The Integration of ‘Bottom‐up’ Approaches to the Analysis of Race Talk for the Future of Discourse Analytic Research

Current understandings of racism and race talk within discourse analytic traditions have largely focused on the discursive construction and perpetuation of dominance, prejudice, and racism within majority and privileged groups. Although minorities are often the objects of these studies, these research traditions have not extensively studied the language of race talk in minority groups. This article aims to integrate ‘bottom‐up’ approaches of minority and marginalized groups' discourses to discursive psychological and critical discourse analysis theory and research on race talk. The paper begins with a short review of the current discourse analytic frameworks utilized in the analysis of race talk. Next, the paper outlines several ‘bottom‐up’ research examples and concludes by offering several important insights. It is argued that the absence of minority discourses runs the danger of reproducing and reinforcing the very things discourse analysis aims to uncover and problematize. The main conclusion of this paper is that the insights from the ‘bottom‐up’ point to the necessity of broader theorizing around the discursive construction of race talk.     

‘Pre‐discursive’ racism

This paper makes the case that discourse analytic approaches in social psychology are not adequate to the task of apprehending racism in its bodily, affective and pre‐symbolic dimensions. We are hence faced with a dilemma: if discursive psychology is inadequate when it comes to theorizing ‘pre‐discursive’ forms of racism, then any attempts to develop an anti‐racist strategy from such a basis will presumably exhibit the same limitations. Suggesting a rapprochement of discursive and psychoanalytic modes of analysis, I argue that Kristeva's theory of abjection provides a means of understanding racism as both historically/socially constructed and as existing at powerfully embodied, visceral and subliminal dimensions of subjectivity. Kristeva's theory of abjection provides us with an account of a ‘pre‐discursive’ (that is, a bodily, affective, pre‐symbolic) racism, a form of racism that ‘comes before words’, and that is routed through the logics of the body and its anxieties of distinction, separation and survival. This theory enables us, moreover, to join together the expulsive reactions of a racism of the body to both the personal racism of the ego and the broader discursive racisms of the prevailing social order. Moreover, it directs our attention to the fact that discourses of racism are always locked into a relationship with ‘pre‐discursive’ processes which condition and augment every discursive action, which escape the codifications of discourse and which drive the urgency of its attempts at containment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Harry Silverstein’s Four‐Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death

Abstract

Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein’s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ‘p’ is true and p in §136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the so-called ‘private language argument’, wherein Wittgenstein provides an expressivist treatment of first-person present tense sensation utterances. In this paper, by contrast, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is best understood as endorsing neither a non-factualism about sensation utterances, nor a deflationism about truth. Wittgenstein should instead be understood as offering a ‘mixed’ view of sensation utterances according to which some while not others are apt for expressivist treatment. Moreover, he should be thought of as identifying truth-conditions with semantic ‘correctness-conditions’, and thus truth with semantic ‘assertibility’.     

Concessive and semifactual interpretations during reasoning with multiple conditionals

The present research evaluates how people integrate factual ‘if then’ and semifactual ‘even if’ conditional premises in an inference task. The theory of mental models establishes that semifactual statements are represented by two mental models with different epistemic status: ‘A & B’ is conjectured and ‘not-A & B’ is presupposed. However, following the principle of cognitive economy in tasks with a high working memory load such as reasoning with multiple conditionals, people could simplify the deduction process in two ways, by discarding: (a) the presupposed case and/or (b) the epistemic status information. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we evaluated each of these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants make inferences from two conditionals: two factual conditionals or one factual and one semifactual, with different representations. In Experiment 2, participants make inferences with a factual conditional followed by two different semifactual conditionals that share the same representations but differ in their epistemic status. Accuracy and latency data suggest that people think of both the conjectured and the presupposed situations, but do not codify the epistemic status of either when the task does not require it. The results are discussed through theoretical predictions about how people make inferences from different connected conditionals.     

Social representations in the ordinary explanation of a ‘riot’

This paper critically examines the notion of social representations by way of a systematic analysis of media and participants' accounts of the St Pauls street disturbances of 1980. The analysis concentrates on two major explanatory categories which appear in the accounts: (A) ‘race’; (B) ‘government cuts and amenities’. In each case it is possible to distinguish three different levels of consensus between accounts: (i) particular explanatory schemata can be recognized as available but treated as mistaken; (ii) particular explanatory schemata can be recognized as relevant and adopted to explain the particular events, although in different ways; (iii) particular schemata can be adopted and used to explain events in the same way. The flexible meaning of these categories is highlighted along with the recurrent reference to alternative explanations. These findings raise problems for the suggestion that social representations minimize conflict and create ‘consensual universes’, and question the straightforward relationship between social representations and identifiable social groups. In conclusion the need is identified for a more detailed analysis of the language in which social representations are couched, and the relationship they bear to different contexts of use.     

The Argumentative Reconstruction of Multimodal Discourse, Taking the ABC Coverage of President Hu Jintao’s Visit to the USA as an Example

This paper addresses the question how to analyze multimodal public discourse in such a way that the resulting reconstruction of the rhetor’s accountability either obliges the rhetor to acknowledge the argumentative reconstruction as valid or to refute its validity in a meta-discussion. This is a challenge for discourse theory as well as for argument theory because multimodal discourse seems far removed from the ‘standard’ propositional format of an argument. We argue that multimodal discourse should be analyzed as a coherent and relevant discourse, assuming the possibility of instant interactions between all modes. We introduce a method that allows us to account for an argumentative reconstruction in a systematic way. We illustrate our method by analyzing the ABC news item titled Hu Jintao Visit: Economics and Panda Bears of January 20, 2011, holding ABC news as a rhetor accountable for several far reaching standpoints that are implied in the multimodal format.     

Teachers as informants: countering extremism and promoting violence

ABSTRACT

This article is a response to Muslim students reporting that they had been silenced by fear of the PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy. By adopting a Critical Realist stance, real generative mechanisms of this actual phenomenon are investigated and theorised. Recognition of changing definitions of both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ in different versions of PREVENT results in the discursive aspect of these real generative mechanisms being investigated using critical discourse analysis (CDA). This analysis identifies the emergence of a violent discourse of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ (RadEx) that it is theorised has the capacity to promote rather than prevent violence. Finally, a process by which this production of violence in the classroom might have been avoided is explored and this indicates that critique of government efforts to counter ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ is a vital aspect of pedagogy in the context of PREVENT and the War on Terror.     

The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended

In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this reading raises fundamental issues about different notions of propositional content. I disagree with Ludwig's diagnosis with respect to the third reading. Contrary to Ludwig's claim, there is no modal error involved if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the third way. Ludwig's objection to the argument according to its third reading can be answered by pointing out that every individual has its identity conditions necessarily. ¹ At this point fundamental and general metaphysical issues (concerning the link between identity conditions and the nature of ontological categories and between transworld and transtemporal identity) prove relevant. Finally, I make more explicit how ‘factual difference’ should be understood in the context of the argument (this is a fourth reading not considered by Ludwig) and explain how this reading strengthens the argument (compared to the third reading) by weakening its central premise. I conclude that Ludwig's attempt at undermining the argument from transtemporal identity for subject body dualism is unsuccessful.     

The Pattern and Process of Language in Use: A Test Case

This paper is concerned with the kind of non-linear causation that lies behind the production and comprehension of speech in discourse, where multiple ‘input’ data typically act in concert towards a determinate output. To this end Whitehead's philosophy of Process - in particular his theory of ‘prehensions’ — is applied to the analysis of pragmatic implication and inference in a short literary excerpt, which involves the most complex kind of prehension, the `intuitive judgment'. This leads to a number of conclusions concerning the way in which patterns of linguistic behaviour can be evoked out of mere potentiality by contextually embedded prehensions that constrain and modulate the expression of intended discourse acts. Some of these constraints are attributable to the nature of focal consciousness itself. An extension of the Whiteheadian notion of ‘subjective aim’ (usually understood to preside over a single ‘actual occasion’) will be necessitated, since in discourse this can clearly both be suspended and divided into subordinate sub-aims while the overall aim, still unfulfilled, is inherited from occasion to occasion.     

Imagination, language, and the perceptual world: a post-analytic phenomenology

This paper seeks to integrate analytic philosophy and phenomenology. It does so through an approach generated, specifically, in relation to imagination and its cognitive significance. As an Introduction, some reservations about existing phenomenological approaches to imagination—in the work of Sartre and Edward S. Casey—are considered. It is argued that their introspective psychological approach needs to be qualified through a more analytic orientation that determines essence, initially, on the basis of public discourse concerning the term ‘imagination.’ Part One then articulates this orientation through an ‘analytic reduction’ that identifies imagination’s essence in public discourse as thought in its quasi-sensory mode. Part Two offers a sustained phenomenological investigation of this essence, and identifies four major intrinsic features. On the basis of this, Part Three shows how imagination is implicated, centrally, in the capacity to acquire language. In Conclusion the proceeding arguments are defended against possible objections, and a final key summarizing argument is formulated to show that imagination must be regarded, also, as necessary to perception and its capacity to articulate a world. The paper ends with a few thoughts on the further potential of post-analytic phenomenology.     

Attribution in sport psychology: seeking congruence between theory,research and practice

ObjectivesThis paper urges revision of the way attributions are conceptualised, investigated, and applied in sport psychology. There has been a recent decline in attribution research in sport psychology, despite the generally accepted relevance of attributions in applied settings. In seeking closer links between attribution theory, research, and practice, we argue that there is a mismatch between research and practice in sport psychology.MethodsRelevant literature is reviewed and theoretical arguments offered within seven sub-headings: attribution theory in practice; linking consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information to attribution dimensions; controllability as the primary attribution dimension; the generalisability of controllability; assessing attributions; implications for practice; and the social context.Results and conclusionsResearch within sport psychology should focus on the central issue of how controllability attributions generalise across time, situations, and people. Measurement should reflect this approach to research within the field of attributions and, to this end, researchers might consider using a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry. Practitioners should use consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information to challenge clients' attributional thinking and help them attain adaptive perceptions of controllability. Practitioners should also help clients to be their own psychologist. Future research and practice should include a consideration of the social context in which attributions are shaped.     

The landscapes of minus. Hatred,adolescence and the paradoxes of growth

This paper explores Bion’s theory of links, L, H, K (Love, Hate and Knowledge) and their minus counterparts, -L, -H, -K, which are not conceivable as simply opposite to or as a lack of L, H, K. Rather, they correspond to a way of experiencing Love, Hatred and Knowledge in terms of absoluteness, and in terms of a radical impossibility of acknowledging loss, relativeness and absence. The theory of links is also examined in its evolution towards the conceptualization of three types of container/contained configurations (commensal, symbiotic and parasitic). These Bionian models are compared and referred to the way Jung articulates the coexistence of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and the paradoxical nature of mental functioning in relation to the individuation process. The images taken from the Rosarium Philosophorum, particularly the Fons Mercurialis, examined by Jung in ‘The psychology of the transference’ (1946), are explored in the paper. Theory is examined with a particular focus on the adolescent mind and its dramatic phenomenology. Two excerpts taken from the analytic work with a mid-adolescent female patient and a late-adolescent male patient are presented to describe minus-Hate as a form of absolute love, and minus-Love as a form of absolute hatred.     

Culturally sensitive therapy? Examining the practice of cross‐cultural family therapy

This article is drawn from a research project that examines cross‐cultural family therapy sessions in order to consider what constitutes culturally sensitive practice. A discourse analytic approach was adopted in the analysis of three sessions from two families where the family and the therapists originated from different ethnic backgrounds. This article is based around part of the research findings connected to one of the families, and focuses upon the ways in which ‘culture’ is talked about in therapy (the term ‘culture’ will be referred to in inverted commas in order to acknowledge its complexity as is emphasized in this article). This allows for an examination of the cultural assumptions that we hold as therapists, which are enacted in therapy with effects on all participants and upon the course of the therapy. The value of qualitative research methods in examining the cultural assumptions we bring to therapy is highlighted as one way of improving culturally sensitive therapeutic practice, especially with regard to therapist reflexivity.     

Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism

This paper argues that reliabilism can plausibly live without epistemic consequentialism, either as part of a non-consequentialist normative theory or as a non-normative account of knowledge on a par with certain accounts of the metaphysics of perception and action. It argues moreover that reliabilism should not be defended as a consequentialist theory. Its most plausible versions are not aptly dubbed ‘consequentialist’ in any sense that genuinely parallels the dominant sense in ethics. Indeed, there is no strong reason to believe reliabilism was ever seriously intended as a form of epistemic consequentialism. At the heart of its original motivation was a concern about the necessity of non-accidentality for knowledge, a concern quite at home in a non-consequentialist or non-normative setting. Reliabilism's connection to epistemic consequentialism was an accretion of the ’80s, and a feature of only one of its formulations in that decade.     

Relativism, sceptical paradox, and semantic blindness

Relativism about knowledge attributions is the view that a single occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ may be true as assessed in one context and false as assessed in another context. It has been argued that relativism is equipped to accommodate all the data from speakers’ use of ‘know’ without recourse to an error theory. This is supposed to be relativism’s main advantage over contextualist and invariantist views. This paper argues that relativism does require the attribution of semantic blindness to speakers, viz. to account for sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles. To that end, the notion of semantic blindness is clarified by distinguishing between content-blindness and index-blindness, and it is argued that the attribution of index-blindness required by the relativist account is implausible. Along the way, it is shown that error-theoretic objections from speakers’ inter-contextual judgments fail against relativism.