicy is the distinction between general volitions and particular volitions. One of the fundamental claims of his theodicy is that although God created a world with suffering and evil, God does not will these things by particular volitions, but only by general volitions. Commentators disagree about how to interpret Malebranche’s distinction. According to the ‘general content’ interpretation, the difference between general volitions and particular volitions is a difference in content. General volitions have general laws as their content and particular volitions have particular contents. The ‘particular content’ interpretation holds that all of God’s volitions have particular contents. The difference between general and particular volitions is whether the content of the volition is in accordance with the laws that God has established. A proper interpretation of this distinction is essential to understanding Malebranche’s theodicy, as well as his account of occasionalism and God’s causal activity in the world. In this paper, I defend the ‘particular content’ interpretation of the distinction.     

BOOK REVIEWS

The storming of the Golden Temple complex in 1984 is central to the imagination of both a Sikh ‘nation’ and a specifically Sikh ‘diaspora’. Both ‘derivative discourses’ construct Sikhs as ‘victims’ of a ghallughara which forced them into a physical or emotional exile from India. Translated as ‘genocide’, the term ghallughara resonates deeply with earlier pogroms in Sikh history, and is memorialized through the image of the desecrated Akal Takht. Mediated through Information and Communications Technologies, this on-line lieux de mémoire provides testimony to the attempt by the ‘secular’ Indian state to violently wrench the temporal from the spiritual dimensions of Sikh sovereignty as embodied in the Khalsa, thus leaving Sikhs ‘mute and absolutely alone’ in a world of nation-states. In contrast to the nationalist imaginary, it is suggested that Sikh claims to sovereignty should be grounded not in territorial claims to an imagined homeland of Khalistan, but in a reconceptualization of the Khalsa as a distinct de-territorialized religio-political community, one better able to articulate the universal values of the Gurus in an increasingly ‘post-western’ world.     

LAWS AND ESSENCES

Those who favour an ontology based on dispositions are thereby able to provide a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature. In part 1 of this paper I sketch the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and the concomitant account of laws. In part 2, I characterise various claims about the modal character of properties that fall under the heading ‘quidditism’ and which are consequences of the categoricalist view of properties, which is the alternative to the dispositional essentialist view. I argue that quidditism should be rejected. In part 3, I address a criticism of a strong dispositional essentialist view, viz. that ‘structural’ (i.e. geometrical, numerical, spatial and temporal) properties must be regarded as categorical.     

Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists.